Parental warmth moderates the relation between children’s lying and theory-of-mind

Abstract

Lying is a prevalent and normative behavior in young children. Conceptually, it is strongly linked with children’s theory-of-mind development. However, empirical studies show that the link between children’s lying and theory-of-mind is heterogeneous. This study examined whether parental control and parental warmth moderate the link between children’s lying and theory-of-mind understanding. Three- to six-year-old Singaporean children (N = 116, M_age = 59 months, 59 male, 81.0% Chinese) participated in the temptation resistance paradigm, in which they were asked to guess the identity of a toy but instructed not to peek at it when left alone. Parental control and parental warmth were assessed via a parent–child interactive game. Results showed that the relation between children’s maintenance of their initial lie and general theory-of-mind understanding was moderated by parental warmth. Specifically, there was a negative relation between children’s lying and theory-of-mind for dyads with high parental warmth, but a positive relation between children’s lying and theory-of-mind for dyads with low parental warmth. Overall, the findings suggest that children’s lying behavior is the outcome of a complex interaction between cognitive and social factors.

Keywords

Lying honesty parenting theory of mind parental control parental warmth

Children acquire the ability to deceive others early in life. They begin to tell lies to conceal their wrongdoings at as early as two years of age, and gradually become capable of lying for different purposes (Talwar & Lee, 2002; Wilson et al., 2003). Although lying is considered to be a milestone for children’s social and cognitive development (K. Lee, 2013; Talwar & Crossman, 2011), it is important to understand the potential social and cognitive factors underlying children’s lying given that problematic lying is linked with a series of maladaptive behaviors in late childhood (Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986). Because children need to understand the lie-recipient’s mental states to tell a successful lie, theory-of-mind is considered to be a significant cognitive contributor to children’s lying (K. Lee, 2013). However, empirical studies show that the relation between theory-of-mind and lying is heterogeneous (J. Y. S. Lee & Imuta, 2021; Sai et al., 2021). Therefore, this study sought to investigate whether parenting moderates the relation between children’s lying behavior and theory-of-mind, as well as shed light on the underlying social-cognitive mechanisms that drive children’s lying behavior.

Theory-of-mind refers to the ability to infer and reason about others’ mental states such as desires, beliefs, and emotions (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wellman, 2014). A hallmark of theory-of-mind development is first-order false-belief understanding (Perner et al., 1987), which is the understanding that others’ representations of an event may be inconsistent with reality. To tell a lie, children need to instill a false belief in others (K. Lee, 2013). Thus, first-order false-belief understanding is hypothesized to be associated with children’s tendency to deny a transgression (i.e., tell an initial lie) (Miller, 2009; Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002). Furthermore, to lie successfully by maintaining their initial lie, children need to understand the lie recipient’s beliefs. For example, children need to infer whether the lie recipient expects them to have certain knowledge based on their initial lie (Talwar et al., 2007). To do so, children need to be able to represent a belief about others’ beliefs, which is known as second-order false-belief understanding (Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar et al., 2007; Talwar & Lee, 2008).

Although the conceptual links between children’s theory-of-mind and lying are strong, empirical studies have shown mixed results. On one hand, there are numerous studies supporting this link. For example, Talwar and Lee (2008) found that children with better first-order false-belief understanding were more likely to tell initial lies, whereas children with better second-order false-belief understanding were more likely to maintain their initial lies. Ding et al. (2015) found that theory-of-mind training can enhance children’s strategic lying abilities, which provides further evidence that the link between theory-of-mind and lying could be causal. On the other hand, other studies show no significant association between theory-of-mind and lying. For example, Talwar, Crossman, and Wyman (2017) found that theory-of-mind abilities were not correlated with lies told for one’s self-interest or lies told for the interests of others. Through a longitudinal study, Talwar et al. (2019) showed that children’s theory-of-mind abilities cannot predict children’s initial lies in terms of denying their transgression. Furthermore, two recent meta-analyses showed that though there is a positive and significant link between theory of mind and lying, the effect size is small (around r = .20; J. Y. S. Lee & Imuta, 2021; Sai et al., 2021) and the proposed moderators (such as types of lying paradigms and theory-of-mind tasks) cannot entirely account for the heterogeneity.

This empirical evidence raises the question of why the link between theory-of-mind and lying is so heterogeneous. Since the moderators included in the two previous meta-analyses were largely focused on methodological factors not on social factors, several studies proposed that parenting style might moderate the link between theory-of-mind and lying (Sai et al., 2021; Talwar & Crossman, 2011, 2022). It is possible that once children acquire sufficient theory-of-mind ability to tell lies, their decision to lie may be largely influenced by whether they are motivated to tell a lie. The parenting style of a child’s main caregiver may therefore be an important social factor that affects a child’s motivation to lie (Talwar & Crossman, 2011; Tong & Talwar, 2021). For example, Talwar, Crossman, and Wyman (2017) examined whether parenting moderates the link between inhibitory control and lying in 3- to 6-year-old children. They found that authoritative parenting behaviors (firm control and a high degree of warmth) that discouraged lying moderated the link between children’s inhibitory control and both their propensity to tell an initial lie, as well as maintain their lies. For children with high authoritative parenting, inhibitory control was negatively related to their probability of telling an initial lie and positively related to their lie maintenance score. In contrast, for children with low authoritative parenting, inhibitory control was positively correlated with their propensity to tell an initial lie and negatively related to their lie maintenance score. However, as far as we know, no study has examined how parenting styles moderate the relation between theory-of-mind and lying.

