The Peripheral State and Corruption in The Global South

Introduction

The post-Cold War era has witnessed increased scholarly and public policy interest in the study of corruption. Numerous books, monographs, book chapters, journal articles, dissertations, and theses have been written about the various aspects of corruption, including its causes and the ways to address this phenomenon. ¹ In the policy domain, various countries have enacted anti-corruption statutes, as well as established anti-corruption agencies. Various developed democracies, such as the United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, as well as international organizations such as the European Union (EU), have made anti-corruption a major cornerstone of their development assistance programs to developing countries. ² The recent interest in corruption has been fueled, in large measure, by the “third wave of democratization,” and the “good governance” agenda of improving public accountability and transparency in the public sector. Johnston and Heidenheimer (2001, p. 275) provide an excellent summation of the growing interest in the study of corruption:

Possible reasons for the increased scholarly interest in the study of corruption include the end of the Cold War, which reduced the perceived geopolitical value of many corrupt regimes and intensified pressures upon aid and lending budgets; and increased global competition among firms; capital managers and countries seeking involvement, all of whom, found it increasingly difficult to justify corruption as an “overhead expense”…

Clearly, there is a consensus that corruption has deleterious effects that are antithetical to democracy and development. In the case of democracy, the corrosive effects of corruption can undermine both state and regime legitimacy. This is because citizens lose trust in both the state and the regime in power. In the latter case, the scourge of corruption can undermine socio-economic development by diverting needed public financial resources away from meeting major human needs, such as healthcare, education, food security, public housing, public transportation, clean drinking water, sanitation, and so on.

Significantly, one of the major issues that has framed both the scholarly and policy discourse on corruption has revolved around the causes of the phenomenon. In other words, the central question is why do people, especially public servants, engage in corruption? What are the root causes? In response, several explanations—institutional, rent-seeking or bureaucratic, and the “resource curse,” among others—have been proffered. In addition, a major resulting lacuna has been to design and implement the requisite modalities for addressing this phenomenon.

Against this background, using the Global South as the focus of the study, this article seeks to contribute to the literature in two major ways. First, the article will focus on an under-researched piece of the corruption puzzle—the nature of the peripheral state in the Global State. Particularly, how does this genre of the state generate or cause corruption? Second, how can corruption be addressed in the context of the pathologies of the peripheral state in the Global South? In order to address this research problem, the article is divided into five major parts. In the first part, some of the extant literature on the peripheral state and corruption are reviewed. The overarching purpose is twofold. In the review of studies on the peripheral state, the goal is to tease out its major characteristics. As for the focus on corruption, the purpose is to identify the major arguments of the main theoretical approaches. Next, the peripheral state is problematized by examining its pedigree. Third, this study focuses on the major dimensions of corruption. The fourth section deals with the crux of the article: linking the peripheral state to corruption. Fifth, the study then suggests some ways for tackling corruption by addressing the pathologies of the peripheral state in the Global South. Finally, the study offers some major conclusions.

Conceptual Framework

The study’s conceptual framework is anchored on three major concepts: corruption, Global South, and peripheral state. In this section, each of these concepts is defined. For the purposes of this study, corruption is the practice of a public official deviating from official rules by engaging in predatory behavior for private interests or monetary gains through the agency of his or her office (Zimelis, 2020). In short, corruption is the “misuse of public power for private gains” (Zimelis, 2020, p. 289).

Global South is referred to variously as the third world, developing world, and global periphery (Figure 1). It consists of two major tiers: the periphery (peripheral states) and semi-periphery (semi-peripheral states) (Petras, 1982; Ruvaleaba, 2020; Wallerstein, 1976). Basically, the peripheral states lack an industrial base and are hence the producers of primary goods, such as agricultural products, oil, and minerals. On the other hand, the semi-peripheral states have an industrial base and thus can produce both manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. Nonetheless, collectively, the Global South is socio-economically less developed than the core states of the Global North comprising mainly the Western developed states such as the United States plus Japan. In addition, the constituent states of the Global South are marginal actors in the “global balance of power,” its “international division of power,” and the “international division of labor.” In order to address the gaps in the “global balance of power,” the countries of the Global South have formed coalitions to resist “not only Northern dominance in multilateral settings but also neoliberal capitalism and other forms of global hegemonic power more generally” (Haug et al., 2021, p. 1929).

