Development Outcomes of Old and New Sources of International Development Finance in Sri Lanka

Abstract

This research article compares and contrasts development outcomes of ‘traditional’ or ‘old’ and ‘emerging’ or ‘new’ sources of international development finance in Sri Lanka during the ceasefire time (2002–2005) when it depended on former sources and the post-civil war period (2009–2012) when it depended heavily on the latter sources. It also compares and contrasts the development outcomes in Sri Lanka (a lower middle income country), which depended heavily on the ‘emerging’ or ‘new’ sources of international development finance, and Nepal (a low income country), which depended on ‘traditional’ or ‘old’ sources of international development finance, during the first five years after the end of their respective civil wars. Although the causality is difficult to establish, the data presented herein demonstrates that while GDP growth and per capita income growth have been greater under the new international development finance regime in Sri Lanka, positive changes in the rates of inflation, unemployment, and poverty have been greater under the old international development finance regimes in Sri Lanka and Nepal.

Keywords

China emerging donors India Nepal new donors old donors rising powers Sri Lanka traditional donors

Introduction

Sri Lanka has graduated into a lower middle-income country¹ officially by early January 2010 and therefore decreasingly eligible for grants and concessionary loans from bilateral and multilateral international development partners. In anticipation of this graduation, Sri Lanka started borrowing from international private commercial capital markets since 2007 when it floated the first ever Sovereign Bond worth USD 500 million. Additionally, it has been floating Sri Lanka Development Bonds periodically, primarily but not exclusively, targeting the Sri Lankan Diaspora communities. Thus, Sovereign Bonds, Sri Lanka Development Bonds, and Syndicated Loans have become the primary mediums for mobilization of external financial resources from private commercial international capital markets for Sri Lanka in the past decade since 2007. Moreover, foreign currency (US dollar) denominated Treasury bonds are also floated in order to bolster the balance-of-payments since 2010. Furthermore, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) is preparing to float Chinese Renminbi/Yuan denominated bonds (Panda Bond), which has been in the pipeline for the past couple of years, in order to tap into the Chinese private and public capital markets.

There are advantages and disadvantages of borrowing externally as opposed to domestic borrowings in order to finance the budget deficit or development projects. The domestic borrowings through the issuance of Treasury bills and bonds could result in printing of money by the Central Bank thereby contributing to the rise in inflation. Besides, domestic borrowings by the government will crowd out private borrowings by businesses for their investment needs. On the other hand, external borrowings by the government do not directly contribute to inflation (however, indirectly it may) and do not crowd out domestic private borrowers. However, external borrowings, especially at higher commercial interest rates (5–8% per annum), cost more and typically have shorter maturity period thereby straining the balance-of-payments more often.

There is an indirect cost as well to external commercial borrowings because the interest rates are significantly higher (than the traditional concessionary loans) and maturity periods are shorter, the Central Bank has been intervening in the foreign exchange market aggressively to prevent the depreciation of the rupee in order to minimize the cost of external repayments. This arbitrary protection of the rupee by the Central Bank has eroded the competitiveness of Sri Lanka’s exports thereby widening the trade deficit resulting in frequent balance-of-payments imbalances.

Furthermore, since 2006 Sri Lanka has been increasingly courting and depending on “emerging” or “new” donors/lenders (China and India in particular but Russia and Iran as well) for bilateral aid as opposed to the “traditional” or “old” donors/lenders (Japan, Germany, Norway, the USA, the UK, and others). This was because the traditional lenders have been critical of the previous government under President Mahinda Rajapaksa (2006–2014) because of deteriorating human rights situation in the country, lack of post-civil war reconciliation efforts, unprecedented corruption, and wanton abuse of executive power, especially to undermine the independence of the judiciary.

Moreover, the Rajapaksa regime severely restricted the operations of the international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in the country, especially in the conflict-affected Eastern and Northern Provinces, which has resulted in a number of INGOs withdrawing from Sri Lanka. The INGO operations are funded by outright grants and therefore extremely beneficial for the country in the context of decreasing grants through official development assistance (ODA) from the traditional bilateral and multilateral donors as a consequence of becoming a lower middle-income country.

The member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are called the “traditional” or “old” or DAC donors, of which there are 24 countries (Roussel, 2013, p. 803). The “emerging” or “new” or non-DAC donors term their engagement with other developing countries as “development cooperation” or “development partnerships” as opposed to the traditional donor engagement in terms of “aid” and “aid recipients” (ibid.).

While some opine that the new donors have positively impacted the international aid architecture and the beneficiary countries, others opine that the emergence of new donors has negatively impacted the international aid architecture and more so the beneficiary countries (Gu et al., 2014, Naim, 2009; for a snapshot of this on-going debate, see Roussel, 2013, p. 804).

Due to the deterioration of the human rights and governance standards under the Daniel Ortega government, since 2013 eight bilateral donors have ceased operations in Nicaragua (Roussel, 2013, p. 806). At the same time, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Russia, Taiwan, Uruguay, and Venezuela are the emerging or new donors who have stepped-up their support to Nicaragua (ibid.). It is claimed that “…competitive pressures introduced by emerging donors are enhancing local ownership of the development agenda and fostering cooperation between donors” in Nicaragua (ibid.).

In addition to the “emerging” or “new” bilateral donors/lenders (such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Russia, and South Africa—aka as rising powers) that have scaled-up in the last decade, there are also “emerging” or “new” multilateral lending institutions such as the New Development Bank (NDB) (formerly known as BRICS Development Bank) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) established more recently. Although some of the so-called “new” bilateral donors (such as China and India) have been in the foreign aid business since the 1950s (see Dutt, 1983 for India; Li, Banik, Tang, & Wu, 2014, pp. 25–28 for China), they have significantly scaled-up their aid portfolio in the new millennium. However, the “new” multilateral financial institutions such as the NDB and AIIB are indeed new having been formally established in mid- and late-2015, respectively.

The information on China’s development assistance programs in other developing countries, such as in Sri Lanka, is sparse because there are many Ministries such as the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Finance are involved (Xue, 2014, pp. 39, 41). China published its first-ever White Paper on its development cooperation with other developing countries in 2011 (ibid., p. 40). According to the Chinese White Paper, 80 percent of its development assistance was to low income countries; geographically 45.7 percent was disbursed to African countries, 32.8 percent to Asia, and 12.7 percent to Latin American countries (Li et al., 2014, p. 27).