Parental warmth and parental control are two theoretically independent dimensions of parenting styles (Baumrind, 1966; Deater-Deckard et al., 2011). Parental warmth refers to a parenting style that is marked by affection and acceptance (Deater-Deckard et al., 2011). According to the evolutionary account of the human affectional system (MacDonald, 1992), high levels of parental warmth cultivate a positive reward system, which can lead children to greater acceptance of adult values and a generally higher level of compliance. This was supported by several empirical studies. For example, parents with high warmth are more likely to show positive reactions toward children’s disclosure (Tilton-Weaver et al., 2010), and parental warmth makes children more likely to comply to please others (Grusec et al., 2000). It is possible that highly warm parenting can weaken the relation between theory-of-mind and lying. This is because children may be more motivated to garner praise from their highly supportive parents by telling the truth rather than by concealing information from their highly supportive parents (Polak & Harris, 1999), even if they are equipped with a sufficient level of theory-of-mind to tell lies. For example, common lab-based task used to measure children’s lying is the temptation resistance paradigm (TRP; Lewis et al., 1989), which involves eliciting a transgression (peeking at a forbidden toy), then asking children whether they had peeked at the toy (initial lie) and what they thought the toy was (lie maintenance). In the context of this lying task, children of warm parents may expect positive reactions from adult experimenters when disclosing minor transgressions. This may make them less likely to tell the initial lie (i.e., more likely to disclose the transgression that they have peeked the toy). Although some children may still tell initial lies for self-protection, children of warm parents may also expect positive reactions from adult experimenters in response to possessing accurate knowledge about the identity of the toy. Therefore, they may be less likely to maintain their lie (i.e., more likely to reveal their transgression by disclosing the identity of the toy) after initially lying to the experimenters. In contrast, children exposed to low or moderate parental warmth may have lower motivation to tell the truth and appear knowledgeable for the purpose of pleasing adult figures, who are unlikely to react with praise and warmth. Thus, the lying behavior of children of parents with low warmth may still depend largely on their theory-of-mind ability.

Parental control may be another parenting factor that moderates the relation between children’s theory-of-mind and lying. Parental control refers to a parenting style that is marked by intrusiveness, pressure, and domination over children (Grolnick & Pomerantz, 2009). Ma et al. (2015) explored the relation between parental control and lying in 3-year-old Chinese children. They found that while parental control had a direct negative relationship with children’s tendency to tell an initial lie, the link between parental control and children’s lying behavior was also significantly mediated by children’s theory-of-mind. Specifically, high parental control reduced children’s theory-of-mind, which in turn, reduced children’s lying behavior. However, their results may be limited to children with poorer theory-of-mind, as their sample consisted of 3-year-olds, whose theory-of-mind were typically not mature yet (e.g., Wellman et al., 2001). For children with lower theory-of-mind ability, it is possible that a high degree of parental control leads to a lower likelihood of lie-telling (as seen in Ma et al.’s (2005) results). However, for children with sufficient theory-of-mind ability to tell a lie, a high degree of parental control may instead strengthen the link between theory-of-mind and lying as it could potentially motivate children to tell more lies. There are several reasons why this may be the case. First, parents who are highly controlling may limit their children’s autonomy. Children with sufficient theory-of-mind to determine their parents’ knowledge of events may, in turn, be compelled to conceal their transgressions from their parents to restore their autonomy (Brehm, 1966). Second, parents who are highly controlling may also rely on the use of punishments or threats in response to children’s noncompliance (Legate et al., 2019), thus giving children fewer incentives to be honest about any minor transgressions they may have made. Therefore, compared to children with low or moderate parental control, children with a high degree of parental control may be more likely to tell lies with increased theory-of-mind ability.

Apart from parental control and parental warmth, the heterogeneity of the theory-of-mind and lying link might be due to the fact that the previous studies focus primarily on the role of false-belief understanding on children’s lying, even though general theory-of-mind may be more closely linked to children’s lying compared to false-belief understanding per se. Although children typically do not attain first-order false-belief understanding until the age of 4 (Liu et al., 2008; Polak & Harris, 1999), children’s lying for self-serving purposes (e.g., to conceal a wrongdoing, to avoid punishments) emerges at as early as 2 to 3 years of age (Evans & Lee, 2013; Leduc et al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2003). Likewise, while children attain second-order false-belief understanding after the age of 6 (Sullivan et al., 1994, 1995; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), the ability to maintain one’s initial lie begins to surface even before the age of 6, with about one-third of children younger than 6 years of age capable of maintaining their lies during the follow-up questions (Talwar & Lee, 2008). Given that theory-of-mind encompasses conceptual acquisitions beyond false-belief understanding, such as diverse desires and diverse beliefs (Flavell & Miller, 1998; Wellman & Liu, 2004), it is likely that instead of first- and second-order false-belief understanding, general theory-of-mind may be required for children to engage in lying.