OPEN IN VIEWER

Figure 1.

Source: From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Periphery_countries

The peripheral state is the social formation that occupies the lower tier of the global periphery while the semi-peripheral state (e.g., Brazil and South Korea) has features of both the peripheral and core states, and occupies the upper tier of the Global South. The peripheral state is the common state type in Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America. Overall, it is a marginal actor in both the “international division of power” and the “international division of labor” within the global economy. Its major role in the “international division of labor” is to produce raw materials to supply the industrial and manufacturing complexes of the core states (mainly the developed Western states such as the United States plus Japan) (Petras, 1982). Its distinctive specific features include a capitalist materialist base that is anchored on the private ownership of the major means of production; its relations of production are based on a class system (Petras, 1982) with ruling and subaltern classes; it creates propitious conditions for the predatory accumulation of wealth by core-based multinational corporations and other businesses, as well as for primitive accumulation of wealth by state managers (through the agency of public office); and it reproduces economic, political and social structures that ensure the domination of the ruling classes (Fatton, 1988; Petras, 1982; Zieman & Lazendefer, 1977).

Literature Review

This literature review is divided into two major sections: the peripheral state and corruption. In the case of the former, some of the extant studies that have been done on the peripheral state are reviewed. The purpose is to provide an understanding of the nature of the peripheral state as a specific genre of the state that is generally a marginal actor in the global power arrangements and their associated “division of labor” that anchor the global political economy.

The latter section focuses on the phenomenon of corruption. The section surveys some of the major theoretical perspectives on the nature and causes of corruption. The rationale is to provide the major crucibles that provide the bases for the contribution of this article. In other words, the section summarizes some of the major studies that have been conducted on the root causes of corruption.

Zieman and Lanzendefer (1977) assert that the peripheral state has several distinct characteristics. A key one is that the peripheral state is a social formation for economic and political reproduction. The state ensures the reproduction of the peripheral capitalist material base. In the latter case, the state seeks to, for example, mediate class conflicts, and is a partisan intervener that is biased toward the ruling class. Another key role is that the state ensures the maintenance of the dependent relationship between the peripheral political economy and the global political economy. In addition, the state’s bureaucracy manages the distribution of societal resources. In the performance of this important task, the “bureaucracy cooperates with the economically and socially most powerful classes” (Zieman and Lanzenderfer, 1977, p. 165).

Jessop (2002) argues that the state is the embodiment of social relations. That is, as the arena of struggle, the state sets the parameters within which the contestation for power takes place between and among various class forces. Thus, state power is the by-product of the “prevailing balances of forces and this is institutionally mediated through the state apparatus” (Jessop, 2002, p. 40).

Petras (1982) interrogates state capacity in the periphery. He argues that the capacity of a peripheral state is shaped by class formation and class struggles within the state arena. These are the factors and forces that shape the development of the productive forces, and the resulting nature of the class structure. In the case of the latter, it is a critical determinant of “the state’s capacity to act within both the internal and external division of labor” (Petras, 1982, p. 415).

Miliband (1969) posits that the raison d’etre of the state is to serve the interests of the dominant class in society. And this is done through two major means. The state bureaucracy is controlled by the members of the ruling class. The dominant economic position of the ruling class makes its interest ascendant. As Miliband (1969, p. 23) observes, “[the ruling class] which owns and controls the means of production and which is able, by virtue of the economic power thus conferred upon it, to use the state as its instrument for the domination of society.”

Poulantzas (1975) disagrees with Miliband’s instrumentalist view of the relationship between the state and the ruling class. Alternatively, he argues that a distinction needs to be made between the interests of the ruling class, and factional interests within the dominant class. In this vein, he contends that the state has “relative autonomy,” which refers to its degree of independence from the control of any faction of the ruling class (Poulantzas, 1975, p. 9). This means that although the state bureaucracy ultimately serves the general interest of the ruling class, it may also act against the interests of any faction of this class.

