Paradoxical inclusion of India’s ex-untouchables in New Casteist media

Introduction

Contrary to the iconic notion of casteless society, refuting any claims of division based on caste-based dominance and hierarchy, the 200 million Dalits (lower castes/ex-untouchables) of India continue to be identified as outcastes, and discriminated against (Kumar, 2010, 2014; Omvedt, 2006). Although Casteism dates back to 1200–900 BC, media discourse plays an inevitable role in constructing social knowledge. It helps construct ‘common sense’ understanding, reinforce stereotypes, legitimise dominance and naturalize hierarchy and unequal power relations (Cottle, 2000; Van Dijk, 1989, 2000). Previous studies demonstrate repeated reinforcement of casteist beliefs in the media since the 1800s and argue its ongoing influence in the construction of Dalit identity (Jeffrey, 2001; Mamatha, 2012; Ratnamala, 2011, 2012, 2015; Ratnamala and Govindaraju, 2012). However, media, like society is dynamic and media representations alter with changing identities (Entman, 1992, 2007; Neyazi, 2011). While in the late 20th century, a vast majority of Dalits have resisted oppressions and claim their independent socio-political identity, there is a paucity of studies reflecting on Indian news media’s approach towards Dalit’s evolving identities and the narratives of caste-based ethnic affirmation.

This study highlights the media approach towards Dalits in a dynamic and transforming society of 21st century. As discriminatory regimes are justified through narratives, approximately 8000 news reports on Dalit discrimination from 2010 to 2014 have been analysed using content and framing analysis. The findings were conceptualised along the lines of New Casteism derived from the theory of New Racism to discuss inclusion of Dalits and discrimination in 21st century’s Indian news media.

Discrimination, social inequality and media

Discrimination and social inequality have been an object of academic investigation and political debates for over 150 years. The scholarship on discrimination states that a multitude of individual and societal factors continue to reinforce stereotypes and negative evaluative biases, which result in continued expression and experience of discrimination. In the late 20th century, media began to be viewed as an important factor in reinforcement and contribution to discrimination, and as a driver of social disparities at the individual, institutional and structural levels. According to aversive racism framework, people generally will not discriminate in situations in which right and wrong are clearly defined (Murrell, 2020). Through thoughtful constructions of media discourses, media could pronounce ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and redefine the dominant and subordinate relations by upholding egalitarian or non-egalitarian norms. Accordingly, media can alter attitudes and influence how ingroup distinguishes outgroup, or how the dominant discriminates the subordinate (Cottle, 2000).

Entman (1992, 2007, 2010), Van Dijk (1989, 2000) and others argue media representation to be biased towards the majorities (the powerful), and indifferent towards minorities. Alexander (2004) adds that even if the minority resistance (against perceived or actual victimisation by the state and wider society) was reported, it was synonymous with ‘criminality and upheaval’. In context to Indian media, scholars argue that Indian media either excelled at not reporting Dalits or portrayed them in a negative light. For example, in the early 1900s, the Indian press criticised Dalit leader Dr. BR Ambedkar’s anti-casteist ideologies and described him as Bhimasur – a devil (Keer, 1971: 231). Similarly, in the late 20th and early 21st century, scholars such as Ratnamala (2011, 2012), Mamatha (2012) and Teltumbde (2007) argue the absence of reports on casteism, discrimination or issues concerning mythical practices. These scholars bring forth a variety of reasons for the bias, which include Indian media’s Varna (colour and race based) mindset (Prasad, 2004); the continuity of caste norms, and the lack of Dalits in political positions and the newsrooms (Balasubramaniam, 2011; Jeffrey 2001). Kumar (2010, 2014), Thirumal and Leonard (2019) and Illahi (2000) add that Indian media, like other Indian institutions, takes its cues from the temple of Brahminism, humanistic ideals of the upper caste before it projects someone as an ‘acceptable person’. Overall, the previous studies call Indian media Casteist, Varna or Brahminic and blame it for reinforcing casteism by excluding and/or misrepresenting Dalits, promoting exclusionary institutions, silencing Dalits and encouraging Dalit-less newsrooms.

The impact of such representations is difficult to measure but is potentially significant where such skewed representations and distorted images promote public hostility and lower ethnic minority’s self-esteem (Van Dijk, 1989). Thankappan (2006) claims that the implication is not only empirical (expressed in the limited number of Dalit reports) but also ideological (way Dalits and their grievances are constructed) which leads to continuing cultural void that structurally silences Dalits in the public domain. Therefore, an understanding of mainstream media representation of ethnic minorities – here the Dalit is crucial to combatting racist-casteist stereotypes and promoting more positive representations that could result in better attitudes towards minorities.