Several theoretical accounts point to the importance of general theory-of-mind abilities in children’s lying. General theory-of-mind abilities include the understanding that different people have and act on their own desires, beliefs, and knowledge, as well as an understanding of the discrepancy between real and displayed emotion (Wellman & Liu, 2004). As such, having general theory-of-mind not only allows children to represent lie recipient’s desires and beliefs, but also helps them to recognize gaps between their own and others’ beliefs, knowledge status, and emotions. To tell a lie, an understanding of diverse beliefs may help children to infer that others might have different beliefs when the true state of affairs is unknown (e.g., “I believe the toy is a bear, but he can have a different belief; he might believe the toy is a cat.”), such that there is room for them to instill a different belief in others. Similarly, children with an understanding of knowledge access recognize that what is known to themselves might not be known by the lie recipient, so it is possible for them to deny what they know. In addition, hidden emotion understanding could help children to recognize the gaps between real and displayed emotion, so that they are able to manage their facial expression and maintain their lie (Talwar & Lee, 2002). Thus, it is worthwhile to examine how general theory-of-mind understanding, instead of specific false-belief understanding, links with children’s lying.

Present Study

This study aims to examine whether parental control and warmth play a moderating role between children’s theory-of-mind and lying behavior. Consistent with previous studies on children’s lying (Talwar & Lee, 2002; Talwar, Lavoie, et al., 2017), we recruited 3- to 6-year-old children to participate our study. Children in this age group tend to lie more and have a better ability to maintain their lies (see Lee, 2013, for a review). Three- to six-year-olds’ theory-of-mind development also undergoes a dramatic development during this period (Wellman, 2014; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Lying behavior was measured using a version of the TRP (Lewis et al., 1989), in which children are asked to guess the names of animal toys by listening their sounds, then given the opportunity to peek the target toy when left alone. Children are motivated to turn around and peek at the toy as the toy’s sound does not correspond to its actual identity (e.g., instrumental music paired with a teddy bear). Children’s initial lying was operationalized as whether children who peeked at the toy confessed to peeking when asked whether they peeked, and lie maintenance was operationalized as whether children who told an initial lie disclosed the identity of target toy.

In contrast to existing studies, which employed the use of self-report questionnaires to measure parenting (Ma et al., 2015; Talwar, Lavoie, et al., 2017), this study used a logic game to elicit parent–child interactions (Hong et al., 2017; Tay & Ding, 2022). Interactions were videotaped and subsequently coded for parental control and warmth. The most evident advantage of using an observational method in assessing parenting is that such a method limits concerns about social desirability, which is likely inherent in parents’ self-reports of their parenting styles or practices.

Since this study aimed to examine how parental control and warmth moderate the relation between children’s lying and the general theory-of-mind (Wellman & Liu, 2004), the theory-of-mind scale was used instead of the classic false-belief task to assess the development of children’s general theory-of-mind ability in a comprehensive manner. In addition, we also measured children’s executive function and receptive language as covariate variables, as children’s executive function were found to be associated with theory-of-mind abilities and lying behavior (Carlson et al., 1998; Evans & Lee, 2011, 2013; Fu et al., 2018; O’Connor et al., 2020; Talwar & Lee, 2008; Williams et al., 2016), and language was found to be strongly associated with children’s theory-of-mind abilities (Astington & Jenkins, 1999).

Based on previous studies on parenting, theory-of-mind, and lying, we hypothesized that the relation between theory-of-mind and children’s lying depends on different levels of parental control and parental warmth. Specifically, when parental control and parental warmth are at low or moderate levels, there would be a positive relation between children’s theory-of-mind understanding and their tendency to tell and maintain a lie. In contrast, the link between theory-of-mind understanding and lying would be weakened with high levels of parental warmth, whereas the link between theory-of-mind understanding would be strengthened with high levels of parental control.

Method

The study was approved by the National University of Singapore’s Institutional Research Board (protocol number: S-17-139). Participants were recruited via personal contacts and recruitment advertisements on social media. Written informed consent from parents and verbal consent from children were obtained prior to testing.

This study was not preregistered. Power analysis was conducted to determine the minimum sample size required for a medium effect size (f² = .20) in an eight-predictor regression model with interaction terms. We used G*Power 3.1 (α = .05, power = .90) and determined a minimal sample size of 67 children who peeked and subsequently lied (Faul et al., 2007). The analysis of children’s lie maintenance requires that children peek at the toy and subsequently tell a lie. According to previous studies (Ding et al., 2023; Lee et al., 2013), around 75% to 95% of children would choose to peek at the toy and 70% to 80% of children who peeked would then choose to tell a lie. Thus, we aimed to recruit 120 valid participants for this study to ensure that we would have sufficient power to test the hypothesis about children’s lie maintenance.

Participants

A total of 142 parent–child dyads were recruited for this study. Twenty-six children were excluded from the analysis due to unwillingness to complete the tasks (n = 13), fear of being left alone in the room during the lie-telling paradigm (n = 10), inability to understand the executive function task (n = 1), or experimenter error (n = 2).

The final sample consisted of 116 parent–child dyads. Specifically, there were 27 three-year-olds, 34 four-year-olds, 30 five-year-olds, and 25 six-year-olds with an overall mean age of 59 months (SD = 12.5 months, range = 37–83). Child participants (59 male) were raised in Singapore and identified as ethnically Chinese (81.0%), Malay (6.0%), Indian (2.6%), or multi-racial (10.3%). Of the 116 parents, 93 were mothers. Parents’ highest level of education, which was a proxy for familial socioeconomic status, was as follows: 2.6% high school, 21.6% polytechnic diploma, 60.3% bachelor’s degree, and 15.4% post-graduate.

