The Syrian Opposition: Salafi and Nationalist Jihadism and Populist Idealism

Abstract

The debate over international responses to the Assad governments continued barrel-bombing and lethal use of chemical weapons centered on the dominance and agenda of ‘extremists’ in the Syrian opposition and their role in a post-Assad Syria. With 1,500 groups and significant inter-conflict, the future of the popular revolution that originated with non-violent, idealistic civilian demonstrators cannot be foreseen with any certainty. The Supreme Military Command of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was created in an effort to better coordinate its efforts. There were many tensions between the FSA and salafi-jihadist groups which were blocked from the FSA’s distribution system. These salafi-jihadist groups are stigmatized internationally due to their expansion, brutality and actions towards minorities and women in their areas of control. There were also secular or at least, anti-sectarian elements of the Syrian opposition. The Syrian population may well reject the harsh sectarianism and imposition of ‘Islamic rule’ by salafi-jihadists in a post-Assad era. Or conversely, Islamist elements might prevail.

Keywords

Arab Spring Syria Syrian Revolution Bashar al-Assad Islamic State ISIS Jabhat al-Nusra Syrian opposition

The Syrian revolution began with nonviolent protests around the country in the spring of 2011 emulating the events in Tunisia and Egypt. As the government of Bashar al-Assad responded with ferocity against civilians including children, in the early summer of that year some Syrian troops and officers began defecting from the army, joining armed groups to fight government forces. Expatriate Syrians in the Gulf States and elsewhere raised money to aid civilians as well for the armed groups. The international jihadist movements also raised fighters and funds to battle Assad, though they had little else in common with the originally nonviolent civilian movement.

Across the Middle East and South Asia, the importance of paramilitary and non-state actors and militias has grown and their strategies and behavior in the Syrian revolution and Assad’s response are important to track. Ariel Ahram proposed a theory about the nature of military organizations, which partially applies,¹ as Syria’s centralized military was decreased by a third to a half through defections, non-deployment of suspect Sunni forces, and reallocation of resources to national militias, snipers, and other private or warlord-led militia elements (the shabiha, literally ghosts). Both the state military and revolutionary armed groups became multidivisional actors who operate with narrower militia-like loyalties. Just as the logic of counterterrorist measures against jihadist or former military armed groups animates Assad’s responses, so also do the populist and representational aspirations of these groups illustrate some commonalities with jihadists elsewhere and guerrilla paradigms generally.

The medieval rulers of the Middle East, when not gathering armies through tithe (the devshirme, or boy tax of the Ottomans) or slavery (the ghulam armies of the Safavids), sweetened the pot for fighters through land-grants, such as the iqta` system (a land-grant and revenue assignment) in the Sham (Hodgson 1974, p. 49). In my own interviews with members of non-state fighting actors in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq,² I found that economic motivations animate fighters, but not as much as does ideology. Yet, many fighters rely on organizational salaries or stipends which tend to prolong conflicts. This suggests that economic measures (absorbing militias into salaried militaries and security services) should have an important role in solving irredentist, and ‘revolutionary’ instances of armed violence. However, in Syria, the battle to overcome Assad’s military and paramilitary forces is by no means won.

An estimated 1,500 groups are fighting Assad’s military in Syria. No one knows the precise size of all rebel groups as estimates of jihadist groups surged,³ including the Kurdish anti-Assad groups, they numbered about 113,000–115,000 (Congressional Research Service 2014) in the fall of 2013, and expanded until the present. Before the conflict began, the active personnel in Syria’s armed forces were 295,000 with another 314,000 reserves. The paramilitary forces were 108,000 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011). These were hit by defections to rebels, and losses of anywhere from 44,000 to 80,000 deaths in battle, but Assad is also supported by 80,000 National Defence Force paramilitary members (created after the conflict began), Hezbollah’s fighters are estimated at 8,000 and various Iraqi and Iranian groups numbering about 9,000.

Those affiliated with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which is actually a conglomerate of many groups, from 65,000 to 80,000⁴ (Lister 2013), were ordered by external funders to distance themselves from the salafi-jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra,⁵ and fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS). They had been under the authority of the Supreme Military Command under East-German-trained commander General Salim Idris (Sly 2013) and acknowledged the Syrian National Coalition for Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Lund 2013).⁶ Idris was relieved of command in February 2014 (Aron Lund 2014) and was replaced by BG Abdul Ilah Bashir al-Nuwaymi. The FSA had been estimated at about 80 per cent of fighting forces and the forces of the Jabhat Nusra and the ISIS increased in comparison, until the United States declared war on the latter in the fall of 2014, greatly complicating the rebels fight against Assad.

The FSA under the previous joint command had suffered from the rivalry between the Saudi and Qatari funders who sponsored different individuals within the leadership and the coordination office, triggering the anger of other combatants (O’Bagy 2013, pp. 13–14). The Qatari–Saudi rivalry also undid a subsequent five-front command effort and Qatari–Saudi rapprochement preceded the newer structure. Ultimately, the new command enhanced cross-provincial cooperation, and with new strategies and additional media and social media coverage (for example the coverage of the campaign to capture highways and military air bases) (O’Bagy 2013),⁷ to explain them, and various brigades enlarged their operations. Headway was made against Assad’s forces, which controlled only 30–40 per cent of the Syrian territory as of the summer of 2013 (Ben Hubbard 2013). The FSA coordinated with Jabhat Nusra, and Nusra also ran its own five-brigade effort in Damascus to push Assad out of certain outlying areas such as Darayya; his forces had not recaptured Aleppo, Syria’s largest city by the time of writing and have lost Idlib, Palmyra, Deir az-Zor, Raqqa, much of Hassakah, and areas in the south. However, the war declared by ISIS on Nusra, and then by an international front led by the US on ISIS (and some groups in Nusra), has complicated the rebels’ efforts.

