The longitudinal interplay of emotion understanding,theory of mind,and language in the preschool years

Abstract

Emotion comprehension (EC), theory of mind (ToM), and language are particularly important aspects of child development. In recent years, there has been increasing interest in understanding how these three variables are related to preschool children. However, results have been contradictory, and it is not clear how EC, ToM, and language are associated. The aim of this study was to analyze the relationships among EC, ToM, and language through a longitudinal study. Participants were 105 children (49 girls and 56 boys). EC, ToM, and language skills were assessed when children were 3, 4, and 5 years old. The cross-lagged model confirmed that EC preceded ToM in time. The half-longitudinal model showed that linguistic skills at 4 years old mediated the relationship between EC at 3 years old and ToM at 5 years old. These findings provide important insights into the complex relationships among EC, ToM, and language. Developmental, educational, and clinical implications of the results are discussed.

Keywords

Emotion comprehension theory of mind language preschool years longitudinal

The relationship between emotion comprehension (EC) and theory of mind (ToM) in the preschool years has been studied extensively in recent decades. However, there is no definitive evidence clarifying whether one of these variables precedes the other in time, whether they are two independent areas of knowledge, or whether they overlap or could even be the same thing. ToM can be defined as the “ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others and understand that others have beliefs, desires, intentions, and perspectives that are different from one’s own” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, p. 525). EC can be understood as the ability to recognize and manage one’s own emotions and identify and understand others’ emotions in social contexts (Denham, 1998; Saarni, 1999). Different studies have found evidence that EC precedes ToM (Dunn, 2000; Hughes & Dunn, 1998; O’Brien et al., 2011), others have shown that ToM precedes EC (Bender, Pons, Harris, & de Rosnay, 2011; de Rosnay, Pons, Harris, & Morrell, 2004), and some studies have even found that they are two independent areas of knowledge (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Dunn, 1995).

The Relationship Between EC and ToM

As mentioned above, the empirical evidence does not clarify how EC and ToM are related in the first years of life. The contradictory results are mainly due to differences in the definitions of the two constructs and the measures used to evaluate them. Given that they are broad constructs that include different levels of mental and emotional knowledge, their definition and measurement are extremely important. Both constructs can encompass knowledge ranging from the basic comprehension that appears quite early in development (i.e., recognizing facial expressions associated with certain emotions or understanding the other as an intentional being) to complex comprehension that requires abilities from other developmental areas (i.e., complex emotion regulation strategies based on the executive functions of drawing complex inferences through reasoning on second-order tasks). The differences in the ages of the participants, the dimensions evaluated, and the definitions of the constructs have contributed to the disparity in the results.

Some studies have found that EC precedes and predicts ToM based on two main arguments. First, emotions and affects can be considered the two primary intersubject access routes, that is, the first paths to the other’s mind (Rivière & Núñez, 2001). Classic studies using the still-face paradigm (Tronick, Als, Adamson, Wise, & Brazelton, 1978) and the visual cliff (Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985) have shown that, from the first months of life, babies use the adult’s emotional expression to coordinate the interaction. The meta-analysis carried out by Mesman, van Ijzendoorn, and Bakermans-Kranenburg (2009) confirms the effect of the still-face paradigm in situations of joint attention in babies from 1 to 4 months old. Second, the external nature (i.e., facial expression, tone of voice, or body posture) of emotions, compared to the internal nature of mental states, can facilitate the importance of EC over ToM. From a developmental point of view, there is also evidence that, in babies, the recognition of emotional expressions precedes the comprehension of mental states (Saarni, 1999). Along these lines, different studies with preschool children have also found prior comprehension of the emotional states and a predictive relationship with ToM (Dunn, 2000; Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Weimer, Sallquist, & Bolnick, 2012). For example, Hughes and Dunn (1998) found that affective perspective-taking tasks at 3-years old predicted ToM performance at 5 years old, controlling for age and linguistic skills. Likewise, O’Brien et al. (2011) used longitudinal measures of EC and ToM to show that EC at 3 years old predicted changes in ToM task performance at 3 and 4 years old. However, ToM performance at 3 years old did not predict changes in EC during the same time period. This study may be the most complete one carried out in this area because it longitudinally evaluates both constructs through different tasks. Thus, EC was evaluated through three different tasks (labelling, affective perspective-taking, and comprehension of the cause of the emotion), and ToM through four tasks (appearance–reality distinction, unexpected localization, unexpected content, and conceptual perspective-taking). More recently, Ornaghi, Pepe, and Grazzani (2016) found correlations between EC and ToM, as well as the precedence of EC with regard to prosocial behavior mediated by ToM and language. Although this study pursues another objective and includes other variables, it also supports the idea that EC precedes ToM. However, ToM was only evaluated through false-belief tasks.

