Religious Nationalism in a Global Age

Introduction

The rise of religious factions is a pattern evident all across the globe. The sentiments of “tradition” have been politicized to fit the public discourse and now appear as ghosts of their former selves. The “new age” politics of religious affinity rely on global networks, global capital, global communications, etc., and yet somehow seem to be resisting the Western meta-narrative. Here too, the narratives of “nation” and the imaginaries of “patriotism” have not completely lost relevance. I argue that their convenient selection has a major role to play in defining the characteristics of religion, tradition and globalization. This article seeks to substantiate my claim using the specific case-study of Hindu nationalism. Taking the premises that the advent of modernity affected religion, gave birth to the modern nation-state and, more controversially, was the harbinger of the process of globalization, modernity can be used to understand religious nationalism at a global level. The role of collective insecurity, global networks and diaspora politics can be further understood in light of this framework.

It is interesting to note, here, that while religious nationalism has been brought about by the consequences of globalizing, owing to ontological insecurities and existential anxieties at an individual and group level, the intensification of religious nationalism also makes use of globalization. What I perceive as the gap in the theoretical exploration of this face-off between globalization and religious nationalism is that there is scant exploration of whether religious nationalism is against the “state” of globalization or against the “process” of globalization. This distinction between theorizing globalization as an end or as the means to an end has been made by scholars such as Robertson and White (2007), but its implications on religious nationalism has not been explored exhaustively.

In this article, we will be making a distinction between the two understandings of globalization and their individual bearings on the case of religious nationalism and attempt an analysis of how there are diverse implications of this cross-sectional approach:

As we have understood from the prior sections, religious nationalism can be theorized as a response to globalization. In this hypothesis, we understand “globalization” as a state of being. Thus, it would mean that religious nationalism seeks to act as a remedial salve against the growing individualism and the subsequent insecurities and fears of a globalized world. Here, the process of globalization is less important compared to the state the process is heading toward.

To sum up, religious nationalism is a response which seeks to remedy some of the conditions in the state of globalization within which it is a response against exclusion and marginalization but the same religious nationalism thrives in the growing networks which have a direct relationship with the processes of globalization. So, the basic question is: Is religious nationalism a response to globalization or a result of globalization? This is important to note since the interfacing between religion and globalization is not as straitjacketed as is made out to be. This intricate paradox, we will examine in the case of Hindu nationalism.

Religion, Nationalism and Globalization in the Context of Modernity

“Religion” can be defined in several ways. In a comprehensive review of the various definitions of “religion,” Victoria Harrison ¹ (2006) points to the “rival definitions” of religion. In fact, in the 1960s the attempts to define religion were considered futile! Perhaps the most widely rudimentary definition of “religion” would be the one that Durkheim (1915) stated – religion is a “unified” system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things (p. 37). By “sacred,” he meant things that were set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community and all those who adhere to them (pp. 40–41).

Wilfred Cantell Smith (cited in Harrison, 2006, p. 140) argued that the concept of “religion” was created by western scholars and superimposed on a variety of phenomena in order to unify them and categorize them. He even made a claim that religion was a divisive concept that made way for ideological formulations. In a way, he defined the “function” of religion. Peter Berger (1974) has made a useful distinction between substantive and functional definitions of religion. By substantive, he means an approach to understanding religion “from within” and in terms of its believed contexts, whereas a functional approach to religion would amount to a defining it in terms of its social or psychological functions. Geertz (1993) argued for an analysis of religion as a cultural system rather than one removed from it. I find this distinction that Berger makes very useful since it accounts for politico-religious movements as functional, thereby making a sociological analysis of the same possible.

Heelas, et al. (2005) in their book titled The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality have added to the plethora of literature on this subject by discussing the shift from a functional to a substantive “from within” approach to religion as is manifest in the growth of spirituality in the UK and USA. In a collection of essays that discuss the “spiritual revolution,” this book discusses the rise of contemporary religion which has intrinsic connections with globalization, modernity, secularization and sacralization. In this article, we will focus on the functional definition of religion.