Earlier, the forces in the north of the country obtained greater operational freedom and better supply lines (O’Bagy 2013, pp. 29, 33). Heavy weapons originating in Croatia reached the FSA, moving over the Jordanian border in February 2013, and aiding the rebels’ progress in Dara`a and Damascus provinces.⁸ In September, revolutionary forces thought the US might strike Assad’s chemical stores, which would have dealt a military and psychological blow to the regime. That initiative was turned over to the US Congress, where it dissipated, and Russia seized the moment to propose destruction of Assad’s chemical weapons and push for a political solution. The Supreme Military Council (SMC) of the FSA then awaited the Geneva II talks, which were postponed and then failed. Meanwhile a broad counter-council of salafi-jihadist groups had formed that reject any political solution forged with Assad; they had decried the Geneva II talks as treasonous (YouTube 2013). Certain groups were disbanded for example, the Ahfad al-Rasul, a Qatar-supported group whose 7,000–9,000 fighters began participating in the Syria Revolutionaries Front and the 1st Coastal Division.

As of late 2014, the US backed Syria’s armed opposition and groups within the FSA, such as the Hazzm movement, which collapsed and joined Islamist factions. Still the U.S. began training a force intended to combat both ISIS and Nusra, and also Assad’s forces.

Islamist Elements in the FSA

Many elements of the FSA are Islamists and declare their engagement as jihad. Not all are linked to al-Qaida (Lister 2013). Each group was loyal to its own commander and numerous splits have resulted in new groupings. Earlier, the Syria Islamic Liberation Front contained 19 groups including the Kata’ib al-Farouq Islami (Islamic Farouq Battalions, established in Homs/Hama) and the Kata’ib al-Faruq (al-Faruq Battalions, established in Homs), Liwa al-Islam (Islam Brigade, established in Damascus), Suqour al-Sham (in Idlib and Aleppo), Liwa al-Tawhid (Tawhid Brigade, mainly in Aleppo), Fath Brigade (also in Aleppo), and the Deir al-Zour Revolutionaries’ Council.⁹ The groups varied ideologically; the Suqour al-Sham under the leadership of Shaykh Ahmad Abu Issa was more hard-line than the Kata’ib al-Faruq.

The Farouq Battalion (est. 2011) defended the Baba Amr neighborhood in Homs against the Syrian military until February 2012 and then fought in Qusayr against the Syrian forces and Hezbollah in April/May 2013. After its leader, Abu Razzaq Tlas was discredited in August of 2012 (al-Abdeh 2012), two other leaders (Amjad Bitar and Bilal al-Jurayhi) were expelled who formed the Farouq Islamic Battalion.¹⁰ Abu Sakkar (Khalid al-Hammad) shocked many when he bit the internal organ of a dead soldier on video and promised to eat the military’s hearts and livers (Brown Moses Blog 2013b; BBC 2013). Syrians who understood the regime’s brutality against all dissidents, including the 1979–1982 uprising (as alluded to by filmmaker and former prisoner, Muhammad Malas in Night¹¹) or against the current political prisoners, were not as surprised by Abu Sakkar’s gesture.

Salafi Jihadist Groups

Salafi jihadist groups emerged in Syria in the 1990s, although salafism has a lengthy history in Syria (Commins 1990, pp. 34–88). The Muslim Brotherhood are salafiyyin (reformers) and are more dominant in Syria’s externally based opposition than inside Syria since they were exiled and repressed under Hafez al-Assad¹² (Al-Jaba’i 1994, p. 88).¹³ Their dispersion into exile profoundly weakened the group and left it incapable of assuming leadership of the armed movement as a whole, although some are members. A large number of the former Syrian National Council were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, as were the former Hazzm group (originally the Harakat Zaman Muhammad) within the FSA, some of whom were allegedly trained by Americans in Jordan. Unlike, Nusra or ISIS, Hazzm signed the Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitments, promising to respect humanitarian norms (NOW 2014).

The salafi-jihadist groups obtained recruits in transit from Iraq and Jordan following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and from international salafi-jihadists¹⁴ from many countries (see Peters 1996, pp. 120–121 for lengthier discussion of jihad). The Syrian intelligence services allowed jihadist activity in Syria until a crackdown in 2007, when state security assassinated Shaykh Abu al-Qaqaa (Mahmud Gul Aghassi), the mentor of Fatah al-Islam, who had called for jihad against US forces. The jihadists are not the sole religious current in Syria—many in the FSA are not salafists; others are not jihadists, the Zayd Sufi movement supports the revolution as does Shaykh Muhammad Ratib al-Nabulsi and his students (Abu Rumman 2013) and a Sufi militia has also formed under foreign leadership.

The Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS were originally allied with al-Qaida in the Islamic State of Iraq. Recent claims attribute the group to an intelligence agent of Saddam Hussein (Reuter, 2015). They emerged from a split between Nusra’s leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who formed ISIS (later claiming its name was the Islamic State) and declared himself, Caliph. Nusra’s origins were in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s network, al-Qaida fi bilad al-rafidhayn, which contained Syrians and who established mudhafat (guesthouses) in Syria for travelling jihadists; still others like al-Baghdadi were incarcerated by the Americans in Iraq. The popularity of the ISIS is also a Sunni response to former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s supposed kowtowing to both the US and Iran (Ghaddar 2015). According to some, more Syrians are employed by Nusra than in ISIS, which has killed greater numbers of civilians and members of other sects than Nusra (Kayed 2013). A group allied with Nusra, the Free Jazira Brigade in the northeastern Yarubiyya area were the Shammar tribesmen (Heras 2013).

