Mapping digital communication systems: infrastructures,markets,and policies as regulatory forces

Abstract

This article presents a framework for mapping digital communication systems and thereby analyzing how and why structural conditions differ across national contexts. Following the ‘turn to infrastructure’ in Internet studies, we conceptualize communication systems as made of infrastructural, market, and policy structures that enable and constrain mediated communication in a given society. As opposed to media system analyses that typically focus on legacy media institutions, we take individual Internet users as our theoretical point of departure and ask how their communicative capabilities are regulated. In order to exemplify the application of the framework, we describe the methodological steps in a mapping of the components of the Danish communication system. In conclusion, we discuss the overall findings that the method uncovers and its implications for future comparative research.

Keywords

communication system infrastructure media ecology media systems political economy regulation

On New Year’s eve 2016, a massive TV signal blackout sent shock waves through the Danish population as they were waiting for the broadcast of the Queen’s annual New Year’s speech. Unsurprisingly, the fact that nearly 25% of the Danish population suddenly found themselves gathered around darkened screens caused a national uproar against the biggest Danish infrastructure provider, TDC, and its network operator YouSee. Those with the capabilities to do so left their TVs and turned instead to their broadband connections in order to access the speech via the national public service broadcaster DR’s streaming service. The DR app, in turn, experienced the highest amount of traffic ever measured and suffered an overload.

The New Year’s blackout illustrates how more or less mundane communicative activities are enabled and constrained by devices, access networks, and backbone networks that influence the use of different types of platforms, and ultimately the access to communication content. It also shows how the Internet as a common communication infrastructure increasingly substitutes previous distribution systems by serving the same communication purposes – be it through Chromecasts and Smart TVs instead of satellites and cable TVs or by Snapchat and iMessage instead of the SMS.

The mundane choices between streaming and flow TV or between Internet-distributed messages and traditional text messages seem inconsequential and minor to the individual, yet the structural implications of these actions are significant. While communication activities involving legacy media depend mainly on national infrastructures, market actors, and policies, digital communication involves global infrastructures and markets that call upon international governance. While the former are neatly distinguishable into legacy market sectors and legislative categories, the latter traverses existing sectoral and institutional categories and policy fields. Taken together, this poses a challenge to established business models, media and communication policies, and scholarly media system analyses.

Consequently, we argue in favor of a reconceptualization of what we mean by ‘system’ – from media systems to digital communication systems. This conceptualization rests on a functionalistic and materialist approach that identifies the components of a system on the basis of how they support particular activities (such as digital communication). The broader communication system concept considers monumental systematic changes, for instance, the prominence of tracking technologies leading to the rise of the data economy, and encompasses them as important components insofar as they have repercussions for individuals’ communication.

On the basis of this conceptualization, the article presents a methodological framework for mapping digital communication systems which enables further analyses of the structural forces that regulate Internet-based communication. The framework maps the components of a digital communication system by identifying four communication levels (devices and access networks, backbone networks, platforms, and types of content) that are mapped across three structuring dimensions (infrastructure, market, and policy). Applications of the framework ground descriptions and discussions of digital communication systems and qualify comparative analysis of regulation. In other words, what do we mean when we talk about communication systems and how might we compare the system components? In turn, it provides a much-needed base for understanding communicative patterns in different societal settings and contextualizing, for instance, ethnographic comparisons across contexts (Miller et al., 2016) as well as quantitative country indexes (The Economist, 2019).

Communication system analysis and the infrastructural turn

The article builds on and extends research in three different domains: (a) media systems analysis usually comparing institutional models and interplays between media and politics across national contexts, (b) media ecology with a specific emphasis on how material communication infrastructures condition social environments, and (c) political economy studying the distribution of goods and commercial as well as political power structures in society.

Analyses of media systems rest on the premise that the institutional organization and use of communication media vary across national settings due to different structural and historical conditions. Systemic analyses of media in different contexts then aim at identifying the structural forces that frame specific media organizations (on a micro level), sectors (on a meso level), and entire media systems (on a macro level) (McQuail, 1992). The most common type of media system analysis relies on the framework developed by Hallin and Mancini (2004) and studies differences between news media systems and the conditions for practicing journalism in different parts of the world (Brüggemann et al., 2014; Psychogiopoulou, 2014; Terzis, 2008). However, as argued by Norris (2009) – and acknowledged by Hallin and Mancini (2012, 2017) – the framework does not capture the complexity of digital systems and the all-encompassing influence of the Internet on practices inside and outside the sphere of legacy media institutions:

if the larger theoretical point concerns national variations in access to different types of mass communications, then the 800-pound gorilla in the room, concerns the role of new information and telecommunication technologies, which are not featured anywhere as part of the classification. (Norris, 2009: 332)

Also, as the framework was developed with the press in mind, it does not suffice in a digital reality wherein everyone is potentially a journalist and each their own small news outlet (Hardy, 2012). It fails to account for the tremendous influence that market actors such as Alphabet (Google) and Facebook have (also on news media) and falls short of defining what is and what is not covered by the classification today. This underlines the need for a more comprehensive framework that includes communication types outside the sphere of news as the boundaries set up by the initial one is, to say the least, blurry.