Since the main argument of the article does not directly deal with the issue of modernity, a brief overview of the impact of modernity on nationalism and globalization will suffice here. According to Kaldor, “Nationalism, industrialisation and the modern state reinforce each other, although not always harmoniously” (2004, p. 163). However, I would further stress that while there are interconnections amongst these three concepts and modernity, it is pivotal to first assess the directions of causality. Has modernity given rise to the existence of the nation-state which has set in motion the process of globalization which, in turn, has caused religious revivalism all over the world? Is it as legitimate as it is intuitive?

According to Jaspers, there are four essential features of modernity that can be recognized: modern science and technology, a requirement of personal freedom, emergence of social movements, and globalization (1953). To this, some scholars have added other characteristics like “primacy of reason,” “development of capitalism” and “functional differentiation,” in the sense of the emergence of the nation-state and the recognition of different spheres within the society (Lambert, 1999). The concept of the “nation-state” is of particular interest to us here. The idea of nationalism and the idea of religion were approached as being antithetical till the rise of religious nationalism brought about a new framework to dictate thinking.

One can add the emergence of secularism with the increased separation of the state from the church to one of those central tenets of modernity without which it would be under threat. According to Taylor, the objective of secularism in the West, at least initially, was not to diminish the relevance of religion to public life. It was, in fact, directed at not supporting any particular religion over the other as an issue of public policy (Taylor, 1998). However, there exists an inherent paradox in this regard. As Juergensmeyer points out, in asserting that the nationalism of a country is secular, the nationalists require to have strong conviction in a secular culture as credible as a sacred one (1996, p. 13). Emerson problematized this nature of nationalism as having spread from the West to the East as a “by-product of imperialism” (Emerson, 1960, p. 158). The Western notion of secularism is, thus, a western assemble which was dispersed all over the world as it was “consciously adapted to particular situations” and not because it was universally applicable (Juergensmeyer, 1996, p. 16).

In a trenchant analysis of nationalism and religion, Brubaker (2012) has argued that religion and nationalism are “not” antithetical to each other; they can be, in fact, considered to be intrinsically related to each other. Citing the work of Carlton Hayes (1926), Brubaker argues that nationalism is a kind of religion and has a compelling emotion that is “essentially religious” (p. 3). Brubaker further analyses the work of Anthony Smith and demonstrates that according to Smith, nationalism is a religion both in a substantive and in a religious sense; “substantive” since it calls for a “this-worldly” collective salvation and “functional” since it involves a system of beliefs and practices that unite the adherents in a single moral community (pp. 4–5). Brubaker, however, ushers in an alternative framework to view religion within where social relations can be better understood. He claims that religion can be seen as providing a way of “identifying and naming fundamental social groups, a powerful framework for imagining community, and a set of schemas, templates and metaphors for making sense of the social world” (p. 6)

The modern nation states in the west were established through processes of economic integration, administrative homogenization and an equally prolonged process of territorialization (or nationalization) of identities and what Hansen refers to as the “production of the people” through the complex processes of indoctrination, education, enfranchisement and development of public spheres for communication, production of social interests and contestation of power (Hansen, 1996). This is where the relevance of marginalization, unrest and the clash of identities come to the fore. How do identities pan out in the standardized “public sphere” on which the premise of the nation-state is built upon? Is the public–private divide watertight? Again, are religion and nationality antithetical?

According to Gellner, nationalism which abides by the principle that the cultural and political unit is harmonious is flawlessly suited to the construction of a “modular man,” ² making possible smooth encounters with the grand state and the modern industry (1983). This aligns with what Hansen (1996) has argued. The “production of people” is sought by many a process. However, this overtly functional approach to understanding and explaining nationalism has been criticized by Kaldor for its neglect of the prominent principal-agency power relationships and hierarchies within the society at both national and local levels (2004). Furthermore, can there really be such a “modular man”? Even if we do ignore the sexist overtones of this conceptualization, the socio-cultural context of his context cannot be neglected. The consciousness of humankind cannot be attributed to rationality alone.