The Nusra’s philosophy is that: ‘the only way to establish God’s law on earth is through jihad and fighting’. Their second requirement ‘is loyalty and disavowal…anyone who embraces this ideology is a Muslim brother who they must support. However, anyone who violates these beliefs is an infidel and an apostate, and they must disown him’ (Kayed 2013). In 2012, the leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi altered his group’s name to the ISIS and declared both groups unified, but Al-Jawlani resisted and the two groups separated.

The ISIS claimed popular support and pursued a ‘soft campaign’ including public speeches, games, singing of inshad (poetic, religious lyrics), cantaloupe eating, Quranic recitation, and distribution of food and fuel since May 2013 in Aleppo and Raqqa provinces (Zelin 2013, Part I). Yet, long before ISIS’s eruption in Iraq in summer of 2014, it also required full covering and niqab (face veil) of women, burned churches, attacked local non-salafi activists and spread sectarian discourse against the Nusayris (Alawites) and liberals. The ISIS executed three Alawites in mid-May, and killed two alleged apostates in the middle of June in Deir az-Zur, killed two boys charged with heresy in towns in Aleppo, threatened people who did not fast during Ramadan, and cut off tobacco products (ibid. Part II). On November 8, 2013, the ISIS killed an Alawite family near Salamiyah as they harvested their olive crop. Soad Nofal, a former school teacher, part of the Local Council of Raqqa and a nonviolent revolutionary, demonstrated against ISIS every afternoon standing alone, as ISIS condemned her (Global Voices 2013).¹⁵ Perhaps to satisfy Western governments and prior to the scheduled international meetings in Geneva, the FSA and the new Islamic Front began to battle ISIS in the Aleppo province in early January 2014 (Simon and Dumalaon 2014). This effort was unsuccessful, and meanwhile ISIS gained strength and territory in Iraq, resulting in the air bombing of its positions in Iraq and Syria, lengthy battles with the Kurds in Kobane and Iraq’s ground troops elsewhere.

Jabhat al-Nusra (estimated at 6,115 in 2014) similarly aims for an Islamic state, and reinstating shari`ah, is opposed to democracy and calls all who participate in elections, kuffar (unbelievers) (Benotman and Blake n.d.). Nusra uses suicide bombers and vehicle-mounted bombs against militarily-held structures or buildings. It is critical of Syria’s non-Islamist and Kurdish revolutionaries, and considers the Druze, Alawis and Ismai’ilis to be as derelict as Ja`afari Shia. Nusra was involved in the assassinations of Syrian state media figures. In contrast with Nusra’s goal of an Islamic state, a woman fighter of the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) explained that her movement wants a unified Syria, which includes Arabs and Kurds (Beals 2013). Nusra has been a highly effective force in challenging Assad (as has been ISIS). The Syrian revolution’s political leadership was highly critical of the US-led coalition strikes on Nusra, against a so-called Khorasan group within the organization, and of air strikes which hit another brigade, as well as the lack of coordination with the FSA in attacks on ISIS (Ghanem October 2, 2014).

Another large group was Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya that claimed 10,000–15,000 (Free Halab 2013). Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS earlier had 7,000–10,000 fighters¹⁶ but ISIS was said to double in size with its expansion in Iraq, and to be triple previous estimates. In Aleppo, Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa-l-Ansar was aligned with ISIS and operated under the leadership of Chechen, Abu Omar al-Shishani. The Muhajirin included fighters from the Islamic Caucasus Emirate, Azerbaijan, Britons, Europeans, and North Americans. It unleashed suicide attacks on the Minnigh airport outside Aleppo (Bill 2013), capturing it in August of 2013.

A coalition, the Jaysh al-Islam (est. 5,000 up to 50,000), excluded the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra but included fighters from other previous groups. Led by Zahran al-Aloush, a former Liwa al-Islam commander, it reportedly received some Pakistani training and Saudi sponsorship (Black 2013). However, these were not ‘moderates’ according to some; the group acted like ISIS according to certain communities, and hungry Syrians demonstrated against it in November of 2014.

Some observers distinguished organizations such as Ahrar al-Sham as a ‘nationalist salafi-jihadist’ group compared to Jabhat al-Nusra’s globalist or ‘internationalist salafi-jihadist’.¹⁷ Some of its founders were held in Sednaya prison and released in May of 2011. One member said that about half the group’s members were Syrian and the others foreign, including some of their trainers. Funds came from the Gulf States (Saudi Arabia and Qatar) while arms were purchased from Turkey, Chechnya, and elsewhere (Daloglu 2013). In the summer of 2013, Ahrar al-Sham together with Jabhat al-Nusra began a second offensive against Assad’s forces the Aleppo Central Prison to free some 1,000 opposition prisoners (Asharq Al-Awsat 2013), a seemingly unwinnable operation resulting in fierce fighting in the first half of October 2013.

Foreign recruitment has been motivated by salafi beliefs in active (war fighting) jihad as a duty of Islam. The conflict has fueled global jihadism and vice versa. Various governments are trying to prevent the movement of would-be jihadists to Syria. However, many succeed, as did a Saudi engineer, who left his job to join the jihad.¹⁸ The actual number of foreign revolutionary fighters is unclear.