Hence, we suggest a macro perspective, which defines digital communication systems as ecologies that enable and constrain digital communication. Applying a media ecology perspective implies uncovering the ‘often implicit and informal’ infrastructural conditions that ‘specify what we can do and what we cannot’ (Postman, 1970, in Scolari, 2012: 205). Rather than limiting the research scope to certain types of content (e.g. ‘journalism’), communication forms (e.g. ‘political communication’), or institutional categorizations (e.g. ‘news media’), we map the various types of technologies that enable digital communication. In line with governance research emphasizing ‘the currently neglected role of technology in media governance constellation beyond technological determinism’ (Katzenbach, 2012: 119), we see infrastructures as important regulatory forces that both condition and are conditioned by economic and political structures. This theoretical reframing of system analysis follows the current ‘turn to infrastructure’ (Musiani et al., 2016; Parks and Starosielski, 2015; Plantin and Punathambekar, 2019) Internet studies by ‘turning away from the symbolic and investigating the structural – this is the Internet not as “what people say with it” but as “how it works”’ (Sandvig, 2013).

In this perspective, infrastructures are the material basis for communication systems as they enable and constrain mediated communication and make up the underlying resources that communication markets and policies revolve around. In other words, if a population does not have access to the Internet, there is no market for web products or any need for Internet policies. This is not to say, however, that infrastructures have a determining role for the emergence of social structures, but rather that the material foundation for digital communication is an important starting point for identifying and understanding the political economy of digital communication systems. The digital market actors should thus be identified and understood in the light of the basic communication resources that they control the access to – but the development, organization, and distribution of these resources should also be seen in the light of existing and emerging power structures. We thus follow Mansell’s (2004) call for a revitalization of the political economy perspective in digital media studies. This approach to market analysis is broader than case studies of ownership, market dominance, or monopolization and refers to how power structures are institutionalized and naturalized (Chang, 2001, Hardy, 2014). Put differently, when we map the actors that own and administer basic digital infrastructures, our ultimate goal is to be able to discuss how power and control of Internet-based communication are institutionalized.

Taken together, our theoretical approach to communication system analysis follows Lessig’s (2006) call for ‘[. . .] a more general understanding of how regulation works – one that focuses on more than the single influence of any one force [. . .]’ (p. 121). When we talk about ‘regulation’, we refer to the structuring forces that frame common communication conditions in a specific societal context and contribute to the shaping of individuals’ communicative capabilities.

Conceptualizing digital communication systems – the individual perspective

The communication system concept calls for a change of perspective that acknowledges the limitations of studying specific institutions, market sectors, and policy programs (Bar and Sandvig, 2008; Braman, 2004). We argue that digital communication systems should therefore be approached from the analytical perspective of individuals, as the application of the individual perspective entails cutting across historically defined sectors and policy schemes and instead identifying the infrastructures, economic conditions, and policies that frame digital communication.

This does not mean (necessarily) studying actual individuals but rather mapping the common structural conditions for Internet-based communication from the perspective of individuals in a specific national context. This, in turn, can serve as a backdrop for understanding how and why communication patterns differ between specific groups or individuals, as they are influenced by various personal attributes (media literacy, resources, creativity, desires, etc.) and cultural norms and traditions. In line with Sen’s (1985) capability approach, we acknowledge human diversity and the fact that people act differently within the same context but at the same time underline that external and environmental conditions create a common ground.

Four levels of digital communication

Mapping the conditions that frame digital communication capabilities in a society, we simply start out by asking, What possibilities do I have when I pick up my smartphone (or any other digital communication device) and what are the structural consequences of my actions? We understand digital communication as dependent on a chain of events with infrastructural, economic, and political implications. That is, when communicating digitally, an individual activates:

An Internet-enabled device and an access network that give the end user access to the global Internet and thereby to:

The backbone network that connects local access networks and thereby enables the use of:

Platforms for digital communication purposes that carry and aggregate:

Digital communication content of any kind from individuals’ interpersonal communication to private or public broadcasting and beyond.

Similar to other layering models – for example, Bratton’s (2016) stack model – the four levels of digital communication are listed hierarchically as the existence of devices as well as access networks is a fundamental condition enabling (or constraining) the following dimensions; for example, if my optical fiber connection is lost, my subscription to broadband is useless and so is my access to platforms such as Netflix and thereby to whatever content is there, that is, unless I can connect to an alternative infrastructure such as mobile broadband, accessed through my phone subscription, and so on.