For other authors, there is evidence that ToM is a prerequisite for the identification and comprehension of emotional states in other people. Some studies have found that small children comprehend false-belief tasks sooner and better than emotion recognition tasks. For example, Seidenfeld, Johnson, Cavadel, and Izard (2014) found that performance on false-belief tasks from 3 to 5 years old promoted recognition of emotional expressions and identification of causes and consequences of emotions. Likewise, Harwood and Farrar (2006), in a study with children from 3 to 5 years old, found that performance on false-belief tasks correlated positively with the child’s ability to predict the emotion of the main character in a story when it was different from his/her own but not when their emotions coincided. Other studies, such as those by de Rosnay, Pons, Harris, and Morrell (2004) and Bender, Pons, Harris, and de Rosnay (2011), also found that children understood actions based on false beliefs before emotions based on false beliefs, even when predicting their own emotions. Thus, this set of studies suggests that children need to comprehend belief states before correctly predicting their own emotions and those of others and applying EC to more complex social contexts. However, this idea has been controversial. Studies with younger children show that at 2 years old, children comprehend the relationship between desire and emotions such as happiness or sadness (Wellman & Woolley, 1990). At the age of four, they understand the relationships among desires, beliefs, and emotions such as happiness and surprise (Wellman & Banerjee, 1991). Hence, before comprehending false beliefs, children manage other previous and simpler mentalist components. Studies that relate false belief to emotion prediction suggest that this discrepancy could be due to the difficulties of the cognitive demand of inference and emotional prediction, along with the immaturity of the executive functions, which impedes response inhibition (Harris, de Rosnay, & Ronfard, 2014). However, ToM is a broad construct that includes components of varied complexity, and the simplest ones are comprehended from early ages. Studies that show a precedence of ToM over EC usually assess ToM exclusively through false belief, without considering other previous and simpler elements that also form part of ToM.

Finally, a third possibility is that EC and ToM develop in parallel and without a causal relationship between them. This possibility is supported by studies that do not find correlations between ToM and EC or find no relationship between them after controlling other variables. For instance, Cutting and Dunn (1999) found that, after controlling age, linguistic development, and family environment, there was no relationship between these two variables, and Dunn (1995) found no relationship between EC and ToM either. The results of the longitudinal study by Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, and Youngblade (1991) showed that family interaction patterns at the age of three were more related to EC than to ToM at the age of 40 months. In this study, however, EC was only assessed through labelling and causality comprehension (components that develop early), whereas ToM assessment only included tasks measuring the relationship between beliefs and actions (a mentalist comprehension that appears later in development). This limitation in the evaluation of the components may explain the lack of relationship between the two variables. Other studies, such as LaBounty, Wellman, Olson, Lagattuta, and Liu (2008), which focuses on analyzing the relationship between parents’ discourse and their children’s EC and ToM, also defend the independence of the two variables. This study shows that, although both EC and ToM are clearly related to the parents’ discourse, the two domains are not associated. In summary, this line of research leads some authors to propose that ToM and EC are different social comprehension domains that develop independently.

These contradictory results may be related to the definition and measurement of EC and ToM. Most studies have focused on two elements, respectively: labelling the basic emotions and comprehending first-order false-belief tasks. Although these are strong measures of EC and ToM, this reductionism represents an important limitation. In addition, in order to understand the relationship between these two variables in a developmental period in which they change quickly, longitudinal studies are needed to follow these changes over time. Finally, both EC and ToM are associated with language. Although many studies examine these constructs two-by-two, research on all three variables is quite scarce.

The Role of Language in EC and ToM

A large amount of evidence shows that both EC and ToM are related to language. Many studies have shown that language seems to be a good predictor of ToM (Astington & Baird, 2005) and that comprehension of false beliefs is closely linked to linguistic skills (Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007). This relationship between language and false beliefs is maintained when various linguistic measures and different false-belief tasks are used. Nevertheless, performance on ToM tasks does not predict later linguistic skills (Milligan et al., 2007).

With regard to EC, a large amount of research supports its relationship with language. In his studies on emotion and language in children from 9 to 30 months old, Bloom (1998) found an interesting pattern between emotion expression and word acquisition. Whereas the former remain stable in this period of time, acquisition of words and sentences increases but emotional terms are quite scarce. According to Bloom, this indicates that emotion expression is not substituted by words. At this early age, they would instead be two parallel systems. Given that language has a functional quality, and that children are efficacious in expressing their emotional states, they would not need to incorporate words about emotions. From the age of 30 months, however, EC becomes more complex. Children between 24 months and 36 months old learn to identify facial expressions, they begin to incorporate some labels, and they start to comprehend the causes of emotions in relation to their own desires and those of others. Some studies have found an increase in terms associated with emotions in the child’s vocabulary at around 30 months (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006, 2008).

From the age of three, the conceptualization of the emotions undergoes a progressive differentiation between emotions and their nuances (Widen & Russell, 2010). Between 3 and 6 years old, social experiences multiply in the child’s life. Therefore, this progressive comprehension of emotional concepts is linked to language acquisition, certain narrative forms, and mental reasoning (Widen, 2013). In this regard, various studies have found relationships between EC and narrative, grammatical, and receptive vocabulary skills in preschool children (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Pons, Lawson, Harris, & de Rosnay, 2003; Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey, & Garnham, 2003). Recently, De Stasio, Fiorilli, and Di Chiacchio (2014) found associations between the simplest components of EC (facial expression identification, comprehension of causality, and comprehension of desire) and grammatical knowledge in children from 3 to 6 years old.