The Chinese development cooperation are of three types—grants (to build schools, hospitals, low-cost housing, and small to medium scale social welfare projects), interest-free loans (to build public facilities and large-scale social livelihood projects), and concessionary loans (to build productive projects such as infrastructure development, turnkey projects, and technical services). China never provides budgetary support, as traditional donors do, to any country. While the grants and interest-free loans are part of state expenditures, concessionary loans are disbursed by the Export–Import (EXIM) Bank of China (Li et al., 2014, p. 32; Xue, 2014, pp. 37–38).

The bulk of the Chinese development assistance received by Sri Lanka are project loans disbursed by the EXIM Bank of China, China Development Bank (CDB), and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). A total of USD 3.75 billion has been disbursed for development projects in Sri Lanka by China during the period 2010–2014 (External Resources Department (Government of Sri Lanka), p. 17). The Chinese government has not published detailed information (including the terms and conditions) about its development assistance to Sri Lanka to date.

In contrast, the Indian High Commission in Sri Lanka has for the first time published its development cooperation efforts in Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the civil war in 2014 which provides useful information. Accordingly, the Indian government disbursed grants worth over USD 200 million between 2010 and 2014 (or 30 billion Sri Lankan rupees) to Sri Lanka. Additionally, India has disbursed over USD 1 billion between 2005 and 2014 as concessionary loans (Lines of Credit) (or 168 billion Sri Lankan rupees disbursed until 2014 and commitments made for 2015), bulk of which were disbursed between 2010 and 2014 (High Commission of India in Sri Lanka, 2014, pp. 10–11). The 50,000 houses built for the conflict-affected people and the people living in the plantation sector were the flagship outright grant project of the Government of India.

Objectives

The objectives of this article are:

First, to compare and contrast the changes in selected development indicators (economic growth, per capita income, inflation, unemployment, and poverty) both nationally and provincially during the pause-in-civil war (ceasefire) time in Sri Lanka between 2002 and 2005 (4 years) when Sri Lanka was a low income country and therefore depended overwhelmingly on traditional donors/lenders and concessionary borrowings and the post-civil war 4-year period between 2009 and 2012 when it was a lower middle-income country and therefore depended heavily on the “new” lenders and commercial borrowings.

Second, to compare and contrast the changes in selected development indicators (economic growth, per capita income, inflation, employment, and poverty) in the armed conflict-affected Eastern and Northern Provinces and the Western (most prosperous province out of the nine provinces in the country) and Southern (recipient of the highest public capital investments between 2009 and 2014) Provinces during the first 5 years after the civil war (2009–2014).

Third, to compare and contrast the economic growth and the employment growth in the Eastern, Northern, and Southern Provinces in the aftermath of the civil war (2011–2014). The employment data for the Northern Province is available only from 2011 and the latest provincial gross domestic product (PGDP) data available is for 2014.

Fourth, to compare and contrast the changes in selected development indicators (economic growth, per capita income, inflation, unemployment, and poverty) in Sri Lanka (2009–2013) and Nepal (2006–2010) in the first 5 years after the end of their respective civil wars. Whereas Sri Lanka is a lower middle-income country (or emerging economy) and therefore heavily depends on “new” lenders and commercial borrowings, Nepal is a low-income country (or least developed country) and therefore overwhelmingly depends on traditional donors/lenders and concessionary borrowings.

The overarching objective of this article is to compare and contrast the development outcomes of the “traditional” or “old” and “emerging” or “new” sources of international development finance in different time periods within Sri Lanka and between Sri Lanka and Nepal in the aftermath of their respective civil wars.

There is a growing literature on the role of “emerging” or “new” donors in international development finance architecture in the last decade (see, e.g., Gu et al., 2014). However, only a few studies have been undertaken to date to assess the development outcomes of the “emerging” or “new” international development finance architecture vis-à-vis the “traditional” or “old” architecture of international development finance. This research article is a contribution to the assessment of the development outcomes under different international development finance architectures/regimes, especially in South Asia.

Sri Lanka: Pause-in-Civil War versus Post-Civil War

We compare key development indicators during the time of the ceasefire (pause-in-civil war) in Sri Lanka (2002–2005 4-year period) with that of the development indicators in the aftermath of the civil war (2009–2012 4-year period) both at the national and provincial levels in order to compare and contrast the pause-in-civil war and post-civil war development outcomes nationally as well as in the conflict-affected provinces. While Sri Lanka was a low-income country during the ceasefire period and therefore depended on the “traditional” or “old” donors, in the post-civil war period Sri Lanka has graduated into a lower middle-income country (since January 2010) and therefore depends heavily on “emerging” or “new” lenders.

While economic growth (in current prices) at both the national and provincial levels has been significantly higher during the post-civil war period in comparison to the ceasefire period, the per capita income rise has been phenomenally higher (at both national and provincial levels) during the ceasefire period. The PGDP is available only in current prices because there are no provincial consumer price indices in Sri Lanka. The per capita income in this article is based on the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) rather than the P/GDP because HIES reflects the disposable income of households better and the methodology of compiling the PGDP (by way of decomposition of the national GDP) has deficiencies.

The cumulative GDP of Sri Lanka grew by 56.7 percent during the 2009–2012 post-civil war period (Rupees Million 4,835,293–7,578,554) in contrast to 49.5 percent growth during the 2002–2005 ceasefire period (Rupees Million 1,403,287–2,098,004) (+7.2 points) (Table 1). The growth in cumulative PGDP of Eastern and Northern Provinces during the post-civil war period was 25 points or more than during the period of the ceasefire. While the PGDP of the East increased by 71.2 percent in post-2009 4-year period (Rupees Million 279,363–478,401), it increased by only 44.6 percent in post-2002 4-year period (Rupees Million 68,632–99,239) (+26.6 points). Similarly, while the post-2002 PGDP growth in the North recorded 68.6 percent during the 4-year period (Rupees Million 37,400–63,063), the post-2009 4-year period recorded cumulative growth of 78.3 percent (Rupees Million 155,828–277,828) (+9.7 points) (Table 1).