Taking this argument forward, there is a pattern that can be identified. The construction of the nation, replete with taking into account power relationships between principal and agency is focused on the construction of the nation-state from an “insider perspective.” What about the external factors, such as interdependence of “nations”? Giddens contends that the existence of nation-state, as espoused by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), presupposes “reflexively monitored relationships with other states” (Giddens, 1987, p. 263). What he means by this is that for a nation-state to proclaim authority over a certain territory, it requires the endorsement of other nation-states, and that this in itself characterizes a striking feature of globalization, namely, international interaction.

In this article, the premise that globalization is a by-product of modernization is accepted. Not denying the fact that international interaction preceded the existence of a modern conception of nation-state, as such, I think that the scale of globalization, along with its speed, that the period of modernity (and imperialism) have ushered in ³ have had unprecedented impact on the economic features of globalization. These consequences were supported by modern technologies, institutions and processes.

In terms of scale, the number of economic, political, and social linkages between societies is “greater than ever before” (Harvey, 1989, p. 4). In terms of speed, globalization involves a compression of time and space previously unparalleled. This has had ramifications in terms of cognition and perception of the globe as a smaller place—that events elsewhere have consequences for our everyday political, social, and economic lives, affecting individuals’ sense of being. In this context, Harvey’s words ring prescient, “It is this de-territorialization of time and space that influences routine life; in a world of diminishing territorial barriers, the search for constant time- and space-bound, discrete identities has become a way to handle the currents of modern life” (1989, p. 4). What do these identities comprise? Are they purely religious or ethnic? What about the contention and cry of postmodernists? Fractured identities and multiple identities cannot be overlooked either. Can these multiple identities exist in a modern public sphere? If so, how successful are they?

Religious Nationalism: A Response to a Post-national, Globalized World?

Eric Hobsbawm famously remarked, “the owl of Minerva, which brings wisdom (says Hegel) flies out at dusk; it is a good sign that it is now circling round nations and nationalism” (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 181). His main argument is that nationalism will be transitory in an era of globalization. This is somewhat concurrent and in alignment with other scholars like Castells (2008), Samuel P. Huntington (1998) and Beck (2005). ⁴

Anthony Smith (1995), on the other hand, contends that nationalism being observed in various parts of the world provides credence to the enduring nature of the national idea. This is somewhat an extension of the idea that nationalism—secular or otherwise—is a linkage that seals together the emotions of people (Juergensmeyer, 1996).

Robertson and Chirico (1985) theorized the interplay of religion and globalization almost two decades ago, arguing that the upsurge of religious and quasi-religious concerns and issues cannot be comprehensively analyzed in terms of what has been happening sociologically within societies and that globalization enhances, at least in the relatively short run, religion and religiosity (Robertson & Chirico, 1985).

Why and how does this eruption of religious fervor occur? One of the possible explanations is that while globalization in terms of increased movement of goods, services, technology, borders, ideas, and people has tangible social and economic attractions, some of its adverse consequences are manifest in increasing alienation and instability due to the effects capitalist development, privatization, urbanization, unemployment, forced migration, and other similar transformative forces that appear to be having a bearing on individual and collective lives (Kinnvall, 2004). Giddens argues that it is these global changes that have a major role in indicating that a fairly large number of people are beginning to find themselves devoid of relational connections that characterized communities earlier (Giddens, 1990).

The character of modern society, with its tacit inscrutability and rupture, has made the lives of more persons rootless, erratic, and “insecure as they are uprooted from their familiar social locale” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 744). The result has been escalating attempts to “de-modernize” in order to seek “reversal of the modern trend that has left the individual ‘alienated’ and beset with the threats of meaninglessness” Juergensmeyer refers to this religious affinity as being a “surrogate” for morality in a modern world where moral principles are diminishing rapidly (Juergensmeyer, 1996, p. 23).

