Democratic Versus Socialist Multicultural Federalism: The Dilemma of Ethiopian Federalism

Introduction

Multicultural federalism was first considered as a useful tool in nation-building after the end of World War II (Zerihun & Samuel, 2018, p. 106). But in the last few decades, especially in the post-Cold War period, it has been seen as a solution to ethnic conflicts in multi-linguistic and ethnically plural societies (Joanny, 2016, p. 295). Both developed and developing multicultural states have adopted federalism as a panacea for ethnic conflicts. In this form of political system, there is a constitutional and representative democracy, the separation of power between the different territorial levels of the government to foster and maintain unity in diversity and to settle ethnic, linguistic, regional, and/or other types of group conflict (Ketemaw, 2020, p. 39).

However, the application of these constitutional principles to accommodate diversity has varied between democratic and socialist federations. Some scholars have argued that democratic multicultural federalism is a solution to ethnic conflicts, because it constitutionally recognizes local autonomy, and promotes both self-rule and shared rule between levels of government. This type of federalism has been used to address questions related to the management of diversity and to deter secessionist movements in India, Canada, and Belgium (Girma & Getahun, 2019, pp. 94–96). Other scholars have argued that socialist multicultural federations have aggravated ethnic conflicts among multi-ethnic groups, instead of maintaining unity with diversity (Semahagn, 2014, p. 44). They have noted that socialist states have attempted to address ethnic-related political demands in a radical and unprecedented manner that distinguishes them from democratic federations. These states have not given real democratic, socio-economic, and political rights to regional governments; instead, the central governments have monopolized power and decision-making. As a result, political instability becomes a common agenda and leads to disintegration (Semahagn, 2014, p. 44).

The history of Ethiopia is characterized by a centralized authority and an imperial state for at least the last 2,000 years (Zerihun & Samuel, 2018, p. 108). It survived not only by accommodating ethnic diversity but also by promoting national identity more than ethnic identity. The current Ethiopian state is organized on the basis of territorial autonomy for geographically concentrated ethnic groups in an attempt to resolve old and emerging conflicts (Yonatan, 2016, pp. 1–4). After 1991, the previous centralized and imperial state was replaced by a state influenced by Marxist–Leninist political ideology and a state structure primarily based on “ethnic-based territorial units” (Gardachew et al., 2019, pp. 663–664; Temesgen, 2019, p. 18). The constitutional principles of Ethiopian ethnic federalism consist of neither purely democratic nor socialist principles; rather, these are a mix of democratic and socialist federations (Girma & Getahun, 2019, p. 97).

In relation to the democratic approach, the Constitution consists of the principles of liberal democratic federations. Accordingly, the Preamble of the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) declares that:

Ethiopia’s Nations, Nationalities and Peoples have entered into a binding federal compact by their free and full exercise of their respective right of self-determination in order to build one political community based on their respective free will and consent, democratic rights, and the rule of law, and one economic community in order to maintain and promote their rights, freedoms and interests in a mutually supportive manner. (FDRE, 1995)

Concerning socialist federalism, the adoption of the Ethiopian federal structure is based on the identity politics and Marxist–Leninist ideology of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) under the cover of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF; Gardachew et al., 2019, pp. 663–664; Temesgen, 2019, p. 18). The FDRE Constitution allows ethnic-based state formation and the right to self-determination including secession for each ethnic group, which is unusual in the Ethiopian context (Article 39(4)). Even if it theoretically incorporates both democratic and socialist principles, in practice it is fundamentally a socialist federation. Thus, the socialist principles governing the Ethiopian socio-economic and political aspects operate under the umbrella of the democratic principles of the 1995 FDRE Constitution.

As a result, the current federal arrangement of Ethiopia has generated new localized conflicts, instead of solving the old problems, and forces citizens to favor their ethnic identity rather than an Ethiopian identity (Gardachew et al., 2019, p. 665). This has resulted in an undemocratic political mobilization based on ethnic group protection and led to discrimination based on identity and ethnicity. Thus, in Ethiopia, federalism has generated internal violence among ethnic groups. The implication of such behavior is the politics of intolerance, fear, resentment, and hate in the society (Assefa, 2009, p. 19; Gardachew et al., 2019, pp. 665–667; Temesgen, 2019, p. 18).

