Institutional Quality,Taxation and Human Development: The Case of Morocco

Abstract

The main goal of this article is to explore the relationship between taxation and development in Morocco, particularly among university students in the city of Tetouan. This article analyzes the culture and tax morale in a sample of university students, in order to offer a deeper explanation on the obstacles that hamper the construction of human development in that country. A fairer and more equitable tax system is at the basis of human development. In this sense, this research shows the necessity to restore the relationship and trust of citizens toward their states. The work is organized as follows: first, there is a brief introduction; then the second part raises the theoretical framework of the research. The third part analyzes the data collected through the survey on tax culture and development, and the article concludes with a brief reflection.

Keywords

human development tax culture institutional quality capabilities Morocco inequality

Introduction

Several states in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America have suffered fiscal crises that have warned of the need to implement tax systems and increase the capability of the state to carry out growth and redistributive policies. However, tax reforms sponsored by international organizations in the last years of the twentieth century ignored the redistributive impact of the tax system and its positive effects on the legitimacy of the state (Bird, 2012). From a technical point of view, the reforms were based on the introduction of a tax system with reduced rates on capital and corporation tax, a value-added tax on domestic consumption, and indirect taxes on specific consumption, as well as the abolition of tariffs (Brauner & Stewart, 2013). The policy of low direct taxes, tariff disarmament, and the “tragedy” of having to fiscally incentivize foreign investment reduced the tax collection capacity of states by preventing them from pursuing development policies (Dagan, 2013; Fjeldstad & Moore, 2013; Keen & Simone, 2004).

On the other hand, the economic literature on the most recent development continues to reflect on the key economic performance of the countries, measured in terms of growth of production and income, and does not just contemplate the concept of human development. The new institutional economy insists on the role of institutions as formal and informal rules that structure the political, economic, or social incentives of human exchange and emphasizes the market-creating institutions and the conditions of governance that strengthen it (Khan, 2008; Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004).

While human development depends on per capita income, growth also depends on key human development factors, such as health and education (Agosin, Barreix & Machado, 2005; UNDP, 1990). In Sen’s capability approach, GDP growth is seen as a means to expand the fundamental freedoms enjoyed by members of society (Sen, 1999). These freedoms depend on social and economic institutions (health and education) and political and human rights (freedom of political participation). In this sense, social policy must be at the same level as economic policy to ensure equitable and lasting development (Block & Evans, 2005; Chang, 2004; Mkandawire, 2010).

Thus, the tax system is a fundamental institution to reaffirm the capability of the state and promote a policy of development (Prichard, 2010), at the same time being a key element of institutional quality, since it generates the resources to create institutions of quality. It also contributes to establishing a closer relationship between the state and the citizens (Alonso & Garcimartín, 2013; Gupta & Tareq, 2008). Fiscal capability must be understood as a prerequisite for state capability and development strategies (Ayee, Fjeldstad, Marais & Keanly, 2010; Fjeldstad, 2013). A hidden facet of development is revealed: if the state does not have the institutional capability to increase fiscal revenues, it cannot provide public goods for development (Di John, 2007; Di John, forthcoming; Keen, 2012). The inability to collect taxes reflects both the difficulty of raising political legitimacy and an institutional weakness in tax administration and management (Chang, 2002; Toye, 2000).

Until now, the capability paradigm has not been translated into an agenda of fiscal reforms in practice. Sen’s conception of development requires the construction of a new institutional framework which highlights the institutions that facilitate collective decisions about the goals of development (1999). In this article, the idea is that “social inheritance” in education, health, and collective endowments explains, to a large extent, international income differences, in order to show that taxation is a key element of good governance, as well as manifesting the legitimacy of the state and the citizens’ commitment to politics, and hence, to development.

In this work, Sen’s capability approach is adopted (1999). Also, the emphasis is placed on the constitutive role of institutions, and it is assumed that their role must be to develop human capabilities (Chang, 2011). Furthermore, it is based on the idea that institutions, in addition to defining the framework of human beings in the social sphere, can shape their behavior through changes in values (Chang, 2007; Chang & Evans, 2005; Dutt, 2011).

The main goal of this article is to explore the relationship between taxation and development in Morocco, particularly among university students in the city of Tetouan. Based on the analysis of the culture and tax morale of a sample of the university population, it is intended to offer a deeper explanation on the obstacles that hamper the construction of human development in this country. To accomplish this, a survey was conducted. Taxpayers’ experiences were researched in their relations with the treasury and the state. The answers to the following questions were the starting point of the research: perceptions of the tax system, public services, the priority of expenditure, the functioning of the public treasury, the perception of the degree of fulfillment, and the perception of civic-tax education. The sample included 250 men and women, aged 25–59. They were undergraduate and postgraduate students, researchers, and professors from the Abdlmalek Essaadi University in Tetouan.