Some studies have tried to evaluate how these three variables are related. Although correlations have been found between them, there is a lack of clear and detailed evidence about the relationships among the three variables in the preschool stage. For example, Cutting and Dunn (1999) found that language correlated with EC tasks and false belief. Likewise, de Rosnay et al. (2004) found correlations among verbal ability, comprehension of false beliefs, and EC based on false belief. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, apart from correlational studies, there is no clear evidence about the relationships among the three variables.

The Current Study

The purpose of this study is to contribute to the understanding of the relationships among language, EC, and ToM during the preschool years through two strategies that are intended to overcome two important limitations mentioned above. On the one hand, a longitudinal study was carried out in which language, EC, and ToM were evaluated at three points in time over 3 years. On the other hand, the EC and ToM measures include a wide range of knowledge adapted to the ages under study.

Considering the theories proposing that emotion and primary intersubjectivity provide access to mentalist knowledge, the fact that the emotions have an external and visible dimension (compared to mental states), and some results on the configuration of the right cortex and its relationship with emotional information processing, we expect to find that EC precedes ToM. In turn, this relationship will be mediated by language. Our previous studies with cross-sectional designs support the precedence of EC over ToM, with language acting as a mediator between the two variables (Sarmento-Henrique, Recio, Lucas-Molina, Quintanilla, & Giménez-Dasí, 2019)). In this study, we expect to find that this relationship is maintained during the 3 years evaluated.

Method

Participants

The study started with 109 participants, although data presented include 105 children (49 girls and 56 boys) in total. Attrition rate is 3.67%. In the first wave (T1), sample was n = 95, second (T2) n = 100, and third (T3) n = 101, with a mean age of 41.71 months (range 36–47), 51.58 months (range 46–57), and 62.58 months (range 57–68), respectively. As it can be seen, the sample number has not undergone major alterations over time. Variations in sample size are due to missing data (i.e., children who could not complete the tasks for different reasons like linguistic difficulties, attention problems, etc.). Time elapsed between T1 and T2 were 10 months and between T2 and T3 were 11 months. All the children were native Spanish speakers. They were also of Spanish origin, except two Germans and one Ecuadorian. They attended a nursery school in northern Madrid (Spain). The municipality presented a medium income level.

Instruments

Theory of mind

The Spanish translation of the Wellman and Liu (2004) scale was used, which consists of seven tasks scaled by order of difficulty: diverse desires, different beliefs, access to knowledge, false belief, explicit false belief, belief-emotion, and real-apparent-emotion. Depending on the task, either cards with drawings or dolls were used to illustrate the situation following authors’ instructions (Wellman & Liu, 2004) (see Table 1 for a description of some tasks). The child receives 1 point for each task correctly resolved, so that the minimum score is 0 and the maximum 7. Test reliability in the present sample is α = .58. As recently pointed out by Fidalgo, Tenenbaum, and Aznar (2018), Cronbach’s coefficient can provide a lower-bound estimate of true reliability when items are dichotomous.

Table 1.
Examples of Tasks for the Theory of Mind Scale (Wellman & Liu, 2004).

Theory of mind scale

Tasks Example

Diverse desires Children see a sheet of paper with a figure of an adult, a carrot, and a cookie drawn on it. “Here’s Mr. Gómez. It’s snack time, so, Mr. Gómez wants a snack to eat. Here are two different snacks: a carrot and a cookie. Which snack would you like best? Would you like a carrot or a cookie best?
Well, that’s a good choice, but Mr. Gómez really likes (the opposite of child’s choice). He doesn’t like (the child’s choice). What he likes best are (the opposite of child’s choice).” Then the child is asked the target question: “So, now it’s time to eat. Mr. Gómez can only choose one snack, just one. Which snack will Mr. Gómez choose? A carrot or a cookie?”

Diverse beliefs Children see a sheet of paper with a figure of a girl, bushes, and a garage drawn on it. “Here’s María. María wants to find her cat. Her cat might be hiding in the bushes or it might be hiding in the garage. Where do you think the cat is? In the bushes or in the garage?”“Well, that’s a good idea, but María thinks her cat is in the (the opposite child´s choice). She thinks her cat is in the (the opposite child´s choice).” “So where will María look for her cat? In the bushes or in the garage?”

Knowledge access Children see an opaque box containing a small plastic toy inside. “Here’s a box. What do you think is inside the box?” (The child can give any answer he or she likes or indicate that he or she does not know). Next, the box is opened and the child is shown the content of the box: “Let’s see. It’s really a toy inside!” Close the box: “Okay, what is in the box?” Then a toy figure of a girl is produced: “Ana has never ever seen inside this box. Now here comes Ana. So, does Ana know what is in the box?”

Contents false belief The child sees a clearly identifiable Band-Aid box with a plastic toy airplane inside the closed Band-Aid box.“Here’s a Band-Aid box. What do you think is inside the Band-Aid box?” Next, the Band-Aid box is opened: “Let’s see, it’s really an airplane inside!” The Band-Aid box is closed: “Okay, what is in the Band-Aid box?” Then a toy figure of a boy is produced: “Pablo has never ever seen inside this Band-Aid box. Now here comes Pablo. So, what does Pablo think is in the box? Band-Aids or an airplane?” “Did Pablo see inside this box?”