If 10,000–20,000 foreign jihadists have travelled to Syria, then the country is a jihadist magnet more powerful than Afghanistan or Yemen (Wong 2013). This gives some grist to those who want a settlement to Assad, as opposed to the much larger number of Syrians who fear him, and his allies, and want him excluded from any role in a future government. A US Congressional report said that an estimated 7,500 foreign fighters were in Syria as of February 2014¹⁹—at the time of writing this may have increased to 20,000. Yet, only either 326²⁰ or 600 foreign fighters were killed in Syria in the first half of 2013. Out of several thousand salafi-jihadists in Jordan, perhaps 700 or 800 have travelled to Syria and about 100 were killed there.²¹ (Ma’ayeh 2013, Kamal 2013, Jordan Times 2013, Tammimi 2013). Numbers of Tunisian (first at 600, then 2,400 (Al Arabiya 2014) or 3,000 according to Peter Neumann at International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) at King’s College (ABC News 2014)), Saudi Arabian (Al Sabiyi 2013),²² Libyan, Jordanian (500–800) and Iraqi fighters are significant. Supposedly, 1,000 Turks are fighting for ISIS (Ceylan Yeginsu 2014). In July 2013, a Russian source claimed that 100 Chechen fighters were in Syria (Kommersant 2013). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has identified 100 American Muslims fighting in Syria, France has identified 150 French jihadists, and the Spanish government arrested Wahhabists in Ceuta who sent 50 fighters to Syria (Di Giovanni 2013). The British authorities estimate that 200 UK nationals are fighting in Syria (Cuffe 2013, October 15) but have only positively identified 20 (Jenny Cuffe 2013); and 20 Dutch fighters, mostly of Moroccan descent, were in Syria (with six killed) led by Abu Fida’a (Batrawi, Samar 2013); Swedish Security Services estimate 30 Swedes travelled to Syria to fight. Fighters have also arrived from Australia, Pakistan, and many other countries.

Hard-line salafi-jihadists often utilize sectarian themes and slurs as do their foreign supporters. Fighting Alawis, and Shi`i fighters such as Hezbollah, or those considered munafiqin (hypocrites, false Muslims) or kuffar (infidels) is as strong a rationale for them as protecting Syrian citizens. The regime itself is by no means free of sectarianism despite its propagandistic use of the Ba`athist slogan of Arab unity.²³ Hence the recruitment of Alawi members of the national militias and the Assad regime’s assertion that children were kidnapped from Latakia to be gassed with sarin by the ‘rebels’ as made by Bouthaina Shaaban, political and media advisor to Bashar al-Assad (Vale 2013). While some Alawis support the revolution, it is estimated that a third of all Alawi men of military age have been killed defending the Assad regime.

Sectarianism and sectarian fears fund inter-revolutionary conflicts as between the YPG, Kurdish militias, and Nusra, and Assyrian and Turkmen groups also in the al-Hassakah province. The YPG, which includes female fighters, and despite its shared opposition to Assad, has fought many battles with Nusra. The Supreme Kurdish Committee seeks to lead civil governance in those areas ceded by the Assad government. One might anticipate similar efforts, if Isma’ili (Salamiya) or Druze (Suwaida) communities are not amenable to salafi-jihadist control.

Confronting the Enemy

The rebels took on a superior force in that the Syrian air force and army have weaponry they lacked (they have recaptured some) and have massively bombed by air. The Popular Committees now operating as the National Defense Forces, which have a vigilante orientation, are paid by the Assad government. Fighting with Assad are Iranian military groups, Iraqis and Syrian Shia fighting in the Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas (Damascus), and fighters from Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq, Kata’ib Hizb Allah (Iraq’s) the Badr Organization, Harakat Hizb Allah al-Nujaba (Harakat al-Nujaba), Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and possibly fighters from Muqtada al-Sadr’s Liwa al-Yum al-Mawud (Smyth 2013a), as well as the fighters of Hezbollah of Lebanon. To confront the enemy, strongly idealist beliefs in the power of change, and value of a political transition, or jihadist values must outweigh the very high human cost of the conflict, disease, hunger, and deprivation, paid not only by fighters but also by civilians.

Appeals to the international jihadist movement are enunciated in weekly addresses by leaders like Abu Musab of the Muhajirin. He requests donations and du`ah (post-prayer entreaties to God) toward the creation of an Islamic state. Abu Musab’s British accent is noticeable as well as specific religious phrases known to non-Arabic as well as Arabic speakers.²⁴ YouTube videos document battles, attacks on civilians, weapons and tanks captured by the fighters, as well as sermons by the group’s leaders, or specific messages by commanders or groups while Facebook and videos are used for the groups’ martyrology—martyrdom operations or memorials to dead fighters. Jabhat al-Nusra’s media channel is called Manara al-Bayda (the white minaret, the Messiah will appear at the end of the world next to this minaret of the Ummayad mosque in Damascus) and the videos are also advertised on media network Shamikh al-Islam, a well-known al-Qaida forum. Branding assists recruitment for the organization. The ISIS releases its videos via the al-Furqan media including interviews with martyr Abu Abd al-Rahman Faransi (a French convert) and others. References to the Caliphate abound, global maps show the entire Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region under ISIS black banner color and slogans. Ahrar al-Sham shows banners, whinnying Arabian stallions, and training exercises at its camp in Raqqa also to a soundtrack of inshad (religious anthems).²⁵

Both the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra use Twitter very effectively. The ISIS supporters swiftly provide news or propaganda to sympathizers. Both ISIS and Nusra utilize human rights and civil society movements’ documentation of Syrian suffering into their own lexicon, and to show they defend the Syrian people. The same documentary effects are employed by tweeting YouTube videos or sometimes to communicate leadership’s tactical decisions (Prucha and Fisher 2013). Sectarian rhetoric also permeates jihadist social media.