The four levels are used for mapping the infrastructural, market, and policy structures that make up a digital communication system. As such, the analytical strategy is to start from the device and access network level and from the infrastructural dimension, which, taken together, translates into the upper left corner in Table 1.

Table 1.

Framework for communication system analysis.

	Infrastructure	Market	Policy
Device and access network	What are the existing devices and access networks for digital communication?	Who owns and controls devices and access networks?	What policies regulate devices and access networks?
Backbone network	What are the existing backbone networks for digital communication?	Who owns and controls backbone networks?	What policies regulate backbone networks?
Platforms	What are the existing platforms for digital communication?	Who owns and controls digital communication platforms?	What policies regulate communication platforms?
Content	What are the existing types of digital communication content	Who owns and controls digital communication content?	What policies regulate communication content?

Table 1 serves as a guiding framework for identifying the interdependencies between devices and access networks, backbone networks, platforms, and content on the one hand and infrastructures, market, and policy structures on the other. We argue that answering each question in the matrix based on the analysis of a particular research context leads to a mapping of the communication system.

Empirical material and analytical strategies

In order to exemplify the application of framework, we map the Danish communication system. Denmark then serves as a case for exploring the structural components of a concrete digital communication system and for identifying relevant variables that could – and should – be studied across different contexts. We focus on Denmark for a number of reasons: first, Denmark can be described as an ‘extreme case’ (Yin, 2009), since all types of communication infrastructures are highly developed and digital communication services are extensively used, making Denmark a clear example of a digitalized communication system. Second, Denmark (as well as other Northern European countries) is interesting as the emergence of digital markets, global governance, and so on challenges the traditional welfare state policies. Third, being native Danes, we are familiar with the research context, which – especially in small language states – is crucial to the mapping process.

Applying the framework requires a broad collection of information from different fields. In the case study below, we consulted text books and journal articles, investigated databases, and conducted source-critical analysis of official reports and evaluations, legislative acts and court rulings, and news articles.

The following sections describe how we map, first, the infrastructural implications of digital communication (Table 2); second, the market actors that control (and profit from) these infrastructures (Table 3); and finally, the various policies that regulate digital communication (Table 4).

Table 2.

The Danish communication system 2019 from an infrastructural perspective.

	Infrastructure
Device and access network	Any internet-enabled device & DSL broadband (cobber wire), cable TV broadband (coaxial cable), fiber broadband (optical fiber), mobile broadband 3G, 4G (electromagnetic radio frequencies)
Backbone network	Fiber cables, routers, IXPs, CDNs, servers, data centers etc.
Platforms	Operating systems, apps, websites
Content	Sound, text, image, video, data

Table 3.

The Danish communication system 2019 from a market perspective – most prominent actors.

	Market
Device and access network	Apple, Huawei, Samsung, Lenovo, Asus, Dell & TDC, Telia, Telenor, Waoo, Hiper, SE
Backbone network	GlobalConnect, i2, TDC, Telia, Telenor, Alphabet (Google), Facebook, Akamai, AT&T, Verizon, Amazon, CenturyLink, etc.
Platforms	Apple, Google, Microsoft, Facebook, GoDaddy, DR, Netflix, JP/Politikens Hus, public authorities, etc.
Content	Miscellaneous (users), Google, Facebook, Nordisk Film & TV, Blu, Netflix, JP/Politikens Hus, Ritzau, public authorities, etc.

Table 4.

The Danish communication system 2019 from a policy perspective.

	Policy
Device and access network	Consumer policy, taxation policy and spectrum policy, utilization of masts policy, cable laying access and expropriation policy, telecommunications policy, competition policy, broadband strategy, funding for broadband buildout, Internet security policy
Backbone network	Cable laying access and expropriation policy, telecommunications policy (net neutrality), competition policy, Internet security policy
Platforms	Broadcasting policy, domain policy, news media liability and subsidy policy, e-commerce policy, consumer policy, privacy policy
Content	Public service content policy, audiovisual policy, consumer policy, competition policy, marketing policy, data protection policy, news media liability and subsidy policy, copyright, freedom of speech

The Danish case

Mapping infrastructures

Table 2 illustrates the key elements in a digital communication system as exemplified in the mapping of the Danish communication infrastructures. The mapping is based on scholarly research on Internet technology – especially network components and layers – and market reports, statistics, white papers, and so on describing the prominence of different material infrastructures.