In a survey of 26 European nations, Immerzeel and Tubergen found strong correlation tendencies between increasing levels of insecurity and increasing religiosity (2013). Kinnvall, too, supports the idea that existential insecurity can be used as a lens to view the changing emphasis on religious, politico-religious and other mass movements that form the epicenter of communitarian efforts, concerns and strategies (2004). Hansen further argues that interaction between religion and globalization has given way to a development of nationalism in non-West countries that endeavor to achieve equal footing, not despite of, but because of their assertion of difference, unity and strength (Hansen, 1996). However, this assertion has brought with it a homogenizing tendency in non-Western nations that reinforce the notion of “unity”.

Religion contains within itself an institutionally precise way to organize this modern type of collective representation. Friedland begets that religion does not change the nationalist form of collective representation. It does have a bearing on its content since it privileges a basis of identity and a criterion of judgment that cannot not be chosen (2002). However, religion, with its universal claims, is not inherently inconsistent with nationalism; “religious nationalism is not an oxymoron” (p. 385).

Looking at this argument from yet another angle, Smith asks a crucial question – why would you die for the nation? For Smith, the answer lies in the conditions of the existence of a “sacred” community of shared ancestry, memories, emotions, space, among others (1995). Going a step deeper (and further), Appadurai argues that perceptions of the evident regeneration of nationalism in recent times are not due to a notion of territorial nationalism; they “neither seek nor assume identification with the nation-state” (1996, pp. 165–166). Is it, thereby, justified to say that religion can fuel nationalism? And that this nationalism can be antithetical to globalism?

Thus, it can be inferred that movements that are politico-religious in nature and aspire to attain a popular fervor always center their energies on the nation-states in which they live and operate but the crux of the matter is clarifying the following dilemma: do they constrain their “message” to any territorial specificity? Different approaches to “globalization” will synthesize different results.

Hindu Nationalism—A Response to Being Globalized? ⁵

The concept of Hindu nationalism has been intensely discussed in modern Indian politics in both popular media and academic writings. Its supporters, on one hand, often represent it as the veritable manifestation of Indian nationalism vis-à-vis western notions of nationalism, per se and justify its tenets on the basis of the majority-minority binary; opponents, on the other, present it as the very reverse of the concept of nationalism arguing that a modern nation-state cannot be built on the premise of religiosity. A brief historical sketch of the evolution of Hindu nationalism in India will put matters in perspective.

The Hindutva movement in modern history or contemporary times can be traced to 1925 (Jaffrelot, 1999) with the founding of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) for “propagating Hindu culture” (Golwalker, 1939, p. 11). Before this, the main current of Hinduism can be found in movements of Arya Samaj and the Hindu Mahasabha. However, since these remained confined to religious aspects, and did not explicitly deal with politico-religious ones, the rise of Hindu nationalism in India is seldom attributed to these organizations.

Varshney (1993) argues the ideological underpinnings of this Hindu nationalist spirit arose not prior to but as a response to British rule in India (p. 232) and acted as a unifying factor thus having a much tougher hold. Other scholars, however, contend that the rise of Hindu nationalism was a construction that arose from the formation of the “other” (Jaffrelot, 1999) that was Muslim, not British. Pandey (1993) has argued, for instance, that it was in the 1920s in an atmosphere that was suffused with the militancy, institutionalization and spread of the “Muslim fervor” that the codification of Hindu nationalism first took shape. Some other scholars, meanwhile, outline how the contemporary politics of Hindu nationalism in India can be seen as a post-colonial attempt to overcome its inferior place vis-à-vis the West and an aspiration to be received in conjunction with the “superior” nations of the world (Hansen, 1996).