The Theoretical Framework of Federalism

Federalism is a useful mechanism for understanding the causes of ethnic conflict and managing the aspects and accommodation of diversity (Obi, 2019, p. 17). In such a way, the fundamental causes of ethnic conflict involve some primordial elements of ethnicity, in which ethnic communities use historical memories of past grievances as a source of ethnic animosities and a justification for discriminatory actions against other ethnic groups (Sarsale, 2015, p. 3).

It also exists when ethnicity is socially constructed by political elites. The political entrepreneurs create identity-based differences and manipulate those differences to attain political power and economic resources that justify those ethnic differences. Therefore, ethnicities are viewed as instrumental identities, organized as means to particular ends (Mohammadzadeh, 2016, p. 159).

To manage such problems, federalism has become a popular instrument in the majority of multicultural states to maintain unity with diversity and to resolve ethnic conflicts (Asnake, 2009, pp. 41–42). Accordingly, Olumide (2017, p. 66) categorized theories of federalism into three:

Legal–institutional or legal–constitutional theory

In the following text, I explain each of these theories based on their relevance for accommodating diversity and resolving ethnic conflicts in an Ethiopian context.

First, the legal–constitutional theory of federalism recognizes the courts’ role as an essential aspect of federalism for handling ethnic conflicts, that is, the constitutional division of power between federal and regional governments and the three government organs that create the basic rule of law on how conflicts between the two levels of government-managed are resolved (Aliff, 2015, p. 72). Significantly, this type of federalism is advantageous in many respects to resolve ethnic conflicts as is practiced in the United States, Canada, and Switzerland (Auclair, 2005, p. 3; Obi, 2019, p. 17). Therefore, the legal–constitutional theory focuses more on the legal and jurisdictional aspects to accommodate diversity, in which powers are divided between the federal and regional governments (Wheare, 1963, p. 10).

Others have argued that judicial federalism has attracted less close attention. For example, the United States Supreme Court has been actively engaged in adjudicating federalism disputes during various periods of American history. Still today, it has been suggested that the primary determinants of the federal balance lie in the political process and that courts play the role of enforcing constitutional baselines (Tariq et al., 2018, p. 403). In Ethiopia, neither the court nor the upper and lower houses carried out their legalistic functions because the executive branch dominates them.

On the other hand, the sociological theory of federalism has given more attention to the essence of social forces underlying the pressures for diversity in federations. The pivotal interactions of social forces with political organizations have given a chance to establish and create a federal political structure to maintain peace and security (Watts, 2008, p. 21). This theory focuses more on the sociological aspect of the nature of society. It recognizes the political system as a direct result of society’s nature (Tariq et al., 2018, p. 405).

However, this theory lacks the clear guidelines, principles, and norms to show a demarcation line between a federal and non-federal society (Burgess, 2006, pp. 142–144). It focuses on diversity alone, without distinguishing the factors that accommodate various ethnic groups’ diverse interests in the existing federal system. Therefore, the sociological approach has not always led to federalism; instead, it may create a unitary form of government similar to that of the United Kingdom and France (Tariq et al., 2018, p. 406). Hence, this theory of federalism has some implications for the Ethiopian ethno-national federalism that tries to accommodate diversities without setting out clear political principles.

The last theory of federalism is the political/ideological theory. Currently, it has become a potential solution to a political problem. It states that it is essential to recognize political motives as a critical instrument to solve the problems of federal political systems (Tariq et al., 2018, p. 407). Thus, as this theory sets out, federations have different constitutional and political structures and play a critical role in solving the problems encountered in a multi-ethnic society. It must be noted that federations exist in both socialist and liberal democratic states (Burgess, 2006, p. 144).

In socialist states, federations established upon ethnic-based territorial arrangements are known as ethno-national federalism. They recognize the principle of self-governance over the cultural, linguistic, and religious matters in the federation’s constituent entities (Elazar, 1994, p. 168; Horowitz, 1985, pp. 601–652). For example, former socialist federal states tried to create entire constitutional frameworks for the coexistence and integration of different nationalities (Juhász, 2005, pp. 249–254).

However, Sakwa (1998, pp. 107–117) has argued that the constitutional features of most socialist federations have been superficial; and the principles of checks and balances in these federations were largely absent. There was no formal separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government. There were only group rights. There were no individual rights, and the citizens did not have civil, democratic, and political rights. In those circumstances, real political and policy decisions were made by the ruling party at the Central government level.