Dalits in contemporary India are closely engaged in shaping Dalit identity based on their cultural heritage, to gain dignity and visibility in the mainstream exclusionary public sphere. They attribute their conspicuous absence in the mainstream public sphere to their historical exclusion from civil society and to the dominant discriminatory social structures relegating them to the periphery. The mainstream public sphere runs parallel to the Dalit counter-public sphere (Felski, 1989). These counter public spheres such as Dalit Camera (DC), Dalit media watch, Dalit voice emerged due Dalit participation on democratic participatory internet forums such as websites, Facebook and Twitter to circulate reflective discourses on identity and needs (Paul and Dowling, 2018; Thirumal, 2008). In contrast to the Brahmanic ideology reproduced in the public, Dalits articulate oppositional or alternative values in the counter-public sphere. A part of this is reporting caste-based discrimination and violence, contributing to the Dalit social movement for equality and justice (Thakur, 2020). Such ‘counter-narratives’ within the subaltern digital sphere and hybrid media systems have the capability to not just strengthen minority narratives online, but also merge into mainstream narratives/public sphere thus influencing mainstream media’s construction of minority narratives (Couldry and Dreher, 2007; Wimmer, 2005). In this critical context, tradition and modern ideologies are acquiring new meanings to the advantage of the socially excluded sections of the society. Consequently, this has led to a sort of perennial conflict between the hitherto dominant communities and Dalits who find hope of reclaiming their long-overdue share in the local/national structures of power.

However, unequal access to digital devices among Dalits due to ongoing socio-economic challenges, and capitalist market forces help those who already have a high status in the social stratum widen their audience engagement. Kujat (2016: 46) claims that most of the top trends on Twitter can be termed as ‘ad-hoc fame’ and disappear as ‘ad-hoc’ as they start and hence, unable to set the agenda. Although an in-depth discussion of the counter-public sphere is out of the scope of this study, we will provide an overview of whether such spaces influenced mainstream reporting in anyway. Overall, this article aims to locate framings of Dalit stories of discrimination in the news media. It aims to reflect on the influence of Dalit Counter-public sphere, specifically in the second decade of 21st century.

Theoretical framework

This section illustrates the theoretical framework used to investigate the media frames of Dalit discrimination. Framing theory (media theory) has been used as the primary theory to derive meanings from media frames. Following an inductive approach, New Casteism (social theory) was derived through empirical observations and applied to comprehend the power construction within the frames and rationalise Dalit identity.

Media sociologist, Entman (1992: 52) defines framing as the ‘selection of some aspects of perceived reality and making them more salient so as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described’. Framing theory is situated within the social constructivism perspective. It states that the power structure embedded in media messages affect their audiences’ behaviours by telling the audiences ‘what to think about’, shape ‘what they think’ and accordingly influencing ‘what they do’. And accordingly constructs dominant meanings and power by selecting and highlighting some features of reality while omitting others (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Iyengar (1990), Entman (1992) and others suggest framing be applied in conjunction with another theory or concept. Hence, in this article, framing theory has been used along with New-Casteism to facilitate refined interpretations of frames of Dalit experiences.

Heredia (2012: 22) suggests that present society is marked by ‘a transition from old hierarchies with persistent hegemonies to an egalitarian and celebratory pluralism’. Likewise, caste and casteism do not exist in their traditional forms in 21st century. Instead, it exists in the form of specific codes that define ones’ belonging to a group and accordingly set the parameters to define hierarchy, dominance and subordination; these are the core ideas of New Casteism. Contemporary forms of caste are a compound of rejection, denial and suppression of aspirations of the Dalits, which exists as ideologies and ‘castes of mind’ (Dirks, 2002). Although prejudice and discrimination that Dalits faced for centuries resemble the ones that are being implicated now, the new era is marked by (i) subtler stereotypes, (ii) stereotypical thinking reinforced at levels likely to remain below conscious awareness, (iii) declining number of upper caste Hindus who endorse such traditional casteist sentiments, (iv) politically active Dalits, (v) increasing literacy, (vi) economic capability among Dalits and (vi) increasing use of news and digital media leading to Dalit Counter-public sphere to voice against discrimination (Jeffrey, 2001; Kumar, 2010, 2014; Omvedt, 2006; Thirumal, 2008). Van Dijk (1991, 2000) and Entman (1992) expound similar transformations within racist communities, supported by declining racist attitudes among white people and growing consciousness among black Americans. Entman (1992) calls this transforming racism ‘New-Racism’. As racism resembles casteism (Ambedkar, 1944), following Entman (1992), we call this present decade casteism as ‘New-Casteism’. New-Racism centrally involves ‘anti-black affect’ combined with attachment to ‘traditional [American] value’ (Sears, 1988 cited in Entman, 1992: 342).Similarly, New-Casteism involves an ‘anti-caste effect’ induced by reservation policies, the abolition of untouchability, Dalit Counter-public sphere and denial of caste values based on Brahmanic ideologies. Overall, given that casteism does not exist in its primordial form but reflects the lifestyles defined by beliefs and attitudes that are remnants of the past, the present era can be called as New-Casteist era.