Emotion comprehension

A slightly modified version of the Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC) (Pons & Harris, 2000) was used with the authors’ consent. This test was chosen because it is the only test that covers a wide range of EC components and it is easy to administer. Moreover, it has previously been used in Spanish populations (Aznar & Tenenbaum, 2013; Fernández-Sánchez, Quintanilla, & Giménez-Dasí, 2015; Jiménez Elorriaga, Alonso Martínez, García Valero, Marco Moreno, & Giménez-Dasí, 2013).

The TEC evaluates EC in children from 3 to 11 years old through nine components: (1) identification of basic emotions, (2) understanding of the situational causes of emotions, (3) understanding that desires can cause emotions, (4) understanding the role of false beliefs in emotions, (5) understanding the role of memories in emotions, (6) knowledge about emotion regulation strategies, (7) understanding that emotions can be hidden, (8) understanding mixed emotions, and (9) understanding the role of morality in emotions. Cartoon scenarios are presented, and the child has to identify how the main character feels in each cartoon by pointing to one of the three drawings that represent different emotions.

To achieve the objective of the present study, components 1, 2, 3, and 5 were used (identification, causality, desires, and memories) (see Table 2 for a description of the components). These components were chosen according to the age of the participants and the developmental pattern of EC found by the authors of the test (Pons, Harris, & de Rosnay, 2004). We chose the components that were solved by at least 55% of the 5-year-old sample studied by Pons, Harris, and de Rosnay (2004). Based on the percentage of success from the same study, the rest of the components were not considered (Pons et al., 2004). Test reliability in the present sample is α = .60, a bit lower than the value found by Pons and Harris (2005), possibly because in this study only part of the test was used.

Table 2.
Adapted Tasks and Components for the TEC (Pons & Harris, 2000).

Task Example

Identification Let’s look at these three pictures. Can you point to the person who feels sad?

Causality This boy (girl) is looking at his (her) little turtle, which has just died. How is this boy (girl) feeling? Is he (she) feeling nothing, sad or happy?

Desires These two boys (girls) are very thirsty. The first boy (girl) loves Coca Cola, whereas the second boy (girl) hates Coca Cola. There is Coca Cola in the box. How is the first boy (girl) feeling when he (she) sees that there is Coca Cola in the box? Is he (she) feeling sad, happy, or nothing? How is the second boy (girl) feeling when he (she) sees that there is Coca Cola in the box? Is he (she) feeling sad, happy, or nothing?

Memories This boy (girl) is very happy because his (her) mother is telling him (her) that they are soon going to the circus [turn the page]. Later on that night, he (she) goes to bed. The next day, he (she) is angry because his (her) brother (sister) is destroying his (her) a puppet. Later on that day, he (she) is watching a poster of a circus. How is the boy (girl) feeling when he (she) is watching the poster of the circus? Is he (she) feeling happy, nothing or angry?

Note. TEC = Test of Emotion Comprehension.

Language

To assess the level of language development, the Revised Navarra Oral Language Test (PLON-R) for children from 3 to 6 years old was used (Aguinaga-Ayerra, Armentia, Fraile, Olangua, & Uriz, 2005). On this screening test, aspects of form (phonology and syntax–morphology), content, and language use were assessed. The higher the score, the better the language level. Test reliability in the present sample is α = .78

Procedure

Children were evaluated in individual 30-min sessions in a quiet room in the school during school hours. The tests were administered in a randomized order by psychologists who were members of the research team. The testing language was Spanish for the whole sample. The ethical and procedural authorizations of the corresponding institutions were granted. Children were not submitted to any manipulation only assessment at different time points. Before data collection, active parental consent was requested. Children were also informed in an informal way about the kind of questions that would be asked and whether they wanted to participate. The participation was completely in a voluntary basis and children gave their consent verbally. No incentive was provided for their participation. The confidentiality of the data has been guaranteed.

Data Analyses

First, descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations among the study variables were computed. Second, structural equation modeling was used to explore the direct and indirect effects of EC on ToM through language across time. Due to the small sample size, we were unable to conduct a full mediation model to estimate all the parameters of our model (Little, 2013). Thus, we first performed a cross-lagged model in order to examine the predictive power of EC on ToM across the three time points and even draw a causal inference between the two constructs. In a cross-lagged model (Cole & Maxwell, 2003; Liu, Mo, Song, & Wang, 2016), each construct is specified to influence itself over time (“autoregressive effect”) and cross over to influence the other construct at a subsequent time (“cross-lagged effect”), with the variance/residual covariance of subsequent constructs measured at the same time set to covary. This type of model solves several issues of cross-sectional models (e.g., the impossibility of inferring the directional influence variables have on each other over time, etc.; Maxwell & Cole, 2007).