If the ruling party controls the Central government, it controls the constituent governments. This means that the federalist structure is highly centralized. In this case, a single dominant party controls both the government and the party system (Burgess, 2006, p. 147–151). Moreover, if the ruling party follows the Leninist doctrine of democratic centralism, in effect it creates a patron–client relationship between the higher and lower levels of the governmental system (Sakwa, 1998, pp. 91–143).

Likewise, some scholars have argued that socialist federations have caused ethnic conflict (Raffas, 2012, p. 144; Yonas, 2013, pp. 26–27). They contend that ethno-cultural diversity translates into political fragmentation and political claims are refracted through the lens of ethnic identity. As a result, political conflict becomes synonymous with conflict among ethno-cultural groups (Smith, 1995, p. 9).

Empirically, socialist ethnic federalism is not real federalism. In the former socialist federations, the real political and policy decisions are made by party networks (Semahagn, 2014, pp. 52–66). Thus, a single party’s dominance aggravates existing conflicts, endangers state unity, and ensures the federation’s disharmony and disintegration. Compelling examples of such federations were the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia (Burgess, 2006, p. 151).

Roeder (2009, p. 209) argues that the diversity of national identities within federations contributes to conflict between the Center and the regions. Regional ethnic entrepreneurs can use national minorities against the Central authorities, whether by engaging in competitive nation-building or by pushing for enhanced new administrative boundaries, greater autonomy, and political and economic power. Federalism based on ethnic identity has played an influential role in ethnic conflicts and civil wars in Africa—in countries such as Congo, Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, and Nigeria (see Denny & Walter, 2014, pp. 13–16).

In contrast, some scholars argue that democratic forms of multicultural federalism constitutionally recognize ethnic and linguistic diversity and promote both local self-rule and shared rule at the national level (McGarry & O’Leary, 2007, pp. 180–211). They contend that liberal democratic federations are based on democratic values, beliefs, and goals, which balance the economic, political, cultural, and power relationships between the constituent units of the federation (Burgess, 2006, pp. 145–146). Each constituent unit consists of different multi-ethnic groups as different administrative units. Following this path, Canada and India have maintained national unity and reduced tensions and polarization between the bigger ethnic groups and the smaller ones (Burgess, 2006; Elazar, 1994, p. 56).

Other scholars argue that a democratic, non-centralized party system is vital to the federation’s unity, peace, and security. They are the backbone “to the constitutional arrangements originating in the federal compact … [and] once they come into existence, they have tended to be self-perpetuating and to function as decentralizing forces in their own right” (Burgess, 2006, p. 152; Elazar, 1987, pp. 78–79). According to Salih (2007, p. 675), in a democratic political system, the governments assure the political preferences and interests of the citizens in an equal manner through the following:

Meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force.

In the same line of the argument, Juhász (2005, p. 257) adds that to ensure federalism’s success, the institution of political democracy, economic prosperity, and the social and regional balance should be part and parcel of the federal structure itself. Outside of the democratic system, federalism is ultimately an unstable form of government, which logically progresses either to territorial disintegration or to becoming a mere constitutional formality (Feeley & Rubin, 2008, pp. 17–20).

In retrospect, the proponents of socialist ethno-federations anticipated that they would accommodate demands for self-determination, including even secession, without fragmenting the state. Even the word “secession” was used as a tactic to supposedly limit the Central government’s power and as a protective mechanism for minority nationalities (Choudhry & Hume, 2010, p. 366).

The opponents hold that socialist ethnic-based federalism leads to institutionalized ethnic discrimination, obstructs individual citizen rights, and promotes disintegration. They point out that the former socialist states collapsed before their transition to democracy, while democratic federations have been successful in the West (Fleiner, 2000, pp. 14–16). Empirically, they say that democratic federalism has proven to be a better mechanism to maintain internal peace and security and resolve ethnic conflicts than socialist federalism.

The ideological theoretical approach is relevant for analyzing Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism. On the one hand, Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism recognizes on paper all constitutional and democratic rights. On the other hand, for several decades, the TPLF/EPRDF was the dominant party in Ethiopia and controlled almost every activity in the country and played a similar role to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Ideological theory argues that a multi-ethnic federation’s success is determined by ethnic-based political parties or national parties. In territorial federalism, nationwide political issues generally require national parties. The conflicts that arise in the constituent units in this kind of federation tend to be similar to that of conflicts between party leaders at the national level. In this type of federation, equality and harmony among citizens are established at the federal level (Dietmar, 2011, p. 41). In contrast, Ishiyama (2009, p. 56) has argued that in multicultural federations, the creation of ethnic parties provides opportunities for interest articulation from groups that might usually be shut out of the political system.