Method

Content analysis followed by an inductive framing approach was used as the method. Generic content analysis was conducted to identify reports on Dalit discrimination. Thereafter, framing analysis helped identify broader themes located within the media texts. These methods were conducted on news reports of Dalit discrimination from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2014, in the most read and circulated- English newspaper Times of India (hereafter TOI), and vernacular Hindi newspaper Amar Ujala (hereafter AU). 2011 marks the onset of second decade of 21st century, and in 2014 the Lok Sabha Elections took place, which, like any other elections, revoked caste-based discourse for votes (Kothari, 2005). The search terms Dalit <or> Scheduled Caste <or> Acchut <or> ex-untouchable caste <or> Antajya <or> Ashprishya Shudra <or> Harijan <or> Untouchable were used to search for Dalit-related news reports in Factiva, TOI and AU databases. The search yielded more than 8000 news reports, of which 5606 reports in TOI and 2085 in AU reported Dalit discrimination and were used for this study.

Previous studies of the vernacular – Hindi and English language newspaper, in the late 20th century demonstrate Hindi language newspapers to be more casteist and a dominant carrier of caste-based cultural ideologies compared to that of English newspapers (Neyazi, 2011; Ratnamala, 2012). Mutatis mutandis, theoretical scholars like Ratnamala (2012), and Balasubramaniam (2011) argue that almost all Indian newspapers irrespective of English or vernacular, hold similar concern for Dalit issues. Hence, a comparative analysis will elucidate the ongoing debate on media casteism in the academic space.

The analytical strategy pursued here begins with the premise that structurally similar forms of prejudice and discrimination that Dalits faced for centuries resemble the ones that are being implicated now. The assumptions were substantiated by the actuality that these similarities are not unique to caste subordination but persist in the cases of race and slavery, and are straightforward (Van Dijk, 1989, 2000). Here, each report on Dalit discrimination represents an institutionalised arrangement for limiting resources and rights, and appropriating labour services from the subordinate population. The frames derived from the reports represent certain ideologies which either identify with or justify similar domination which includes formal assumptions about superiority and inferiority, expressed through certain rituals and codes of conduct that regulate the Dalit actions. We specifically study episodic frames because episodic compared to thematic frames, are more appealing to the audiences, hence bringing in increased audience engagement and influence on public discourses and society.

Results

Figure 1 demonstrates the overall distribution of reports in TOI and AU from 2011 to 2014. A comparative analysis of quantitative data on the total number of Dalit reports obtained from TOI using similar data (Jeffrey, 2001) indicates an increase in the number of Dalit reports in the second decade of the 21st century by approximately 200 times. From an average of 0.4 per month (4 reports in 9 months) to 116 per month (5606 in 48 months) in the English mainstream newspaper. In the absence of data on Dalit news in vernacular or regional Hindi press of the 20th century, the transition in AU cannot be located. Nevertheless, building on Mamatha’s (2012) idea that the amount of news on Dalits in regional and vernacular newspapers was far less than English newspapers, it can be stated that the increase in the number of Dalit reports from a value <0.4 (less than 0.4) per month to approximately 43 reports per month in the vernacular newspaper, denotes a tremendous growth in the inclusion of Dalit news. Overall, the results suggest a greater inclusion of Dalit-related reports in Indian print media and a subtle but changing scenario in the 21st century.

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Figure 1.

Distribution of reports across TOI and AU (2011–2014).

The application of framing theory to the news reports (episodic cases) of Dalit experiences in both AU and TOI located three ideological approaches taken towards the construction of power, yielding three frames:

The frame of Dalit discrimination was centrally organised around the symbolic expressions of acceptance or denial (Dalit response) of the primordially defined power structures and the consequent identity. Hence, the key criteria that differentiate these media frames are the construction of non-Dalit and Dalit responses. In PV frame, media constructs Dalits as passive receptors of non-Dalit violence. In the second frame – AA, Dalits are portrayed as active agents. That is, the media constructs Dalits to be responsive (in the form of resistance, resilience or revolt) to those atrocities. Lastly, the third frame – RR, discusses Dalit repression and includes elements, namely active Dalit response, upper caste repression and passiveness.

A comparative analysis of quantitative data on the total number of Dalit reports obtained from TOI to a similar data (Dalit news) obtained by Jeffrey (2001) indicates an increase in the number of Dalit reports in the second decade of 21st century by approximately 200 times. That is, from an average of 0.4 per month (4 reports in 9 months) to 116 per month (5606 in 48 months) in the English mainstream newspaper. In the absence of data on Dalit news in vernacular or regional Hindi press of the 20th century, the transition in AU cannot be located. Nevertheless, building on Mamatha’s (2012) idea that the amount of news on Dalits in regional and vernacular newspapers was far less than English newspapers, it can be stated that the increase in number of Dalit reports from a value <0.4 (less than 0.4) per month to approximately 43 reports per month in the vernacular newspaper, denotes a tremendous growth in the inclusion of Dalit news. Overall, the results suggest a greater inclusion of Dalit-related reports in Indian print media and a subtle but changing scenario in 21st century.

Ideological constructs

This section discusses the results obtained by an in-depth analysis of the newspaper articles. Frames have been conceptualised along the lines of New Casteism and previous literature to analyse and understand framing structures.