The cumulative rise in the per capita income in Sri Lanka during the 4 years of ceasefire was 111.4 percent (Rupees 36,692–77,556) in contrast to the much smaller 31.1 percent rise during the first 4 years after the end of the civil war (−80.3 points) (Rupees 109,248–143,184) (Table 1). The scale of the cumulative rise in per capita income during the ceasefire time in the Eastern Province was much greater than that during the post-civil war period; while the ceasefire period (4 years) recorded 176.8 percent rise in per capita income in the Eastern Province (Rupees 21,324–59,028), it was a meagre 21.3 percent rise during the first 4 years after the end of the civil war (Rupees 67,956–82,452) (−155.5 points) (Table 1). In the Northern Province, the cumulative rise in per capita income was 72.9 percent during 2009–2012 period (Rupees 66,180–114,396), but no data is available for the ceasefire period (Table 1). The huge rise in per capita income during the ceasefire time in the East could be partly due to significantly lower base in 2002 compared to 2009.

The inflation in the country increased by considerably greater margin during the post-2009 period in comparison to post-2002 period. Whereas the inflation increased by 3.4 points between 2009 and 2012 (3.5–6.9%), it increased by only 2.0 points between 2002 and 2005 (9.6–11.6%) (Table 1). As noted before, provincial inflation rates are unavailable.

However, the unemployment rate dropped at a marginally higher rate during the post-civil war period as opposed to the ceasefire period. The unemployment rate dropped by (−)1.6 between 2002 and 2005 (8.8–7.2%) as opposed to (−)1.8 drop between 2009 and 2012 (5.8–4.0%) (Table 1). The unemployment rates at provincial level are unavailable for the periods under consideration because the Labour Force Survey recommenced in the Northern Province only in 2012 covering all five districts.

Table 1.

Pause in Civil War and Post Civil War Sri Lanka: A Comparison of Key Economic Indicators

	Economic Growth		Per Capita Income Growth		Inflation		Unemployment		Poverty
	2002–2005	2009–2012	2002–2005	2009–2012	2002–2005	2009–2012	2002–2005	2009–2012	2002–2005	2009–2012
Eastern Province	44.6%	71.2%	176.8	21.3%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	−3.5
Northern Province	68.6%	78.3%	NA	72.9%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sri Lanka	49.5%	56.7%	111.4	31.1%	2.09.6–11.6	3.43.5–6.9	−1.63.8–2.2	−1.85.8–4.0	−7.522.7–15.2	−2.28.9–6.7

Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various years), Annual Report, various years.

Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka (various years), various years.

Department of Census and Statistics (various years), Annual Labour Force Survey, various years.

On the other hand, the headcount consumption poverty ratio of Sri Lanka declined by a much greater scale during the ceasefire time than in the aftermath of the civil war; while poverty declined by (−)7.5 points during the ceasefire period (22.7–15.2%) between 2002 and 2006–2007, it declined by only (−)2.2 points during the post-civil war period (8.9–6.7%) between 2009–2010 and 2012–2013 (Table 1). This could be partly due to the higher duration of the time period during the ceasefire (4 years 2002–2006/2007) as opposed to post-civil war period (3 years 2009/2010–2012/2013). The comparative data for the provinces are unavailable. However, in the Eastern Province the headcount consumption poverty ratio declined by (−)3.5 points between 2009/2010 and 2012/2013 (14.8–11.3%) (Table 1). In the North, we have data for only 2012–2013 incorporating all five districts.

The Post-Civil War Sri Lanka

North and East versus South and West

In the aftermath of the civil war in Sri Lanka, the Eastern, Northern, and Southern Provinces (out of the total nine provinces) were the largest recipients of public capital investments due to the massive reconstruction of economic infrastructures in the former two provinces and the new constructions of international airport, seaport, international convention center, and state-of-the-art hospital in the latter province. Therefore, we compare and contrast economic development indicators such as growth of PGDP, growth of per capita income, growth of employment, and poverty in the foregoing three provinces and the most affluent Western Province during the 5-year period 2009–2014. The latest provincial data available is for the year 2014.

The cumulative growth of PGDP has been highest in the Northern Province, followed by Southern and Eastern Provinces during the first 5 years (2009–2014) after the civil war. The Northern Province recorded cumulative growth of 140.3 percent, Southern Province 123.2 percent, Eastern Province 122.9 percent, and Western Province 96.1 percent (Table 2). While the former three cumulative growth rates were considerably higher than the cumulative national growth rate (116.1%), the Western Province recorded considerably lower cumulative growth rate than the national rate of growth (Table 2).

Table 2.

Post-Civil War Sri Lanka: A Comparison of Civil War Affected and Other Provinces

	Eastern Province	Northern Province	Southern Province	Western Province	Sri Lanka
Growth of PGDP2009–2014 Rupees Million	122.9%279,363–622,759	140.3%155,828–374,403	123.2%509,053–1,136,458	96.1%2,216,346–4,346,682	116.1%4,835,293–10,448,479
Growth of Per Capita IncomeRupees HIES 2009/10–2012/13	21.3%67,956–82,452	72.9%66,180–114,396	37.7%96,420–132,780	41.5%138,732–196,320	31.1%109,248–143,184
Growth of EmploymentLFS 2011–2014	3.7%464,645–482,024	16.7%302,488–352,867	0.9%1,009,330–1,018,709	5.7%2,339,914–2,472,386	2.8%8,196,927–8,423,994
Growth of Poverty RatioHIES 2009/10–2012/13	Ampara (−)6.4Batticaloa (−)0.9Trincomalee (−)2.7	Jaffna 8.3%Kilinochchi 12.7Mannar 20.1%Mullaithivu 28.8Vavuniya 3.4%	Galle (−)0.4Hambantota (−)2.0Matara (−)4.1	Colombo (−)2.2Gampaha (−)1.8Kalutara (−)2.9	(−)2.2

Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various years), Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka, various years.

Department of Census and Statistics (various years), Annual Labour Force Survey, various years.

Department of Census and Statistics, Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2009/10.

Department of Census and Statistics (2014).

Note: The PGDPs for 2014 are provisional estimates.