Focusing on the peripheral state in the Third World, Amin-Khan (2012) contends that the colonial legacy has had an enduring impact on the countries in the global periphery—Africa, Asia, Central, and South America. A major example is a way capitalism has shaped the direction of the post-colonial states. As he notes, “the post-colonial state has been the key mechanism in the Global South’s subordination (internally, by undermining civil society, and externally by facilitating its imperial domination).” As a result. “the populace remains largely fragmented and powerless as it is forced to yield to a unified front of mobile metropolitan capital that has the support of Western and client post-colonial states” (Amin-Khan, 2012, pp. 11–12).

Like Amin-Khan (2012), Gana (1985) argues that the state in Africa has its origins in the dominant forces of the colonial metropole. In other words, the post-colonial African state does not reflect the historical and cultural experiences of its citizens. In this vein, one of the central roles of the state is to “continue its colonial function of integrating the continent more firmly into the orbit of capitalist imperialism” (Gana, 1985, p. 115).

Similarly, Belluci (2010) asserts that the historical development of the African states has shaped the functioning of their post-colonial political systems. Further, he notes that at the dawn of independence there was the expectation that the African state would serve as an engine of independent development. And some of them did attempt to direct their socio-economic development. But, by the 1980s, economic crises and external forces hampered the African state’s developmental role. Consequently, the African states became vulnerable to the dictates of external forces (Belluci, 2010, p. 12).

Mkandawire (2001) argues by the 1990s, the suzerains of the international capitalist system began to demonize the African state as an obstacle to development. One of their major criticisms was the state’s “interference with the smooth operations of the market” (Mkandawire, 2001, p. 293). He notes that a change in the fortunes of the African state was propelled by the social and economic crises of the 1980s and the ascendancy of the neoliberal development model, and its focus on privatization and the need for a “minimalist state.” As an alternative, he argues the establishment of a developmental state is the solution to Africa’s social and economic woes.

Bayart et al. (2009, p. 1) posit that some African states have become the purveyors of “criminalized corruption.” He contends some African states are complacent in smuggling, the pillaging of natural resources for personal gain, and the privatization of state institutions has led to neo-patrimonialism. Cumulatively, they observe, their illicit and criminal activities are corroding the legitimacy of the states participating in these forms of corruption.

Anil Hira (2016) posits that a country’s culture—cultural practices, norms, and beliefs—shapes its social, economic, and political structures and relations, including those in the public sector of society (Hira, 2016, p. 2). Hence, the success of anti-corruption reforms is dependent upon changing the aspects of a country’s culture that contribute to corruption. Hira argues that scholarly literature and anti-corruption reformers for the most part have failed to accord sufficient importance to culture. As a result, civil service anti-corruption reforms have been pursued without any regard for making the necessary cultural changes.

Drawing from Hira’s central premise, Riley and Roy (2016) argue that corruption in India is rooted in the country’s political culture: “including [existing] levels of honesty and of the desire for honesty among public officials, ordinary citizens and political leaders” (Riley & Roy, 2016, p. 75). According to Riley and Roy, “India has deeply ingrained habits of corruption” in its political culture (Riley & Roy, 2016, p. 93). They contend corruption has remained ensconced in the country’s political culture since the post-independence era, including its two major phases: 1947–1991 and 1991–present.

Similarly, Bamidele et al. (2016) in their case study of Nigeria argue that “corruption has almost become a way of life in Nigeria to the extent that not to be corrupt tends to be regarded as an aberration” (Bamidele, 2016, p. 118). Importantly, Bamidele et al. attributes the scourge of corruption in Nigeria to the erosion of traditional Nigerian values such as “uprightness and promotion of honesty, as evident in such concepts as omoluabi (the upright one in Yoruba culture) and mutum kirki (the honest person in Hausa culture)” (Bamidele, 2016, p. 116). According to Bamidele et al., the colonially-constructed “civic culture” with its moral depravity is the root cause of the erosion of traditional Nigerian cultural values, and the main cause of corruption in Nigeria.