After this model had been tested, we conducted three half-longitudinal mediation models, one for each time pair (T1–T2, T1–T3, T2–T3), in order to test the potential mediational role of language in the association between EC and ToM. This type of mediation model is less demanding than the full longitudinal mediation model, and it has been considered appropriate for testing mediation with just two occasions (Cole & Maxwell, 2003; Little, 2013). Based on the stationary assumption, the test of mediation in the half-longitudinal design relies on using structural equation modeling (SEM) to create an alternative parameter that can estimate the indirect effect of a predictor on an outcome via a mediator across two time points. This parameter is the product of two effects: the effect of the predictor on the mediator from T1 to T2 (a) and the effect of the mediator on the outcome from time T1 to T2 (b). To test whether the product ab (indirect effect) was significant, bootstrap analysis was conducted with 5,000 bootstrap sample simulations. According to this procedure, an indirect effect is significant if its 95% confidence interval (CI) does not include the 0 value (Little, 2013; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). One limitation of the half-longitudinal mediation model is that we cannot test whether there is partial or total mediation.

Several fit indices were used to assess model fit: χ² and its ratio with the degrees of freedom (χ²/df), the comparative fit index (CFI), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). If χ² is not significant, the model is adequate. A good fit of the model to the data is also indicated when the χ²/df (degrees of freedom) ratio is less than three (Kline, 2005). For CFI, values above .95 are preferred, and values close to .90 are considered acceptable (Bentler, 1990; Kline, 2005). RMSEA values below .05 reveal a good fit, whereas values between .05 and .08 reveal an acceptable fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1992).

The software packages used for data analysis and processing were IBM SPSS Statistics 22.0 (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 2013) and Mplus 7.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012).

Results

Descriptive Analyses and Correlations

Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviations) and correlations among the study variables at the three measurement times. The mean scores obtained on EC, ToM, and language are common values in children of this age (Aguinaga-Ayerra et al., 2005; Pons et al., 2004; Wellman & Liu, 2004). As the table shows, the three variables were significantly and positively associated with all three times, especially between T1 and T2. However, some exceptions were found: EC at T3 was not associated with either ToM or EC at T1 and T2 or with language at T2, whereas language at T3 was not related to ToM at T1. The largest associations were between language at T1 and language at both T2 and T3, EC at T1 and language at T2, and language at T2 and ToM at T3, with all Pearson correlations values higher than .50.

Table 3.
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among the Study Variables.

Time 1 Time 2 Time 3

Theory of mind Emotion comprehension Language Theory of mind Emotion comprehension Language Theory of mind Emotion comprehension Language

Time 1 Theory of mind —

Emotion comprehension .46 —

Language .33 .55 —

Time 2 Theory of mind .30 .36 .38 —

Emotion comprehension .23* .30 .30 .10 —

Language .32 .55 .63 .42 .34** —

Time 3 Theory of mind .23* .46 .50 .41 .28 .50** —

Emotion comprehension .08 .15 .21* .05 .11 .19 .25* —

Language .10 .43 .60 .29** .20* .43 .39 .03 —

Mean 2.25 1.94 48.31 4.00 2.82 44.17 5.43 3.18 54.53

Range 0–5 0–3.63 6–72 1–7 1.78–3.88 1–80 1–7 2.28–3.88 1–80

Standard deviation 1.28 1.02 18.41 1.50 .79 18.92 1.39 .72 21.76

N 95 95 95 100 100 100 101 101 101

Note. * p < .05. **p < .001.

Cross-Lagged Model

Figure 1 presents the cross-lagged model that estimated the associations between EC and TM over time. This model fitted the data reasonably well: the χ² value obtained was not significant (χ² (4) = 7.181, p = .127), the χ²/df ratio = 1.80 (below 3), and CFI was .962, which is above .95. However, the RMSEA value slightly exceeded the standard (.087, which is higher than .08). This situation where χ² shows a good fit to the model and RMSEA does not can be observed in models with small df or sample sizes (N) (Kenny, Kaniskan, & McCoach, 2015), as in our case.

Figure 1.
Cross-Lagged Model for Testing the Longitudinal Association Between EC and ToM Across the Three Measurement Times (N = 105).

As Figure 1 shows, the autoregressive effects for EC were only significant between T1 and T2, whereas for ToM, they were only significant between T2 and T3.

The two cross-lagged effects from EC to ToM, one from EC (T1) to ToM (T2) and the other from EC (T2) to ToM (T3), were statistically significant (.29 and .23, p < .01, respectively). Neither of the two cross-lagged effects from ToM to EC was statistically significant.

The model explained 19.5% (p < .01) and 3.9% (p = .308) of the variance in EC at T1 and T2, respectively. In addition, it explained 15.3% (p < .05) and 24.4% (p < .01) of the variance in ToM at T1 at T2, respectively.

Half-Longitudinal Models

Due to the impossibility of testing a full mediational model, we tested three half-longitudinal mediation models (Little, 2013), one for each time pair (T1–T2, T1–T3, and T2–T3), in order to examine whether EC has an indirect effect on ToM through language. The results show that only the T1–T2 hypothesized model fitted the data reasonably well: the χ² value was not significant (χ² (2) = 2.33, p = .313), the χ²/df ratio = 1.16 was below 3, the CFI was .996, and the RMSEA was .039. Neither of the other two half-longitudinal models had a good fit to the data (T1–T3: χ² (2) = 9.99; p < .01; CFI = .895; RMSEA = .195; T2–T3: χ² (2) = 4.76; p = .09; CFI = .948; RMSEA = .123, see Supplementary Material for further information on these two models).