By contrast, Syria’s nonviolent revolutionary supporters and those who support Assad’s overthrow but who are not linked to armed groups also circulate powerful messages of resistance, solidarity and political will via the media and social media, directed at each other and external audiences. They confront the accusations of critics that Syria’s revolution is too cruel a hardship for its population with evidence of the inhumanity of the regime which long predates the current uprising.

The Political Economy of Syria’s Shifting Military Landscape

The Syrian path to revolution cannot be explained properly by claiming that financial devastation under neoliberal policies induced the population to revolt. Nor did the military drop its support for Bashar al-Assad in favor of maintaining or regaining stability like Egypt’s military.

Under Bashar al-Assad, state-business networks were established or modernized, a stock exchange was introduced in 2009, and joint ventures in 2010. The main economic beneficiaries of Syria’s political system under Bashar who alluded to a ‘New Syria’, have been a small core of about 100 individuals which includes political leaders, entrepreneurs, senior army and intelligence officers (or retirees) followed by a second strata of their own sons and relatives and a third strata of business tycoons (and other politicians) (Haddad 2012, pp. 64, 86; Grawert 2013). All stand to lose substantially should Assad fall. The new crony neoliberal capitalism was supposed to flourish and discourage political protests. However, that neoliberalism was shallow and did not substantially benefit Syria’s military as an institution, or the lack of political reform was unbearable for a large segment of the population (Zuhur 2015). The Syrian army chose the defense of the president, while Egypt’s chose the defense of the nation. Nonetheless, many defections from the Syrian military attest to weaknesses in the institution, and belief that the government would not survive the revolution.

Lebanon had served as Syria’s second economy through military and other smuggling networks and as a destination for migrant workers. With those ventures disrupted with Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2004, many lost income, but some military officers were able to participate in new businesses as Syria liberalized the economy. As protective tariffs were lifted, Syrian manufactured products faltered and rural areas suffered drought and from the lack of state development schemes (Hinnebusch 2012, pp. 7–8)—all adding to increased discontent with the government, according to those favoring an economic explanation. Once the military overreacted against the peaceful youthful demonstrators in Dara`a, Syria at the outset of the revolution, other components of rural discontent kicked in (and in other parts of the country). These citizens could not be (and were not) bought off. When Bouthaina Shaaban called for alleviating the misery of rural areas (economically), the people of Dara`a responded with anger to her through public demonstrations because the regime had killed their young teens and children: “Yâ Buthayna, yâ Sha‘bân, sha‘b Dar‘â mÛ jÛ‘ân” (Oh, Bouthaina Shaaban, the people of Dara`a are not hungry). Instead of admitting to the massacres of nonviolent protesters, apologizing for them, or embarking on political reform, the government focused on identifying the opposition as conspirators and terrorists. In the countless demonstrations held since March 2011 in every part of Syria, the populist idealism of the demonstrators who demand change has been the strongest fuel.

Funding

Funding for the FSA has come from Syrians themselves inside and outside of the country; from the governments of Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia (Barnard 2013), Qatar, and Lebanon (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2013, p. 330); from France, Germany, Italy, the United States, Great Britain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (Sofer and Shafroth 2013); and from various supportive Muslim communities outside of Syria. The US funds were for nonlethal assistance and set aside for arming Syrian rebels but rebels denied receipt of weapons (Starr 2013). The US more recently promised up to $4 billion in aid for a new force of moderates to fight ISIS. The US secretly funded opposition groups and Syrian expatriate activities back at least to 2011, although not weapons (Al Jazeera 2011) for fighting groups, which nonetheless had come over the Turkish border from other sources (Abouzeid 2012). More than 70 partners including European nations have pledged or sent funds via the opposition group, the Friends of Syria. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations recognized the need to fund opposition fighters’ salaries (Torchia and Klapper 2012), and had previously allowed donations to be collected by private citizens and other Islamic fundraising networks are operating worldwide. Greater impediments to transfers to the FSA appear to exist than with private sponsors of salafi-jihadist groups, who were reportedly better funded and equipped.

As areas are liberated from government control, the militias are reliant on external funding, but also stand to benefit from the oil and gas trade, and various forms of smuggling, including antiquities.

Nonviolent Civilian Revolutionaries

A significant unarmed revolutionary movement also exists, made up of groups such as Nabd (established in June 2011), and the collective effort called Freedom Days (est. October 2011), the Union of Free Syrian Students (est. September 2011), the Kurdish Youth Movement (est. 2005), Syrian Revolutionary Youth (est. May 2012), and the collective Freedom Days efforts (est. in October 2012) as well as the 128 local councils of civilians that try to provide services in liberated areas (Shrooms 2013). These groups illustrate ‘worthiness and commitment’ and embark on campaigns similar to what Charles Tilly described for effective social movements (Tilly 2004, p. 3).²⁶ While some of these groups claim to be nonpolitical, they are also very divided ideologically, didactic and suspicious of other players’ motives, especially concerning the issue of support for the armed revolution.

However, these nonviolent actors have been extremely vulnerable to the Assad governments’ detentions and physical attacks and collective punishment imposed on civilians deemed to be supporting the opposition. The liberated areas rely on fighters to maintain ground, and the nonviolent activities of the civilian unarmed revolutionaries are more for their own morale, gaining no ground against Assad. Therefore, the revolution relies on the fighters’ ability to make gains, and retain areas already liberated. While there is much discussion about imposing civilian control over transitional areas, and plenty of trainings offered on that topic in Turkey, armed groups contest such authority sharing. Their political authority stems from control over coercive force. Charles Tilly pointed out that there is little difference between criminal extortion and coercive state forces (Tilly 1985); hence, these non-state actors may be as ‘legitimate’ as civilian leaders, or more legitimate than the Assadist bureaucrats they have replaced.