Passive victim frame or PV

The term ‘Dalit’ holds connotations of being broken, oppressed and humiliated by the ‘others’ of society (Dirks, 2002) and locates them along caste lines embedded in beliefs of ritual hierarchy, upper-caste dominance, lower caste subordination, and social, political and economic exclusion. This section gives an in-depth analysis of the PV frame, which associate Dalits with the above characteristics.

In the above, the stereotypical identity of Dalits as powerless and passive was popularised in impressions of their silent acceptance of the hegemonic order and control. This embodies Dalits’ acceptance of them being destined for insanity and resembles the peculiarities that defined primordial Dalits. Similarly, in excerpt 2, the acts of execution (by the upper castes) aimed to reinforce an essential upper caste dominance and power, thereby maintaining the social hierarchy were reported and justified as Dalit’s attempt to violate the casteist traditional norms led – ‘boundaries of limited interaction’ leading to severe implications for Dalits. Media emphasised Dalit passiveness and silence to Dalit brutality and reflected their inability to oppose the discriminatory order. PV also framed passiveness because of Dalits’ self-derogation, resulting from socially evaluating themselves as inferior and second class. For example, the media portrays the self-debilitating characteristics of Dalits as representative of their perceived negative self-efficacy and weakness. Approximately 37 cases (44.5%) in TOI and 12 cases (33%) in AU portray the self-debilitation frame. These images resemble the peculiarities that defined primordial Dalits.

Most of the PV reports repeatedly portrayed Dalit existence with little emphasis on their social desires and rights but a strong emphasis on their need to be cautious and discrete. The media fortifies the traditional casteist identity with Dalits emerging as vulnerable, ‘impure’ objects and victims; and upper castes as fetish social agents whose key aim is to maintain the traditional social order. Moreover, it repeatedly reproduces the ideology of Dalit vulnerability and passivity, along with hopelessness and servility, and reflects that Dalits have no desire to resist the abuse and oppression meted on them.

Counter statements that would advocate Dalit equality, assure and claim speedy disposal of such anti-SC/ST acts; and challenge caste-based power paradoxes were largely absent from the PV frame. Cottle (2000) states that negative stereotypes of minorities and the absence of stories that challenge stereotypes contributed to the normalisation and legitimisation of a prejudiced discourse of minorities in the public sphere. Accordingly, it can be added that the absence of counter statements in the PV frame made the gross abuse of power on Dalits by non-Dalits seem a natural and cultural connotation of Hindu society.

A news report headlined Dalit girl tied to a tree, assaulted (TOI, July 21, 2012) narrates an incident where a Dalit girl was falsely accused and attacked on the pretext of trafficking a non-Dalit girl. A firsthand narrative of the non-Dalit girl confirms that she was not trafficked but voluntarily fled for being forced into marriage. Nevertheless, media clearly shows affiliation to dramatizing brutality of the Dalit girl, framing her as helpless rather than asserting her innocence. Overall, PV predominantly framed non-Dalits as powerful, reflected and supported the hierarchical social system (but not precisely the caste system because caste was not directly mentioned), social dominance of the upper caste and consciously dressed Dalits in images of helplessness.

Active victim frames or AV

In a casteist society, rituals and festivals are a means of appropriation and reassertion of one’s cultural uniqueness and identity (Allmen, 2013; Ram, 2016). The above extract from TOI, published in 2014, is from a report that narrates an incident where non-Dalits attacked Dalits for performing the religious-cultural elephant procession called Gurchuri. The conflict on practice of Gurchuri cannot be seen in isolation of the notion of cultural and identity assertion. Until recently, the dominant-subordinate structure created by graded caste hierarchy physically segregated Dalits and restricted the access and practice of religious rituals. However, when Dalits resisted the suppressions and claimed their independent socio-cultural identity through religious procession and rituals, they were resisted by the upper castes. Such attempts by Dalits symbolise a claim to the long-denied share in structures of power and attracted severe outcomes in the form of brutal attacks by upper castes to reclaim their dominance (Arulselvan, 2016; Kumar, 2014). In such reports, the media justifies and thus legitimises the upper castes’ attitude/attack as an attempt to restrict animal abuse, rather than an outcome of anti-Dalit prejudice aimed at suppressing Dalits and legitimising subordination. Similarly, biased framing was common in reports that narrated Dalits’ demand for a piece of land or the celebration of Dalit icon’s Memorial Day, which is about the claim to symbolic equality.