The article is organized as follows. First, there is a brief introduction; then, the second part raises the theoretical framework of the research. The third part analyzes the data collected through the survey on tax culture and development, and the article concludes with a brief reflection.

Institutional Quality, Taxation and Human Development

The great impact of neoinstitutionalist literature on the reorientation of development agencies programs for undeveloped countries (Bates, 2010) has resulted in the elaboration of many institutional quality indicators, articulated around the quality of governance, protection of property rights, respect for laws and contracts, and control of political leaders (Edison, 2003). Public choice dismisses tax and the limitation of social spending, and its influence on the new institutional economy leads to conceive excessive regulation and the collection of taxes as an attack on property rights, and the tax itself as a reflection of the coercive power of the state (Batley & Larbi, 2004; Duff, 2005; Leroy, 2010). Thus, the Index of Economic Freedom associates institutional quality with a low tax incidence of the state, which is why multilateral agencies recommend establishing neutral tax systems and reducing social spending so as not to discourage private initiative or interfere with market signals.

Despite its positive effects on the legitimacy of institutions and good governance, the establishment of institutional quality indicators leaves aside the tax capability of the state and the aspects related to the importance of the taxpayers’ perception of the allocation of their contribution and the connection between the sacrifice of paying taxes and the enjoyment of public expenditure (López, 2012; López & García, 2012).

The developmental capability of the states depends on both the political empowerment and the capacity to mobilize resources in order to provide quality services and protection to broad sectors of the population. The mobilization of domestic resources strengthens ties with citizens and increases political space. Taxation plays a key role in the capability of the state. It is an objective indicator of its power and legitimacy to drive development (Brautigam, 2008; Keen & Lockwood, 2010; Moore, 2004). To guarantee domestic resources, tax reform thus becomes the main funding strategy for development, because the tax income is greater than that of foreign aid or other sources of funding.

The level of social consensus and the legitimacy of government are two factors closely related to the state’s capability to determine tax policy. The social-fiscal pact is the materialization of the social contract resulting from the mutual recognition of obligations and rights between the state and the citizens (ECLAC, 1998). The fiscal contract depends on the confidence citizens have in public administrations and their perception of justice, transparency, and reciprocity in the collection and the destination of public revenues. If the confidence of citizens in the management of taxes by the state is very low, the fiscal pact is weakened. The fiscal pact also depends on the functioning of the tax administration and the agencies or institutions of the state apparatus that are charged with the execution of public expenditure. In order to foster trust between the state and citizens, the tax administration and its sanctioning capability must be strengthened, horizontal equity must be promoted, and law must be excluded.

Citizens understand that they must pay taxes if they are translated into public goods and services. Therefore, the credibility of policies, which is related to how the government spends public resources, will determine its level of legitimacy and its right to demand more income from taxpayers. Fiscal morality, that is, the perception of the payment of taxes as a citizen’s duty and the rejection of evasion, is linked to the citizen’s view of the role of the state and the behavior of other citizens (Attila, Chambas & Combes, 2009; Fjeldstad, Merima & Sjursen, 2012; BID, 2013; BID, 2012).

Literature supports the view that taxation and fiscal reforms are fundamental elements for the creation of states. However, institutional capability indicators and fiscal reform proposals do not include fiscal capability, nor is it fully explained that the failure of fiscal policy can reflect imbalances between the proposals for tax reform and the social and economic culture and context of its application.

In developing countries, there are specific limits to obtain the necessary resources to provide public goods such as health and education, as well as to implement social programs and transfers necessary for human development. The fiscal system determines the potential of the public sector to provide goods and services and carry out redistributive programs. However, tax structures in developing countries have some features that limit the effectiveness of development policies. Among them, we can find: low tax collection, little progressiveness, strong tax evasion, administrative weakness, and governmental mismanagement, as well as low tax morale. In this sense, fiscal reforms for development should focus on increasing the progressiveness of the tax system with a high-income redistributive income tax; simplifying rules and extending tax bases by incorporating activities that are either not taxed or improperly taxed; strengthening tax administrations and establishing a “compliance technology” to ensure the application of standards; and promoting a contributory culture that increases fiscal “morale” and favors such compliance.

As we have already seen in this article, there is an essential link between tax system and human development. It is tax collection which enables the distribution of resources and which provides public goods for development, but in many countries, we find a rupture in this relationship: the fiscal pact hardly exists or is very weak. Even the very idea of a pact and a fiscal contract can be highly foreign to the populations. In this sense, the level of analysis of citizen perceptions and beliefs about tax (fiscal culture) and state action provides first-hand data to understand why the social consensus that underlies the fiscal pact is weakened, as well as revealing its implications for implementing human development.