Procedure

All sessions were conducted face-to face at a research lab in a university. After a warm-up session, the experimenter conducted the TRP and theory-of-mind tasks with children in a counterbalanced order while the parent waited in a separate room. Thereafter, the parent entered the room for the parent–child interaction session, which lasted for around 15 minutes. Finally, executive function and receptive language were measured in a counterbalanced order via the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) and Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), respectively. At the end of the session, participants were debriefed and reimbursed.

Materials

Temptation Resistance Paradigm

The TRP (Lewis et al., 1989; Talwar & Lee, 2002) was used to observe children’s lie-telling behavior. Children were told that they were going to play a guessing game where they had to guess the identity of a toy animal placed behind them by listening to the sound that it made. They were also told that they could not turn around to look at the toy animal during the game. In two practice trials, the toy animals made distinctive sounds (e.g., a cat that meowed). Children were given feedback on whether they had guessed the identity of the animal correctly.

Next, the target trial was conducted. In this trial, a confederate deliberately interrupted the game by knocking on the door and asking to speak to the experimenter outside the room. Thereafter, the experimenter told the child that they would be outside the room for a short while and reminded the child not to turn around. The experimenter then placed the last toy animal on the table, played the audio cue, and left the room while the audio cue was playing. The toy animal in the target trial (i.e., bear) had a nondescript sound (i.e., instrumental song), making it tempting for children to turn around and look. The experimenter returned a minute after leaving the room and signaled their return with loud footsteps and a rattle of the door handle.

Peeking behavior

Children’s behaviors were recorded by hidden cameras. Children were coded as peekers if they turned to look at the toy animal, while children who did not look were coded as non-peekers.

Initial lie

Upon re-entering the room, the experimenter covered the toy animal with a cloth while reminding children to keep looking forward. Children were then asked the target initial lie question, “Did you look at the toy animal while I was outside?” Peekers who confessed to looking were coded as having told the truth, while peekers who denied looking were coded as having told an initial lie. Peekers therefore received an initial lie score of 0 (truth) or 1 (lie).

Lie maintenance

Thereafter, children were asked two follow-up questions: “What do you think the toy animal is?” and “Why do you think the toy animal is a [child’s answer]?” Children’s responses to each of these were coded independently by two trained research assistants and received either 0 or 1 points, depending on whether the answers implied their peeking behavior (see Supplemental Appendix A for the coding manual). Therefore, peekers who told an initial lie received a lie maintenance score that ranged from 0 to 2, and higher points reflected better lie maintenance. The intercoder agreement for children’s lie maintenance score was 95%. Discrepancies were discussed until the two coders reached 100% agreement.

Parenting Styles

Parental control and warmth were assessed through an observation task. The task used was Rush Hour Jr. by ThinkFun, a logic game consisting of a grid with toy vehicles. The goal of the game was to slide a target vehicle out of the exit by maneuvering other vehicles out of a gridlock. In this study, 24 novel and simpler puzzles were created so that 3-year-olds were able to solve them. Parents were told that the objective of this activity was for their child to win as many points as possible within 10 minutes and that they were able to help their child whenever they felt that it was necessary. Parents were first given two example puzzles to teach the game to their child. After teaching was completed, the experimenter started a 10-minute countdown, which was video-recorded for coding purposes.

This study’s coding protocol was derived from previous studies in the literature (Baumrind, 1991; Biringen & Robinson, 1991; Eisenberg et al., 2001; Grolnick & Pomerantz, 2009; Ispa et al., 2004). Specifically, parental control was operationalized as verbal or physical behavior that stopped or took over child’s activity, the use of demands or directives without explanation, domination of the game such that the child has minimal or no influence (Biringen & Robinson, 1991; Egeland et al., 1993; Ispa et al., 2004). Parental warmth was operationalized as tendencies and behaviors that are responsive, sensitive, and supportive to their child’s needs (Eisenberg et al., 2001). Examples of items for each of these dimensions can be found in Table 1.

Table 1.

Examples of Parental Control and Parental Warmth Coding Items.

Parenting dimension	Example
Parental control	Directives such as, “take your hand off the game,” “no, the pink one should stay here.” Grabbing the child’s hand or pushing the child’s hand away from the game Taking vehicles from child when child is solving the puzzle
Parental warmth	Parent praises child, e.g., stating in an emotional tone, “Wow! Way to go!” or “So clever!” Parent makes the child feel better when something is wrong or comforts child Parent physically expresses affection (e.g., giving a high five, patting a child on the back)

For every 1-minute block, coders observed the frequency and intensity of behaviors for each of the respective parenting dimensions to derive at a rating on a 5-point Likert-type scale. Parental control and warmth were both rated on 5-point Likert-type scales: 5 (extremely controlling/warm), 4 (very controlling/warm), 3 (moderately controlling/warm), 2 (slightly controlling/warm), 1 (not controlling/warm at all). Ratings for the ten 1-minute blocks were then averaged to provide an overall rating for each scale.

One of the authors (G.S.J.) coded all videos, while a trained research assistant coded 20% of the videos independently. Using Cicchetti and Sparrow’s (1981) guidelines, inter-coder reliability was excellent for both parental control (ICC = .857) and parental warmth (ICC = .809), suggesting that the coders demonstrated substantial agreement for ratings.