The coverage of events and violence was fleeting and not particularly supportive of Dalits and their fight for justice. The news reports of Dalit protests/retaliation/resilience were pre-occupied by narratives of police and negative images of Dalits as ‘violent mob’. Approximately 43% (TOI: 45%, AU: 41%) of the stories under AA mentioned barratry, use of weapons, gunfire, injury to individuals and destruction of property by Dalits. These actions were apparent in phrases such as: ‘There were incidents of looting and damage to shops’ (Traders jam road after Dalit bandh call, TOI, May 13, 2011); and ‘a man [non-Dalit] was shot dead by a group of Dalits’ (Communal violence in Rajasthan village forces Dalit exodus, TOI, February 11, 2011). Approximately half of the reports identify Dalit agency as manifestations of violent and sectarian unrest, and 17% (TOI: 15%, AU: 12%) of the cases label Dalits as agitators, violent mob, gunde (hooligans) and pradarshankariyo (protestors).

These reports reflect a lack of substantial information or discussion of the non-Dalit perpetrators and their casteist intentions. The media neither blames the non-Dalit perpetrators nor discusses their inhumane acts as a punishable offence. Instead, the media portrayed the non-Dalits as ‘sympathetic characters’ during violent Dalit moments. Like PV, 62% of cases frame the discriminatory act perpetrated on Dalits as a random act and do not indicate the perpetrator’s caste (in doing so, they do not portray it as an anti-Dalit act), thus normalising the anti-Dalit attacks, cruelty and subordination.

The most favourable coverage was given to those radical events that were portrayed to be controlled and dealt with successfully by the legal forces or other government bodies. Therefore, it can be deduced that the nature of media reporting was more superficial than Dalits would have preferred. Instead, media was supportive to the preferences of dominant groups and projected them as righteous. Similar to Alexander’s (2004) study on media representation of youth resistance (also an age based non-dominant group), this study reflects that resistance of the socially non-hegemonic population (Dalit ‘resistance’ against perceived or actual victimisation) were synonymous with ‘criminality and upheaval’.

Frame of response and repression or RR

The abovementioned excerpt reveals an element of sympathy (‘as his legs had to be amputated’); institutional favour (‘allocated bighas’); upper-caste hegemony (‘grabbed their land’); Dalit retaliation (‘protested’) and violence as a demonstration of upper cate hegemony (as in ‘violent backlash’). RR frames constitute similar stories that construct Dalit victimisation because of upper caste retaliation to their (Dalit) activeness. Specifically, this frame reflects Dalits subjugation by the upper caste because of their act of defiance against caste-Hindus, or whoever the dominant group is.

Fearful representations of Dalit failure shaped the polarising rhetoric of non-Dalit repression to Dalit's active agency. The story headlines equally highlight Dalit subordination. Approximately 74% of the headlines of RR cases portrayed Dalits as victims and stigmatised, for example, ‘Dalits pay the price for supporting BJP’; ‘Cries of discrimination reverberate’; ‘Dalits told to keep distance from the temple’; ‘Barred from Theni temple’; ‘Dalit priest commits suicide’; ‘Dalit houses torched’; ‘Caste violence in Dharmapuri’; ‘Dalits families attacked in Dadri’; ‘Dalit family “evicted” from village in Sambalpur’ and ‘Dalit sarpanch’s house torched in Bhiwani district’. Only 13% of headlines portray them as social reformers, such as ‘Knot Scared: Rajasthan Dalit groom defied threats, rides horse’. As Hall (1989) notes, when repeated over time, such constructs become the regime of life. Similarly, a repetition of such images without reflection on the non-existence of these practices can become the way of imagining Dalit lives, that is a life that is vulnerable to subjugation and suffering.

Instead of highlighting the casteist aspect of the attacks, media blamed Dalits. Specifically, under RR, their repression and victimisation were framed as an outcome of Dalit’s acts of defiance, which deserved retribution. Approximately 72% of the RR stories were framed as if attacks on Dalits resulted from their refusal to comply with non-Dalit orders or expectations or retaliation against non-Dalit antagonism. In 23% of RR cases, media deconstructs Dalit repression as (i) a clash between two communities rather than claiming the non-Dalit attacks as a violation of Dalits’ human rights, or (ii) an inter-caste clash which is not specifically due to caste prejudice but a result of immediate motives of non-Dalits or (iii) random incidents.

Around 28% of RR cases in TOI and AU justify upper-caste retaliation because of Dalit rejection of mythical practices. According to Smith (2003: 37), mythical practices are synonymous with ‘Denial of God’s rule’. Although these practices are constitutionally non-existent, they justify and validate the hegemonic social hierarchy and norms. Lastly, this frame reflected a lack of advocacy for Dalit rights in the media content, which can eventually lead to misrepresenting the media message. The lack of advocacy in 35% of the reports justify Dalit protest and murder/molestation by non-Dalits due to politically conflicting actions and denial of hegemonic order. In 28% of RR reports (TOI: 31%, AU: 25%), the media legitimised the hierarchical norms, translated them into stereotypes and legitimized Dalit violations as politically incorrect by representing the state’s intervention against such undertakings. Following, Entman (2007) such representations authentic restrictions on Dalits as means of social betterment, thereby validating Dalit discrimination and subordination. Overall, the media systematically condones Dalits, legitimises upper-caste violence and uniquely justifies caste ideologies. The reports had limited usefulness for explaining the Dalit’s or police’s true agenda in the attacks. Instead, media predominantly focused on the novelty of police and suddenness of legal bodies, in lieu of attending to the crucial subject of violent repression by upper caste and veracity of the attack as against and intended to suppress the long struggle for Dalit rights.