However, Kymlicka (2006, pp. 36–47) has argued that a democratic national political system will not work properly in developing countries, while it works appropriately in industrially developed countries, because their major political parties generally have not organized around ethnic identities. This is because their ethnic and religious differences are generally smaller than the developing countries in Asia and Africa (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 569–572). In contrast, Priya (2016, pp. 59–60) notes that non-ethnic political parties have worked correctly in some developing countries. According to Priya, India is unique in terms of its multi-ethnic, linguistic, and cultural heterogeneity. Its diversity is its greatest strength. Forging unity with diversity holds the key to India’s success as a vibrant democracy.

Most contemporary scholars argue that consociationalism is an excellent response to divergent political, economic, and ethnic conflicts in a multicultural society. A consociational state is one which has major internal divisions along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines, but which remains stable due to the consensual consultation among the leaders of these groups. Consensual forms of democracy have been successfully used in multicultural federations, such as the Netherlands, India, Belgium, and Switzerland, to accommodate the interests of their various ethnic and/or linguistic communities (McGarry & O’Leary, 2007, pp. 180–181).

Kymlicka (2006, p. 97) contends that a federation should be based upon consociational democratic structures and practices, together with boundary demarcations that promote multicultural interests and resolve ethnic conflicts. This has been successful in states such as Switzerland. Swiss citizens define themselves as Swiss first, and their ethnic group is a secondary group identity (Juhász, 2005, p. 247). In this light, the Ethiopian ethnic federation’s rhetoric is often democratic and consociational, but in fact it is “democratic federalism in form, but socialist federalism in content and practice”.

The Ethiopian Ethno-Federal Arrangement

The EPRDF came to power after defeating the Marxist–Leninist military junta in 1991. It established an ethnic based federal system, which made a new beginning in the country’s political history and political development (Abebe, 2017, pp. 278–283; Asnake, 2009, pp. 64–65). At that moment, ethnicity was taken seriously in the endeavor to reconstruct the state as a multi-ethnic federal polity, which it was “de facto as of 1991 and de jure as of 1995” (Tsegaye, 2010, p. 53). In doing so, “federalism [was] supposedly chosen to respond to the challenge of ethno-national conflicts that stressed the old Ethiopian state from the time it [was] built into a multi-ethnic empire and to build one nation out of many” (Tsegaye, 2010, p. 53). This federalism was taken as a panacea for both the old and emerging conflicts in the future.

Article 50(2) of the 1995 FDRE Constitution states that both the federal government and regional states have their own separate legislatures, executives, and judiciaries within their own domain. It also states that

Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession and has the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and Federal governments. (FDRE, 1995, Article 39(1, 3))

The 1995 FDRE Constitution sets forth the separation of powers between the federal and regional governments. Empirically, the country’s marginalized minority ethnic groups have the right to representation at both the federal and regional levels. This form of ethnic-based democratic political structure and legal ethnic rights’ recognition was recorded in Ethiopia’s history for the first time (Aklilu, 2006, p. 92; Alexander, 2019, p. 18). The United Nations Development Programme believes that the existence of federalism is not only transforming the country toward democracy but also achieving the equitable sharing of resources and power over the last two decades (UNDP, 2012, pp. 3–9).

Nevertheless, the implementation of Ethiopian federalism has produced both positive and negative effects. Advocates argue that the implementation of Ethiopian ethnic federalism has produced positive effects. For example, it has helped ethnic groups to develop and use their own language in their socio-economic and political life and grants every ethnic community the right to self-rule and to engage in shared rule at the national level (Desta & Ephrem, 2020, p. 38).

Accordingly, Ethiopia is constitutionally a democratic multicultural federation with a view to addressing the age-old causes of a state crisis. The federal system intends to decentralize power and resources and resolve the “nationalities question” by accommodating the country’s various ethnolinguistic groups (Assefa, 2009, p. 215).