Theory-of-Mind

Children’s general theory-of-mind understanding was assessed using five subtasks (diverse desires, diverse beliefs, knowledge access, false belief, hidden emotion) in Wellman and Liu’s (2004) theory-of-mind scale. All children began with the diverse desires task and completed the remaining tasks in a randomized order. For each task, which was presented as a short story consisting of one or several characters, children were asked control questions, which checked for their memory of the story, followed by target questions, which assessed their theory-of-mind understanding. One point was awarded for each task if the child provided the correct answer to both the control and target questions. Total scores ranged from 0 to 5.

Executive Function

To control for children’s executive function, we measured children’s executive function using the DCCS task from the National Institute of Health Toolbox (Zelazo et al., 2013). In the DCCS task, a bivalent picture (e.g., a blue truck) appeared in the middle of the screen and children had to match the picture to one of two pictures at the bottom of the screen according to one dimension (e.g., color). Children first underwent a training phase and received feedback for their answers. After which, children underwent the test phase which consisted of non-switch trials and switch trials. In the non-switch trials, children were asked to match the bivalent pictures by one dimension. Children who passed the non-switch trials continued on to the switch trials, where they were asked to match the bivalent pictures based on one dimension and then switch to matching cards based on another dimension. Children’s scores on this task had a range of 0 to 10 and were computed based on protocol by Zelazo et al. (2013).

Receptive Vocabulary

To control for language abilities, the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test–Fourth Edition (PPVT-4) was used to assess children’s receptive vocabulary (Dunn & Dunn, 2007). For each item, children were shown four pictures on a slide and were asked to point to the picture that best corresponded to the word that they heard. The basal set was established when there was no more than one error in the first set of 12 items. The ceiling set was established when there were eight or more errors in one set of 12 items. Test administration discontinued when the ceiling set was established or when the child reached the final question. Children’s raw scores on the PPVT were norm-referenced based on Dunn and Dunn (2007) to obtain age-corrected standard scores (μ = 100, σ = 15).

Data Analysis Plan

To explore whether parental control and warmth moderated the relation between children’s lying and theory-of-mind, two hierarchical regressions were conducted. A logistic regression was conducted with children’s initial lie (lie = 1, truth = 0) as the dependent variable, while a linear regression was conducted with children’s lie maintenance (continuous variable with range 0 to 2) as the dependent variable. For both analyses, children’s age (in months), receptive language (age-standardized scores on the PPVT), and executive function (computed DCCS scores) were included as covariates. The main predictors for the first step consisted of: children’s scores on the theory-of-mind scale, as well as Likert-type ratings of parental warmth and parental control from the observed parent–child interaction. On the second step, interaction terms between the two parenting dimensions and children’s theory-of-mind scale were included in the model. In all models, children’s theory-of-mind scale scores as well as ratings of parental warmth and parental control were centered at their respective means.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

Descriptive Statistics

During the TRP, 93 (80.2%) of the 116 children who participated in the study peeked at the toy animal. Of the 93 children who peeked, 76 (81.7%) initially denied peeking when asked about whether they had done so. Of the 76 children who told an initial lie, the mean lie maintenance score was 0.5 (SD = 0.7). There were no significant associations between children’s gender and whether they peeked, χ²(1) = 0.02, p = .888, told an initial lie, χ²(1) = 0.57, p = .450, or maintained their lie, t(74) = 0.55, p = .582. As such, children’s gender was collapsed across categories for all subsequent analyses.

Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of study variables, as well as zero-order correlations and partial correlations controlling for children’s age.

Table 2.

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Study Variables (N = 116).

Variable	M	SD	Range	1	2	3	4	5	6
Age in months	59.0	12.5	37−83	—	—	—	—	—	—
PPVT	104.1	12.1	81−136	–.192*	—	.265**	.138	–.022	–.078
DCCS	4.0	2.2	0.3−7.7	.467**	.140	—	.136	–.109	.073
Theory-of-mind	3.6	1.2	0−5	.622**	–.014	.384**	—	.115	–.028
Parental control	1.5	0.8	1−5	–.073	–.007	–.130	.045	—	–.259**
Parental warmth	3.0	0.8	1−5	–.043	–.068	.044	–.048	–.255**	—

Note. Zero-order correlations are shown below the diagonal while partial correlations controlling for child age (in months) are shown above the diagonal. SD: standard deviation; PPVT: children’s age-standardized scores on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Fourth Edition); DCCS: Dimensional Change Card Sort task with a measurement range of 0−10.

p < .05. **p < .01.

Children’s Peeking Behavior

Children’s peeking behavior (peek = 1, did not peek = 0) was not predicted by age (OR = 0.99, b = −.01, p = .660), PPVT (OR = 0.96, b = −.04, p = .068), DCCS (OR = 0.86, b = −.15, p = .328), theory-of-mind (OR = 0.70, b = −.36, p = .219), parental control (OR = 1.82, b = .60, p = .161), or parental warmth (OR = 1.30, b = .27, p = .416).