As Figure 2 shows, the hypothesis that language is a mediator in the relationship between EC at T1 and ToM at T2 is confirmed. There is an indirect effect through language: EC at T1 is positively related to language at T2 (a = .26, p < .01), and language at T1 is related to ToM (b = .32, p <.01). The bootstrapping results reveal that the mediator effect of language gave rise to significant indirect relationships between EC at T1 and ToM at T2 (ab = .13, p = .027; 95% CI: .019, .326).

Figure 2.
Half-Longitudinal Mediation Model for Testing the Mediation Role of Language Between Emotion Comprehension at T1 and ToM at T2 (N = 105).

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to longitudinally assess EC, ToM, and language in a group of children from 3 to 5 years old, in order to analyze the relationships among these three variables during this developmental period. Our basic hypothesis predicted that EC precedes ToM and that language mediates between these two variables over time. The results support the basic hypothesis, although they nuance the role of language. Our longitudinal model points to a significant effect of EC at T1 on ToM at T2 and of EC at T2 on ToM at T3. Furthermore, the proportion of variance explained by our model, although rather small (between 3.9% and 24.4%), was in general higher for ToM than for EC, especially at T3. In addition, the half-longitudinal model indicates that language has a mediator role between EC at T1 and ToM at T2. Finally, the correlations obtained among the three variables show an interesting pattern that suggests how they are related over time. These results would indicate that the three variables are closely related to each other in 3, 4, and 5-year-old children, although the relationship between EC and language seems to diminish with age, whereas the relationship between ToM and language is maintained in all three measures. Next, we will discuss the results and the theoretical proposals we draw on to interpret them.

As mentioned above, the correlations obtained in each assessment suggest an important relationship among the three variables at the three points in time. Specifically, the highest correlations are found between EC at the age of three and language at the ages of three, four, and five. However, these correlations progressively decline and at the age of five, they are no longer significant. In addition, the correlation between language and ToM increases at 4 and 5 years old. These results suggest that the two constructs would be highly correlated with each other at these ages, but the relationship would be especially close at 4 and 5 years old. Based on our results, language seems to play an important role in EC at the age of three, and this role would transfer to ToM between 4 and 5 years old. In conclusion, together our results suggest a close relationship between EC and language at 3 and 4 years old, a close relationship between ToM and language at 4 and 5 years old, and a time precedence of EC at 3 and 4 years old on ToM at 4 and 5 years old.

The theoretical interpretation of these results could fit developmental theories that attribute the initiation of social cognition to the affective exchange and comprehension of basic emotions that unfold through the relationship between the caregiver and the baby in the first months of life. The theories by Hobson (1993) and Trevarthen (1986) about the importance of primary intersubjectivity provide a framework to interpret our results. This initial framework can be completed with the results found by socio-affective neuroscience in recent decades. Generally, these studies suggest that the early affective exchange molds a series of neuronal circuits that have an effect on complex individual and social aspects, such as self-regulation, self-awareness, autobiographical memory, empathy, or ToM (Schore, 2003a, 2003b; Siegel, 2012). These early experiences affect the structural connections and maturation of the orbitofrontal cortex, a region especially linked to emotional processing that mediates in intrapsychological and interpersonal aspects of all future socio-emotional functions (Schore, 2003a, 2010). Studies have compared babies who enjoy a coordinated affective exchange in the first 12–18 months of life to babies with mothers who suffer from depression or reside in institutions. The results have shown important differences in these cerebral areas and in the activation patterns of both hemispheres. These differences seem to give rise to differentiated frontal activation patterns that are related to temperamental bases and condition children’s way of coping with experiences, their regulation capacity, and their socio-emotional life (Davidson & Begley, 2012; Field & Diego, 2008). Thus, some evidence suggests that the affective exchange and, therefore, the EC arising from this exchange, could be the basis for mentalist knowledge and future complex socio-emotional functions.

In relation to language, our results confirm the close relationship between language and ToM, as many previous studies have demonstrated (Milligan et al., 2007). However, they allow us to further clarify the role of language. Language seems to be closely linked to EC. This relationship would appear at around 30 months, when emotional expression through language becomes functional, and the child begins to acquire more complex understanding of emotions (Bloom, 1998; Widen, 2013). Later, language would progressively become aligned with ToM. Based on theories that situate EC as the basis of social cognition, it makes sense that EC and language would be closely linked at first and that later the vehicle through which knowledge is explicitly constructed would move toward aspects of ToM. As research from developmental disorders also show, children’s reasoning about mental states can be seriously affected when language presents alterations or delays (see, e.g., the studies with deaf children by de Villiers, 2005 or the recent meta-analysis on specific language impairment and ToM by Nilsson & de López, 2016). This developmental panorama, in which language would play an essential mediator role between the two variables, but stem from EC and later move toward ToM, would be compatible with theoretical models that highlight the role of the affective exchange within primary intersubjectivity and joint attention and understand language to be the cultural tool that will later make it possible to internalize knowledge (Vygotski, 1934/1986). In addition, the neuroconstructivist models, which include the dynamic relationships established between domains throughout development, would also serve as a framework to interpret these models. In our case, the close relationship between EC and language at 3 and 4 years old could indicate that the child is explicitly constructing the basis for EC through language. This relationship between EC and language at 3 and 4 years old could coincide with the differentiation process described by Widen (2013), which states that children start with two large emotional categories (feeling good and feeling bad). During these years, more precise linguistic labels are incorporated that allow them to differentiate emotions such as anger from sadness. Once this explicit EC is established, the child would use language for explicit aspects linked to ToM. In some way, the temporal relationships found between language and EC and ToM could reveal moments of representational redescription of this knowledge (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).