The Constitution also recognizes the principles of constitutionalism and constitutional supremacy, human rights, popular sovereignty, secularism, transparency, and the accountability of the government as the basic pillars of the constitutional system. It also ensures that both federal and state governments have parallel legislative, executive, and judicial powers (Assefa, 2007, p. 329).

At the same time, advocates argue that the Ethiopian federal Constitution adopted principles of democracy such as competitive elections and multi-party systems, in which it recognizes ethnic-based party politics adopted as a response to the past unitary state by recognizing the presence of freedom and political participation among different ethnic groups. It also recognizes the separation between the state and the party system (Bekalu, 2017, pp. 52–54; Jan, 2017, p. 221).

Furthermore, Muleta (2017, pp. 202–231) argues that following its adoption of a democratic federal system, Ethiopia achieved respectable rates of economic growth and social development in the last decade of the twentieth century under the EPRDF government. At close to 5%, average GDP growth was substantial when compared to the performance of other African countries.

In contrast, opponents argue that though the Ethiopian ethno-federal system incorporates the fundamental principles of democratic federations, the design and operation of its federal system are derived from an expired socialist federation and Marxist ideological perspective (Bahru, 2008, p. 332). Concomitantly, Yilmaz and Venugopal (2008, p. 2) noted that Ethiopian federalism is a mixed bag, combining high degree of both decentralization and centralization. In the former case, constitutionally it allowed for each ethnic group the right of self-administration, including secession. In the latter case, empirically the country continued to be governed by the Marxist–Leninist ideological principles of the TPLF/EPRDF, such as the pervasiveness of communist economic policy and perception of the national question; principle of democratic centralism; central party control; adoption of the patron–client relationship between party members; and monitoring every activity by using what is called leadership evaluation to purge leaders at all levels.

This EPRDF implementation of exclusive power control and a lack of democratic political participation has intensified the acceleration of violent conflicts. Government’s “security dilemma in the face of radical rejections and calcifying hatred against everything EPRDF has done also contributed to the unabated conflict dynamic in the post-1991 period” (Abebe, 2017, p. 288).

This line of argument is continued by different scholars, who argue that though the Constitution provides unlimited rights to self-determination to all ethnic groups in the country, it is clear from the experience of the last 25 years that the ethnic regions are not allowed to exercise administrative autonomy, let alone secession (Asnake, 2009, p. 66).

In a similar fashion to the USSR, Ethiopia pursued a multi-tiered approach to territorial autonomy,

in which apparently the bigger ethnic groups such as Tigray, Amhara, Oromo, Afar and Somali [currently Sidama] have been given their own regions in which they constitute the majority and the regions were named following their own ethnic groups. In contrast, several dozens of smaller ethnic groups were put together to create “multi-ethnic” regions such as the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (often abbreviated as SNNPR) in southwestern Ethiopia, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz. (Asnake, 2009, pp. 65–66)

The rhetoric of unlimited rights to self-determination is valid on paper only.

Moreover, Alemu (2018, p. 44) argues that the opposition political parties have not significantly contributed to Ethiopia’s democratic and political development. Most of the political parties are organized on a narrow ethnic group basis. As such, elites employ the ethnicity card during elections and other political campaigns. The ethnic-based TPLF’s ‘divide and rule’ strategy has weakened the united opposition against the government at the Center; instead, “Ethiopian ethnic parties are rivals with each other” (Legesse, 2015, p. 465). Due to this reason, the country’s economic and political power was under the control of the minority Tigre ethnic group through the virtue of the TPLF-led EPRDF’s government (Abebaw, 2013, p. 22).

Holding a similar view, Alexander (2019) remarked that several federations discouraged the establishment of ethnic-based political parties in their country because an ethnic-based political arrangement resulted in political mobilization. In African countries, such as

Uganda and Eritrea, tribal or religious parties are discouraged. The Ghanaian Constitution, Article 55 (4), prohibits tribal or ethnic-based political parties and it clearly states “Every political party shall have a national character, and membership shall not be based on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divisions”. (Alexander, 2019, p. 19)

In Ethiopia, though, it is seen as being detrimental to ethnic peace and national unity, promoting ethnic diversity and ostensibly encouraging ethno-nationalism which contributes to deteriorating Ethiopian nationalism (Alemu, 2018, p. 43).

