Abstract
This article explores master frames of social movement mobilization over the course of the long twentieth century in Iran. It illustrates that while participants were diverse, democratization remained the dominant master frame of the grand social movements of the twentieth century. In this article, I present historical analyses of four social movements in Iran which demonstrate that although Iran’s integration into the capitalist world system fostered profound economic and social transformation, its political system remained comparatively unaffected. This explains why demands for political reforms served as key mobilizing frames for social movements. This continuity reveals a profound crisis of the Iranian political system, because although nationwide social movements have experienced success the state–society relationship remains fraught with contention.
Introduction
Historian Eric Hobsbawm suggested the existence of a ‘long nineteenth century’ covering the period between the French Revolution and the beginning of the First World War to emphasize the significance of the events during this period (1994). In a much smaller scale, but with the same intention of underscoring the importance of events that influenced Iran since early twentieth century, in this article I adopt the expression the ‘long twentieth century’ to refer to the nationwide mobilizations that occurred in Iran during this time and whose effects have been redefining socio-political processes until today. The first of these mobilizations was the constitutional movement of 1905–1907 which introduced a constitution and a parliament to the Iranian political system. The national oil movement in 1951–1953 nationalized the Iranian oil industry. In 1979 a revolutionary movement brought an end to 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy. In the late 1990s the reform movement advocated citizenship rights and fostered a vibrant civil society. In this article, I show that although socially and economically the Iranian society experienced transformations, the political system remained authoritarian and therefore, the master frames of all aforementioned mobilizations remained similar. Hence, each movement was a continuation of the previous movement(s) and none of the movements emerged as a counter movement1 to the previous one or disrupted the previous master frame.
In social movement studies, framing refers to the production of meaning and mobilizing ideas for a social movement (Snow & Benford, 1988). Sidney Tarrow has demonstrated that social movements and collective actors can hang together and cluster in a common political struggle in a particular historical conjuncture or an era (1983). He refers to this clustering within a specific period of time as a ‘cycle of protest’. Snow and Benford developed the idea of master frames in an effort to theoretically contribute to the concept of cycle of protest. They argued that master frames within a cycle of protest carry out a similar function as frames ‘albeit on a larger scale in that they provide the interpretive medium through which collective actors associated with different movements within a cycle assign blame for the problem they are attempting to ameliorate’ (1992, p. 139). Master frames are broad themes which bring together and cluster different collective actors within a movement (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1992). They are important aspects of a movement in that they function as a kind of ‘master algorithm’ (Benford & Snow, 2000) that assimilates diverse ideas and groups under a single umbrella. They are broad and inclusive and hence they serve different groups of people who support the given movement. However, the importance of master frames does not only lie in the fact that they are broad and inclusive. They are also significant in that they resonate with a large number of people in a specific historical (Tarrow, 1992) and political (Diani, 1996) context. Therefore, master frames not only help us understand grievances and demands of the main protagonists of movements, but they speak to the larger economic, social, and political context at the time of mobilization.
The twentieth century in Iran began with the constitutional movement demanding democratic rights and political inclusion and ended with the reform movement demanding the same. In this article, I demonstrate that despite profound transformations that Iran experienced in the twentieth century the authoritarian political structure remained resilient (see Rivetti & Cavatorta, 2014; Tezcür, 2012). Hence, due to large-scale political exclusion from political processes, inclusion in formal politics has remained the main demand of movement protagonists over a century of mobilization. On the one hand, in the course of the twentieth century Iranian society was increasingly integrated into the structures of the capitalist world system (Wallerstein, 1974). Since the early twentieth century this integration had economic and social consequences. On the other hand, the political structure was relatively unaffected. This explains why the state–society relation has remained contested.