Lessig (2013) posits that institutional corruption is a specific type of corruption that is characterized by, among other things, the illegal diversion of institutions from their purposes, and thus the erosion of public trust in these institutions. This is done through the use of money and other inducements to exert “systemic and strategic influence” (Lessig, 2013, p. 553); and the erosion of institutional effectiveness.

de Oliveira (2014) argues that there are two major flaws at the core of institutional corruption: institutional design and institutional performance. In the case of the former, the way an institution is constructed—purposes, rules, processes, etc.—is seriously flawed. This in turn undermines the effectiveness of an institution, especially it’s capacity to prevent and address corruption. In the case of the latter, public servants deviate from the legal intent that undergirds the institution. Hence, “the very design aimed at achieving the [institutional goals] undermines the expected achievement” (de Oliveira, 2014, p. 16).

Tanzi (1998) lays the responsibility for corruption at the doorsteps of the poor quality of the bureaucracy in some countries. This is attributable to several factors. A key factor in these countries uses patronage and nepotism in the hiring of workers in the public sector. In addition, there is a lack of transparency in the administration of institutional rules and processes. Further, the poor quality of the bureaucracy militates against its capacity to even enforce existing penalty systems. Further, anti-corruption bodies in some cases are captives of political manipulation. For example, they are amenable to partisan and/or personal control, thereby undermining their independence.

Shadnam and Lawrence (2011) argue institutional corruption involves a web of relationships that links the beliefs and actions of individuals, the organizational context, and the broader social context that provide overarching beliefs, norms, and rules, Institutional corruption occurs because of what they refer to as “moral collapse”—the breakdown in the two-way flow of ideology and regulation and moral ideas and influence (Shadnam & Lawrence, 2011, p. 379).

Similarly, Luo (2002) argues that corruption takes place on two major levels: at the task and the institutional levels. The former concerns the specific responsibilities of public servants. The latter refers to the broader organizational or institutional tapestry that provides the context in which public servants perform their respective functions. Cumulatively, the environment at each level can lead public servants to engage in corrupt acts, thereby weakening the entire institutional fabric. Overall, Luo contends institutional corruption is “an evolutionary hazard, a strategic impediment and an organizational deficiency” (Luo, 2002, p. 405).

Aidt (2016, p. 4) argues that corruption through rent-seeking is anchored in “influence seeking activities.” Against this background, there are two major dimensions to influence-seeking activities. One type revolves around the public servant, who assigns the rent and does this to obtain personal benefits from this transaction. The other is where the influence-seeking activity involves the offer of a bribe/s from a private party who seeks to influence a public servant/s for specific purposes/outcomes.

Lamsdorff (2002) posits that rent-seeking corruption involves a dyadic relationship between public servants and private parties. In this relationship, the “state has a monopoly on allocating property rights, be it by certain laws, regulations, subsidies, taxes, tariffs, import quotas or by awarding contracts in public procurement. Such activities usually involve the distribution and redistribution of income” (Lamsdorff (2002, p. 101). For their part, private parties will try to influence the decisions of state bureaucrats for preferential treatment through the provision of bribes and other inducements.

Treading on the same path, Mbaku (1998) asserts that rent-seeking or bureaucratic corruption “is related to the scope and extent of government’s intervention in private exchanges” (Mbaku, 1998, p. 194). Specifically, public servants, including elected officials, seek to use the agency of their respective offices to maximize their personal gains. For example, given the low salaries of public servants in most developing countries, they seek to augment their income by engaging in sundry corrupt acts, including receiving bribes in exchange for dispensing favors to private groups and individuals.

Tanzi (1998) builds on Mbaku’s (1998) work by expanding the ambit of the areas of bureaucratic corruption to include the issuance of licenses and permits. Public servants require individuals to pay them bribes for “opening a shop and keeping it open, borrowing money, driving a car, owning a car, building a house, engaging in foreign trade, obtaining foreign exchange, getting a passport, going abroad…” (Tanzi, 1998, p. 566). In addition, Tanzi (1998) observes that public servants also engage in corrupt behavior in the area of public expenditures for various projects, including physical infrastructure.

Loftis (2014) concurs with Lamsdorff, Tanzi, and Mbaku that public servants use their official positions for private gains. One of the major ways in which this is done is for “legislative and executive officials [to] regularly make policies in ways which facilitate their own or their accomplices’ corrupt activity” (Loftis, 2014, p. 735). In addition, this is made possible by a system of public administration that is susceptible to political manipulation. In other words, rent-seeking behavior is facilitated by a politicized public bureaucracy in which policy-making is devoid of institutionalization.