While this ethnocentric understanding of nationalism is essential, what is interesting to note in the case of Hindu nationalism is the relevance of territory. V.D. Savarkar, a prominent Hindu nationalist in the colonial period, believed that “India cannot be separated from the Hindu culture and the Hindu people” (Jaffrelot, 1999, p. 27). Savarkar’s understanding of territory was not a duplication of the Western construct of nationalism. Savarkar contended, instead, that “geographical unity, racial features and a common culture had already embodied in Hindus the spirit of nationhood, something that could not be separated from them and their fatherland” (Jaffrelot, 1999, pp. 27–28). More than anything, it was the focus on the common “blood” that made them a race. In other words, it was ordained that Hindus were a separate nation; a discrete entity:

The Hindus are not merely the citizens of the Indian state because they are united by common bonds of love they bear to a common motherland but also by the bonds of a common bond. They are not only a nation but a race-jati.…All Hindus claim to have in their veins the blood of the mighty race incorporated with and descended from their Vedic fathers. (Savarkar, 1969, pp. 84–85)

Apart from suppressing the right of Muslims, Christians, even Dravidians, among others, from claiming citizenship to India, Jaffrelot contends that Savarkar was basically “resisting the idea that nation-states can exist on the basis of a social contract” (Jaffrelot, 1999, p. 28). The social contract theory is one of the most predominantly modern paradigms of statehood today. Is this “resisting modernity”? Madhu Kishwar thinks not. According to her, the Sangh Parivar is attempting to homogenize the varied people of India because homogenization is a precondition to build India into a strong, modern nation-state modeled after twentieth-century Western European nations (Kishwar, 1998, p. 251). There is a very obvious paradox here and it brings to light the notion of “selectivity” that was discussed earlier. While certain paradigms of modernity have been resisted, others are accepted and actively encouraged by religious nationalism.

Returning to our focus on globalization (as a state of being), can we say that Hindu nationalism arose, or is arising, as a response to the anxieties, fears and insecurities of a globalized world? As in the case of the debate on modernity, Hindu nationalism also confronts a dilemma in this regard – how can the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) resolve the contradiction or the paradox that arises from wanting the financial and symbolic compensation that it has sought to obtain from foreign investment and diaspora connections while rejecting the modernizing elements in terms of symbolic globalization and the import of the neoliberal individual?

BJP supporters advocating privatization and deregulation policies are challenged by Hindutva sticklers opposed to neoliberalism and Western-style consumerism. Also, a fraction of the global Hindutva network are local organizers abroad who have adapted to diaspora contexts whilst BJP voters among Delhi’s lower middle-class feel threatened by foreign investment and are not happy with the BJP’s alignment with global economic patterns and demands (Karner & Aldridge, 2004). McDonald further asserts that economic prosperity, a substantial and strong state and a national identity are manufactured and imagined within Hindu nationalist discourse as critical for capitalizing on global modernity (McDonald, 2003). Varshney remarks that the existence of this “anxiety” in Indian politics today is shaping most of the contemporary political discourse in the country (Varshney, 1993). From these discussions one can see two dominant threads for future analysis: one, in the national sphere; and the other, in the international sphere.

In the national sphere, the notion that globalization is causing insecurities within Indian society which give rise to the need for Hindu nationalism is valid only to a certain extent. Five reasons contribute to the hesitancy to accept such a claim: First, Hindu nationalism in India is still dominantly political. Spiritual movements, even the explicitly “Hindu” ones, should be analyzed with reference to religious anxiety. Second, India is not yet globalized in the full sense of this term. The semi-globalized state of India makes it difficult to assess this question. Third, if we do accept the assumption that India is globalized, territorial transformations would be almost impossible without attaining the approval of the global community (the need for reflexivity). Fourth, the stance of the popular Hindu party in India, the BJP, with regard to globalization is uncertain, as we discussed in the preceding paragraph. Ultimately, the strongest justification for Hindu nationalism in national politics is that the Hindu majority has been discriminated against in the efforts to protect India’s minorities. There is more fear that the minorities will take over (Vanaik, 1997), than there is of insecurity surrounding globalization.