The Northern Province recorded the highest cumulative growth in per capita income (72.9%), based on the HIES, followed by Western (41.5%), Southern (37.7%), and Eastern (21.3%) between 2009–2010 and 2012–2013 (Table 2). A significant proportion of the people in the North (especially in the Jaffna district) receive remittances from abroad from their kith and kin and friends, which partly explains the highest growth of per capita income in the North. The cumulative growth in the national per capita income during the reference period (31.1%) was higher than the Eastern Province (21.3%) but lower than the Northern (72.9%), Southern (37.7%), and Western (41.5%) Provinces (Table 2).

The number of jobs newly created in the provinces during the post-civil war period would be an indication of the benefits that had accrued to the respective local people, especially youths. A total of 227,067 net employments were created in the country between 2011 (total number of employed persons 8,196,927) and 2014 (total number of employed persons 8,423,994) denoting a 2.8 percent increase (Table 2). Among the four provinces under consideration in this article, the highest number of 132,472 was created in the Western Province (2,339,914 employed persons in 2011 and 2,472,386 employed persons in 2014); 50,379 was created in the Northern Province (302,488 employed persons in 2011 and 352,867 employed persons in 2014); 17,379 jobs in the Eastern Province (464,645 employed persons in 2011 and 482,024 employed persons in 2014); and only 9,379 was created in the Southern Province (1,009,330 employed persons in 2011 and 1,018,709 employed persons in 2014) between 2011 and 2014 (Table 2). The growth of cumulative net employment was highest in the North (16.7%), followed by West (5.7%), East (3.7%), and South (0.9%) between 2011 and 2014 (Table 2).

The base year is taken as 2011 because the Labour Force Survey recommenced in the Northern Province only in 2011. However, in 2011 only Jaffna and Vavuniya districts in the North were covered, and only since the 2012 Annual Labour Force Survey did all five districts got covered. Therefore, the Northern Province data for 2011 is an underestimation (because it covered only two out of five districts), which partly explains the highest growth in employment among the provinces considered here.

The drop-in poverty was greatest in the Eastern districts between 2009 and 2012 (especially in Ampara (−)6.4 points and Trincomalee (−)2.7 points), followed by in the Western districts (all three districts) and Southern districts (especially in Hambantota (−)2.0 points and Matara (−)4.1 points) (Table 2). For the North, poverty figures are available for only 2012–2013, and therefore, we cannot estimate the change over time. However, Mannar (20.1%) and Mullaithivu (28.8%) districts in the North had the highest incidence of consumption poverty in 2012–2013 among the 25 districts in the country (Table 2).

Economic Growth versus Employment Growth

Although the construction sector and the tourism sector have been the largest recipients of public and private capital, respectively, after the end of the civil war, employment generation in these sectors have been low vis-à-vis economic growth in the same sectors in the three provinces that received the highest public and private investments in infrastructure (roads, airport, harbor, etc.) and hotels, namely Southern, Northern, and Eastern, respectively.

In the first four of the selected six sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, construction, hospitality, financial intermediation, and government services), employment growth has been significantly lower than the economic growth in the Eastern and Southern Provinces between 2011 and 2014 (Table 3). In the Northern Province, while employment growth has been lagging behind economic growth in the manufacturing and construction sectors, employment growth was greater than economic growth in the agriculture and hospitality sectors during the same period (Table 3). Please remember that the first four sectors noted previously are dominated by the private sector. In contrast, in the public sector dominated financial intermediation and government services (public administration, defense, education, health, etc.) employment growth far outstrips the economic growth in all three provinces under consideration between 2011 and 2014, barring the financial sector in the Southern Province (Table 3).

In Table 3, the base year has been taken as 2011 because the Labour Force Survey recommenced in the Northern Province only in 2011 and therefore there was no employment data available for the North in 2009 or 2010. The latest provincial economic data and employment data available is for 2014. It is important to point out the huge differences in the bases of monetary values and employment numbers in the Southern Province and the Eastern and Northern Provinces, which could partly explain the respective differences in the growth rates (see Table 3 where absolute numbers are given). This important point should be borne in mind in the following analyses of the statistical data.

Table 3.

Post-Civil War Sri Lanka: A Comparison of Economic Growth and Employment Growth

		Eastern Province2011–2014	Northern Province2011–2014	Southern Province2011–2014
Agriculture, forestry and fishery	Economic growth %Rupees Million	27.461,056–77,769	(−)16.758,423–48,651	31.7111,892–147,376
	Employment growth %Numbers	(−)7.3156,574–145,100	2.9106,196–109,262	(−)2.9372,285–361,387
Manufacturing	Economic growth %Rupees Million	82.439,772–72,563	91.66,357–12,183	11.993,142–104,188
	Employment growth %Numbers	53.137,310–57,107	73.822,498–39,108	(−)5.3194,582–184,179
Construction, mining and quarrying, electricity, gas, and water supply	Economic growth %Rupees Million	74.369,243–120,708	44.040,918–58,924	55.0119,841–185,748
	Employment growth %Numbers	25.536,269–45,509	3.839,542–41,028	6.980,422–85,947
Hotels and restaurants	Economic growth %Rupees Million	844.9900–8504	47.21,025–1,509	258.212,467–44,663
	Employment growth %Numbers	73.26812–11,800	58.23992–6315	(–)7.227,677–29,668
Financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business activities	Economic growth %Rupees Million	(−)12.032,146–28,282	(−)7.622,010–20,331	59.253,506–85,173
	Employment Growth %Numbers	64.211,807–19,382	242.75,487–18,802	(−)5.729,930–28,213
Public administration, defense, and social security	Economic Growth %Rupees Million	(−)13.365,426–56,733	18.543,248–51,253	(−)39.790,005–54,279
	Employment Growth %Numbers	19.950,910–61,056	35.817,363–23,583	16.258,948–68,472

Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various years), Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka, various years.

Department of Census and Statistics (various years), Annual Labour Force Survey, various years.

Note: The total number of employed persons in the hotels and restaurants in the Eastern Province in 2011 was not available. Therefore, 2010 data was used in lieu of 2011 data.