The main results of this research are presented below, with particular emphasis on their relationship with human development. They also show that they help us understand the data collected on the process of human development in Morocco.

Tax Culture and Human Development in Morocco

For more than a decade, Morocco has included the term human development in its political discourse and joins the international consensus of different organizations. In 2005, Mohammed VI launched the National Human Development Initiative (NHDI), with the main purpose of transferring wealth to the poorest populations and raising the standard of the Human Development Indicator (HDI), especially in education, health, and inclusion (NHDO, 2009a). The NHDI was designed to reinforce the action of the state and local communities, trying to focus their action on the most vulnerable regions and groups. Likewise, it was understood as a pilot experience of integration of public policies at a time when Morocco was questioning the search for a model of sustainable development (NHDO, 2009a). The NHDI includes programs to combat social exclusion in urban and rural areas and to combat urban precariousness. It also created the National Human Development Observatory (NHDO), whose main purpose is to analyze and evaluate the impact of human development programs.

It is important to consider that the analysis of the NHDI is only a starting point for understanding the process of human development in Morocco as a whole, since it depends on the coordination and effectiveness of different public policies (among them, fiscal policy). For that reason, we cannot address this issue in this artilce entirely. However, the perceptions of the NHDI itself by the Moroccan population will allow us to place and understand much of the research results with respect to the tax system.

Despite the interest the NHDI has aroused at government level, the perceptions of Moroccan population regarding this matter are quite critical. The NHDI perceptions report, released by the National Human Development Observatory, pointed out that in 2009, 64.5 percent of the surveyors had a critical assessment of those institutions responsible for implementing the NHDI, in particular the state services and the communes. Similarly, although 64.1 percent expected the NHDI to improve the situation of those poorest, when asked about the choice and quality of the projects being carried out, the answers were far from satisfactory. Some 47 percent were dissatisfied with the projects conducted and 47.5 percent stated that NHDI’s implementation procedures could not have a positive impact on good governance (NHDO, 2009b).

As we will see below, this data not only corroborates the perceptions of the surveyors of this research but also shows the importance of looking at human development, not only from the analysis of institutional discourses and practices but also by looking at the need to understand its impact through people’s perceptions. It is important to understand how Moroccan citizens themselves perceive these development processes, whether they feel part of them or whether they experience any benefit. In short, there is a need to understand whether they form part of the definitions of the collective well-being of their country. The dissatisfaction of Moroccan citizens toward the NHDI and the institutions is only one example which gives us relevant information on the everyday languages of development, on the people’s own vision of state action, and on the degree of trust and distrust toward it.

One of the main conclusions we can extract from this research is that human development is still far from materializing for most of the surveyors. This is shown by the critical assessments the surveyors of the university community of Tetouan make on the Moroccan tax system, which is one of the key pillars for promoting development. This is also shown by the perceptions of public services. In this sense, it is striking that a large majority of surveyors consider that the Moroccan tax system is unfair or very unfair (70%). Likewise, it should be emphasized that almost 90 percent of the surveyors perceive that public services function poorly, and more than 90 percent think that the services they receive do not correspond to the amount of taxes they pay.

The perceptions on public services express a public concern that corroborates the persistent deficiencies of the social protection system in Morocco. The majority of Moroccan citizens continue to bear health and education costs which are not covered by the state. At national level, in 2012, only 23.3 percent of people were covered by health insurance, which means that more than three Moroccans out of four did not have any health insurance cover (NHDO, 2012). Here we can see an enormous difference between the disadvantaged and the wealthier households and the fact that they come from the urban or rural areas. In addition, the absence of medical cover particularly affects the elderly. In Morocco, currently 84 percent of people aged 60 or above do not have a pension scheme, and 85 percent do not have medical cover (Lahlimi, 2015).

In this sense, it is relevant to see how most of the surveyors of this research place health and education as public services that should be given priority in the public budget (80%). Along with this, priority is given to public security. Also, these perceptions reflect priorities expressed by Moroccan citizens as a whole in previous studies. The Welfare survey carried out by the Moroccan National Institute of Statistics (Haut commissariat au Plan in Morocco) showed in 2012 that education and health were among the priority sources for improving living conditions for the population. The proximity and quality of social services; the permanence, dignity, and income of employment; the security of the elderly; and the equality of opportunities are all significantly growing requirements among the Moroccan population (NHDO, 2012, p. 19).