Moderation Analyses of Parental Factors on Theory-of-Mind and Lying

Initial Lie-Telling

For the children who peeked at the toy animal (n = 93), a hierarchical binary logistic regression (Table 3) was conducted to examine whether parental control and warmth moderated the relation between children’s theory-of-mind and initial lie-telling. The predicted variable was whether peekers initially denied peeking during TRP (lie = 1, truth = 0). Two models were compared. The first model consisted of three covariates (children’s age, PPVT, and DCCS) as well as children’s theory-of-mind scale score, parental warmth, and parental control. The second model included two interaction terms, Theory-of-mind scale score × Parental warmth and Theory-of-mind scale score × Parental control, in addition to the first model’s six predictors.

Table 3.

Hierarchical Binary Logistic Regression of Children’s Initial Lie-Telling (n = 93).

	Model 1					Model 2
	b	SE	OR	95% CI	p	b	SE	OR	95% CI	p
Step 1
Child age	0.05	0.03	1.05	[–0.02, 0.12]	.135	0.05	0.04	1.05	[–0.02, 0.12]	.135
PPVT	0.05	0.03	1.05	[0.00, 0.10]	.044	0.06	0.03	1.06	[0.00, 0.11]	.035
DCCS	–0.22	0.16	0.81	[–0.54, 0.10]	.185	–0.28	0.18	0.75	[–0.64, 0.07]	.113
Theory-of-mind	–0.06	0.31	0.94	[–0.67, 0.55]	.847	0.14	0.34	1.15	[–0.52, 0.80]	.677
Parental control	0.07	0.35	1.07	[–0.61, 0.75]	.845	0.19	0.40	1.20	[–0.60, 0.97]	.642
Parental warmth	–0.33	0.40	0.72	[–1.11, 0.45]	.403	–0.64	0.45	0.53	[–1.52, 0.24]	.151
Step 2
Theory-of-mind × Parental control						0.39	0.35	1.47	[–0.30, 1.07]	.268
Theory-of-mind × Parental warmth						–0.72	0.41	0.49	[–1.53. 0.09]	.081

Note. SE = standard error; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval; PPVT: children’s age-standardized scores on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Fourth Edition); DCCS: Dimensional Change Card Sort task with a measurement range of 0−10.

A likelihood ratio test showed that the second model did not predict significantly more variance in children’s initial lie compared to the first model, χ²(2) = 4.45, p = .108. This suggests that overall, parental factors did not moderate the relation between children’s theory-of-mind and initial lie-telling. Specifically, the second model’s parameter estimates for the interaction between theory-of-mind and parental warmth (OR = 0.49, b = −.72, p = .081), as well as between theory-of-mind and parental control (OR = 1.47, b = .39, p = .268), were both not significantly different from 0.

A closer examination of parameter estimates in the first model shows that there was no significant association between children’s initial lie-telling and theory-of-mind scale score (OR = 0.94, b = −.06, p = .847). Similarly, neither parental warmth (OR = 0.72, b = −.33, p = .403) nor parental control (OR = 1.07, b = .07, p = .845) was related to children’s initial lie-telling.

Lie Maintenance

For children who told an initial lie (n = 76), a hierarchical linear regression (Table 4) was conducted to examine whether parental control and warmth moderated the relationship between children’s theory-of-mind and how well children maintained their initial lie. The predicted variable was children’s lie maintenance score (continuous variable with range: 0–2) for the TRP follow-up questions. Two models were compared. The first model consisted of three covariates (children’s age, PPVT, and DCCS) as well as children’s theory-of-mind scale score, parental warmth, and parental control. The second model included two interaction terms, Theory-of-mind scale score × Parental warmth and Theory-of-mind scale score × Parental control, in addition to the first model’s six predictors.

Table 4.

Hierarchical Linear Regression of Children’s Lie Maintenance (n = 76).

	Model 1					Model 2
	b	SE	β	95% CI	p	b	SE	β	95% CI	p
Step 1
Child age	0.02	0.01	.387	[0.00, 0.04]	.020	0.02	0.01	.354	[0.00, 0.03]	.026
PPVT	0.01	0.01	.147	[–0.01, 0.02]	.235	0.01	0.01	.131	[–0.01, 0.02]	.270
DCCS	0.01	0.04	.045	[–0.06, 0.09]	.734	0.02	0.04	.078	[–0.05, 0.10]	.539
Theory-of-mind	0.02	0.08	.044	[–0.13, 0.18]	.747	0.03	0.07	.072	[–0.12, 0.17]	.689
Parental control	–0.05	0.08	–.065	[–0.20, 0.11]	.550	–0.05	0.07	–.080	[–0.20, 0.10]	.516
Parental warmth	–0.15	0.10	–.172	[–0.34, 0.04]	.120	–0.17	0.09	–.175	[–0.36, 0.01]	.065
Step 2
Theory-of-mind × Parental control						0.07	0.07	.128	[–0.07, 0.22]	.299
Theory-of-mind × Parental warmth						–0.22	0.08	–.298	[–0.38, –0.05]	.011

Note. SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval; PPVT: children’s age-standardized scores on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Fourth Edition); DCCS: Dimensional Change Card Sort task with a measurement range of 0−10.

A likelihood ratio test showed that the second model predicted significantly more variance in children’s lie maintenance compared to the first model, F(2, 67) = 4.03, p = .022. A closer examination of parameter estimates in the second model shows that parental warmth significantly moderated the relation between children’s theory-of-mind and lie maintenance (β = −.298, b = −.22, p = .011). An analysis of Johnson–Neyman intervals (Figure 1) showed that when parental warmth (measured on a 5-point scale) was greater than 4.5, there was a significant negative relation between children’s theory-of-mind and lie maintenance. Conversely, when parental warmth was less than 2.3, there was a significant positive relation between children’s theory-of-mind and lie maintenance.