The qualitative analysis also demonstrates that media phrases upper-caste death in simpler terms such as ‘killed’ or ‘murdered’, whereas the attacks on Dalit’s are framed as torturous, brutal and inhumane: ‘A gang slit his throat and severed his private parts for marrying a non-Dalit girl’ (Dalit women narrate tales of atrocities, TOI, April 12, 2013); and, ‘A Dalit teenager was confined to a room, his head was partially shaved and thrashed for allegedly having an affair’ (Affair assault on Dalit teen triggers protest, TOI, September 4, 2011). Similar to Mamatha (2012) and Arulselvan’s (2016) study of Dalits in the early 21st century media, present study confirms the presence of negative verbalised emotions and brutality in the Dalit reports. This finding is also consistent with studies on racial exemplification in media where Cottle (2000) and Entman (1992, 2007) argue that black people are framed to be treated more brutally than white people. Overall, the analysis reflects similar ideological framing of Dalit discrimination in AU and TOI. This finding provides empirical evidence and confirms Ratnamala (2012) and Balasubramaniam’s (2011) theoretical claim that almost all Indian newspapers (irrespective of English or vernacular) hold similar concern for Dalit issues.

Quantitative comparative analysis of the three frames

This study utilises the data obtained through a quantitative analysis of the three master frames to trace their trajectories across the 4 years and newspapers, and understand its stand on construction of Dalit responses.

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the spread of the three master frames across the 4 years and indicate different growth trajectories between TOI and AU. TOI shows a sudden drop in PV in 2012 and 2014, whereas PV in AU does not demonstrate any significant change over the 4 years. The number of cases under TOI’s AA is greater in 2013 than in 2012, contrary to AU’s AA which illustrates a greater number of cases in 2012 than in 2013. The only similarity between the two newspapers is in their RR cases which constantly increase from 2011 to 2014, indicating a gradual increase in cases of Dalit repression. Unlike the previous studies, which through a comparative analysis of English and vernacular newspapers, claimed the latter as more casteist than the former, the finding obtained in this study demonstrated homogeneity between TOI and AU. Both the newspapers portrayed Dalit incidents and represented their identity along the broader narratives of passive victims, active agents and repressed Dalits.

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Figure 2.

Frames distribution in Times of India (2011–2014).

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Figure 3.

Frames distribution in Amar Ujala (2011–2014).

Nonetheless, the frequency of distribution of the three master frames varied across the two newspapers. Precisely, we locate a much higher number of reports on active Dalits in AU than TOI. The reason can be argued to be embedded in the distribution of newspapers, audiences and regional politics. AU operates majorly in Uttar Pradesh, the state with active Dalit politics and relatively a greater number of active Dalits (Mamatha, 2012). As media coverage echoes the dominant discourses of society (Van Dijk, 2000), it can be argued that AU shows an orientation towards Dalit discourses of power rather than victimisation (the number of cases that frame Dalits as passive in TOI was almost three times that of AU). On the contrary, TOI, which is spread across 18 Indian states, takes a pan-Indian approach (Mamatha, 2012) and denotes an orientation towards ideology of the majority population, that is, non-Dalits, which are ideologies that promote the victimisation and suppression of Dalits.

Discussion

Slavery does not merely mean a legalised form of subjection. It means a state of society in which some men are forced to accept from others the purposes which control their conduct.

–Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (2003; 276)

The above quote demonstrates non-Dalit power and subordination that has defined the identity of Dalits for centuries. Despite the dynamic nature of their identities which are an outcome of the convergence of primordial and traditional codes of conduct, along with the intervention of media industries, socioeconomic development and cultural processes, the Dalits are still subjugated in the 21st century (Arulselvan, 2016; Dirks, 2002). While Dirks (2002) argue this subjugating behaviour as the reproduction of ‘castes of mind’ and the notion of divine sanction (Dharma and Karma), Entman, Van Dijk, Ratnamala and others criticize media for rejuvenating the artificial distinction (of caste) and justifying repression, domination and enslavement. In lieu of these debates on media’s role in rekindling inequalities, this article analysed Indian news media frames of Dalit discrimination in the second decade of 21st century.

Typically, studies of media representation of Dalits argued a symbolic annihilation of Dalits from the Indian mainstream media because of media-casteism (Ratnamala, 2015; Ratnamala and Govindaraju, 2012). Unlike the results obtained in the past, this article demonstrates a surprising prominence of Dalit reports in the vernacular and English newspapers [AU and TOI]. Unlike the construction of Dalits as passive and helpless as argued by Prasad (2004), and Teltumbde (2007), the present study reflects the inclusion of active Dalits. These changes denote a shift in Indian media’s attitude towards Dalits wherein media is more inclusive of the diversities of Dalit experiences.