The external political opposition is also engaged in war with the Assad regime, primarily in the media and in their lobbying efforts toward foreign governments, but they are not extensively discussed in this paper, although they have tried to exercise control over the armed movement. Ironically, they may well lead a future Assad-less Syria, but fighting will continue and will in fact determine the outcome of the conflict.

Spillover

Spillover from the Syrian conflict into Turkey and Lebanon has already occurred, as well return migrations of refugees into Iraq, and other refugee outflows seriously impacting Jordan, Iraq and Turkey. Simultaneously, salafi-jihadism originating outside of Syria, but perhaps most tellingly from Jordan and Iraq, is impacting the revolution and intergroup competition in Syria. Support by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, groups emanating from the IRGC such as the Sariyya Tal`ia Khurasani (Smyth 2013b), Hezbollah and Russian advisers are extremely important for the regime, The above-mentioned Jordanian salafi-jihadists have escaped repression in Jordan. In fact, counter-terrorist measures in the region appear to have spurred greater rather than less recruitment into Syria, notably into ISIS.

Spillover into Lebanon is also a secondary dependent outcome of the conflict. The salafi-jihadi phenomenon there was connected to specific Syrian intelligence operatives with the growth of Fath al-Islam in the Palestinian camp of Nahr al-Bared in 2007. Fatah al-Islam prisoners in Roumieh in Lebanon were able to communicate with salafi-jihadists in Syria, there were some prison breaks, and released Fatah al-Islam leader Khalid Mahmoud and an associate have sent Lebanese youth for training to Syria (Mortada 2013; Shams 2013). The outgrowth of differing camps on the Syria conflict, refugees, and Hezbollah followers has led to clashes in Tripoli and Sidon with Lebanese army attacking the compound of Shaykh al-Assir, bombings in the dahiya of Beirut and kidnappings all over the country. In November 2013, a Lebanese and a Palestinian together bombed the Iranian embassy in Beirut killing 25. On January 2, 2013, a Lebanese Sunni drove a car bomb to a Shia area, Hrat Hreik, in southern Beirut targeting civilians, killing four and wounding 77 (Blanford 2014). This came just a week after a car bomb killed eight people in Beirut including Mohamed Chatah, the former finance minister. Chatah had strongly opposed Hezbollah and Syria’s actions in the country.

Jabhat al-Nusra formed a Lebanese branch (Aziz 2012; Al-Monitor 2013), first under Saudi, Majid bin Muhammad al-Majid, and now consisting of Ain al-Hilweh and Tripoli branches (Saab 2013).²⁷ However, spillover has also occurred reactively because of Hezbollah’s activism in Syria and the Syrian military’s frequent aerial strikes on Lebanese towns such as Arsaal in the Biqa` and with the tit-for-tat kidnappings which occurred there, and elsewhere in country. The conflict is destabilizing to Lebanon, which has now disallowed Syrian refugees from entering into the country without visas (unobtainable by any). This came about due to the concerns over many dramatic events such as ISIS’ and Nusra’s seizure of hostages from Lebanon’s army, whom they beheaded, and because Lebanon is incapable of sustaining and indeed is failing the huge number of Syrian refugees now present.

A prisoner exchange in late October 2013 in which kidnapped Turkish pilots were exchanged for Hezbollah fighter (‘pilgrims’) seized by revolutionaries and also Syrian women activists held by the Assad government was revealing. This initiative was not credited to allies of Assad like the late October release of civilians in Mouadamiyya who had been subjected to starvation in a lengthy siege. Rather, the three-way deal was brokered by Qatar and the Palestinian Authority (Guardian 2013), further evidence of the regional scope of the conflict.

The actors who most needed to exercise political leadership over the revolution—the Syrian National Coalition—have not done so, despite their close ties with funders, and regional and international powers. Those leading the struggle are actually the military forces. Liz O’Bagy (2013), as an advocate for the US support of the FSA, showed that the FSA, like the salafist-jihadists had demonstrated an effective use of military strategy by using tactics that will be difficult for Assad’s forces to counter.

By contrast, the political leadership in exile was not able to deliver arms from Europe or the US, nor was it able to impose civilian leadership in transitional areas held by the revolutionary forces.²⁸ Thus, various schemes and recommendations that the political leadership capture or exercise leadership in liberated areas are all very well—but these are not the liberators—leadership of transitional areas is wielded by military forces, despite local civilian revolutionary efforts in some areas.

Where Are Women in the Revolution and the Armed Groups?

The Assad regime and its supporters term revolutionaries ‘rats’, and takfiris, their bodies, ‘carcasses’, and predicts a Taliban-like state that would oppress women if it falls and the revolutionaries win. In most treatments of Syria, women are mentioned as victims rather than protagonists in the conflict. The regime’s efforts to demonize the revolution through narratives involving women (or minorities) are very problematic. Women are as divided by the revolution as are men but they are certainly active participants. One vocal group containing many women are Syria’s nonviolent organizers and activists, who frame a challenge to Islamist, patriarchal, patrimonial, and factional frameworks or as they put it, the necessity of multiple revolutions. In areas of the country, they are confronted by Islamist male fighters who demand they wear salafist clothing, or who are suspicious of women activists living on their own and demonstrating publicly.

Some of these women activists first engaged politically in the Damascus Spring of 2001 and most of these are secularists and highly ideological. Others derive from middle- or working-class backgrounds and some are appalled by the extremist Islamist vision of many of the subsequently formed fighting groups (Kahf 2012) and others pragmatically view this as a necessary evil in that jihadism has swept through the region. Certain protests have been solely female, as in weekly sit-ins and demonstrations in the town of Baniyas, and in Salamiyya, organized in solidarity with women prisoners on strike at Adra prison, and the latter’s nontraditional participation in funeral processions of those killed by regime forces (Women’s Group of the Coordination of Salamiyeh 2013). Some resemble street theatre, as when four women in Damascus defied the government dressed in wedding dresses in a Bride of Peace march in November of 2012, before authorities detained them (Reilly 2012).