McAdam has argued that frames should not necessarily be understood with regard to words or meaning construction but also with regard to collective action strategies, tactics, and events (1996). In this article, I view frames as concrete forms of political rhetoric or a mobilizing message rather than specific processes of meaning construction. Hence, I do not emphasize the process of frame construction by social actors, but I underline the relationship between socio-political structures and diagnostic and prognostic frames. While the former refers to the identification of the problem, the latter outlines the solution (Snow & Benford, 1988). In the next section, I briefly review literature on framing in social movements and position my work within that literature. In the third section I provide a brief overview of the four grand social movements of Iran in twentieth century. In the fourth section I demonstrate the changing relations among the state, society and the economy and demonstrate the connection between these transformations and democratizing frames. Finally, I conclude and elaborate on the implications of this case for future research.
Frames and Social Movements
The origin of the concept of frame can be traced back to the work of Erving Goffman. He introduced this concept as a basic cognitive structure which shapes our perception of social reality (1974). Based on Goffman’s work Benford and Snow developed the term framing, and they refer to the process of constructing meaning by movement activists or social movement organizations (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988). The most significant aspect of framing is its emphasis on the symbolic aspects of mobilization and the work carried on by activists to articulate rationale for their collective action and proposals of solutions. Moreover, this process is claimed to be contentious in the sense that ‘it involves the generation of interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones but may also challenge them’ (Benford & Snow, 2000).
Scholarship on framing typically either focuses on the importance of culture and employs discourse analysis (see Davis, 2012; Fine, 1995) or analyzes the emergence and evolution of ideology (e.g., Oliver & Johnston, 2000; Westby, 2002). These approaches have remained largely descriptive and concerned with meaning work and the role of agency with reference to internal dimensions of movements (Swart, 1995; Williams, 2004). Much less scholarship focuses on the structural context in which framing processes of a movement materialize. Scholars such as Diani (1996), Evans (1997), and Ferree (2003) have attempted to overcome this shortcoming by emphasizing the impact of external social and political forces on framing. For example, Diani combines scholarship on framing processes and political opportunity structures to explain how different opportunities for a movement can influence development of different mobilizing messages and their effectiveness (Diani, 1996). Evans (1997, p. 451) draws on the idea of ‘multi organizational field’—that is, ‘all of the groups in a society with which a social movement organization may establish a link’—to illustrate how social-structural and discursive boundaries of the targets in the field can determine framing of social movement organizations. Ferree (2003, p. 309) developed the idea of discursive opportunity structures as ‘institutionally anchored ways of thinking that provide a gradient of political acceptability to specific packages of idea’ to distinguish the role of structured discourses from agency in framing of a movement. She shows how differences in discursive opportunities influence the use of frames in the feminist movement in Germany and the United States and create very different frames.
While this literature has significantly expanded our understanding of frame creation with regard to structures, it has largely remained limited to explaining how power relations and structural advantages/disadvantages influence dominant discourses and opportunities for movement framings. Furthermore, as discussed by Snow and his colleagues in a recent publication on the emergence, development and future of framing perspective, a significant gap remains in multi-case investigations of framing (Snow, Benford, McCammon, Hewitt, & Fitzgerald, 2014). In this article, I aim to provide a multi-case analysis of movement framing by tracing the similarity of the master frame within four different movements. Moreover, I go beyond structures of discourse and opportunity in addressing the external determinants of movement frames. Instead, I focus on social and political structures at the time of the emergence of four nationwide social movements in Iran.
Grand Social Movements of Iran Twentieth Century
In his ground-breaking work on social movements, Charles Tilly has underlined the significance of historical analysis of social movements (Tilly, 2004). In line with Tilly’s claims, the emergence of social movements in Iran was associated with the advent of a modern nation state and Iran’s gradual integration in structures of global capitalism. The transformation of the Iranian state and its gradual insertion into the modern world system can be traced back to the late 1800s/early 1900s. In the beginning of the twentieth century the constitutional movement introduced a parliament and a constitution to Iran’s political system, but since then the political structure has not been radically changed.