Mapping the Danish case, all types of existing Internet-enabled devices (from stationary computers to smartwatches and beyond) are present – most prominently PCs (91% of the population) and smartphones (88%) (Tassy, 2018). We identify four types of access networks that enable the digital communication of individuals: DSL broadband, cable TV broadband, fiber broadband, and mobile broadband. Broadband connections are dependent on the material infrastructures insofar as one cannot, for instance, access a DSL broadband connection without having access to cobber wire or one can only access mobile broadband such as 4G if electromagnetic radio frequencies have been allocated for this. The presence (now and historically) of various types of highly developed and widespread access networks means that 97% of households connect to the Internet and 8 out of 10 use their mobile phone for Internet purposes (Tassy, 2018). In turn, people are canceling their landline phones and traditional TV subscriptions, which puts increasing pressure on the demand for broadband. The high degree of access to different infrastructures in Denmark should be seen in the light of the country’s geographic characteristics: By all comparisons, Denmark is a relatively small, flat, and densely populated country suitable for infrastructure projects. Also, historical conditions (e.g. the extensive electricity system and early telecommunications network) have eased the implementation of new communication technologies. This is further underlined by global data centers that are being built in Denmark, exploiting the country’s geographic position, stable energy supply, and well-functioning IT infrastructure.

As the existing access networks have been gradually refunctioned for Internet purposes, the underlying backbone networks are increasingly important to the Danish communication system. Not only do the central fiber cables connect the national access networks and thereby Danish individuals, they also create the link to the global Internet and thereby to an indefinite number of IP addresses and domains. The backbone network components in Denmark include, first, the fiber cable bundles and routers that connect the local, regional, and global networks; the Internet exchange points (IXPs) where network providers interconnect; servers and data centers where content is physically stored; and content delivery networks (CDNs) that create local caches to store content temporarily and close to the end user.

The components of the platform dimension – operating systems, apps, and websites – are characterized by enabling any type of mediated communication over the Internet. In Denmark, the decline in TV subscriptions goes hand in hand with a decline in the viewing of flow TV (more than 25% since 2011), and the use of video on demand (VOD) services is massively increasing (48% use a streaming service each week) (DR Media Research, 2018). Similarly, the extensive use of smartphones and mobile apps is moving telephone calls and messages to Internet-based platforms (e.g. facetime and iMessage), and multi-purpose platforms in general supplement or replace former single-purpose technologies. As communication moves to mobile platforms (smartphones, tablets, etc.), the use of apps has challenged the former position of websites and thereby the browsers used to locate the website-URLs in the communication systems.

Finally, content types, provided by different types of platforms, accessed through the backbone and access networks, and activated through the use of a digital device, are divided into text, image, sound, video, and, finally, data. Data should be understood here as the specific configuration of web applications that enable an unprecedented, constant, and instant flow of (meta)data via analytics, cookies, fingerprinting, and other tracking technologies. Due to the high Internet penetration, the generally high bandwidth, and the common use of digital services, almost all Danes have access to all types of content through the Internet, and in turn, corporations have access to unprecedented amounts of data on people’s mediated communication.

In sum, from an infrastructural perspective, Denmark serves as an example of a digital communication system in which the Internet can (and gradually does) substitute all former distribution systems. The mapping outlines a country characterized by highly developed and wide-ranging infrastructures and by general accessibility to different networks, which also reflects socio-economic conditions as well as political and economic strategies. Digitalization has thus increased the access and options to choose between various communication media. At the same time, these infrastructural changes have also had a significant impact on the market actors controlling and profiting from communications.

Mapping economic structures

Table 3 illustrates the key elements in a digital communication system as exemplified in the mapping of the Danish market actors who own and control access to different (increasingly intersecting) infrastructures. Similar to the previous infrastructural mapping, the table as a whole exemplifies how market actors can be mapped out at particular levels (e.g. the market for devices and access networks at the first level or the market for content at the fourth), as well as across levels (e.g. the way the market for infrastructure influences the platform market structures). This enables analyses of the most important power structures and competing interests at play in the Danish communication system.

We conducted the mapping through various stages of research: first, we identified the variety of actors that operate in the Danish market on the basis of mainly market reports from the Danish business and competition authorities. Following this, we uncovered the often unclear and complex (co-)ownership structures. This led us to a further analysis of the different actors’ market assets and their subsequent market positions. In contrast to the access network level, the backbone network, platform, and content actors make up a much broader and manifold sample consisting of national as well as international actors, where only the most prominent and exemplary are included in the mapping.

The key market actors are divided into two groups depending on their ownership and control of, respectively, device and the principal focus here, access networks. While the device manufacturers consist entirely of global actors, the access network providers are regional ‘giants’ characterized by having expanded their original business models through acquisitions in areas outside their original domain. For instance, TDC, the legacy telecommunications company, is placed at the center of the Danish marketplace due to its former position as the public monopoly telephone company, and thereby its ownership of the nationwide copper wire network. TDC has used its original market position to expand into mobile telephony, TV distribution, and broadband services. Another example from the Danish context is the presence of various energy suppliers that have merged into the market for optical fiber on the basis of their existing networks. The seemingly wide range of different companies that offer, for instance, mobile telephony and broadband is to a large degree owned by four licensed electromagnetic radio frequency holders: the mobile operators 3, Telenor, Telia, and TDC. The Danish market is, then, characterized by intense competition between a few large market actors, which keeps subscription rates at a minimum and leads to a continuing pressure on the supply of faster and stronger Internet connections. However, TDC (and other national market actors) is both losing former revenues from TV distribution and telephone subscriptions and increasingly competes with, often global, infrastructure actors supplying international fiber connections, data centers, and so on (e.g. Akamai, Amazon).