Women are fighting on Assad’s side in the National Defense Force militias set up from 2012 into 2013; they are stationed at checkpoints, and guard pro-regime neighborhoods. One example was the all-female Lioness Brigade, an Alawi force that excludes Sunni women, labeling those who wear hijab ‘al-Qaeda’ (Sly and Ramadan 2013). One in every five fighters of the Kurdish YPG, which supports the revolution, is female (Beals 2013; Johnson 2013). The YPG militias are battling Jabhat Nusra and the ISIS for control over the Kurdish-dominant areas (which also include Arab populations) and to preserve their somewhat greater freedom as women in these areas. The mutual hatred of these Kurdish women fighters and ISIS was highlighted by the media covering the battles at Kobane. Other fighting groups have included the Daughters of Walid Brigade in Homs, a female battalion formed in 2012 (see YouTube 2012), the Summaya Bint Khayat Brigade in Nabak, and Our Mother `A’isha, a female brigade attached to the male al-Tawhid Brigades in Aleppo (Heffez 2013; Zuhur and Malone 2013).

Women are also active in the Local Coordination Committees operating under the umbrella of the externally based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. They confirm the identities of those wounded or killed and their precise location and condition, if known, thereby providing a picture of the revolution which is completely unavailable in the tightly controlled Syrian state media. One was Razan Zeitouneh who worked underground, and who was threatened by Islamist groups earlier in 2013, and then kidnapped along with three other activists. She had blogged instructively about her experiences (Zaman al-Wasl 2013; Zeitouneh 2013) and the conflict between Islamists and non-Islamists and had done important work by identifying those killed for the Local Coordination Councils. Others work as journalists and photographers,²⁹ or writers and activists such as Amal Hanano, Rafif Jouajeti, Mohja Kahf (these three outside of Syria), and still others who organize aid into Jordan or Syria for refugees.

Conclusion

Two worst-case scenarios for Syria would be the continuation of the conflict for years, or its expansion into a regional war. Unfortunately, elements of the policy-making community in the US suggested in 2013 that the first of those scenarios is tolerable (Oppenheimer 2013)³⁰ and the involvement of Jordan and Saudi Arabia so they would not ‘outsource’ its goals to the US (Simon 2013, October 24) are part of the logic of the campaign on ISIS which now involves Iraq as well. The groups discussed (ISIS, Nusra, the FSA(s), the YPG, and also Assad’s national militias) are close to, but not identical with warlords’ gangs, in that their struggles with each other and other elements of the Syrian population and armed groups will contribute to instability and insecurity (Marten 2012, p. 11).³¹ There has been a lack of will toward humanitarian intervention, and seemingly conscious decision to allow the asymmetry of forces to take its toll (denying the rebels anti-aircraft weapons, or not providing sufficient arms in the face of substantial Iranian and Russian support for Assad). The US was training a new rebel contingent while carrying out airstrikes with coalition partners against ISIS and occasionally, Nusra.

The salafi-jihadists have outfought and were better supplied than other fighters. Therefore, their concomitant efforts to Islamize the population are not resented to the degree that they might otherwise be. The population, however war-weary, knows that certain death will find them if Assad’s forces and militias retake their areas. Thus, the controversial Islamist ideology, and vague-to-distinct promises of an Islamic state are a mobilizing factor for revolutionaries and not as destructive of the revolution as a whole as foreign media might suggest. Assad’s military’s dilemma, despite his superior weapons, is the diffusion of the conflict’s centre of gravity throughout the country, and his current inability to extinguish popular will for revolution. Although Assad temporarily regained certain areas (Sayigh 2014) the rebels were able to defend fixed lines and move to larger formations since the regime could not continue defenses or counterattack in all areas and then took more territory in Idlib, Homs, Aleppo, Daraa and other provinces.

Salvation for the majority of the Syrian population lies in a transition to a new political system. The interim phase, in which the populist idealism and economic needs of competing smaller armed organizations are apparent, might be a lengthy one. Either the Syrian military or the armed groups discussed in this article—or both—will play a critical role in such a political transition. For now, ironically, the external opposition and demands by its funders has proven to be a form of restraint against ISIS and Nusra, without curtailing the Assad government’s, military’s, and militias’ incredibly vicious treatment of the Syrian population. No matter how admirable the ideas of Maulana Azad’s nonviolent resistance, or those adopted by Syrians protesters in emulation of Egyptians and Tunisians, they were unable to withstand the repressive responses of the Assad government, and therefore, the notions of jihad have had as much of a bearing in Syria as the idealistic aims of the nonviolent resistance. In areas outside of Assad’s control multidivisional aspects of militias emerging in accordance with Ahram’s predications (2011) are apparent. Civilian control is desirable but unlikely until a political transition is achieved.

Footnotes

1.

Ahram () hypothesized the growth of M-(multidivisional) or U-(unitary) organizations via the battle against colonial forces, but revolutions, like civil wars, also transform militaries.

2.

Hezbollah, al-Aqsa Brigades, Shia militias in Iraq, Hamas military wing, al-Qaida fi Jazirat al-`Arabiyya, and my reading of statements by other similar jihadist organizations.

3.

A low estimate was at 115,000, see Congressional Research Service. ‘Armed Conflict in Syria’. June 27, , 3.

4.