Constitutional Movement
It has been argued that the nature of the government during Qajar Dynasty (1789–1925) was ‘patrimonial in Weber’s typology’ (Arjomand, 1988, p. 24). The idea of separating the state from dynastic rule and patrimonial government flourished in the beginning of the nineteenth century as Iran was incorporated into the international system of sovereign states. In this period, the concept of the state as an organization responsible for the welfare of the nation was popularized (Arjomand, 1988). Moreover, it was under the Qajar Dynasty and in the late 1800s and early 1900s that Iran was gradually integrated into structures of global capitalism. Consequently, Western influence increased enormously in comparison to previous years and European powers sought to expand their political and commercial influence (Banani, 1961). One telling figure which demonstrates this transformation is Iran’s foreign trade, which increased 12-fold in real terms from 1800 to 1913 (Arjomand, 1988, p. 34).
Although some groups benefited from the increasing Western influence and trade during Qajar time, most social groups were against this engagement. Iran’s economic integration with Europe had a direct impact on the position of bazaar traders, many of whom struggled to compete with European competitors given economic concessions which favored the latter (Abrahamian, 1982; Arjomand, 1984). Furthermore, the clerics were opposed to the tolerance of the Qajars towards Western culture, Western style education, and the presence of missionaries. The intellectuals who opposed the Qajar rule were mostly educated in Europe or had gained knowledge of the West second hand by studying in countries such as India or Egypt. They were struck by ‘Western comparative justice and lack of arbitrary rule’ (Keddie, 1983, p. 584). As Abrahamian argues:
The impact of the West during the second half of the nineteenth century undermined in two separate ways the fragile relationship between the Qajar state and Iranian society. First, Western penetration, especially economic penetration, threatened the many urban bazaars, and thereby gradually induced the scattered regional commercial interests to coalesce into one cross-regional middle class that was conscious for the first time of its own common grievances. This propertied middle class, because of its ties to the traditional economy and the traditional Shia ideology, became known in later years as the traditional middle class. Second, Western contact, particularly ideological contact through modern educational institutions, introduced new concepts, new aspirations, new occupations, and eventually a new professional middle class known as the intelligentsia. (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 50)
As the result the middle class which in 1800s was rather fragmented was transformed into a ‘broad state-wide force conscious for the first time’ (Abrahamian, 1982 p. 58). The simultaneous emergence of the modern intelligentsia and the traditional middle class led to widespread social dissatisfaction with the Qajars (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 69). In the context of political, economic, and social change, four factors led to the emergence of the constitutional movement. First, the intelligentsia was anxious for change. Second, the traditional middle class was left defenseless against foreign competitors. Third, there was a dramatic decline in living standards due to Western competition. Finally, the tyranny of the Qajars remained unchanged. The combination of all these factors gradually generated support among a range of diverse groups for the constitutional movement (Abrahamian, 1982; Fadaee, 2012; Keddie, 2006). Despite the fact that different social groups involved in the constitutional movement faced different grievances they defined their problems (diagnostic frame) with regard to the authoritarian nature of the state. They aimed at introducing a constitution and a parliamentary system as a solution to the identified problem (prognostic frame) which would limit the power of the rulers and would allow participation of different social groups in the process of decision-making.
The introduction of a constitution and a parliamentary system led to the outbreak of civil war and Mohammad Ali Shah, the sixth king of Qajar Dynasty, bombed the parliament. However, the constitution and the parliament remained an important heritage for the political system of Iran. A series of financial reforms were introduced and the parliament began to regulate foreign interventions (Keddie, 1981, p. 71).
National Oil Movement
Reza Shah (1925–1941) was the first king of Pahlavi Dynasty (1925–1979) and he implemented a series of modernization programs and sought to centralize the state. He modernized the army, raised the state revenues through taxation, banking, and customs reforms and constructed infrastructure such as roads and the trans-Iranian railway. The civil bureaucracy was expanded under his reign, the judicial system was secularized and European-style education was promoted (Arjomand, 1988; Cronin, 2003).