The backbone network market is perhaps the most difficult to map out since infrastructures at this level are complex and opaque and often co-owned by multiple international actors with different levels of control over assets and inherent dependencies (this makes it an obvious, although neglected, field for further research). The most powerful actors at this level are global tier 1 networks such as CenturyLink, Verizon, and AT&T that mainly handle data traffic through extensive global fiber networks. Lower level backbone networks (tier 2 and down) rely on and pay transit fees to the tier 1 companies. These include the national and regional actors TDC, GlobalConnect, i2, Telia (Sweden), and Telenor (Norway) that control national fiber cables, routers, and switches, and for GlobalConnect and i2 also own the existing Danish IXPs. Akamai and Amazon also figure in the mapping of the backbone market, as they provide data storage in the form of cloud hosting and CDNs, and finally, Alphabet and Facebook own data centers and servers, but also co-own central sub-sea cables such as the Havfrue (Mermaid) cable as well as hosting services.

At the platform level, we identify a diverse sample of different prominent market actors that can be divided into two groups depending on either their legacy positions in the communication system or their status as international, and mainly Internet-based, businesses. The most powerful actors include Apple, Alphabet, and Microsoft that operate proprietary operative systems, browsers, and apps for telephone calls, text-messaging, navigation, and so on, that are preinstalled in Android phones (Alphabet), iPhones (Apple), and PCs (Windows). Although national websites and apps continue to rank high in web statistics (e.g. e-Boks – the public digital mailbox, MobilePay – the key mobile payment service, and DR – the national public service broadcaster), international players dominate the top lists (e.g. Facebook (also Messenger), Instagram (Facebook), Google (Alphabet), YouTube (Alphabet), and Snapchat). In general, the Internet has fundamentally altered the national market conditions as, for example, Netflix and YouTube both reach larger proportions of the population each week than any of the national VOD players (DR Media Research, 2018). Social media platforms challenge the business models of traditional news media institutions (funded by subscription fees and advertising), but are simultaneously crucial distribution platforms – Facebook, for example, reaches 65% of Danish adults on a daily basis (DR Media Research, 2018). Dominated by a few large actors (Alphabet and Facebook), personal data increasingly replace former sources of income, placing the data traders at the center of the Danish 2019 communication system (Helles et al., in press). Finally, Internet domain registrars such as DK Hostmaster and GoDaddy act as necessary gatekeepers for the establishment of Internet-based services.

In accordance with our theoretical point of departure, the definition of content producers extends from individuals engaged in private, semi-public, or public communication to professional content producers. For search engines, social media applications, and general online tracking enterprises, the list of producers is a varied and, in principle, endless assemblage of actors – we label these ‘miscellaneous’. In order to find examples of the key producers in Denmark, we looked at each of the actors in the platform level of the market mapping and asked, Who produces content for this particular platform (e.g. DR), and who profits from it (e.g. Nordisk Film)? In other words, the strategy is to look for ‘the money arrow’ (DeFleur, 1971) in the content production system. Examples of professional content producers in the mapping include public and commercial national actors as well as international actors that to a large extent reflect the power structures at the platform level. In general, producers that used to have exclusive access to national audiences (e.g. publishers and TV producers) by now compete with and depend on global market actors such as Alphabet and Facebook, who take over large amounts of the former revenues through data-based business models (The Danish Agency for Culture and Palaces (DACP), 2017).

In sum, by mapping the dominant marked actors onto the infrastructure mapping, we gain knowledge on the existing actors’ assets, business models, competition relations, and interdependencies. The mapping shows, on the one hand, how the fast and wide-ranging digitalization of all parts of the Danish communication system has been led by national legacy actors: Former monopoly players such as TDC and DR built their market positions on historically determined distributions of assets (e.g. frequency allocation, ownership of telecommunications infrastructures) and have used these as stepping stones for positioning themselves in the digital landscape. However, digitalization has, on the other hand, led to a massive globalization of the Danish communication market and an erosion of traditional business models and value chains.

Mapping policy structures

Table 4 illustrates the key elements in a digital communication system as exemplified in the mapping of the Danish communication policies. We identify the overall structures of policy regulation and the categorizations that continue to determine how digital communication media are regulated.