These results may also have important repercussions for practice and intervention. As recent studies from the neurocontructivist perspective point out, knowledge about the developmental patterns of the different processes, the moment when they emerge, and their relationships is vital in performing effective interventions (Edgin, Clark, Massand, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2015; Johnson, Jones, & Gliga, 2015; Karmiloff-Smith, 2015). Knowledge about these patterns would make it possible to plan interventions to influence the processes at the right time, thus increasing their efficacy. In this case, we can suggest that interventions with 3-year-old children should focus on making EC explicit and that from the age of four and five, they can work on contents related to ToM through language. Additionally, the relevance of language found in this study coincides with the findings of recent studies where language is established as a key element in development, due to its influence on other processes, such as executive functions (Allan & Lonigan, 2011; Lonigan et al., 2017; Valloton & Ayoub, 2011), or its important role as a mediator variable (Zadeh, Im-Bolter, & Cohen, 2007). These results show that linguistic development is a high-priority area for work in early childhood education and that teachers in these stages need specific training to optimize this development and detect alterations as soon as possible.

As in all studies, these findings must be interpreted with certain limitations in mind. First, the sample of children we followed is relatively small for this type of study and this limits the possibility of generalizing the findings. Future studies should increase the sample size. Second, the internal consistency of some measures was low (i.e., around .60) based on the reliability standards for research. This limitation has to do with the difficulty of measuring these constructs in young children. As we mentioned in the introduction, the amplitude of the constructs and the difficulty of working with young children causes that the measures are very scarce and not as powerful as they should be. Future research needs to continue working on the construction of reliable tests for these ages. Third, the pattern of relationships among CE, ToM, and language should also be studied in older children, considering more complex components of EC (emotion regulation, ambivalence, morality, etc.) and ToM (second-order false belief, irony, white lies, etc.). Fourth, both the incidental nature of the sample and the fact that is limited to Spanish preschool children affect the generalizability of the study findings. In the future, random samples belonging to different cultural environments could be tested to confirm the results. Finally, only child measures were considered, which may have contributed to common source variance and associations between the studied variables. Further research on the links between EC, ToM, and language using multiple informants and observational measures is warranted.

Despite its limitations, we believe that the present study provides important insights into the complex relationships among CE, ToM, and language. Much remains to be learned about the underlying mechanisms explaining the relations among these variables. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that EC precedes ToM in early childhood and that language may play an important role in the emergence of these two constructs and their relationship.

Supplemental material

Supplemental Material, JBD866907_supplementary_figure_1 - The longitudinal interplay of emotion understanding, theory of mind, and language in the preschool years

Supplemental Material, JBD866907_supplementary_figure_1 for The longitudinal interplay of emotion understanding, theory of mind, and language in the preschool years by Renata Sarmento-Henrique, Laura Quintanilla, Beatriz Lucas-Molina, Patricia Recio and Marta Giménez-Dasí in International Journal of Behavioral Development

Supplemental material

Supplemental Material, JBD866907_supplementary_figure_2 - The longitudinal interplay of emotion understanding, theory of mind, and language in the preschool years

Supplemental Material, JBD866907_supplementary_figure_2 for The longitudinal interplay of emotion understanding, theory of mind, and language in the preschool years by Renata Sarmento-Henrique, Laura Quintanilla, Beatriz Lucas-Molina, Patricia Recio and Marta Giménez-Dasí in International Journal of Behavioral Development

Theory of mind scale
Diverse desires	Children see a sheet of paper with a figure of an adult, a carrot, and a cookie drawn on it. “Here’s Mr. Gómez. It’s snack time, so, Mr. Gómez wants a snack to eat. Here are two different snacks: a carrot and a cookie. Which snack would you like best? Would you like a carrot or a cookie best? Well, that’s a good choice, but Mr. Gómez really likes (the opposite of child’s choice). He doesn’t like (the child’s choice). What he likes best are (the opposite of child’s choice).” Then the child is asked the target question: “So, now it’s time to eat. Mr. Gómez can only choose one snack, just one. Which snack will Mr. Gómez choose? A carrot or a cookie?”

Diverse beliefs	Children see a sheet of paper with a figure of a girl, bushes, and a garage drawn on it. “Here’s María. María wants to find her cat. Her cat might be hiding in the bushes or it might be hiding in the garage. Where do you think the cat is? In the bushes or in the garage?”“Well, that’s a good idea, but María thinks her cat is in the (the opposite child´s choice). She thinks her cat is in the (the opposite child´s choice).” “So where will María look for her cat? In the bushes or in the garage?”
Knowledge access	Children see an opaque box containing a small plastic toy inside. “Here’s a box. What do you think is inside the box?” (The child can give any answer he or she likes or indicate that he or she does not know). Next, the box is opened and the child is shown the content of the box: “Let’s see. It’s really a toy inside!” Close the box: “Okay, what is in the box?” Then a toy figure of a girl is produced: “Ana has never ever seen inside this box. Now here comes Ana. So, does Ana know what is in the box?”
Contents false belief	The child sees a clearly identifiable Band-Aid box with a plastic toy airplane inside the closed Band-Aid box.“Here’s a Band-Aid box. What do you think is inside the Band-Aid box?” Next, the Band-Aid box is opened: “Let’s see, it’s really an airplane inside!” The Band-Aid box is closed: “Okay, what is in the Band-Aid box?” Then a toy figure of a boy is produced: “Pablo has never ever seen inside this Band-Aid box. Now here comes Pablo. So, what does Pablo think is in the box? Band-Aids or an airplane?” “Did Pablo see inside this box?”