The employment generation in the agriculture sector has been negative in the Eastern (−7.3%) and Southern (−2.9) Provinces in spite of significant positive economic growth in monetary terms in the same sector (27.4% and 31.7%, respectively). In contrast, while the monetary growth of the agriculture sector was negative (−16.7), employment growth was positive (2.9%) in the Northern Province (Table 3). The shrinking of the agriculture labor in the East between 2011 and 2014 was largely due to severe floods there in 2012, which severely affected the agriculture sector. Given that the agriculture sector and the public sector are the employers of last resort in Sri Lanka, both these sectors are overstaffed and therefore the negative growth in the employed population in the agriculture sector is not necessarily bad for the provincial economies.

The growth of jobs in the manufacturing sector in the conflict-affected Eastern and Northern Provinces and the Southern Province has also been considerably lower than the growth of the manufacturing sector in monetary terms. That is, while the manufacturing sector grew by 82.4 percent in monetary terms in the East and by 91.6 percent in monetary terms in the North between 2011 and 2014, the growth of jobs in manufacturing in the East was 53.1 percent, and in the North, it was 73.8 percent during the same time period (Table 3). In the Southern Province also, while the manufacturing sector grew by 11.9 percent in monetary terms between 2011 and 2014, the number of employed persons in the same sector shrunk marginally by (−)5.3 percent from 194,582 in 2011 to 184,179 in 2014 (Table 3).

In spite of the significant cumulative growth between 2011 and 2014 in the combined construction, mining and quarrying, and utilities (electricity, gas, and water) sector in monetary terms in all three provinces under consideration (East 74.3%, North 44.0%, and South 55.0%), the employment generation in that combined sector has been lagging far behind in the Eastern Province (25.5%), and marginal growth in the Northern (3.8%) and Southern (6.9%) Provinces (Table 3).

The foregoing results is ironic because the Southern Province was the single largest recipient of public investments in major infrastructure developments such as the second international airport and the international harbor in Hambantota district during this time period. These major infrastructure development projects have been funded by the Chinese government and bulk of the labor (from unskilled labor to highly skilled technical personnel) was imported from China as part of the conditions imposed by the Chinese government, which probably explains the negligible growth of local jobs in the construction sector in the Southern Province.

Despite the huge cumulative growth in the hotels and restaurants (hospitality) sector in monetary terms in the Eastern (844.9%) and Southern (258.2%) Provinces between 2011 and 2014, employment growth (cumulatively) in this sector has been negative in the South (−7.2%) and far low in the East (73.2%) during the same period. In contrast, only in the Northern Province the cumulative employment growth in the hospitality sector between 2011 and 2014 (58.2%) was marginally greater than the growth in monetary terms (47.2%) (Table 3).

It is astounding to note that in the tourism hub of the Southern Province, which attracts about 60 percent of the total tourist traffic to the Island, there has been a decline in the number of personnel employed between 2011 and 2014. Furthermore, although the Eastern Province is the fastest growing region for tourism in the country, new employment generation in the hotels and restaurants sector has been relatively low. In contrast, the new employment generation in the hotels and restaurants sector in the Northern Province has been higher than the monetary growth among the provinces under consideration, which may be partly explained by the lowest base and robust domestic tourism mostly from the Western, Southern, and Central Provinces of the country.

The combined financial intermediation, real estate, and renting and business activities sector has been one of only two sectors where employment growth has outpaced output growth in the Eastern and Northern Provinces between 2011 and 2014. In the Eastern Province, while the growth in monetary terms was negative (−12.0), the employment growth in the sector was significant (64.2%). The gap is even more striking in the Northern Province where negative growth of the financial and allied sector in monetary terms (−7.6) between 2011 and 2014 is far outpaced by the huge growth in employment (242.7%—from 5,487 in 2011 to 18,802 in 2014) (Table 3). In contrast, in the Southern Province significant growth in monetary terms (59.2%) is coupled with marginal negative growth in employment (−5.7) in the same sector (Table 3).

The government (civilian and military) services (public administration, defense, and social security) sector is the only sector wherein employment growth has been considerably greater than economic growth (in monetary terms) in all three provinces under consideration. While in the Eastern and Southern Provinces the cumulative economic growth in the government services sector between 2011 and 2014 has been considerably negative; whereas employment growth in the same sector has been considerable, in the Northern Province, both the economic and employment growth has been considerably positive.

While the cumulative growth in the government services in monetary terms has been negative (−13.3%) in the East, cumulative growth in the number of persons employed in the same sector has been positive (19.9%) between 2011 and 2014 (Table 3). Similarly, while the cumulative growth in the government services in monetary terms in the Southern Province has declined considerably by (−)39.7 percent between 2011 and 2014, cumulative growth in the number of persons employed was 16.2 percent during the same period (Table 3). However, in the Northern Province the cumulative economic growth in the government services sector has recorded 18.5 percent between 2011 and 2014 and the cumulative growth in the number of persons employed in the same sector recorded 35.8 percent during the same time period (Table 3).

In the post-civil war Eastern and Northern Provinces where unemployment rates, especially among women, are more than 30 percent (Sarvananthan, 2015, 2016) policymakers should give high priority to local employment generation and thereby improve livelihood opportunities.

Post-Civil War Sri Lanka and Nepal: An Introduction

Sri Lanka has undergone a civil war between 1983 and 2009 towards the establishment of a separate country for the minority Tamil community in the Eastern and Northern parts of the country. Nepal has undergone a high intensity Maoist insurgency between 1997 and 2006 towards the overthrow of its feudalist regime. In Sri Lanka, the Government was successful in militarily defeating the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) in May 2009. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal ended with the Monarchy relinquishing its absolute hold on political power, a comprehensive ceasefire agreement between the Government and the Maoist rebels in 2006, and subsequent political participation of the Maoists in the government. It is 8 years since the decisive end of the armed conflict in Sri Lanka in 2009 and 11 years since the end of the armed conflict in Nepal in 2006.

Both in Sri Lanka and in Nepal, the transition from war to durable peace has been painful and is ongoing and not devoid of pitfalls as has been the case elsewhere in the World as well. In Sri Lanka, land, language, and political rights of the minority Tamil community have been at the forefront of the separatist armed struggle (see, e.g., De Silva, 2013; Welhengama & Pillay, 2014). In the case of Nepal underdevelopment of the vast hinterland has been widely acknowledged as the primary cause of the armed conflict (see, e.g., Hutt, 2004; Karki & Seddon, 2003; Lawoti & Pahari, 2009; Thapa & Sijapati, 2003).