Moreover, some argue that although the government of the EPRDF enabled substantial economic development, it was insufficient to resolve the multifaceted and deep-rooted problems of the country. Widespread poverty and other social complications have been prevalent in the current situation in Ethiopia (Muleta, 2017, pp. 202–231). Therefore, Ethiopian federalism constitutional principles are designed to serve the EPRDF’s party-state craving for power. In practice, since 1991, the TPLF/EPRDF was the vanguard party that controlled political, economic, and social activities throughout the country, like the Communist Party of the former USSR federation (Semahagn, 2014, p. 124).

Alexander (2019, p. 21) remarks that one of the most important motives for the establishment of a federal government has been to prevent the appearance of tyrannical regimes by decentralizing the powers of the government. But an attempt to mix the Marxist–Leninist ideology of one-party rule with federalism creates contradictory scenarios. The former indoctrinates centralization of political power, while the latter teaches decentralization of power. As it is quite evident today in Ethiopia, the blending of two contradictory ideologies coupled with the modalities of the federal structures (such as ethnic federalism, asymmetric and incongruent forms of federalism, and dominant-party governance) provide valid reasons for the prevailing ethnic conflict in Ethiopia.

By mixing liberal capitalist economic principles and a socialist command economic system, the EPRDF achieved double-digit economic development for the last two decades. They also argued that the existence of the secession clause in the Constitution is necessary in order to make the rights of a minority equal with the majority. For this reason, they argue that, on the one hand, it limits the majority groups’ dominant power, on the other hand, it serves as a protective mechanism for the minority nation, which frustrates attempts to address societal pressing on the minority group.

Instead of the Constitution’s democratic principles, TPLF/EPRDF applied the Marxist–Leninist ideological principles of

Democratic centralism instead of democratic governance

By the same token, currently both the constitutional and ideological principles of EPRDF continue to prevail. The current Prosperity Party (PP) has not changed the socialist constitutional principles nor adopted clear ideological principles (except in the use of the word “Synergy”). In view of this, the PP is in an ideological dilemma because everything applies based on personal discretion rather than the party’s political. And although considerable economic development took place under EPRDF rule, it was not equally distributed among regions, and still 22% of the population lives in poverty.

With regard to the secession clause, it has exaggerated conflicts among ethnic groups and promoted ethnic identity over Ethiopian identity. The right of secession makes the boundary-drawing exercises around and between ethnic groups highly politicized. That is why the TPLF adopted a tendency toward secession in the year 2020.

There is no difference between the current PP and the EPRDF in terms of theory and practice. The TPLF, EPRDF and their affiliated parties, the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), and the Southern Ethiopia Peoples’ Democratic Front (SEPDF) directly govern all the regions in the Ethiopian federal system under their control. Although the EPRDF was replaced by the new PP in November 2019, the members and leaders of the PP are in fact the offspring of the EPRDF party.

Currently, the Oromia elites control the state apparatus and lead the country in the name of the PP. The existence of the socialist principles of the FDRE Constitution remain inviolable and indisputable in Ethiopia. It is thus clear that with the amalgamation of two contradictory (democratic and socialist) ideologies, the country is placed in an ideological dilemma. Constitutionally, each constituent unit of the federation is supposed to have full democratic rights, but in reality a single party dominates the country’s political, economic, and social life. The current PP has emphasized liberal democratic principles but continues the EPRDF’s Marxist-oriented undemocratic political policies, and this promotes political confusion in the country. As a result, the country’s existence is questioned, the country seems at times like a failed state, and there are more inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts than before.

The Current Challenges of Ethiopia’s Ethno-national Federalism

Ethiopia’s federal experiment faces challenges that have handicapped the transformation of the political system into a more viable and vibrant multicultural federation. The most serious challenges of the country’s federal system (Semahagn, 2012, p. 172) are as follows:

The legitimacy of the federal system in its origin and discourse

Most scholars argue that the whole federal arrangement of Ethiopia is organized along ethnic lines, and the inclusion of the secession element enables serious ethnic conflicts. In other words, the Constitution draws boundaries along ethnic lines and grants power based on ethnic identity politics to titular ethnic groups without considering the non-titular ethnic groups who have been living in the same territory for generations (Jan, 2017, p. 225; Joanny, 2016, pp. 296–297).