Figure 1.

Moderating Effect of Parental Warmth on the Relation Between Theory-of-Mind and Lie Maintenance (n = 76). Johnson–Neyman Intervals Show that the Slope of Lie Maintenance on Theory-Of-Mind is Significant (at α = .05) for Parental Warmth <2.3 and Parental Warmth >4.5.

In contrast, parental control did not moderate the relation between children’s theory-of-mind and lie maintenance (β = .128, b = .07, p = .299). There was additionally no significant association between parental control and children’s lie maintenance (β = −.080, b = −.05, p = .516).

Discussion

This study examined the moderating role of parenting on the relationship between children’s lying and theory-of-mind. The results partially supported our hypotheses: the relation between theory-of-mind and children’s lying was moderated by parental warmth. However, this only applied to children’s maintenance of their lies, but not to their tendency to tell the initial lie. In addition, parental control did not moderate the relation between children’s lying and theory-of-mind.

Different from previous studies, which employed the use of self-report questionnaires to measure parenting practice (Ma et al., 2015; Talwar, Lavoie, et al., 2017), this study used a parent–child interactive game (Hong et al., 2017) and coded two parenting styles (parental control and parental warmth) by observing parent–child interactions. This study provided the first evidence that parental warmth moderates the relation between children’s theory-of-mind and lying. Specifically, with a high level of parental warmth, children with higher theory-of-mind abilities were less likely to maintain their lies. Conversely, with a low level of parental warmth, children with higher theory-of-mind abilities were more likely to maintain their lies. The finding is consistent with Talwar, Lavoie, et al. (2017), which found that children with authoritative parents (a high degree of parental control and parental warmth) were less likely to maintain their lies compared to children with authoritarian parents (a high degree of parental control and a low degree of parental warmth). According to the evolutionary account of the human affectional system (MacDonald, 1992), parental warmth cultivates a positive reward system as it consistently provides a pleasurable affective response in children. It is possible that children with highly supportive parents learn that they will receive positive feedback if they are forthcoming when interacting with their parents (Zhou et al., 2002). Children may then also apply this social schema (i.e., general mental framework from their own previous experience) in novel situations when interacting with others (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Because children with higher theory-of-mind performance are better at understanding the social context and applying relevant social schemata in a novel situation, such children may be more likely to apply a positive social schema in their interactions with the experimenter and respond by telling fewer lies.

However, we did not find that parental warmth moderated the relation between children’s tendency to lie (i.e., whether children tell initial lies) and theory-of-mind. Although previous studies found that children’s first-order false-belief understanding is related to initial lying, while second-order false-belief is related to lie maintenance (Talwar & Lee, 2008), we failed to find any associations between initial lying and the general theory-of-mind ability. It is possible that the initial lying only entails the simple false denial of misdeeds, which does not require much involvement of general theory-of-mind ability (Talwar & Crossman, 2011; Walczyk & Fargerson, 2019). In contrast, lie maintenance requires children need to deliberately avoid semantic leakage. To maintain a lie, children need to recognize the knowledge gaps and difference in beliefs between themselves and their lie-recipients, such that they can instill a false belief to make the lie-recipient unaware of their transgression. Thus, lie maintenance may require the involvement of general theory-of-mind abilities.

Influenced by Grusec and Davidov’s (2010) control domain of socialization theory, most studies focus on exploring how parental control affects children’s lying behavior. Theoretical accounts suggest that parental control may be associated with more lying behavior in children (Tong & Talwar, 2021), while other studies found that parental control reduces children’s lying negatively via theory-of-mind development (Ma et al., 2015) or is moderated by children’s inhibitory control (Talwar, Lavoie, et al., 2017). This study was inconsistent with previous studies as results showed that parental control did not play a role in children’s lying nor moderate the link between theory-of-mind and lying. It is possible that this discrepancy is due to differences in the age of the studies’ samples. Ma et al. (2015)’s study only focused on young children (3-year-olds), while this study investigated a wider age group (3- to 6-year-olds). As previously mentioned, children continue to undergo dramatic shifts in theory-of-mind understanding past 3 years of age (e.g., Wellman et al., 2001). While the development of more complex theory-of-mind skills (e.g., false belief understanding) equips children with sufficient theory-of-mind to tell a lie, better theory-of-mind may also help children to better internalize their parents’ socialization practices of forbidding them to lie (Tong & Talwar, 2021). As such, in this study, parenting practices may have affected 3- to 6-year-olds’ motivation to lie rather than just their ability to tell a lie, and the opposing effects of these two mechanisms may have canceled each other out. Second, it is important to note that this study was conducted in Singapore, a city-state in Southeast Asia where parenting practices are influenced by traditional Asian child-rearing values (Cheung & Lim, 2022). As highlighted by Stewart et al. (2002), Asian parents typically use parental control as a means of maintaining harmony and this is often viewed as an expression of love and concern for their children. In contrast to western countries, studies conducted in many Asian countries show no significant association between parental control and children’s psychological adjustment (Dwairy & Achoui, 2010). Therefore, it is possible that children with high levels of parental control may not necessarily have a higher tendency to tell lies compared to those with low or moderate levels of parental control. Third, the non-significant result may also be due to the fact that parental control had a floor effect (e.g., 81.9% of parents were rated as not controlling at all) in this study. It is possible that only high parental control alters children’s lying behavior, and our data may not have had enough variability or representativeness to detect a moderating effect of parental control on the relation between children’s lying and theory-of-mind. Also, this variable (i.e., parental control) was obtained via a specific task in a lab setting, which might differ from how parents might behave in their everyday interactions with their children in naturalistic settings. This methodological difference might explain in part the inconsistency between the broader consensus that Asian parents’ tendency to use more control (although as an expression of love and concern) and the current observed floor effect.