Reza Shah’s reforms paved the way for a more rapid integration of Iran in the capitalist world system (Keddie, 1972, p. 76). As the consequence of Reza Shah’s economic policies, a ‘modern working class’ emerged which was mostly concentrated in major cities (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 147). Moreover, his policies disadvantaged the traditional petty bourgeoisie of the bazaar. Modern textile factories wrought havoc on traditional handicraft industries and control of foreign trade influenced private traders negatively and in some cases it caused bankruptcy. Furthermore, right after Reza Shah came to power he sought to undermine the power and privileges of clerics. Consequently, clerics lost their seats in the Parliament and their control over the educational and judicial systems (Moaddel, 1986).
Reza Shah concentrated on his modernization program and ignored the constitution (Behnam, 1986). Compared with the years after the constitutional movement, there was a decline in independent activities and institutions. An independent press did not exist and all the social and political institutions such as political parties and associations that could have played an important role in the development of the civil society were banned. The intellectual opposition was either jailed or banned, the working class was not allowed to organize, and Great Britain influenced the national affairs of Iran (Ghani, 1999; Keddie, 1972). In 1942, Reza Shah abdicated and was succeeded by his son Mohammad Reza. Short after his abdication there was a liberalization with regard to freedom of speech and movement. Newspapers and magazines were proliferated and political prisoners were released. Hence, from the beginning of the 1940s, oppositional organizations, protests, and trade unions started to emerge (Ansari, 2003; Keddie, 2006).
In order to analyze the national oil movement, one should consider that the Iranian oil industry had been controlled by the British through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) since its establishment in 1909. From the very beginning Iranians had many grievances against the AIOC, mostly related to the small amount of revenue that Iran received from the company. The first attempt to nationalize the Iranian oil was launched by an informal opposition group in parliament. Unhappy with this campaign the Shah and his proponents rigged the subsequent parliamentary elections and this triggered a wave of dissent. A crowd of politicians, university students, and bazaar traders gathered in the palace grounds to protest against the absence of free elections (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 252). Three groups were represented in this first protest act according to Abrahamian: prominent anti-court politicians, politicians connected to the bazaar, and a number of young, Western-educated radicals from the intelligentsia (Abrahamian, 1982). The consequent unrests caused by this demonstration forced the court to promise to end electoral irregularities. In addition, the representative committee formed a broad coalition—mobilized under the leadership of the prominent parliamentarian Mohammad Mosaddegh—which was named the National Front (Jebhe-ye Melli in Persian). In its first public declaration, the National Front did not raise the oil issue. Rather they were concerned with the election issue and had three specific demands: honest elections, lifting of martial law, and freedom of the press (Abrahamian, 1982). This was the beginning of large scale mobilizations of different groups and organizations which later demanded the nationalization of Iranian oil.
Similar to the previous mobilization middle classes, bazaar traders and the clerics participated but this time most of the intellectuals (many of them influenced by the October Revolution in Russia and socialist ideas), university students and the newly emerged working classes joined the protests as well. These mobilizations were first and foremost framed (diagnostic and prognostic frames) with reference to the undemocratic practices of the state (e.g., election fraud and absence of freedom of speech), and subsequently incorporated demands to nationalize the petroleum industry.
The AIOC was nationalized in March 1951 and Mosaddegh, as the champion of oil nationalization, was elected prime minister and became one of the icons of Iranians’ struggle for democracy. During two terms of Mosaddegh’s government, Iranian society experienced one of its most intense democratic periods. Political parties and groups were free, the ministers were accountable to the parliament and the public, the courts were independent, and all the military and other special courts were abolished. Thus, the movement had two main outcomes: a democratic government was established and the Iranian oil was nationalized (Gasiorowski, 2004).
The Revolutionary Movement of 1979
In August 1953, a military coup d’état, which was supported by the British and the American CIA, was successful in overthrowing Mosaddegh’s government (Abrahamian, 2001, 2013). Mosaddegh was imprisoned for 3 years and lived under house arrest for the remainder of his life. After the coup, Mohammad Reza Shah developed a repressive authoritarian regime. All oppositional political parties were banned and many of the activists of the national oil movement were arrested or fled the country. In 1957, an extensive security apparatus (SAVAK) was formed with the help of the American CIA and Israeli Mossad (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 425). The post-1953 coup’s regime was characterized by two broad policy orientations. First, the majority of the population was excluded from participating in economic and political decision-making. Second, the Shah adopted an economic strategy which would promote ‘dependent capitalist development’ (Moaddel, 1993, p. 52).