Li (2013) posits that the exploitation of natural resources provides inducements for corruption. Specifically, Li argues that revenues that are generated from the sale of natural resources such as oil and minerals are diverted to the personal gain of public officials, instead of being used for national development. Using Equatorial Guinea as a case study, Li laments that “oil wealth has failed to generate development and has instead led to corruption that retards development” (Li, 2002, p. 572).

Shaxson (2007) argues that the major reason for corruption in resource-rich countries is because “large tides of …money, for example, are simply too much for institutions to absorb” (Shaxson, 2007, p. 1126). In other words, resource-rich countries lack the institutional modalities for ensuring the prudent management of revenues generated by the sale of natural resources. This is made worse by the fact that the public institutions that are charged with the responsibility of managing the revenues suffer from the lack of public trust as a result.

Similarly, Brollo et al. (2010) assert that the economic windfall that is generated from natural resources tends to “worsen the functioning of political institutions” (Brollo et al., 2010, p. 1). This is because the revenues that are generated provide a larger revenue base for the fostering of personal accumulation. In the case of elected officials, for example, they can then use the diverted revenues to fund their re-election campaigns.

Ross (2015) focuses on oil resources, one of the most lucrative natural resources, He posits that under certain circumstances, oil tends to produce a “political resource curse” (Ross, 2015, p. 240). That is, oil leads to increased corruption, especially in low- and lower-middle-income countries with authoritarian regimes. These authoritarian regimes use the oil revenue to corrupt the political system and to establish their overall stranglehold on political power.

In their study, Hussain and Wadho (2017) argue that ethnically-based elite networks provide a conducive atmosphere in which their members have the opportunity to “collude with each other in corrupt activities by increasing their net share of resource flows per member” (Hussain & Wadho, 2017, p. 24). In addition, the greater the amount of political power an elite network has, the greater its share of the loot from the expropriation of natural resource revenues.

Clearly, while the various explanations that have been provided by the theories on the causes of corruption capture some of the major dimensions of the pathologies of corruption, much attention has not been accorded to the peripheral state per seen as a major cause of corruption in the Global South. Hence, there are gaps in the scholarly literature revolving around the ubiquity of the state and its overarching role as a setter and controller of the parameters of behaviors such as corruption. In other words, we argue that given the state’s dominant role in society in the Global South, it has become the crucible within which corruption occurs. Thus, the sine qua non for understanding the root causes of the corruption in the Global South is lodged in the nature of the peripheral state.

Hence, as was discussed in the introductory section of the study, the article seeks to contribute to the literature by exposing the role of the peripheral state in the Global South in providing propitious conditions for the undertaking of corrupt activities. In other words, the article proffers a distinct trajectory for probing the root causes of corruption, as well as suggestions for addressing them. In short, the scholarly literature needs to transcend the prevailing explanatory frameworks and incorporate the peripheral state as the most comprehensive Weltanschauung (worldview) for understanding the root causes of corruption in the Global South.

The Historical Development of the Peripheral State in the Global South

The peripheral state in the Global South has evolved over a relatively long period of time. It has its historical origins in the Americas some 500 years ago. Beginning at the end of the fifteenth century, the existing European monarchies led by Spain conquered the hitherto independent polities and colonized the inhabitants of North, Central, and South America as well as the Caribbean islands. Similarly, about a century later, they turned their attention to Asia and Africa and extended their colonial subjugation to these regions as well. In the nineteenth century, France, the United Kingdom, and other European states expanded the frontiers of their respective colonial empires by “scrambling over” (Chamberlain, 2014; Rodney, 1984), and eventually carving up Africa. However, the confluence of various factors, including the liberation struggles of the colonized peoples eventually forced the decolonization and the subsequent political independence of most of these European colonies by the last half of the twentieth century.