Based on the previous mappings of infrastructural and economic structures – as well as a review of the existing research on media and communications policy – we collected the bulk of policy documents (e.g. acts, regulatory contracts, political agreements) that regulate the digital communication system in Denmark. After a qualitative content analysis, the entire collection was divided into four piles representing each of the four analytical levels – device and access networks, and so on – and later into ministerial departments and policy areas – respectively frequency and wired infrastructure policies. We then identified ideological values and regulatory strategies and analyzed how these influence and are influenced by the infrastructure and market structures.

Mapping the policies for devices and access networks, it is important to notice how Danish political regulation hinges onto European Union (EU) legislation (e.g. the EU telecommunications directive, The Digital Single Market) as well as international Internet governance (International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), etc.). The mapping explicates differences between the regulation of the four types of material infrastructure identified in the access network level of the infrastructure mapping: ‘Wired infrastructure policy’ – regulating copper wire, coaxial cable, and optical fiber – promotes a market-based development of communication infrastructures since wired infrastructures are (in principle) an abundant resource. However, the Danish government grants funding to co-operative projects aimed at improving access to high-speed Internet through the so-called Broadband Pool as part of a general digitalization strategy. ‘Frequency policy’ – regulating airborne infrastructures – implies a higher degree of political involvement as electromagnetic frequencies are a limited resource and the market demand for frequencies is larger than the available spectrum. The Danish state and international committees (e.g. ICANN) therefore play a more direct part in regulating the allocation and use of radio frequencies. Cultural policies have historically been dominant in this policy field, reserving a large part of the spectrum for public service broadcasting. The growing use of spectrum for mobile telephony and broadband has led to an increased market orientation, and since the 1990s various commercial mobile operators have been assigned licenses for radio frequencies on increasingly commercial terms. ‘Telecommunications policy’ revolves around ensuring universal access and is influenced by the liberalization of the telecommunications sector in the 1990s and oblige the incumbent operator (TDC) to give competing operators access to its infrastructures and thereby create conditions for free competition. As a result, cross-country access is secured and subscription fees are kept at a minimum compared to, for instance, in the United States. The telecommunications act also determines the rules for net neutrality (as required by EU telecommunications regulation), regulated through an independent forum of professional stakeholders and consumer representatives. Both ‘telecommunications policy’ and its historical opposite, ‘broadcasting policy’, balance, on the one hand, socio-cultural values based on universalistic welfare principles and, on the other hand, commercial interests encouraging competition and economic growth. Radio and TV, however, continue to be primarily regulated in the realm of cultural policy, while telecommunications is regulated as a matter of communication carriage.

Similar to the access network level, backbone networks are subject to telecommunications policy (net neutrality), competition policy, and so on. However, although, for instance, Danish competition laws aim at ensuring that no actor becomes large enough to dominate any market, the enforcement of competition policy is limited since the actual backbone market has not yet been adequately identified. Moreover, the US Federal Communications Commission does not monitor US backbone competition. In result, the global (and often American) backbone companies (e.g. Akamai, Facebook) operating on Danish ground are not subject to competition regulation.

The mapping of platform policies shows that the Danish state, policy-makers, and authorities have been actively involved in the digitalization of the communication system through the development of a range of public websites and apps. Early digitalization strategies were built on a demand-driven logic assuming that the population would acquire Internet access (and skills) if the digital products were available and if they were encouraged to use them. However, Danish media and communication policies are challenged by the multifarious nature of web-based platforms that can combine formerly separated communication forms and thus blur the basic categorizations that these legislative frameworks are built on. For example, legislators categorize some market players as ‘TV-like’ and hence subject to broadcasting policy, while others (such as YouTube) are excluded from cultural policy legislation. National legislation is in general far more successful at regulating national legacy players and newcomers than it is at targeting international, Internet-based platforms (such as Google and Facebook) that act from outside Danish jurisdiction and are built on entirely different data-based business models. Following the EU ePrivacy Directive, however, the Danish Business Authority oversees that platforms follow the ‘cookie rules’ (information and consent). Finally, whereas DK Hostmaster administering .dk domains is subject to Danish domain policy, GoDaddy (and other international actors) handling .com domains are not. Consequently, national policies do not regulate the globalized communication system that Danes actually act within, as it is still oriented toward the subsystem made up by national platform actors.

The level of content policy resonates with the platform level, as the state has paved the way for the extensive digitalization of Danish communication content but at the same time struggles to amend the legislative frameworks to effectively address digital communication. Content policy traditionally distinguishes between telecommunications developed for private one-to-one communication, subject to limited and more general regulation, and broadcasting media distributing public one-to-many communication, characterized by higher degrees of state involvement (e.g. through extensive public service schemes). Digital content policies are generally challenged by the use of social media and many-to-many communication that blur the distinctions between when a speech act is made in public or private, which leads to emergent regulation that hinges on court rulings, re-interpretations of existing legislation, and so on. An example of recent attempts at increasing the political regulation of digital content is the extensive General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) program which – at least in principle – limits the ways in which data can be collected, stored, and traded across Europe. In general, digital information flows have challenged the existing interpretation and enforcement of key policies related to freedom of expression, copyright, and so on.