However, in the aftermath of their respective civil wars, while Sri Lanka had prioritized rapid economic development as the panacea for reconciliation and durable peace (until the end of 2014), Nepal on the other hand is on a path to Constitutional reforms toward establishing a parliamentary democracy as its priority toward reconciliation and durable peace. That is, while a country that had undergone a civil war primarily due to linguistic-based political factors and institutional failures has chosen the path of rapid economic growth, a country in which economic underdevelopment was the root cause of the civil war has chosen the path of politico institutional reforms in order to lay a sound foundation for rapid economic advancement. Both these contrasting post-civil war recovery strategies are in a sense putting the “cart before the horse,” so to speak; therein lays the enduring fragility in both of these South Asian countries.

This is not the first time Sri Lanka is attempting to put the “cart before the horse”; the LTTE adopted the same strategy during the pause-in-civil war (aka Ceasefire) time of 2002–2005 (see, e.g., Sriskandarajah, 2003). The LTTE refused or dithered to enter into negotiations with the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) toward finding a durable solution to the ethnic/separatist conflict on the premise that the people it represents have undergone livelihood devastation due to the civil war and hence until the livelihoods of the people are restored it cannot enter into negotiations on core issues underlying the armed conflict. In a similar vein, the GoSL under the former President Mahinda Rajapaksa has been making pronouncements since the end of the civil war (until the end of 2014) that economic underdevelopment of the Eastern and Northern regions of Sri Lanka was the primary cause of the armed conflict and therefore the government is striving to rapidly develop the conflict-affected regions in order to ameliorate that cause and integrate it with the national economy. At least on this one critical issue both the late LTTE and the former Rajapaksa government were on the very same page because for both sustainable peace is anathema for their respective political survival.

The following section compares and contrasts the post-civil war economic development in Sri Lanka and Nepal using key macroeconomic variables of both countries during the first 5 years after the end of their respective civil wars. The growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) (in current and constant prices), per capita income (in current and constant prices), inflation, unemployment, and poverty in both Sri Lanka and Nepal are compared during 2009–2013 and 2006–2010, respectively. It is crucial to note that economic development indicators of Nepal are generally lower than those of Sri Lanka and therefore changes in such lower economic development indicators in Nepal (vis-à-vis Sri Lanka) could be greater because of the effect of lower base.

Sri Lanka had a population of 20.8 million in 2014, while Nepal’s population was 28.2 million in 2014. Whereas Sri Lanka is a lower middle-income country (GNI per capita income of US $3,440 in 2014), Nepal is a low income country (GNI per capita income of US $730 in 2014).² While Sri Lanka significantly relies on international private capital markets and “emerging” or “new” donors to mobilize international financial resources to reconstruct and recover from the protracted civil war, Nepal continues to rely on concessionary international development finance (grants and concessionary loans from “traditional” or “old” donors) to recover from its civil war. Whereas Sri Lanka, until the end of 2014, had embarked on an ambitious mega development drive underpinned by self-styled “animal spirits”³ in order to leapfrog to become a “Wonder of Asia” driven by physical construction boom (airport, seaport, toll highways, tourist hotels, luxury high-rise mixed-development complexes, etc.), Nepal had pursued a pragmatic development trajectory through small and medium scale development projects.

Post-Civil War Development Outcomes in Sri Lanka and Nepal

The GDP expanded by 79.4 percent (in current prices) in Sri Lanka between 2009 and 2013, whereas the GDP expanded by 87.8 percent (in current prices) in Nepal between 2006 and 2010 in the first 5 years after the end of their respective civil wars (Table 4). Although in nominal terms (at current prices), the GDP growth rate in Nepal was higher than in Sri Lanka, in real terms (at constant prices), Sri Lanka had a higher GDP growth (33.3%) than Nepal (20.2%) during the respective 5-year periods under consideration (Table 4).

The per capita income growth rate during the 5-year period in both Sri Lanka (79.1%) and Nepal (78.5%) was more or less the same in terms of current prices (nominal per capita income), but at constant prices (real per capita income) Sri Lanka (34.2%) experienced significantly higher growth than Nepal (14.3%) during the respective time periods (Table 4). This result indicates that the inflation in Sri Lanka has been significantly lower than that in Nepal between 2009 and 2013 and 2006 and 2010, respectively.

Table 4.

Post-Civil War Nepal and Sri Lanka: A Comparison of Key Economic Indicators

	Nepal2006–2010	Sri Lanka2009–2013
GDP Growth Rate (current market prices)	87.8%(727,827–1,366,953)NPR Million	79.4%(4,835,293–8,674,230)LKR Million
GDP Growth Rate (constant market prices)	20.2%(532,038–639,694)(@2000-01 prices)	33.3%(2,449,214–3,266,099)(@2002 prices)
Per Capita Income Growth Rate (current market prices)	78.5%(28,905–51,594)	79.1%(236,445–423,467)
Per Capita Income Growth Rate (constant market prices)	14.3%(21,129–24,144)	34.2%(119,766–160,670)
Inflation	(+)1.6(8.0%–9.6%)	(+)3.4(3.5%–6.9%)
Unemployment	(−)1.6(3.8%–2.2%)(2003/4–2010/11)	(−)1.4(5.8%–4.4%)(2009/10–2012/13)
Poverty	(−)5.6(30.8%–25.2%)(2003/4–2010/11)	(−)2.2(8.9%–6.7%)(2009/10–2012/13)

Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various years), Annual Report, various years.

Department of Census and Statistics (various years), Annual Labour Force Survey, various years.

Department of Census and Statistics (various years), Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2009/10.

Department of Census and Statistics (2014).

Central Bureau of Statistics (n.d.), Statistical Bulletin Vol. 105.

Central Bureau of Statistics (n.d.), Nepal in Figures 2013.

Central Bureau of Statistics (2010–2011), Nepal Living Standards Survey 2010–2011.