However, the case of Hindu nationalism abroad makes for an interesting analysis vis-à-vis globalization and its existential crises. Contemporary globalization has ushered in widespread transnational migrations, transnational connectedness and deterritorialization (Narayan, Purkayastha & Banerjee, 2011). This leads to political participation by the migrants in the host countries. Indian–Americans, for instance, are said to “adopt and operate an edition of an ethno-religious identity that positions them within the rubric of racial politics” (Kamat & Mathew, 2003). Racial groups tend to synthesize and affirm their respective ethnic identities by using history, ideology, beliefs and practices as “cultural gear” which tactically are used to endorse a sense of ethno-nationalism (Nagel, 1994). The discourse of Hindutva provides the immigrant community with social values, cultural capital and identity. It thus can be argued that a globalized liberal and multicultural space energizes the yearning for a special identity, which does not align with the mainstream identity (Kamat & Mathew, 2003).

To extrapolate, fundamentalist ideologies are able to capitalize on the exclusion felt by some people in liberal societies, and they thus are finding a niche for themselves in the social order. Rajagopal (2001), however, takes a more nuanced approach in arguing that “in finding a niche for themselves, these immigrants tend to adopt a more syncretic culture rather than a sectarian religious outlook” (p. 244). This situation also results in generalized and simplistic forms of Hinduism becoming the norm; a form of “homogenization” you might say.

The paradox here is this: the will to “distinguish” onself turns into an unavoidable “sameness,” and the will to create a separate identity results in an identity that is lacking in nuance. How does this process of identity formation occur? The most obvious answer is the role played by the media in identity formation (Rajagopal, 2001). Apart from the media, the role of networks – local and global – has been pivotal in disseminating ideas regarding ethnicity, nationality and culture, among others. This aspect of globalization will be analyzed in the next section.

Hindutvaat Home and Abroad

Manuel Castells has argued that the nature of society in a globalizing world is best characterized as being a “network” (2000). There are two implications implied in this characterization: there is exclusion from the network and the power relations within the network. This can be the result of marginalization owing to a lack of access to the nodes of the network and the modes of networking, since the latter is based more on a tug-of-war. In this age of global processes, the benefits of which accrue mostly to the North (or the West), exclusion and marginalization build up resentment amongst communities. In fact, Karner and Aldridge argue that “this exclusion from the network coupled with a lack of power gives rise to the most potent forms of resistance to globalization, such as Christian and Muslim fundamentalisms” (2004, p. 18).

In analyzing the networks that facilitate the intensification of Hindu nationalism, there is a difference between domestic networks and international networks. The functions of these networks vary vastly in these two arenas as will be analyzed; and the depth of these networks is also lopsided. ⁶ Since this article deals with the global context of Hindu nationalism, the stress will be more on the international networks. But first a brief summary of the domestic networks is needed.

A series of domestic political and cultural organizations has arisen to carry out the cultural and political venture of constructing a Hindu identity for Hindus and non-Hindus (Kamat & Mathew, 2003). The task of building a “Hindu Rashtra” (Hindu nation) is their universal goal. The central activity for promoting and showcasing Hindutva ideology is the reproduction of the RSS (Hindi: “National Volunteer Organization”). The RSS is structured into local units in which young men are trained in physical education and are imparted certain aspects of Hindutva ideology (Kamat & Mathew, 2003, p. 10). Once they are trained, these young men are given responsibilities for managing and administering organizations that range from day care centers and play schools to trade unions and political groups on university campuses (Noorani, 2000).

Apart from the RSS, parties like Bajrang Dal, which is a paramilitary group, the BJP, which is a major parliamentary party and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), which is a worldwide organization of Hindus—are all part of the Sangh Parivar (Hindi: the “Family of Sangh”), which is a family of Hindu nationalist organizations which have been started by members of the RSS. Other organizations like Shiv Sena, (meaning “Shivaji’s Army” – a Marathi regional and Hindu nationalist political organization) are either associated with the family or share some of the same ideals.