Moreover, although several past studies have found that lying rates increase significantly between ages three and four (Lewis et al., 1989; Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002), this study did not find any effect of age on children’s tendency to tell a lie (i.e., initial lies). This finding was instead consistent with that of Talwar and Lee’s (2008) study, which also found no age differences in lie-telling to conceal a transgression. As such, it appears that the tendency to lie to cover up one’s misdoings remains consistently strong from the age of three and onwards. In contrast, age was found to be a significant predictor of lie maintenance. Specifically, as age increased, children were also increasingly able to provide plausible answers or feign ignorance to the follow-up questions, which asked what they thought the toy animal was and why they thought so. This finding is highly consistent with findings from Talwar and Lee’s (2008) study, which found that children’s ability to maintain their initial lie is related to their age, such that older children have better semantic leakage control than younger children.

Along with extant studies on the development of lying as a normative behavior in childhood (e.g., Visu-Petra et al., 2022), the present findings help to build a more comprehensive picture of how children learn to lie in a social context between the ages of 3 and 6. As pointed out by Talwar, Lavoie, et al. (2017) as well as Talwar and Crossman (2022), previous studies provided in-depth research on the relations between children’s cognitive abilities and the development of different types of children’s lying (Ding et al., 2015; Ding, Omrin, et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2018; Leduc et al., 2017; Talwar & Lee, 2008). However, as “lying is inherently an interpersonal social behavior,” taking social-environmental and cognitive factors into consideration can strengthen our understanding of how children’s use of this particular social strategy (Talwar, Lavoie, et al., 2017).

In addition, this study can shed light on neuroimaging research on dishonest behavior. Most previous neuroimaging studies focus on how cognitive control plays a part in dishonest behavior (Abe, 2009; Christ et al., 2009; Ding et al., 2013; Ding, Sai, et al., 2014). Thus, existing studies have examined the role of the neural cognitive control network in lying extensively, though recent studies have also begun to study how the neural reward system plays a part in spontaneous dishonest behavior in adults (Abe & Greene, 2014; Liang et al., 2021). As this study found that parental warmth might potentially serve as a positive reward system in children’s development of (dis)honest behavior, future studies could investigate how reward systems, along with the theory-of-mind network, play a joint role in the development of children’s lying behavior. This might help to elucidate the neural underpinnings and development of children’s deception.

Limitations and Future Directions

This study has several limitations. One limitation is that parental behavior may differ from one context to another. While parenting styles and behaviors displayed by parents are generally perceived to be consistent, Skinner and colleagues (2005) have asserted that it is possible that parenting behaviors differ from one interaction to another. In this study, parent–child interactions were only limited to a short period of 10 min for a single activity, which was communicated to them as a puzzle game in which they need to win as many points as possible. Arguably, if parent–child interactions were observed in a different context, or across a range of different situations, different parenting behaviors may be observed. As such, to gain a more comprehensive perspective of parenting behaviors, future studies may consider including additional tasks or observing parent–child interactions in natural settings (e.g., at home) so that the context of the parent–child interactions can be varied and other parenting behaviors can be observed.

In addition, although this study provided support for an association between parenting and children’s lying behavior to conceal a transgression, this does not rule out the possibility that this association is bidirectional. While levels of parental warmth and parental control might influence children’s lying behavior, children’s lying behavior may also influence the way a parent interacts with a child. However, given the cross-sectional design of this study, no conclusion about directionality of this association can be drawn. Future studies may thus consider a longitudinal approach to shed light on the nature of this relation between parenting and children’s lie-telling.

Conclusion

This study examined whether parenting is a moderator between children’s lying and theory-of-mind understanding. Results showed that the relation between children’s maintenance of their initial lie and general theory-of-mind understanding was moderated by parental warmth. However, we also found that parental control did not play any moderating role between children’s lying and theory-of-mind. Results provide empirical evidence that positive parenting practices are associated with optimal social and behavioral outcomes in children. The results also suggest that children’s lying behaviors are the outcome of the complex interaction between cognitive and social factors.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-jbd-10.1177_01650254231175835 – Supplemental material for Parental warmth moderates the relation between children’s lying and theory-of-mind

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-jbd-10.1177_01650254231175835 for Parental warmth moderates the relation between children’s lying and theory-of-mind by Xiao Pan Ding, Cleo Tay, Shu Juan Goh and Ryan Y. Hong in International Journal of Behavioral Development

Footnotes

Authors’ Note

This study was not preregistered.

Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available on the Open Science Framework (OSF) website ().

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The present study was supported by the Singapore Ministry of Education Tier 1 Grant (FY2019-FRC2-004) to X.P.D.

ORCID iDs

Xiao Pan Ding

Cleo Tay

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

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