For this reason, the Ethiopian ethnic regionalization arrangement has dramatically converted the relations between the titular (regional majorities) and the non-titular (regional or settler minorities) groups from a peaceful coexistence into inter-ethnic conflicts. This is best illustrated in the Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Oromiya, and SNNP regions. These regions reveal the adverse “impact of ethno-federalism on the generation and transformation of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia” (Girum, 2014, p. 68). These conditions have led to the politics of intolerance and fear, resentment, and hate in the Ethiopian society (Gardachew et al., 2019, pp. 665–667).

According to Tsegaye (2010, p. 99), the other challenges Ethiopia confronts can be mostly expressed in terms of the competition for resources—natural endowments as well as financial resources in the form of fiscal transfers, that is, subsidies and grants, jobs, education, and power at the local, subnational, and national levels. Local elites tend to contribute to the escalation of ethnic conflict for the purpose of securing better access to coveted resources, opportunities, and powers.

Furthermore, Nikodimos (2004, p. 58) argues that the major challenge of Ethiopian federalism is related to recognizing ethnic-based parties which promote instability through the entrenchment of ethnic differences rather than the promotion of national unity. Thus, numerous inter-ethnic conflicts have occurred because “ethnicity has been used as an instrument to fuel conflicts caused by lopsided allocation of political and economic powers” (Legesse, 2015, p. 472).

The other challenge of Ethiopian federalism is its propensity to restrict migration-induced demographic changes. The established ethnic boundaries are threatened by inter-ethnic migration. Such opposition has generated internal violence among ethnic groups and produced conflict-induced displacement and deaths in current Ethiopia (Sibuh, 2020, p. 3499).

Similarly, Abebe (2017, pp. 284–285) has highlighted the fact that although the EPRDF promises to promote the issues of “development, peace and security within the ambit of a constitutional system of democratic republicanism”, the ethno-federation has empirically aggravated ethnic animosity over time and could lead to ethnic cleansing as in Rwanda. The TPLF engineers of this ethno-federal system designed it for the purpose of divide-and-rule by a minority group over the majority and for causing violent conflicts among Ethiopia’s diverse ethnic groups. That is why, currently, the OLF and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) are involved in an armed struggle to realize their asserted aim of seceding from Ethiopia (Alemante, 2003, p. 84; Temesgen, 2019, p. 19).

To dig deeper into the political conflicts of Ethiopia, Wondwosen Teshome (2008, pp. 21–22) has illustrated that empirically, different ethnic groups quarrel with each other about claiming additional land (boundary conflicts) from neighboring regions. It has become a common challenge between the Oromo and the Somali ethnic groups; the Oromo and Harari, the Somali and Afar; the Amhara and Tigray; and the Oromo and the Southern Nations in SNNPRS.

Many scholars (Girma & Getahun, 2019; Kedir, 2011; Ketemaw, 2020) suggest that the only mechanism to overcome the above challenges is for the Ethiopian government to adopt a consociational democratic federation and form an all-party national coalition, the widespread use of the minority veto in the national and subnational legislatures, and the adoption of proportional representation in the electoral system and the central executive apparatus, the police, public administration, and the judiciary. These structural reforms can potentially protect local minorities against the undue intrusion of regional majorities.

In addition, the following problems must be resolved in order for the Ethiopian federation to overcome its debilitating internal contractions:

The contested boundaries between regional states

The ethno-federal structure and ethnic party politics have engendered ethnic tensions and violence and encourage political activists to organize around parochial ethnic issues, thereby fragmenting national politics in Ethiopia today.

Impacts on Ethiopia of Its Flawed Federal Structure

The impacts of its flawed federal governmental structure on Ethiopia today include political instability stemming from its entrenchment of ethnic conflicts rather than the promotion of national unity. In addition, the past and current demarcation of regional boundaries based on ethnic lines promotes ethnic identity over national identity (Nikodimos, 2004, p. 58; Yonatan, 2016, p. 14).

In the same manner, the interactions and relations of citizens with the federal government offices and party membership depend on their ethnic membership or ethnic classification. This imposition of ethnic classification is resulting in a confrontation and hesitation among 85 diverse ethnolinguistic groups of Ethiopians, especially for the southern people of Ethiopia, which consist of more than 50 ethnic groups (Sibuh, 2020, p. 3498).

The second impact of Ethiopian federalism is inter-regional displacement of its citizens. According to the United Nations, as of January 2019, there were a large number of internally displaced people (IDP) due to conflicts over identity, access to critical resources, political power, and boundary conflicts. As a result, Ethiopia has a large number of IDP. In 2019, there were approximately 2.9 million IDP in Ethiopia and more than 2.4 million IDP who identified conflict as the primary cause of their displacement (Sibuh, 2020, p. 3500; USAID, 2019, p. 3).