Of those surveyed in this research, 70 percent also considered that the Moroccan tax system is unfair. The perception of the majority coincides with that of authors who have analyzed the degree of equity of the Moroccan tax system in depth. As Akesbi points out, the Moroccan tax system is becoming less equitable, less fair, and less clear for citizens (Akesbi, 2008, p. 91). It has not become more egalitarian: on the contrary, it is increasingly unequal. Let us consider, for example, the weight of rising taxes and consumption rates (by definition, blind and insensitive to the contributory capabilities of citizens), the tax burden on the purchasing power of small and medium wage earners, the strong fiscal pressure affecting medium and low incomes, and the increase in the tax burden on basic goods and services. Meanwhile, as the author points out, capital and large fortunes are ignored by the tax system (Akesbi, 2008, p. 91).

In this sense, it is important to consider that the commitment to human development in the political-institutional discourse coexists with an important process of economic liberalization in the country. This process is rooted in the post-independence decades and structural adjustment policies promoted by the IMF and WB in the 1980s (1983–1993). For Akesbi, it was precisely neoliberal policies that inspired the 1980s tax reform and still continue to do so (Akesbi, 2008, p. 75).

Therefore, the survey reveals that most surveyors understand that the tax system is unfair, as they not only have to carry the weight of the tax, but the public services they receive do not correspond to what they pay. The research also yielded relevant data on the degree of compliance with tax and fiscal awareness. Of those surveyed, 70 percent felt that fiscal fraud reduced resources and forced fiscal pressure to increase. Of these, almost 40 percent think that fraud is not justified under any concept, and more than 40 percent emphasize that it can be justified because those who have more do not pay their fair share. This last statement again gives us information on the extent to which the informants perceived that the tax system is unfair and unequal. In relation to fiscal awareness, a large majority of surveyors stated that citizens pay taxes out of fear of being sanctioned. When questioning why tax fraud occurs, surveyors also considered corruption (169), lack of confidence in the political system (101), lack of taxpayer education (101), and lack of religiosity (97) as the most frequent causes.

Final Remarks

In this article, we sought to explore the link between the tax system and human development in Morocco, particularly among the university students in the city of Tetouan. Based on the analysis of the culture and tax morale of a sample of university population, it was intended to offer a deeper explanation on the obstacles that hamper the construction of human development in this country. To accomplish this, a survey was conducted. Taxpayers’ experiences were researched in their relations with the treasury and the state. The answers to the following questions were the starting point of the research: perceptions of the tax system, public services, the priority of expenditure, the functioning of the public treasury, the perception of the degree of fulfillment and the perception of civic-tax education. The sample included 250 men and women, aged 25–59. They were undergraduate and postgraduate students, researchers and professors from the Abdlmalek Essaadi University in Tetouan.

As we have seen throughout this article, there is a fundamental link between the tax system and human development. The latter has undoubtedly become a concept and an approach to action, which is legitimizing public development policies in many countries. However, the sociocultural contexts in which it is being implemented are often ignored. A fair tax system allows states to provide public goods that are essential for the development and well-being of citizens. However, building human development with the fiscal system requires prior understanding of fiscal culture and morality in each sociocultural context. For this reason, this research has tried to rescue the value of the perceptions and beliefs which citizens have regarding the tax system. Thanks to them, we do not only understand citizens’ attitudes toward the tax system but also their views on the state, their degree of confidence or mistrust, and their possible involvement in processes of collective change.

As shown throughout these pages, perceptions of the Moroccan tax system primarily suggest that the idea of the social pact is very weak among citizens. As far as taxation is concerned, many citizens do not perceive reciprocity in their relationship with the state. They continue to perceive that their fiscal system is unfair, that public services function poorly, and that they do not have basic coverage, as well as feeling oppression in various ways. In this sense, it cannot be forgotten that their own beliefs on tax and on the tax system are a result of what they experience in their relationship with the state, together with their living and material conditions.

Second, their perceptions point to some of the major disruptions in the process of human development in Morocco. They also indicate that deep structural changes are necessary to make it effective. These changes must fully address inequalities in the country, especially those coming from the education and health sectors. It is important to note that these perceptions express concerns that Moroccans have manifested in very different ways for a long time, before and after the Arab Spring. This demand for social justice, not just freedom, was present in many ways inside the demonstrations of citizens in the Arab Spring movements and the Moroccan 20 February movement.

A fairer and more equitable tax system is at the basis of human development, but as this research reveals, there are challenges in how to restore the relationship and trust of citizens toward their states. This way, they would be able to contribute fiscally to the development of their country, feeling they are part of it and experiencing their benefits.

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