Another person in the SMC had claimed to command 320,000; Mohammad al-Mustafa in a personal [Skype] interview with Liz Sly. Such an overstatement may be for propaganda purposes.

5.

In order to receive funding via the Friends of Syria (also known as the Friends of Democratic Syria), a group of Syrian opposition leaders and other international participants first convened by then-President Nicholas Sarkozy of France and which met in London and issued a communiqué on October 23, 2013, available online: . Apparently, the US CIA funding was authorized in the spring of 2013 for weapons and not only for such items as radios, or logistical support, but for various reasons, these weapons were not received. Other weapons sources, like those from Croatia that reached Syria, were also directed toward FSA groups.

6.

Earlier, the Syrian National Council.

7.

On the battle for Wadi al-Deif airbase by Jabhat al-Nusra, Suqur al-Sham, and the Idlib Military Council, see p. 21 and see Map 4, p. 22, and Map 5, on the battle for Taftanaz, p. 23.

8.

These weapons were spotted in YouTube videos by a self-taught weapons expert, see Brown Moses Blog ().

9.

At the time I presented this article as a paper in Kolkatta, the FSA and Islamic fighting groups had begun to reshape into new fronts.

10.

Its leader Abu Razzaq Tlas appeared in a YouTube video engaged in Skype/phone sex reportedly with a Turkish journalist in August of 2012 presumably due to spyware. He denied the incident in a video release. See Malik Al-Abdeh ().

11.

The film also alludes to the destruction of Quneitra. See Miriam Cooke () (not a typographical error; her pen name is in the lower-case like poet bell hooks), pp. 110–114.

12.

For a brief portrait of the Muslim Brotherhood’s history in Syria prior to the revolution, see Robert G. Rabil ().

13.

This playwright was ‘disappeared’ into prison and gave horrifying accounts of his experience, but modified references in his play to the Muslim Brotherhood here, only to the ‘sound’ (the sound of the whip/the sound of ‘Allahu Akbar’).

14.

The main rationale utilized is repelling attacks on Muslim lives and property by enemy forces (based on Quranic Surah 2: 190). The salafis and salafi-jihadists also claim to be fighting for Islam (Quranic Surah 2: 193) against the disbelief (polytheism) of Assad’s Alawi grouping. For a lengthier discussion, see Rudolph Peters (), pp. 120–121.

15.

Short video of Suad Nofal is available here: https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=10151674274772016 or see: Global Voices ().

16.

Numerous sources do not aggregate the two groups and instead simply say that Jabhat al-Nusra have a few thousand fighters.

17.

See Helene Lavoix’ discussion of Abdelrahman al-Hajj’s approach as quoted by Aron Lund versus that of Aymenn Jawad al-Tammimi (for Raqqa in Jihadology) who sees this as a false dichotomy; Strategic Analysis Assessment for Syria 4—State of Play, Part 3, on Red (team) Analysis, 6 May 2013 and 8 July 2013. Also see her very useful if incomplete chart of interrelationships:

18.

Shown here after shooting rabbits in the desert, a favorite male pastime, see Al Sabiyi ().

19.

Remarks by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 11, 2014.

20.

The website Syrian Martyrs had only documented 326 foreign fighters’ deaths by June of 2014 (this source documents deaths even when identification by name is not made).

21.

Interview with Mohammed al-Shalabi, a Jordanian Salafi-jihadi leader, on August 9, 2013, see Suha Philip Ma’ayeh (); Muwaffaq Kamal (2013); Jordan Times (2013); Hassan Tammimi (2013).

22.

John Kerry claimed there were no Saudi Arabian fighters in Syria in June of 2013, despite the reported death of a Nusra commander, Kasura al-Jazrawi in May 2013. CNS News.com June 25, 2013. In October 2013, the Mufti of Saudi Arabia issued a statement to discourage Saudi engagement in jihad. Global Voices, October 1, 2013.

23.

Freedom, socialism, and Arab unity are the triad of Ba`thism’s foundational principles, which obviously exclude Kurdish identity and political ambitions, but premise the equality of all religious sects. The Assad regimes claimed that Christians, Alawis, Isma’ilis, and Druze are its firmest supporters yet the revolution is supported by members of each of these sects along with Sunni Syrians (and many Sunni Syrians continue to support Assad).

24.

Commander Abu Musab’s weekly address, April 1, 2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=3wE0VWLgQnA

25.

Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya’s Training Camp in Raqqa. Liveleak.com (loaded September 7, 2013)

26.

These groups also produce their own media as a counter to the very tightly-censored state Syrian media.

27.

Who reportedly traveled to challenge al-Jawlani in Syria, but some of his fighters defected to al-Jawlani and he returned to Ain al-Hilweh ().

28.

This was a primary recommendation by Yezid Sayigh (2013) although it makes no sense to require a leadership-in-exile to accomplish tasks deliverable only by an ‘inside’ leadership. Similarly, he faults the Syrian National Council (predating the Coalition) for lacking a military strategy. Perhaps the argument is made with the aim of supporting the so-called loyal opposition, a small faction with strong ties to Russia which Assad has been willing to include at Geneva II, since it poses no armed challenge. However, even that faction may fall under suspicion as with the firing of Qadri Jamil, the deputy prime minister after he met with US Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford.

29.

‘Not Any More: A Story of Revolution’. Dir. by Matthew VanDyke. Prod. by Matthew VanDyke and Nour Keize, 2013.

30.

Oppenheimer proposes three possible outcomes of the conflict, a negotiated settlement, a regional war, or a continuing civil war.

31.

These are the negative impact of warlordism along with economic inefficiencies pointed out by Kimberly Marten (), p. 11.

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