Task	Example
Identification	Let’s look at these three pictures. Can you point to the person who feels sad?

Causality	This boy (girl) is looking at his (her) little turtle, which has just died. How is this boy (girl) feeling? Is he (she) feeling nothing, sad or happy?

Desires	These two boys (girls) are very thirsty. The first boy (girl) loves Coca Cola, whereas the second boy (girl) hates Coca Cola. There is Coca Cola in the box. How is the first boy (girl) feeling when he (she) sees that there is Coca Cola in the box? Is he (she) feeling sad, happy, or nothing? How is the second boy (girl) feeling when he (she) sees that there is Coca Cola in the box? Is he (she) feeling sad, happy, or nothing?
Memories	This boy (girl) is very happy because his (her) mother is telling him (her) that they are soon going to the circus [turn the page]. Later on that night, he (she) goes to bed. The next day, he (she) is angry because his (her) brother (sister) is destroying his (her) a puppet. Later on that day, he (she) is watching a poster of a circus. How is the boy (girl) feeling when he (she) is watching the poster of the circus? Is he (she) feeling happy, nothing or angry?

	Time 1	Time 2	Time 3
Time 1	Theory of mind	—
Emotion comprehension	.46**	—
Language	.33**	.55**	—
Time 2	Theory of mind	.30**	.36**	.38**	—
Emotion comprehension	.23*	.30**	.30**	.10	—
Language	.32**	.55**	.63**	.42**	.34**	—
Time 3	Theory of mind	.23*	.46**	.50**	.41**	.28**	.50**	—
Emotion comprehension	.08	.15	.21*	.05	.11	.19	.25*	—
Language	.10	.43**	.60**	.29**	.20*	.43**	.39**	.03	—
Mean	2.25	1.94	48.31	4.00	2.82	44.17	5.43	3.18	54.53
Range	0–5	0–3.63	6–72	1–7	1.78–3.88	1–80	1–7	2.28–3.88	1–80
Standard deviation	1.28	1.02	18.41	1.50	.79	18.92	1.39	.72	21.76
N	95	95	95	100	100	100	101	101	101

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This study has received funding through research project EDU2013-45181-R and GV2016-136.

ORCID iD

Laura Quintanilla

Marta Giménez-Dasí

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

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Theory of mind scale
Tasks	Example
Diverse desires	Children see a sheet of paper with a figure of an adult, a carrot, and a cookie drawn on it. “Here’s Mr. Gómez. It’s snack time, so, Mr. Gómez wants a snack to eat. Here are two different snacks: a carrot and a cookie. Which snack would you like best? Would you like a carrot or a cookie best? Well, that’s a good choice, but Mr. Gómez really likes (the opposite of child’s choice). He doesn’t like (the child’s choice). What he likes best are (the opposite of child’s choice).” Then the child is asked the target question: “So, now it’s time to eat. Mr. Gómez can only choose one snack, just one. Which snack will Mr. Gómez choose? A carrot or a cookie?”

Diverse beliefs	Children see a sheet of paper with a figure of a girl, bushes, and a garage drawn on it. “Here’s María. María wants to find her cat. Her cat might be hiding in the bushes or it might be hiding in the garage. Where do you think the cat is? In the bushes or in the garage?”“Well, that’s a good idea, but María thinks her cat is in the (the opposite child´s choice). She thinks her cat is in the (the opposite child´s choice).” “So where will María look for her cat? In the bushes or in the garage?”
Knowledge access	Children see an opaque box containing a small plastic toy inside. “Here’s a box. What do you think is inside the box?” (The child can give any answer he or she likes or indicate that he or she does not know). Next, the box is opened and the child is shown the content of the box: “Let’s see. It’s really a toy inside!” Close the box: “Okay, what is in the box?” Then a toy figure of a girl is produced: “Ana has never ever seen inside this box. Now here comes Ana. So, does Ana know what is in the box?”
Contents false belief	The child sees a clearly identifiable Band-Aid box with a plastic toy airplane inside the closed Band-Aid box.“Here’s a Band-Aid box. What do you think is inside the Band-Aid box?” Next, the Band-Aid box is opened: “Let’s see, it’s really an airplane inside!” The Band-Aid box is closed: “Okay, what is in the Band-Aid box?” Then a toy figure of a boy is produced: “Pablo has never ever seen inside this Band-Aid box. Now here comes Pablo. So, what does Pablo think is in the box? Band-Aids or an airplane?” “Did Pablo see inside this box?”