However, the inflation increased by significantly higher points in Sri Lanka (+3.4 between 2009 and 2013) than in Nepal (+1.6 between 2006 and 2010), at least partly because of comparatively lower base in Sri Lanka (Table 4). The rate of unemployment declined marginally higher in Nepal (−1.6) than in Sri Lanka (−1.4) during the corresponding time periods (Table 4). The headcount poverty ratio dropped by considerably higher points in Nepal between 2003/2004 and 2010/2011 (−5.6) than in Sri Lanka between 2009/2010 and 2012/2013 (−2.2) at least partly because of double-digit rate of inflation in Nepal as opposed to single digit in Sri Lanka (Table 4). However, the relatively greater drop in poverty in Nepal could be also due to the longer time period in Nepal (2003/2004–2010/2011) than in Sri Lanka (2009/2010–2012/2013) due to lack of data in the same time period.

It appears that in spite of massive public capital infusion in Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the civil war resulting in relatively higher real economic growth and relatively higher growth in real per capita income vis-à-vis Nepal, the change in inflation rate has been relatively higher in Sri Lanka and changes in unemployment and poverty rates have been relatively lower in Sri Lanka than that experienced by Nepal in the first 5 years after their respective civil wars. However, in terms of absolute rates of inflation and poverty they were significantly lower in Sri Lanka than in Nepal (Table 4).

In spite of significantly lower economic base than that of Sri Lanka, Nepal appears to have recovered relatively better in the first 5-years after the civil war than Sri Lanka in terms of the macroeconomic indicators that matters most to the vast majority of the people (namely, inflation, unemployment, and poverty). Economic growth and per capita income growth can be achieved by a variety of means; some of it could be real growth and some could be phantom growth (meaning government debt fueled growth with negative or no returns) (Sarvananthan, 2013). Thus, while the per capita income derived from GDP is partly phantom income (because the GDP includes incomes of the government and public institutions, private businesses, and households, not all GDP income will filter-down to the households), the per capita income derived from the HIES is the real disposable income. Unfortunately, comparable HIES data is unavailable for Nepal for comparison with Sri Lanka.

Post-Civil War Development in Sri Lanka—A Critical Appraisal

In spite of the populist propaganda and massive hype in Sri Lanka (until the end of 2014) about the post-civil war development thrust throughout the country, especially in the former conflict-affected provinces, this article has highlighted the not so glittering reality by comparing selected key economic indicators (both national and provincial data) during the ceasefire time (2002–2005) and the post-civil war period (2009–2012) in Sri Lanka, and during the first 5 years after the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka (2009–2013) and Nepal (2006–2010) respectively. Although Sri Lanka is relatively in a better politically stable position than Nepal because of its total military defeat of the LTTE and the insurgency, its post-civil war reconciliation efforts have been lacklustre (certainly up to the end of 2014).

To the best of our knowledge, three critical factors have negatively impacted on the outcomes of the development process in Sri Lanka under the former government headed by former President Rajapaksa since 2006 which have wider implications to countries emerging out of civil war.

As mentioned at the outset, the GoSL since 2006 has been increasingly relying on international private commercial capital market borrowings and bilateral commercial borrowings from “emerging” or “new” development partners such as China and India as opposed to erstwhile reliance on traditional concessionary international development finance from international financial institutions (such as the Asian Development Bank and the Work Bank Group) and Western bilateral development partners (including Japan). Almost 42.0 percent of the total outstanding foreign debt of Sri Lanka as of end-2013 was owed to international private financial markets, which was just 6.6 percent by end-2005 when the former President Rajapaksa was elected to power (Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2013), Annual Report 2013; Department of External Resources, 2013, 2014). Of course, since the graduation of Sri Lanka into a lower middle-income country in January 2010, eligibility for the erstwhile concessionary development finance has shrunk considerably.

Moreover, the capacity of the central, provincial, and local public administrative systems in Sri Lanka has been severely depleted since the early 1970s which has led the successive governments to promote few mega development projects since late-1977 (e.g., The Accelerated Mahaweli Development Project) instead of number of small and medium scale development projects undertaken in the 1950s and 1960s. The mega development projects are also means of appropriation of huge rents for politicians and bureaucrats. Hence, most development projects in Sri Lanka until the end of 2014 were probably chosen not on the basis of the needs of the people of the country, but on the basis of the extent of rents that could be amassed by a coterie.

Second, severe restrictions on international, national, and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have had a debilitating impact on the general population, and vulnerable groups of people and regions in particular (i.e., the former conflict-affected provinces). Although official statistics are unavailable, it is believed that the INGOs contribute over US$50 million annually to the marginalized and vulnerable populations throughout the country. Moreover, these are outright grants and therefore no repayments are due.

A primary reason for the very limited improvements in the livelihoods of the people in the conflict-affected North and East is the severe limitations imposed on the operations of the NGOs (local, national, and international NGOs) as a result of the security phobia of the state. Traditionally it is the NGOs that fund small and micro-scale development initiatives by local communities throughout the country. Few INGOs (such as the Norwegian Refugee Council and Danish Refugee Council) have completely withdrawn from Sri Lanka and many have scaled-back their operations, especially in the former conflict-affected regions.

For example, the World University Service of Canada (WUSC), which has been providing quality skills training to thousands of youths throughout the country since the 1990s (especially to the youths of the conflict-affected provinces during the course of the civil war), has withdrawn from the conflict-affected provinces in Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the civil war due to severe restrictions imposed by the government. The private buildings that housed the head office of the WUSC in Colombo and a major vocational training center in Point Pedro (in the Northern Province) have been converted to restaurants reflecting the rise of the hospitality sector (tourism) earmarked as a priority sector for development by the former Rajapaksa government.

As Sri Lanka has graduated into a lower middle-income country, grants from bilateral and multilateral development partners are drying and therefore INGOs are valuable source of external financial resources which are entirely outright grants. Under the present regime that came to power in January 2015 the INGOs are wooed back into the country but with little success so far.

Third, reparations to the victims of the long drawn-out civil war in Sri Lanka by way of compensation for the loss of life and property could have had a positive impact on improving the livelihoods of the Eastern and Northern people. Unfortunately, the GoSL has not undertaken any measures of reparations to date (8 years after the end of the civil war). Reparations to victims of armed conflict are an integral part of almost all the post-civil war rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts by the national governments and international organizations as reflected in the case of Nepal in the aftermath of the civil war that resulted in a comprehensive peace agreement signed in 2006 (Carranza, 2012) and in the peace negotiations between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels (Rettberg & Prieto, 2010). There is no logical reason why Sri Lanka could not be accommodative of the livelihood needs of the vanquished population by way of reparations.