According to Bekalu (2017, p. 50) the Oromia Regional State officials have forcibly evicted about 100,000 ethnic Amhara from their homes:

The majority of ethnic Amhara living in Western Harergie, Western Arsi, Arbagugu, Jimma, Guraferda, Wellega, Afar, Benshangul, and Western Shoa were displaced, killed or mistreated because of their ethnicity—which they never had a chance to choose before birth. According to these sources, the forced exclusion of people from their places of residence has been continuing.

Another major impact of Ethiopian ethnic-federalism is the death of innocent citizens in each region. Temesgen (2019, p. 20) has reported that inter-regional conflicts have resulted in the death of thousands of people and significant destruction of property. Violent conflicts have occurred between the Borana and Gerri in both the Oromia and Somali regional states; the Afar versus Issa in the Afar and Somali regional states; the Guji versus Gedeo in Oromia and SNNPR states; and the Guji versus Burji in the Oromia and SNNPR states.

For instance, according to the Ethiopian Broadcast Corporation (EBC, 2019), the Oromia activist known as Jawar Mohamed showed a message on his Facebook page, stating that his house was surrounded by the police who appeared to be against him. Following this, about 86 non-Oromo people were killed by his followers. Again, in June 2020, the EBC announced that the known Oromia Artist Hachalu Hundessa had been killed by organized groups in Addis Ababa. Following his death, since June 2020, over 200 people were killed by organized groups in the Oromia region (EBC, 2020).

All the above incidents occurred due to the failure of conflict management, resolution, and transformation mechanisms in the Ethiopian ethno-federal system. The country has been exposed to the continuation of the old violent conflicts and the “sporadic explosion of new ethno-territorial and political violent conflicts, often taken as a bad omen for ethnonational bloodshed” (Abebe, 2017, p. 287). In fact, the claims of ethnic-based violent conflict have become the norm in Ethiopia (Abduselam, 2018, p. 42).

In June 2020, the Sidama ethnic group was recognized and allowed to establish its regional status. Following this, other ethnicities are asking the federal government to grant them regional status by both democratic and violent means, such as Hadya, Kembata, Gurage, Keffa, and Dawaro from SNNPRS. The Wolayta ethnic group has been repeatedly questioning the right to be a regional state within a separate entity. Due to the absence of an immediate response from the federal government, they have fought with the police and many people have been killed as a result. Even today, the southern region is in confrontation with itself and others and with the federal government.

In order to solve such ethnic conflicts and build unity, at the initiative of the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the coalition of three ethnic parties of the EPRDF renamed itself as the PP in November 2019. As the designer and owner of the EPRDF for the last 27 years, the TPLF had withdrawn from the coalition party and, by acting with other ethnic parties in the name of federalism, began interrupting the whole political system of the country. In October 2020, it waged an open war against the Ethiopian national armed forces, but it has been defeated by the federal government, though there are some remaining areas of conflict. In spite of the reconciliation of the parties by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the end of the rebellion looked alarmingly out of control. However, ethnic identity-based violent conflict has apparently decreased (Osunkoya & Basiru, 2020, p. 56).

Conclusion

From the beginning of Ethiopia’s political history until the downfall of the Derg military regime, the country’s state has possessed a centralized system of administration. Following the demise of the socialist Derg military regime in 1991, and under the leadership of the EPRDF, the country became a formal democratic federal state in 1995. Supposedly, this state has a division of power between the Central government and the constituent regional units of the federation, and the country has a democratic political system. In practice, however, it has a socialist federation mixed with democratic ideological principles.

It is an ill-assorted hodgepodge; the socialist-oriented undemocratic multi-ethnic federal state has fostered ethnic identity politics and promoted antagonism among Ethiopia’s ethnic groups. This has generated violence among many of the ethnic groups in the country and the displacement and/or death of many Ethiopians.

To resolve these problems, Ethiopia needs to reform its present ethno-federal political system and stop politicizing ethnic identity. Instead, the government should establish a consociational democratic federal system together with new uncontested regional boundaries and a non-ethnic, non-tribal, multi-party democratic political system similar to Switzerland and India.