In sum, applying the framework to the Danish case sheds light on the different and sometimes contradictory initiatives, strategies, and values that influence the political regulation of the digital communication system. Crucial to the Danish communication system from a policy perspective is the dichotomy between socio-cultural policies, based on universalistic welfare state values that legitimate relatively strong state regulation, and competition policies encouraging market and self-regulation. On the one hand, this duality has contributed to the development of a thriving telecommunications sector characterized by high access and low prices where market and consumer interests go hand-in-hand. On the other, the global nature of the Internet has challenged national regulation and evoked conflicts between capitalist governance structures and universalistic welfare state principles, which complicates efforts to reform existing policy schemes. Digital communication services and content forms are still in the process of being institutionalized and continue to fall between historically defined policy fields. As a result, digital communication content is subject to less political regulation than its analog predecessors, and the digitalization of the Danish communication system has all in all led to a general decline in the impact of political regulation.

Communication scenarios illustrative of the Danish digital communication system

The three example mappings of the Danish context have so far been described separately; however, the next and crucial step is to synthesize them. The four levels – devices and access networks, backbone networks, platforms, and content – recur in each of the three versions of the mapping so that the technological features of the existing access networks resonate with market structures and policies regulating access to these networks and so on. This also makes it possible to assess how the infrastructural, economic, and political regulatory forces interact and condition each other. Hence, on the basis of the description of the components of the Danish 2019 communication system, we now exemplify how the mapping method enables further analyses of the power structures and control mechanisms that frame communication capabilities within a specific societal context. Figure 1 establishes three communication scenarios where each chain of events has different regulatory implications.

Figure 1.

Illustrates three different communication scenarios. Each of the three subfigures show infrastructural, market and policy implications of specific communication activities across the four analytical levels (device and access network, backbone network, platforms and content).

In Figure 1(a), an individual logs into her Acer laptop to get a news update from the Danish newspaper Politiken’s website. Her PC connects to the Internet through a DSL broadband connection running on the Danish cobber wire infrastructure. This is owned and controlled by the network operator TDC, and both the infrastructure and the market for it are politically regulated by, for instance, Danish cable laying access and expropriation policy and telecommunications policy. In order to access the website and its content, the DSL broadband connects to a national backbone network and the servers hosting Politiken’s content. The network is still owned by TDC, but the servers belong to Amazon (Cloudfront). Less legislation applies to this level altogether, and the national actor TDC is subject to more political regulation than its international colleague. This enables the connection to a browser, owned by Microsoft (Internet explorer), and a website owned by JP/Politikens Hus – the latter being politically regulated under national domain policy, the European e-commerce rules, consumer policy, and so on. Finally, the individual receives news in the form of both textual and audiovisual content and simultaneously cookies on the site harvest data on the individual. As politiken.dk is a national website and politically categorized as ‘news media’, it is subject to various forms of content regulation (e.g. the guiding rules on press ethics grounded on the media liability act, media subsidy requirements, marketing policy, copyright). The actors who profit from data tracking on the site (Alphabet, Facebook, and numerous others) are in principle subject to the European GDPR directive, but unlike in other European contexts, no ruling has so far enforced the rules of the direction on Danish ground.

In a different scenario, Figure 1(b), the individual unlocks her Huawei smartphone to check the recent US NFL scores. Her smartphone connects to the 4G network enabled by the electromagnetic radio frequencies and in this case owned by the mobile operator Telenor. Telenor’s mobile broadband is politically regulated under, for instance, spectrum policy and telecommunications policy. The 4G network connects to a fiber cable, still owned by Telenor, and from there to GlobalConnect’s IXP, which connects to the undersea Havfrue (Mermaid) cable, owned by several market actors including Alphabet and Facebook. While the local actors, Telenor and GlobalConnect, are subject to Danish telecommunications policy, competition policy, and so on, the latter part of the infrastructural chain of events – from the undersea cable stakeholders to the NFL – is not. Once the NFL website metadata are retrieved (via the Google Chrome browser), then consumer policy and the European e-commerce rules apply. The individual now accesses all five content types on the NFL site, and NFL and again various trackers profit from her visit and are, again in principle, subject to EU data protection policy.