Nonetheless, the frames discussed above reflect media involvement in the ‘politics of signification’ whereby signifying certain aspects of social reality in the media-text, media legitimised the dominant-subordinate relation between Dalits and non-Dalits. Instead of being the ‘voice for change’, media which is ‘a stenography of the powerful and dominant bodies’ (Parthasarathi, 2011: 11), legitimizes myths of subordination, sanctions the discriminatory behaviours of the non-Dalits and negatively constructs Dalit identity. Surprisingly, compared to 19th century representation, the prominence of Dalits in Indian mainstream print media (both TOI and AU) has increased. However, their identities in media constructs remain limited to stereotypical iterations of Dalits as helpless and/or protestors. These findings align with Entman (1992) studies, which reflect a similar inclusion of black people in the US newspapers in the 19th and 21st century as violent and dangerous. Bringing together the results obtained here along with Entman (1992) and Van Dijk’s (1991) study, it can be stated that although mainstream media allowed its platform for the discussion of minority issues and grievance, that is, of Dalits and black people, it still shows an unequal distribution of power and privilege to these minorities.

Changes in media contents are influenced by the changing power structures within the society (Cottle, 2000; Entman, 2010) and can be analysed primarily within the structural framework of historical, political, socio-economic and cultural power relations in society (Van Dijk, 1989). Analysing representation of black people across the parameters mentioned above (history, political, socio-economic, cultural), Van Dijk (2000) and Entman (1992) states the media coverage of discrimination of black people and the changes, represents a structural property of New-Racist society. Following this, Entman (1992) justifies the change on the grounds of New-Racism symbolising changing media approach to minorities. New Racist press positively conveys the message that black people suffer from discrimination but continue to construct black people as ‘some kind of aberration, a problem, or just an oddity, rather than as “belonging” to the society’ (Hartmann et al., 1974: 44). Jeffrey’s (2001) discusses the exclusion of Dalits because of lower literacy, socio-economic and political status. In the New-Casteist era, distribution of social power based on social hierarchy defined by their caste has shown a rapid transformation specifically in the late 1900s and eventually allowed the traditionally accepted powerless group (Dalits) to adopt a critical move when the powerful (non-Dalits) suppress, overdramatise, and substantiate their status, power and rights.

Bringing forth three significant findings from this article, that are (i) magnified inclusion of Dalits in Indian print media, (ii) inclusion of reports which discuss Dalit discrimination and resistance and (iii) persistence of ambiguities constructing Dalits as active yet subordinate within media industries, it can be argued that the images produced by Indian press media are reproductions of New-Casteism. The media frame parallels the social phenomena of subtle but fading casteism, growing Dalit consciousness and impact of Dalit Counter-public sphere. The use of stereotypical images in the frames of AA and RR further explains that the increasing number of Dalit movements and their growing sophistication may have helped Dalits gain coverage but not control over the news message, that is, they continue to be framed as unequal and subordinate. Moreover, considering inequality in terms of digital access and capitalist market forces it could be argued that digital media’s contribution to the pluralist-democratic culture of the mainstream media is still being explored today.

In the context of the derogatory framing of minorities in media, Iyengar (1990, 2005), Stocking and Gross (1989), Ratnamala (2011, 2012) and Arulselvan (2016), argue negative images of the minorities as a result of (i) preconceived ideologies about a group among the elite majority journalists, (ii) because the news houses have very few numbers of minority journalists, (iii) minority images of discrimination are connected to sensation, where the aim of the journalists seems to be pleasing the majority audiences. These apply to Dalit misrepresentations as well. Firstly, the proportion of Dalits to non-Dalits in the media houses is still negligible (Balasubramaniam, 2011). Secondly, the caste ideologies remain as ‘castes of mind’ among the non-Dalits (Dirks, 2002). Thirdly, because media narratives of Dalit brutality, including self-debilitation, have elements of victim vulnerability and offence seriousness (Duwe, 2000), specifically of a culturally defined minority community member, the Dalits and hence are highly newsworthy.

Overall, the findings from the qualitative and quantitative approaches partly support Kumar’s (2010) statement that ‘Dalit entry to the modern public sphere with the rise of Dalit movement has created a big jolt in the media’ (p. 115). Conceptualising the findings along the lines of framing by Entman (2007), Van Dijk (1989, 2000) and New Casteism, this chapter argues that the inclusion of active and resilient Dalits, although covered in images of subordination, is an outcome of shifting approach of media in the era of New Casteism. Unlike Patel and Ratnamala, Indian media can no longer be called Varna, Brahminic or Casteist. However, based on the media’s altered approach to Dalit and Dalit grievances, it can now be called New-Casteist media. Media is no more a casteist institution that promotes casteism and the ideologies of Dharma and Karma, but one that reflects the changing structures of subordination and acceptance or denial of subordination. Considering the parameters highlighted by Van Dijk and Jeffrey, the following paragraph demonstrates the changes in the media attitude towards Dalits.