However, the end of colonialism has only meant the loss of formal control by the former colonizers over the colonized. Instead, the major European powers and the United States of America established informal control over most of the countries that were colonized. This was made possible by the foundation that was laid by colonialism. For example, during colonialism, the colonial powers incorporated their colonies into the world capitalist system as marginal players within a framework based on dependent relations (Frank, 1966, 1967). Specifically, they have used foreign aid, loans, and trade as the cords that tie these states in the periphery of the global economy to them (the core states) as appendages.

Significantly, colonialism and imperialism have been the major historical currents that have conditioned and shaped the Global South or the global periphery. Under the existing “international division of labor,” the core states have assigned the peripheral ones the role of producing raw materials—agricultural, minerals, and oil–to feed the industrial- manufacturing complexes of the former. These raw materials are used by the cores states to produce manufactured goods. Van der Meer (2017, p. 9) refers to this as the “value flow from the periphery to the core.” Linked to this “international division of labor” is a “system of unequal exchange” under which the core states determine the prices for manufactured goods, raw materials, and the main commodities produced and sold in the global economy (Amin, 1977; Birkan, 2015).

A major dimension of the peripheral state is its material base. With its genesis in colonialism, the material base is largely owned and/or controlled by private individuals and core-based multinational corporations; profit-making is the main motif for economic activity; and the state generally plays a minimal role in the development of the country. In addition, one of the major contradictions of the peripheral capitalist materialist base is the imitation of the consumption habits of the ruling classes of the core states by those of the peripheral states. One of the major resultant effects is that peripheral states spend a considerable amount of money to purchase these luxurious goods.

As for the mission of the peripheral state, it is to create an enabling environment in which the owners of capital can generate wealth through various self-serving and often corrupt commercial activities. This requires the maintenance of “law and order” by using the coercive powers of the state to keep labor and civil society in check. This in turn enables the members of the faction or fractions of the ruling class that controls state power to engage in the accumulation of wealth. Corruption is a central mode for the accumulation of wealth in these political systems.

The character of the peripheral state is multidimensional: it has been described variously as “criminalized,” “exploitative,” “predatory,” and “negligent,” among others (Agbese, 2007). No single characterization can adequately explain the character of the peripheral state. Agbese (2007) provides an excellent summation of the character of the peripheral state as follows:

[The peripheral state is] a composite of several tendencies or characteristics… the ascendancy of any particular tendency is a function of numerous conjunctural factors. Thus, at several historical moments, some tendencies are clearly more dominant, while at other times, those same tendencies, while far from the political surface, do not completely disappear from the political arena.

The peripheral state in the Global South provides an enabling environment for several major types of corruption to be engaged in by public officials. A key type is the embezzlement of public funds. That is, public officials and public servants steal public funds. Four major axles serve as the motor force. One is the “hegemonic presidency” (Kieh, 2018; Prempeh, 2008). It is commonplace for the president to use his or her dominant position in the state to facilitate the transfer of public funds to his or her private bank accounts or those of relatives, friends, supporters, and clients. Another is public officials use the agency of their respective positions to divert public funds to their private bank accounts. In addition, public servants may steal money from tax revenues. Further, government officials may divert “rents” (bribes) from multinational corporations and other businesses to their private accounts. And both higher officials and public servants may divert money from development aid and loans to their private bank accounts.

Public servants at various levels of the state bureaucracy receive bribes for sundry activities ranging from routine administrative functions to the signing of concessional agreements. For example, private individuals offer bribes routinely to state bureaucrats to speedily facilitate various transactions, including getting licenses, passports, permits, and receiving government contracts to provide various services. As Ackerman-Rose (1999, p. 19) observers in the case of the payment of taxes, “Businesses and individuals may collude with tax collectors and custom agents to lower the sum collected.”

Further, extortion is also a widely used instrument of corruption. This entails “the demand for money and other material benefits by state managers as the preconditions for providing public services to individuals or groups seeking them” (Kieh, 2008, p. 152). Like bribery, extortion assumes many forms, including traffic violations, the setting up of roadblocks by police officers, and the flaunting of regulations. In other words, the quid pro quo is initiated by a public servant.