In 1963 Shah launched a series of reform programs referred to as the White Revolution. The main target of these reforms was the peasantry through extensive land reforms and nationalization of forests. Furthermore, because the capital was shifted from the traditional landholding the government started supporting large investments of foreign and domestic capital. These transformations led to the emergence and growth of a capitalist class (Keddie, 1978, p. 321) and accelerated integration of Iran in the world system. In other words, they changed Iran from an ‘agrarian based, pre-industrial society to a semi-industrialized, capitalist society’ (Behrooz, 1981, p. 192).
The bazaar and small-scale industry was marginalized as a consequence of policy that favored large-scale industry (Moaddel, 1986). Moreover, the expansion of the bureaucracy became a mechanism for the state to control civil society and maintain national integration. This expansion led to the decline of intermediate organizations like guilds, anjomans (societies), the dowreh (circle), boneh (traditional farming organizations), and other forms of corporate life that existed in Iran for many centuries (Moaddel, 1993, p. 60). Hence, the development of bureaucratic institutions widened the gap between the state and society (Moaddel, 1993). In 1975 the Shah dissolved all the political parties and declared a one-party system and the gap between state and society became a chasm. Kamali characterizes two important elements of these years as ‘fundamentalist secularism’ and ‘fundamentalist marketism’ (Kamali, 2007). Asef Bayat explains that
By the late 1970s, a large well to do middle class, a generation of modern youth and publicly active women, an industrial working class, and a new impoverished class of slum dwellers and squatters dominated the social scene. Except for the poor, most groups benefited from economic development and enjoyed higher social status and a superior quality of life. However, the persistence of Shah’s autocracy prevented these thriving social layers from participating in the political process. (Bayat, 2007, p. 22)
Similarly Abrahamian traces the origins of the 1979 revolution to the success of Shah in modernizing the country on the socio-economic level but failing to change it on the political level. Hence, he concludes that ‘the revolution took place neither because of overdevelopment nor because of underdevelopment but because of uneven development’ (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 427).
In the beginning, the revolutionary movement was supported by students and intellectuals, who were demanding political freedom and democracy. Ayatollah Khomeini’s promises of democracy and progress went hand in hand with his uncompromising opposition against the regime, and his interpretation of Islam as essentially against monarchy persuaded the revolutionaries to support him (Daneshvar, 1996; Halliday, 1979). The movement went through different stages starting from 1977 with non-violent protests and gatherings which were mainly organized by different socio-political groups such as the National Front, the Tudeh Party2 and the Iranian Writers’ Association3. These early mobilizations made the Shah liberalize the political scene to some extent. In 1978 mass demonstrations erupted and government employees, workers, students, and teachers mobilized in large scales (Ashraf & Banuazizi, 1985; Daneshvar, 1996; Parsa, 1989). By the late stages of the revolutionary movement it became clear that the movement was not led by a single group or ideology, but by a heterogeneous and diverse group including bazaar traders and clergy under the leadership of Khomeini, plus young educated people and leftist groups (Khosrokhavar, 2004). However, because of the repressive policies of the Shah against the secular and leftist forces and suppression of their organizations these groups could not publicize their ideologies. In contrast, religious forces and the clergy could disseminate their political ideology through institutions such as mosques and hussainias.4 This facilitated a systemic pollicization of their ideology and orders (Bayat, 2007; Dabashi, 1993). The most important antagonism and common frame which mobilized all these diverse groups was opposition to the Shah (Khosrokhavar, 2004) and his repressive policies (diagnostic frame). On November 6, 1978, Shah made a nationwide address in which he told the protestors that ‘I have heard the message of your revolution’. He described the revolutionary movement as a movement ‘against oppression and corruption’ and promised to continue with his democratizing policies (Arjomand, 1988). The protesters responded by continuing their protests and chanting the famous slogans of their movement ‘Death to Shah’ and ‘Death to Dictator’ (prognostic frame). On January 17, 1979 Mohammad Reza Shah left Iran and his guards gave up on 12 February leading to the victory of the revolutionary movement.