While this organizational pattern appears to be deep-seated in a thoroughly radical ideology, there are organizations within its scaffold like the Sewa Vibha, which “provides rehabilitation and other public services like schools for poor, blood banks, organized tours of temples, homes for widows, etc” (Kamat & Mathew, 2003, p. 11). Two important aspects emerge from this networked feature of the Hindu nationalist factions in India: First, that while the production of Hindutva ideology is brokered by a network that has a wide spread across classes (Rajagopal, 2001, p. 263), there is a contention that the Hindutva ideology is an elitist project. Second, the movement has a dual purpose agenda—some facets of the network have an outwardly political and public role, while others engage in ground-work and grassroots-level voluntary organizing, thereby taking the mammoth project to the ground level. Whether or not globalization as a process or an outcome has facilitated this penetration of Indian society there is little empirical evidence. Certainly, transnational communications have played a phenomenal role in the transfer and flow of information. However, the question is how much impact do they have? Is there any empirical evidence that globalization has indeed contributed to them? This is what needs more research in light of the rise of religious nationalist politics in India.

While the domestic networks do provide a reference for us to understand the level of complexity involved in the workings of the Hindu nationalist parties, the international networks that are emerging in the process of globalization have an interesting facet. The analysis of religious revivalism can no longer be restrained within the boundaries of a single nation-state rather it has to be mapped across national boundaries (Narayan, Purkayastha & Banerjee, 2011). While earlier, cultural ties were given priority as a lens for examination, owing to features like cultural hybridity and the multitude of second-generation immigrants, it is “symbolic ties” today that have taken primacy as a means of understanding not just host–home networks (Dasgupta, 1997) but also host–host networks (Narayan, Purkayastha & Banerjee, 2011). Appadurai contends that because of the increase in the modes and nodes of communication and the fluid identities of audiences, individuals are blending relations with each other across national boundaries, which is disquieting for conformist traditions about the link between cultural affinity and political identity (Appadurai, 1996).

It can be argued that symbolic ties are bolstered by the presence of institutions of domestic origin in other countries. In the case of Hindu nationalism, the presence of the VHP and RSS in foreign nations like the USA and UK is not insignificant. The organized Hindu Right in the US for the first twenty years of its existence (1970–1990) placed the emphasis on the VHP of America. The VHP of America disseminates knowledge on the “Hindu way of life” through publications, seminars and lecture tours for visiting spiritual personalities keeping alight their agenda to affect upon receivers “a Hindu outlook on life.” In addition to these activities, they form a network of contacts and affiliations with other Indian religious and social organizations in the US, and often their own members may occupy prominent positions in these other organizations. Thus, its influence extends well beyond its enrollment. In the last few years the VHP of America has grown rapidly, from having a presence in thirteen states to maintaining branches in more than forty states (Rajagopal, 2000).

The most obvious form of interaction between non-resident Indians and resident Indians in a global scenario is the transfer of flows of finance. In context of the Hindu nationalism, the global Hindu community is known for financing many of its activities ⁷ through the transnational transfer of money from “the Diaspora to the Homeland” (Bhatt, 2000). While the monetary aspect of home–host networks has been buoyant since the time of the freedom struggles in India (Rajagopal, 2001), the aspect of networking is gaining a lot of dominance in the past decade especially through that of the internet and other forms of media.

Cyberspace has emerged as an acute intermediary for the fabrication and deployment of networks and, consequently, identities (Diamandaki, 2003). Some scholars argue that the internet has emerged as an occasion for the minority members to make public their frustration and discontent regarding negative conduct they face on the basis of their religion and nationality. This is met by constructing discrete ethno-religious and ethno-nationalist identities (Narayan, Purkayastha & Banerjee, 2011). Several studies have revealed that the internet presents global and transnational platforms to schematize political triumph and produce social networks that offer political, cultural and social sustenance for community participants (Gibson, 2006). Mitra (1997) and Mallapragda (2000) argue that the internet provides the immigrant Indian population a comfort zone where they can correspond freely and openly without facing marginalization. The excesses of marginalization owing to global migration are thus combated.

However, scholars also note a paradox that while the internet does garner hybrid, diverse opinions, it also attracts homogenous groups with standardized agendas (el-Nawawy & Khamis, 2010) thereby facilitating the propagation of stereotypical, generalized and simplistic notions of whichever concern. This is exactly what Nandy had hypothesized with regard to Hindu nationalism in India (1998). According to Nandy, Hinduism being a “way of life” cannot be captured within a single group. The existence of a lot of diversities and sub-diversities within this religion makes any generalization redundant and antithetical to its very essence.