In addition, procurement fraud is another genre of corruption that is quite pervasive in the public sector in peripheral states. Essentially, procurement fraud has two major dimensions. One is an illegal agreement between a public servant or public servants and a vendor to defraud the government by inflating the prices of goods and services that the latter is desirous of purchasing. The “lion share” of the surplus that is generated from the illegal transaction is then transferred to the public servant or servants, who “negotiated” on the government’s behalf. The other type involves projects such as road construction. Like the first type, the ostensible purpose is for the public servant concerned to extract a profit through the inflation of the price. Importantly, the net benefit for the vendor is getting the contract to either provide the goods or services or undertake a project.

The Corruption Nexus

The peripheral state in the Global South creates the propitious conditions for corruption in several major ways. But irrespective of its possession of coercive powers—the military, police, and armed forces, the peripheral state is, by its intrinsic nature, incapable of establishing its complete dominance over all of the social forces that operate in the society (Hoare & Smith, 1999, p. 495). The major reason is that as a marginal and dependent social formation, the peripheral state in the Global South lacks the institutional capacity that would enable it to discipline all actors, both internal and external.

The peripheral state in the Global South lacks autonomy—absolute, relative, or otherwise. In other words, the peripheral state lacks the independence that would enable it to stay above class conflicts, and it ultimately serves the general interests of the ruling class (Kieh, 2009; Poulantzas, 1975). Autonomy would enable the peripheral state to act against factional or sectional class interests. However, because it lacks autonomy, the peripheral state is susceptible to being captured. Hence, any faction or fraction of the ruling class can control state power at any historical moment, and subordinate the state to its interests. That means the state can be used to enable the members of the ruling faction or fraction and their supporters to accumulate wealth through various corrupt means, including embezzlement, bribery, and extortion (Kieh, 2009). Since the control of state power ensures control over state resources, the faction or fraction of the ruling class that has state power during a particular time has access to the state’s financial resources.

The political culture in the Global South, by and large, fosters the orientation that the quickest way for one to get rich is to get a position in the state bureaucracy. In other words, given the fact that the state lacks autonomy, the risk is therefore very low for a public servant to use their position for the predatory accumulation of wealth through corrupt means. The risk is even much lower if a public servant is associated with the ruling faction or fraction. The ruling actors use the state as a protective shield to insulate themselves, their family members, and supporters from scrutiny either by the public or state agencies such as anti-corruption bodies.

Further, where there is a “hegemonic presidency,” this undermines the institutional capacity of the state to curb corruption. That is, if there is a concentration of powers in the presidency, even in democratic peripheral states, this tends to subordinate the state to the whims of the presidency. In other words, because the constitutions and statutes of various peripheral states centralize power in the presidency, the president often is able to pursue a particularistic agenda, including engagement in corruption. For example, because of the expansive nature of presidential powers, presidents often have carte blanche to engage in sundry acts of corruption, especially embezzlement and bribery, without being held accountable. That is, presidents in peripheral states often do not have constraints that limit their capacity to requisition and receive public funds for transfer to their personal accounts.

Linked to this type of “hegemonic presidency” is the weakness of public institutions, especially parliaments. In other words, one of the major resultant effects of the “hegemonic presidency” is the weakening of other public institutions by subordinating them to the executive. Thus, the weakness of other public institutions, especially parliaments, undercuts their capacity to serve as a countervailing force, thereby resulting in the absence of “checks and balances.” Importantly, the weakness of other public institutions, amid presidential suzerainty, makes it quite difficult for them to serve as bulwarks against corruption.

Significantly, one of the major cumulative effects of the “hegemonic presidency” is the emergence of a “cult of impunity.” Under this pathology, the “rule of law,” which is indispensable to curbing corruption, does not apply to those, who are politically well-connected. That is, as has been discussed, those who have ties to the president or the faction or fraction of the ruling class that is in power can engage in corruption without any fear of being brought to justice. This is because the anti-corruption mechanisms in peripheral states if they exist, are by and large susceptible to political manipulation and are ineffective.

The Democratic Reconstitution of the Peripheral State

The neo-liberalization of the economies and states in the Global South, which commenced in the 1980s, and the “third wave of democratization,” which began in the 1990s and early years of the present century have not done very much to address the scourge of corruption in the Global South. As a result, the peripheral states in the Global South needs to be democratically reconstituted to rid these states of this scourge. This entails a deep multidimensional process of transformation in their state structures and political cultures. Clearly, the peripheral state is not the appropriate social formation for addressing corruption in the Global South. This is because its intrinsic nature makes it an enabler of corruption.