The Reform Movement
The victory of the 1979 revolution was the end of the 2,500 years of monarchic rule in Iran. A coalition comprising different groups and ideologies started to work together in the months after the victory of the revolution. However, by 1981 the clerics—under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini—had monopolized power and suppressed other groups. The concept of velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists) became part of the country’s first constitution5 and newly emerged Islamic institutions started to exert control over more and more spheres of everyday life and civil society (Amjad, 1989; Ehteshami, 1995). Moreover, many autonomous peasants and worker’s organizations were destroyed and those parts of the constitution which were concerned with democratic freedoms, labor councils and nationalization of foreign trade were neglected (Moaddel, 1991). The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) shifted attention to the war and the process of consolidation of power was facilitated. In the meantime merchants became the major beneficiaries of economic policy in the post-revolutionary era. Although economic policies of Shah were anti-bazaar, the merchants managed to reassert their power in the years before the revolution. Their position which was consolidated with the support of many prominent leaders of the Islamic Republic and their political position was ultimately bolstered with financial power. Through their connections with clerics merchants influenced policy toward the economy and politics (Moaddel, 1991).
Until the end of the war and death of Khomeini Islamization was reinforced, oppositional groups were systematically eliminated, civil society was repressed, the public sector was expanded and the economy was weakened. After the death of Khomeini and under the presidency of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani the main goals were to improve the primary infrastructure and foster economic growth. In contrast to the statist policies of the previous years Rafsanjani started to liberalize the economy. This era has become known as ‘the reconstruction’ era in the socio-political language of Iran (Fadaee, 2012). However, similar to the previous years the regime remained repressive and none of the applications to form political parties, as authorized by the 1981 Parties Law, which was supposed to be put into practice after the war, were approved.
The Islamic regime had become an oligarchy by the 1990s, and the political landscape was dominated by a small number of institutions. Moreover, there was a clear division between the so-called ‘Islamic left’ and the conservative clergy (Khosrokhavar, 2004). Political struggles among these groups unfolded in the context of ongoing social transformation. Literacy and university attendance, particularly among women, had increased dramatically and by the early 1990s Iran’s reform movement had emerged as a potent political force (Bayat, 2007, p. 49). Mohammad Khatami as the main champion of this movement was elected president in 1997. Khatami advocated significance of civil society, individual liberties, women’s rights and political pluralism.
Three factors paved the way for emergence of this movement: first, the Islamization project of the Islamic Republic had stalled. Second, social changes such as increasing literacy and urbanization generated actors from among educated middle classes, particularly youth and women, whose political demands became the main driver of the movement. Third, globalization and the expansion of communication technologies allowed for the introduction and proliferation of new ideas and discourses (Bayat, 2007; Fadaee, 2011, 2012).
Although middle classes were the main supporters of the movement, the reform movement also found support among working classes and many of the poor and disenfranchised. Therefore, the emergence of the reform movement was the result of a coalition that included millions of women, youth, intellectuals, journalists, artists, clergy, and technocrats (Abrahamian, 2008; Yaghmaian, 2002). Its rise and evolution signaled a major turning point for the Islamic Republic. Large numbers of people who had lived through the dark years of the post-revolution and an 8-year war with Iraq opposed repression and censorship (diagnostic frame) and mobilized under the frame which supported building a civil society, freedom of expression, citizenship rights and above all inclusion in electoral politics (prognostic frame).
In the aftermath of the electoral victory of the reform movement, society and politics underwent striking transformations. The number of women’s, youth’s and environmental NGOs, increased enormously (Arjomand, 2009, p. 93). Spectacular victories followed the 1997 triumph: the reformists obtained 75 percent of the vote in local elections in 1999 and Khatami won a second term as president in 2001.