The National Literacy Reports (2012) demonstrated a growing Dalit literacy rate from 10.27% in 1961 to 66.1% in 2011 (Dhakal, 2017) .Deriving from Jeffery (2001) and Kumar (2014) that literacy rate is significantly related to newspaper readership and that newspapers constantly adhere to the audience’s demands. The increased Dalit literacy rate can be argued to have resulted in the inclusion of the ‘active’ ‘empowered’ Dalits in the media. Moreover, increased purchasing power and literacy is related to increased income (Kumar, 2014). Jodhka 2001 and Varshney (2014) affirm that the growing ownership of private industry-based neo-liberal economic policy opened new business opportunities for the Dalits. This led to a drop in unemployment and poverty rates and increased economic capability among the Dalits. Owing to the increased financial ability and literacy rates, along with reservation and government policies that allowed Dalit employment in various sectors (public and private), the lingering limitations in access to assets faded away, creating Dalit media consumers (Ninan, 2007). Van Dijk (1991) relates the dynamic media landscape and inclusion of ‘once excluded’ to changing economic conditions of minorities. Hence the inclusion of Dalits in the media contents of the 21st century can be attributed to their economic prosperity in the New-Casteist era.

Van Dijk (1991) and Entman (1992, 2010) add that news on politics is frequent and more newsworthy when consolidating subjects such as minorities, conflicts, riots and race. Entman (1992, 2010) argues that political struggles have called for the greater inclusion of black people in the American mainstream media. Similarly, it can be stated that one of the crucial socio-political elements that partly erupted out of the social consciousness and influenced Dalit reporting in Indian newspapers (here TOI and AU) is Dalit politics (Neyazi, 2011). Dalit politics (which includes voting systems, Dalit movements, rallies, alliances, Sanskritisation) has led to revolutionary changes in the Indian political system, especially after the formation of BSP (1984). Dalit politics challenged those who supported the primordial anti-Dalit dominations and redefined social relations and power distribution between the non-Dalits and Dalits. ‘Government politics typically interests the quality press’ (Van Dijk, 1991: 81) and political information constitutes a significant amount of content space in the language press (Neyazi, 2011; Ratnamala, 2011). Accordingly, it can be argued that the increasing intensity of Dalit participation in politics, and the interest of audiences regarding the same (precisely about political organizations and the politicians), fosters greater Dalit inclusion in the media in the 21st century. Following Entman (1992, 2010) and Iyengar (1990) that political stories easily make into media discourses, the growing consciousness (among both non-Dalits and Dalits) and increasing strength of Dalit politics can be deemed to have contributed to the increase in the number of reports on Dalits in the mainstream Indian media. This can further be justified from the quantitative findings, which reflect more active Dalit discourses in AU, primarily circulated across Uttar Pradesh, that is, the state with active Dalit politics.

Increasing literacy rate, greater economic power and awareness in this global mediascape provided space for Dalits who were caught in the complex web of social oppression and media exclusion in the era of traditional media. In the New-Casteist era, Dalit Counter-public sphere created using the internet, challenge fabricated information, communicate interests, make claims, mobilise identity and reflect on the negligence of mainstream print media. Jenkins and Duze (2008) add that the internet provided voices to the unheard and compelled the inclusion in mainstream media. Hence, active Dalit participation in the mediascape eventually influenced their inclusion into mainstream press as well.

Conclusion

This study moves beyond the simplistic evaluations of stereotypical representations and misrepresentations and elaborates on more profound aspects of power concentration in media frames of Dalit discrimination in the New-Casteist era. The qualitative and quantitative framing analysis along the lines of New Casteism demonstrate a change in news media framing of Dalit discrimination and an ideological similarity in the way Dalits are framed in vernacular and national language newspapers. The dispersion of Dalit images characterises media in the transitioning Indian society, a shift in the embodiment of Dalit response from passive to active and from acceptance of hegemony to resistance. Nonetheless, frames of Dalit discrimination reflect more than numeric distinctions. They represent an increasing Dalit inclusion in media as well as a continued ideological representation of Dalits as subordinate, powerless or perpetrators. Precisely, while there is an increased representation of Dalits and inclusion of ‘Dalits as active citizens’, they continue to be negatively framed with limited recognition of Dalit struggle and activism.

Although there lacks substantial literature on the TV coverage of Dalits, Mehta (2008) and Kumar (2007) expediates that TV channels that thrive on immediate conflict do not go beyond stereotypes while reporting oppressed Dalits. When and if journalists portrayed the ‘progressive Dalits in the 21st century’, the audiences showed disbelief, which impacted the positive reporting of Dalits. This suggests that the newspaper reporting is similar to TV reporting and in line with Mehta and Kumar’s findings. Overall, the results indicated representations far from historically static norms and codes but instead give increasing expression to the surrounding cultural politics of New-Casteism, consistent with media representations of ‘New-Racism’ (Entman, 1992). Unlike the previous studies, Indian media can no longer be termed as Brahmanic, Casteist or Varna media. Rather, the 21st-century media can be considered the manifestation of the New-Casteist Media.