The state must be reconstituted so that it no longer serves as an arena for the predatory accumulation of wealth through corrupt means. Two major sets of actors are critical for this transformative process to succeed: the citizenry and servant-leaders (Greenleaf, 1988). The citizenry of the various peripheral states in the Global South need to take the destinies of their respective countries into their own hands by getting actively involved in ensuring that the state serves its interests. And this requires a new form of leadership, one which places the interests of the country above personal gain and private interests. New political leaders who are committed to serving the people and not corrupt private interests must lead the democratic reconstitution of the state. They must ensure the mission of the state involves using public resources to satisfy the citizenry’s human needs, such as education, adequate health care, food security, and the provision of clean drinking water and sanitation—and not the corrupt enrichment of the public servants and the upper classes.

With a new mission based on the effective provision of services to the citizenry, the state needs to be accountable to the citizenry and not the private interests of domestic elites and multinational corporations. This requires changing the existing political culture and social relations to support honesty, legality, and equity in place of corrupt practices and selfish values.

Another major element of the democratic state reconstitution process is the restructuring of power relations in all spheres and at all levels. Class relations need to be restructured to checkmate the exercise of disproportionate power by the existing elites and upper classes. A major way to do this will be to develop modalities that ensure the state no longer serves as one of the main sources for the accumulation of private wealth, especially by the faction or factions of the ruling class/es that now dominant the state and society.

Once the state is democratically reconstituted in this way, it will be much easier to delink it from the various existing forms of corruption. The democratized state will also be able to play a decisive role in the regulation and development of the economy—in sharp contrast to the neo-liberal minimalist state. A major way to do this is to concentrate the state’s financial resources under the state’s democratic control. This will necessitate the creation of mechanisms that will prevent the misuse of state resources through corrupt means by both non-state actors as well as corruption-minded state actors.

The concentration of state resources under democratic state control will make it difficult to misuse these resources for corrupt purposes. In this way, the state, through the appropriate mechanisms, including anti-corruption bodies, can then isolate and hold those who engage in corruption accountable. Further, the state’s institutional capacity needs to be increased. One of the major resultant effects of the enhancement of the state’s institutional capacity would be the “caging of the hegemonic presidency” (Kieh, 2012). Instead of presidential suzerainty over the state’s financial resources, the parliament should be given ultimate control and oversight over the expenditure of state financial resources. This will help curb corruption, because it can take away the president’s capacity to have unfettered control over state funds, including using them for personal use.

A state that has relative autonomy and strong institutional capacity can end the “culture of impunity” that enables those who are politically connected to engage in corruption without being held accountable for their actions. The state would be able to effectively establish the “rule of law” and anyone, including the president, who is accused of corruption could be brought to justice and subjected to the appropriate punishment.

Conclusion

The scholarly literature has not given adequate attention to the peripheral state in the Global South and its role in creating the conditions that facilitate and reproduce corruption. Because of its intrinsic undemocratic nature, the peripheral state in the Global South is susceptible to corruption. The nature of the peripheral state is a product of its historical origins and its development under colonial rule and imperialism. This history created and shaped the nature of the peripheral state today and gave it a corrupt role within the peripheral tier of the international capitalist system.

Based on its nature and role, the peripheral state in the Global South lacks relative autonomy, strong democratic institutions, and a political culture that extolls honesty, public service, and public accountability. These deficiencies have created an enabling environment in which the state bureaucracy and the public engage in corruption. The accumulation of personal wealth is a primary motive for working in the state bureaucracy in these states, and the faction or fractions of the ruling class that controls state power use the state’s financial resources to promote corruption that increases their wealth and that of the multinational corporations which extract local natural resources and sell luxury goods to the upper classes.

In order to eliminate corruption, most of the states in the Global South need to be democratically reconstituted. This requires a deep and multidimensional process of transformation that includes the restructuring of power relations and ending the domination of the state by the local ruling elites and foreign corporations. A new democratic state is needed that is based on an effective and honest public service that is genuinely accountable to the citizenry and their elected leaders.