Dynamics of Change, Continuity and Democratizing Frames
The twentieth century began in Iran with the constitutional movement demanding rule of law and a democratic system. The national oil movement was launched as a response to electoral irregularities and the Shah’s intervention in parliamentary affairs. The 1979 revolution abolished the 2,500 years of monarchical rule and the reform movement facilitated the emergence of the most vibrant period of civil society mobilization Iran has witnessed in its history.
In his study of social movements in twentieth century Iran, Poulson has argued that Iranians have adopted two master frames of mobilization during the twentieth century: ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘individual sovereignty’ (Poulson, 2005). While the former concerned how the Iranian state should achieve independence in the world, the latter debated the rights individual Iranians have in their political and social system. While these are certainly important frames which characterize Iranian movements, I argue that the main master frame of Iran’s grand social movements has been democratization. Although it is similar to individual sovereignty, Poulson emphasizes the negotiation of rights as Muslim Individuals and refers to a ‘broad Iranian-Muslim culture’ (Poulson, 2005, p. 9). I emphasize changes in society and economy and continuity in political structure within Iran as the main reason why movements exhibit similar master frames.
Social problems have been recognized as the roots of struggles over meaning since long ago (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). Social, economic, and political dynamics of Iranian society created a context for social groups to define their problems (diagnostic frame) and accompanying solutions (prognostic frame) with regard to the authoritarian nature of the state. Grievances articulated by different groups were seen as by-products of an undemocratic political system (diagnostic frame). The accompanying prognostic frame argued that these grievances could not be eliminated without profound changes in the political system. Hence, despite the fact that different groups were involved in nationwide mobilizations of the twentieth century, there were no autonomous mobilizations or bearer of an opposing frame. Even the most radical leftist parties prioritized reforming the political system over demands to nationalize industry and redistribute wealth. Similarly, religious groups and traders demanded political reforms, and these demands were not necessarily given an Islamic frame. This frame was also embraced by the wider public. In this section, I outline some of the main and interacting social, economic and political elements of Iranian society to show that the continuity in movements’ master frame is a logical outcome of these specific developments which transformed the socio-economic structure of Iran and left the political structure largely unchanged.
The first three movements were the consequence of the state’s attempts to modernize. Moreover, the changes which occurred in the economic, social, and intellectual structures of each era fostered the emergence of social groups which demanded reforms of the political system. While all movements included a diverse range of actors, they were spearheaded by the traditional middle class—comprised of the bazaar traders and the clerics—as well as members of the modern middle class such as intellectuals. However, in the last grand social movement of the century—the reform movement—the modern middle class was the main protagonist. Absence of the traditional middle class in this movement was due to growing connections of the Islamic regime with the clergy and the bazaar after the 1979 revolution (Fadaee, 2012).
The introduction of the modern Western capitalism and integration of Iran into the world market during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries led to important changes in its socio-economic system which dramatically transformed the agrarian relations of production. The modernization process launched by Naser al-Din Shah Qajar began the process of integrating Iran in the world system and this process was accelerated under Pahlavi (Keddie, 1978). However, Iran’s experience with modernization was not homogenous. As Kamali argues, the state was the main agent of modernization in Iran, and its development strategies served the ruling economic and social elite (Kamali, 2007). Moreover, as a consequence of socio-economic changes a new professional middle class emerged, consisting of highly skilled and educated professions like doctors, engineers, civil servants, etc. With advancements in communication technology and the growth of Western style universities this class increasingly aspired to change relations between society and the state. Furthermore, due to investment in large-scale factories a new group of industrialists and bankers outside the traditional system of bazaar emerged. These groups gradually usurped bazaar traders as political power brokers (Bonine, 1981, p. 236). Bazaars had traditionally been the commercial center of the city, and they functioned as community centers with mosques, religious schools, public baths, tea houses, etc. Moreover, historically bazaar traders and the clerics had strong linkages and were political allies (Moaddel, 1993). Given the fact that clerics had traditionally played a significant role in shaping the social, political and economic structures of the country their alliance with bazaar traders put both groups in an even more privileged position. This group i.e. bazaar traders and clerics, referred to as traditional middle class (Abrahamian, 1982) only existed as a socio-economic entity until the last years of nineteenth century, and never became a nationwide antagonistic force. But in the late nineteenth century, because of the rapid economic integration and weakening of their position which coincided with the introduction of the telegraph and postal systems, and of newspapers, the traditional middle class went through political awakening and sought to reverse its weakening political position in society (Abrahamian, 1982; Arjomand, 1988; Keddie, 1981).