Appadurai characterizes the global culture as being one in which the homogenizing tendencies and the heterogenzing tendencies tend to “cannibalize” each other (1990). This sort of a non-Binary understanding is what characterizes religious revivalism in the post-modern era and I wholeheartedly agree with Appadurai on this account.

In a study of discourse and networks of ethnic student organizations in the USA and UK (Narayan, Purkayastha & Banerjee, 2011), three conclusions were revealed: one, virtual ethnicities with regard to Hindu nationalism have been fashioned by discourses that flow through well-strung networks of relationships over dispersed locations; two, the importance of the “homeland” is waning slowly in favor of communication technologies, communal identities and diaspora communities; and three, even while Internet inspires decentralized, autonomous communication channels, it enables privileged groups to exploit their resources to dictate the web-discourse, provided that technology is accessible. The study also validated the hypothesis that homogenized, simplified messages of Hindu nationalism tend to “drown out the more nuanced, diverse and measured forms of religious practice” (p. 533).

Is this feature of networks a nature of the globalization process or a permanent feature of the state of globalization? The requirement for a reasonably foolproof distinction arises when trying to structure public–policy with regard to secularity and religion. Keeping in mind the vastness of international networks and global circuits, the impact of public policy can be far-reaching and expansive. In this scenario, the diaspora and domestic concerns regarding religious nationalism have to be addressed. The knot, thus, arises when we attempt to analyze a global phenomenon without first comprehending if the phenomenon is a process or an outcome. If religious nationalism is a response to the globalized outcome, the approach of public policy has to be directed at, say, placating the concerns of a vulnerable, marginalized group. If religious nationalism is, on the other hand, a trend which makes use of a globalizing process, it is important to unearth the origins and directions of these processes and networks in order to impede a catastrophe of national and international scale. Whether secularism is a well-suited term for India is a debate of less relevance today. At a truly global platform, what is of more relevance is an overarching framework of well-oiled machinery to foster cultural hybridity and harmony whilst combating narrow agendas of cultural or religious homogenization.

Conclusions

To sum up: first, there is no consensus on whether globalization is an end in itself or a process. The conceptions of globalization in which it is viewed as a “snowball effect” or a cumulative progression appear to provide the best understanding of globalization. Each stage of globalization can be seen as an outcome leading to another outcome which would then make the dynamism a process. In this view, religious nationalism appears to be brought about as a response to globalization, but is propagated and intensified by the process of globalization.

There are many patterns that we are witnessing today with regard to religious nationalism.

One of these patterns is religious revivalism combined with nationalism. But definitions of territoriality tend to get fuzzy in the context of globalization since the globalization process tends to emphasize extra-territorial and de-territorial spaces. Thus, there is a dire need for theoretical frameworks that encompass these different tendencies.

While theoretical frameworks have been forged with regard to understanding the relationship between insecurities and religious revivalism, one wonders if this relationship describes the case of Hindu nationalism well enough. For one thing, while some scholars do suggest that Hindu revivalism appears to be at least in part a response to colonial rule, the rise of Hindutva seems to favor global capital flows, opening up trade barriers and other economic factors associated with globalization, not oppose it. This has resulted in some tensions within the constituent elements of the Sangh Parivar.

Hindu Nationalism is still submerged in a more political outlook than a religious one. This makes it a challenging case to scrutinize with regard to only religiosity. Spiritual movements that have flowered in India and abroad should the new topic of interest to religious scholars. The interplay of globalization and religion can be seen clearly in the case of spiritual movements. However, more research is needed in this direction.

Networks and institutions, including political parties in India, appear to have a homogenizing effect on Hinduism. While globalization tends to prompt the “voice of the marginalized,” the power relations within globalized networks are such that the majoritarian view dominates popular discourse. Whether this feature of networks is an inherent characteristic of the globalization process and/or a permanent feature of the state of globalization is an important question with regard to the context of Hindu nationalism.