While Sri Lanka has been on a rapid economic recovery at the national level, the economic recovery in the peripheries (in terms of per capita income, employment, and poverty), especially in the former conflict-affected provinces, have been lagging behind. In terms of post-civil war economic development, the experiences of Sri Lanka and Nepal could be analogous to that of the story of hare and tortoise. Moreover, not only that there was no political process at all in Sri Lanka to find a solution to the root causes of the armed conflict until the end of 2014, there were new conflicts (e.g., anti-Muslim hate campaign) instigated by religious bigots suspected to be closer to the previous regime until the end of 2014.

Moral Hazard of the New International Development Finances

The lower middle-income country status of Sri Lanka has become a ruse for both mal-development and mal-economic governance in the country underpinned by mass appropriation of public finance by bureaucrats, politicians, and crony businesses (Department of Auditor General, various years). Although the traditional concessionary international development finance usually comes forth with strings attached (such as on economic policy, governance, human rights, etc.) that may be politically unfavorable to the ruling elites, it undergoes considerable scrutiny in terms of economic and financial feasibility and probity of the projects and potential benefits to the people of the country.

On the other hand, in the case of project-based commercial borrowings from Sri Lanka’s new development partners such as China and India, it appears that political imperatives override economic imperatives for the lender. In the case of traditional donors/lenders political imperatives for lending were significantly lower than in the case of new lenders. On the other hand, the borrowings from international private capital markets are non-project based and do not undergo any needs assessment (neither economic nor political) at all by the lender/s, which is even worse than the borrowings from the “new” bilateral lenders, primarily China and India.

Out of the total commitments of foreign aid made to Sri Lanka by bilateral and multilateral donors during 2014, 52 percent was accounted by China (External Resources Department, 2014, p. 4). Moreover, 64 percent of the total aid commitments made during 2014 was for building and reconstructing roads and bridges (External Resources Department, 2014, p. 5). A total of USD 1,400 million (1.4 billion) was disbursed by both bilateral and multilateral donors during 2014 in Sri Lanka, out of which USD 902 million (or 65%) was bilateral aid. Three major contributing countries to bilateral aid disbursements in Sri Lanka during 2014 were China 34.2 percent (or USD 309 million), Japan 28.4 percent (or USD 257 million), and India 15.8 percent (or USD 143 million) (External Resources Department, 2014, pp. 5–6).

The new international development finance model pursued by the GoSL since 2006 has resulted in uneconomical and financially unviable mega prestige projects around the country. The establishment of the second national airline Mihin Air, construction of the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, and Magam Ruhunupura Mahinda Rajapaksa Port are few loss-making (from inception) mega prestige projects those have not undergone market-based economic and financial feasibility studies. The latter two projects were funded through commercial loans from the EXIM Bank of China. Hence, the migration of international development finance of Sri Lanka to private commercial capital market borrowings and borrowings from the “new” international development partners has obliterated the necessary checks and balances in international development finance, which has opened the flood-gates to mass appropriation by politicians, crony businesses, and bureaucrats.

The mass appropriation of public finance by a coterie is reflected in the fact that about 70 percent of the Annual Budget of the government in 2012 and 2013 was allocated to the Ministries under the purview of the then President and his two brothers (Ministries of Defence and Urban Development, Economic Development, Finance and Planning, and Ports and Highways) (Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2012–2013), Annual report 2012 & 2013).⁴ The situation in Sri Lanka between 2006 and 2014 was resemblance of that of Indonesia during the 1990s under the late President Suharto (Friend, 2003; Pepinsky, 2009).

On the other hand, Nepal is on a slow but steady path of economic, political, and social recovery from its decade long civil war underpinned by Constitutional reforms and setting-up of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction and the Truth and Reconciliation Committee. However, Nepal’s post-civil war economic growth is inadequate to emerge out of underdevelopment.

In the case of both Sri Lanka and Nepal, fragilities still remain in spite of progress in certain spheres of the post-civil war economic recovery. While Nepal needs to accelerate its economic growth, per capita income, and various other human development indicators, Sri Lanka needs to ensure real tangible economic benefits filter down to the peripheries, especially to the former conflict-affected provinces.

The empirical evidence presented herein on Sri Lanka during two different time periods—one in which the country was dependent on “traditional” or “old” sources of international development finance (2002–2005) and the more recent times (2009–2012) in which the country was overwhelmingly dependent on “emerging” or “new” sources of international development finance, and for Sri Lanka (dependent on “new” sources of international development finance) and Nepal (dependent on “old” sources of international development finance) during the first 5 years after the end of their respective civil wars tend to suggest that real development outcomes in terms of per capita income, inflation, unemployment, and poverty have been better under the regimes that depended on “traditional” or “old” sources of international development finance.

Of course, we appreciate the fact that the development outcomes in any country are due to a number of domestic and external factors and such outcomes cannot be attributed to any single factor such as the sources of international development finance. Nevertheless, we posit from the empirical evidence presented herein that the differences in the sources of international development finance could have played a significant role in the realization of the development outcomes as reflected in the few development indicators used in this article.

In principle, the new players in the international development finance (both the international private commercial capital market lenders as well as the bilateral lenders among the “rising powers”) do promote competition in international development financial markets, which is good for the borrowing countries because of multiplicity of choices available. These new sources of international development finance have the potential to enhance ownership by the borrowers. However, in practice this author doubts whether the governments in many developing countries have the capacity to be prudent borrowers. The “emerging” or “new” model of no-strings attached lending to developing countries (especially to lower middle-income countries) has the potential to be a moral hazard to the international financial architecture as reflected in the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, present day financial crisis in Greece, and the balance-of-payments turbulence experienced by Sri Lanka since the mid-2014, which continues to date.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Peer reviewers are gratefully acknowledged for their constructive and incisive comments and suggestions which have greatly enhanced the quality of this final product. However, all remaining errors are the responsibility of the author.

Notes

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