Despite the aforementioned transformations of Iran’s socio-economic structures the political structure remained authoritarian. The authoritarian nature of the Iranian political system is rooted in the existence of a hierarchical monarchical rule and institutions for twenty-five centuries which precluded the emergence of an autonomous civil society. Katouzian (1997, 2006) has argued that historically power has been concentrated and used arbitrarily in Iran. The Iranian state monopolized property rights and has been supported by bureaucratic and military power. Furthermore, the absence of laws and rules to regulate the state power has decoupled the ruler and the state from any independent socio-political entity. Moreover, there were no rights and laws independent of the state. In other words, the laws and rules could be applied only as long as they did not conflict with the wishes of the state. Hence, arbitrariness made power dependent on the personality of the ruler and his organization of the state.
The monarchical and arbitrary institutions started to fall apart in the early twentieth century with the introduction of the constitution and the parliament. Since then the main aim of social movements has been to reinforce democratic institutions and to establish and empower civil society. However, in spite of these efforts a strong and long-lasting civil society never emerged. Even after the abolishment of the monarchical system and the establishment of a republic after the 1979 revolution and introduction of a very progressive constitution into the political system, the state–society relation remained contested. Many progressive laws mentioned in the constitution were never implemented and from the beginning the concept of velayate faghih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists) made it clear that no law or rule can be implemented independent of the state. However, during the reform era the basis of Iran’s first long-lasting civil society mobilization were established and developed. New forms of political resistance and social movements emerged which were mostly manifested in the rise of a critical press and development of movements such as environmental movements and women’s rights movement. Furthermore, new discourses and narratives such as ‘pluralism’, ‘human rights’ and ‘political participation’ were widely advocated in the public discourse (Abrahamian, 2008; Fadaee, 2012). Since then despite the attempts of the conservatives to destroy these fundaments, civil society actors have managed to retain their pillars.
Conclusion
In this article, I have focused on a century of mobilization in Iran. The brief history of mobilization in Iran explains why some frames become dominant and effective in clustering different groups and messages. I have illustrated that while participants remained diverse, democratization stayed the dominant master frame of these mobilizations. This continuity demonstrates the importance of historical analysis of social movements. Furthermore, continuity in the democratizing master frame and the absence of counter-movements reveals the crisis of the Iranian political system. It shows that despite the emergence and victory of nationwide movements over the course of a century, the state-society conflict has remained the main issue at stake. Nathan (2003) has shown that although regime theory presupposes the fragility of authoritarian systems, China’s authoritarian system has remained resilient even after the Tiananmen crisis of 1989. Since then the concept has been increasingly used to demonstrate resilient nature of authoritarianism in the Middle East (see Haddad, 2011; Heydemann & Leenders, 2011; Tezcür, 2012; Zoubir, 2005). By emphasizing the significance of historical continuities and the persistence of older structures of society and politics this article calls for a historical analysis of authoritarian resiliency. As Barington Moore’s work on the social origins of dictatorship and democracy has shown, different historical contexts create different lines of politics and these particularities can enrich our understanding of (de) democratization processes (Moore, 1966). Future research could provide a historical perspective on specific forms of authoritarian resiliency with regard to persisting structures of society, economy, and politics. This article also offers practical implications for our understanding of democratizing processes in Iran. The fact that changes in dynasties, Shahs and the transformation from a long-lasting monarchy to a republic did not solve the contested relation of state and society illustrates the fact that strengthening the foundations of Iran’s civil society should lie at the heart of any progressive struggle.