In the third scenario, Figure 1(c), the individual picks up her iPad to watch a TV series on Netflix. Her tablet connects to her fiber broadband running on the optical fiber network. This is owned by the assembly of former energy supply companies Waoo and politically regulated by the same array of policies that applied to the access network level in the first scenario. The fiber broadband connects to Waoo’s national backbone network, regulated by telecommunications policy, and to a local CDN owned by the Netflix subsidiary OpenConnect, which in principle is regulated under Danish competition policy, although, as mentioned earlier, the rules are not enforced. This, in turn, allows her to open the Netflix application enabled by Apple iOS, both of which, again, only in principle are subject to, for example, e-commerce rules, consumer policy, and competition regulation. Finally, she accesses the desired audiovisual content and data are retrieved on her visit and preferences. Netflix profits from her visit and its interface is refined to match the newly harvested data and push personalized content. Netflix is also in principle subject to data privacy policy, and the producers, internal and external, are subject to audiovisual policies.

The scenarios exhibit that digital communication rests on not just national access networks but also international backbone networks, IXPs, CDNs, cloud servers, and so on that are increasingly vital to any type of mundane communication – be it reading the news, engaging in sports, or watching TV. Across the communicative chain of events, digital communication systems such as the Danish are critically reliant on both global infrastructures controlled by international actors and the adaption to business models that rely on the massive collection of digital data – be it the Danish operator TDC at the access network level or the news site Politiken at the platform level. Increasingly, dominant international market actors, such as Apple, Alphabet, and Netflix, take over functions and revenues from national legacy players and establish new markets that have not yet been adequately identified and thereby not subjected to political regulation. Policy reforms have focused on regulating national legacy market sectors and institutions transitioning online – such as broadcasters, news media, and telcos – rather than emergent Internet-based markets, international corporations, and digital content.

In other words, in the scenarios, we glimpse into the analytical potentials of the mapping method as it supports systemic empirical analyses of the ways in which infrastructures, economic structures, and policy structures regulate digital communication. These analytical perspectives include the following: how mediated communication is rematerialized as it increasingly rests on digital infrastructures, and how data traffic is influenced by the geo-political circumstances surrounding material infrastructures; how new markets and market actors emerge and become dominant, and how business models and market interdependencies develop; and, finally, how legislation is in the process of being reformed and adapted (more or less successfully) to address emerging, urgent political issues surrounding digital infrastructures and markets.

Conclusion

This article has identified a research gap in terms of theoretical and methodological frameworks for analyzing and understanding the interplay between infrastructures, markets, and policies in digital communication systems. By applying an infrastructural and materialist perspective to system analysis, we have developed a methodological framework for analyzing the structural forces that regulate common communication capabilities in different societal settings. The case study described above serves as a starting point for and a guide to mappings and analyses of contexts beyond the Danish. Going back to the matrix between regulatory structures and communication chains of events that make up Table 1, the three mappings (Tables 2 –4) provide answers to each of the 12 matrix questions. Apart from generating original knowledge on the Danish digital communication system, the lessons learned from this analysis also translate into three main guidelines for future comparative studies that all underline benefits of an ‘infrastructural turn’ in systemic media and communication analysis:

First, the framework draws attention to the material conditions that influence the structural characteristics of communication systems. Physical characteristics, such as country size and topography, and historical infrastructures have significant impact on Internet development as both market structures and political initiatives are fundamentally based on the resources at hand. Characteristics associated with democratic corporatist media systems (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) or media welfare states (Syvertsen et al., 2014) should thus be seen not only as reflections of institutional features and ideological traditions but also as dependent on material conditions that frame and have framed (de-)institutionalization processes. Hence, future comparative studies should seek to analyze similar as well as discrete contexts that differ in terms of geography, demography, and infrastructural development – for example, where digital infrastructures are built from scratch rather than established on the basis of existing communication networks.

Second, and following from the first guideline, we stress the importance of studying the specific infrastructures that digital communication systems are based on. In order to explain quantitative differences between countries in terms of Internet quality and use, affordability and competition structures, platform use and content supply, and so on, it is crucial to explore how Internet access is supplied. For example, even though wired and airborne infrastructures can be used for the same communication purposes, they have different technological and regulatory implications and thus give rise to different commercial power struggles and political questions. The types of communications infrastructure that provide a country with broadband are thus key to understanding the competition structures and policies and ultimately the structural conditions that frame digital communication capabilities.

Finally, rather than focusing on the activities and market strategies of particular institutions (such as Facebook or legacy players), we draw attention to the implications that digitalization has for individuals and thereby for societies as a whole. Taking individuals’ communication capabilities as a point of departure and asking how they are enabled and constrained by material conditions in turn make it possible to identify the basic communication resources that key market players control and thus to explain power structures and competition conditions. This approach also enables further discussions and explorations of the general features that make Internet-based players fundamentally different from legacy media and the ways in which they challenge the existing policy structures originating in the structural conditions of the past.

In conclusion, the framework and mapping method create a common ground for future comparative analyses of communication systems with a greater attention to digitalization than that of previous studies. In future studies, the framework will also serve as a common ground for developing indicators that can assess how infrastructures, markets, and policies regulate digital communication across the globe.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Sofie Flensburg

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