Abstract
Recent literature on institutional entrepreneurship has examined the enabling conditions under which actors may influence institutional arrangements. Whereas conditions at field level and among actors have been highlighted, scholars have paid little attention to how and why the field is amenable to change at certain times and how actors act upon these conditions in a timely fashion. This paper examines the temporal conditions for institutional entrepreneurship. I propose that a collective of time-aware institutional entrepreneurs opens a window of opportunity for policy breakthrough by relating its activities to temporally favorable conditions of the multidimensional institutional process. These theoretical propositions are illustrated through an empirical case study of how aviation was targeted for its climate change impact by inclusion in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.
Introduction
The shift of attention in organization studies from stability to dynamics has led to a range of studies of institutional processes and change, largely analyzed in terms of institutional entrepreneurship. Enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship have been identified at field level and among actors (see Leca, Battilana & Boxenbaum, 2008), contributing to the scholarly debate on whether change should predominantly be ascribed to exogenous or endogenous factors. However, scholars have paid little attention to how and why the field is amenable to change at certain times and how actors act upon these conditions in a timely fashion. By adopting a process perspective and directing attention to the role of time and timing, new light can be shed on what enables institutional entrepreneurship.
This paper addresses the following research question: What are the temporal conditions of institutional entrepreneurship? I build on research that suggests that we can enhance our understanding of policy breakthrough by studying the broader institutional process in which policy develops. Thus, rather than studying an existing institutional order, I direct attention to an emerging regulation and its associated normative and cultural-cognitive elements that prescribe how a certain concern ought to be addressed. I demonstrate how policy breakthroughs in a field can be explained by conceiving of institutional processes as multidimensional and institutional entrepreneurship as dependent on a window of opportunity.
These claims are supported by an empirical study of how aviation was targeted for its climate change impact by being included in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) as of 2012. In September 2005, the European Commission proposed that all airlines arriving to or departing from European Union (EU) territory were to participate in the EU ETS, trading pollution permits on an emission rights market as a means to control carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This proposal introduced for the first time a new sector into the EU ETS and represented a ground-breaking climate policy to target international aviation regardless of domicile. However, it has also raised considerable controversy. Several non-European airlines and their governments have questioned its compliance with international law and threatened countermeasures. This paper improves our understanding of the process that allowed for this proposal and contributes with insights into how and why climate policy breakthrough occurs more broadly.
In what follows, I present a theoretical framework for understanding a case such as the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS by demonstrating the temporal conditions for institutional entrepreneurship. I combine ideas from institutional theory in organization studies with a seminal study by political scientist John W. Kingdon, first published in 1984. Kingdon’s (1984, 2003) model provides inspiration for how institutional processes can be perceived of as separate streams of problems, policy and politics that allow for change when they coincide. I conceive of the development of a climate policy for aviation as an institutional process that brought a substantial change in an issue field (Hoffman, 1999) at the intersection of aviation and the environment, and the individuals and organizations that promoted emissions trading for aviation as an organized collective of institutional entrepreneurs. After describing the method used, I present an empirical case study which examines the institutionally colored climate policy development for aviation during 1997–2005. The paper concludes with reflections on how my results advance research on policy breakthroughs through an institutional perspective and empirical directions since 2005.
Institutional Entrepreneurship at Windows of Opportunity
This study focuses on the process of policy development to understand how and why policy breakthrough occurs. Taking interest in historical events preceding certain outcomes is a broad trend in organization studies (Schneiberg, 2007; Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011). I apply the perspective that policy development is an institutional process. This perspective builds on Scott (2008), who suggests that “institutions are comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” (Scott, 2008, p. 48). The regulative element involves explicit regulatory activities such as rule-setting. The normative element refers to values, defined as “conceptions of the preferred or desirable” (Scott, 2008, p. 54), and norms which “specify how things should be done” (Scott, 2008, p. 55). The cultural-cognitive element rests on “shared conceptions that constitute the nature of reality” (Scott, 2008, p. 57). Hence, regulation is itself one institutional element that prescribes “rules of the game” (e.g. Djelic & Quack, 2003). Yet, for a richer explanation of how policy develops, we need to direct attention to how emerging formal legislation is supported by normative and cultural-cognitive factors (Quack & Djelic, 2005; Scott, Ruef, Mendel & Caronna, 2000). Taking values, norms and shared conceptions into account allows for an understanding of how policy processes are shaped by social structures (Clemens & Cook, 1999).
While Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) paved the way for institutional theory’s emphasis on stable social structures, scholars have more recently taken interest in institutional dynamics. Focusing on how regulation takes form aligns with studies that question the notion of institutions as an assumed force that influences organizations. Recent scholarship examines institutions themselves and the processes through which institutions evolve and change (e.g. Leblebici, Salancik, Copay & King, 1991; Thelen, 2004). Supported by the concept of institutional entrepreneurs, defined as “organized actors with sufficient resources who see in new institutions an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly” (DiMaggio, 1988, p. 14), researchers have shown how individuals, organizations (Lawrence, 1999), networks (Dorado, 2005) or social movements (Lounsbury, Ventresca & Hirsch, 2003) can affect institutional arrangements. Institutional entrepreneurs can influence new organizational forms (Thornton, 2002), practices (Boxenbaum & Battilana, 2005) and, like the subject of the present study, formal regulatory arrangements such as environmental regulatory conventions (Maguire & Hardy, 2006), climate policy (Wijen & Ansari, 2007) or EU policy (Fligstein, 2001). More than just formulating new policy, institutional entrepreneurs create or transform overarching institutional arrangements including contextual norms and values (Hardy & Maguire, 2008).
Institutional processes as multidimensional
The multifaceted nature of institutions (Scott, 2008) offers opportunities to study how the different dimensions of an institutional process interact. Previous research has investigated how normative, cultural-cognitive or regulative elements relate to each other (e.g. March & Olsen, 1989; Suchman & Edelman, 1997). I argue that we can shed new light on policy development by slicing the institutional process in a Kingdon-inspired way that further illuminates its multidimensional character.
To enrich the literature on institutional entrepreneurship, I propose a theoretical perspective that builds on Kingdon (1984, 2003). He makes a distinct analytical division between what he refers to as processes and participants (i.e. actors). The process is split into three broad streams: problem, policies and politics. These streams advance largely independent of one another. Problems are only problems to the extent that they are recognized as such. Problem recognition has a clear “perceptual, interpretative element” (Kingdon, 2003, p. 110) at the collective level and comes to mind through systematic indicators in the environment that call for attention. It corresponds well with Scott’s (2008) description of shared conceptions and common beliefs in the cultural-cognitive element of institutions. Kingdon (2003, p. 109) further argues that a problem emerges “when we come to believe that we should do something about them”, which overlaps with conceptions of the desirable or social obligations in Scott’s (2008) normative element. Furthermore, Kingdon (1984) describes how problems compete for attention with a range of other issues. Policies are described by Kingdon (1984) as ideas that are being debated and tested in what is often a drawn-out, if not endless, process. Over time, the policy stream narrows down and generates a short list of proposals, although it may not be a solution that has been developed towards a specific problem. Similar to arguments in institutional theory (e.g. Quack & Djelic, 2005) policies include a whole ideological package. Policy proposals survive due to “value acceptability” (Kingdon, 2003, p. 132), i.e. because the proposals are compatible with other values. Politics refers to events within and outside the government. Intra-governmental events such as election results and changes in administration influence policy development through its underpinning ideologies. Extra-governmental factors such as pressure group campaigns and public opinion carry interests from wider society, which is also recognized by institutional scholars (Scott, 2008). Thus, each stream overlaps with the strong contextual account in institutional theory (see Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin & Suddaby, 2008). I argue therefore that the entire policy development process should be analytically treated as institutional. Splitting the process highlights how different elements in a policy process may develop at a different pace. The independent character of the streams implies that policy is not necessarily defined only with reference to a problem; nor is it a given what problems or policies receive attention in politics.
Proposition 1: Policy development is a multidimensional institutional process that consists of a problem, policy and political stream.
However, more than just normative and cultural-cognitive elements, policy development also engages specific individuals and organizations. Kingdon (1984) analyses agency separately, while recognizing that policy processes are obviously not actor-less. Kingdon (1984) describes the agency in the process as dispersed, with contestations about the issue at stake. Over time, the majority of people eventually adopt a similar worldview. Actors are not exclusively attached to any one of the three streams.
Conditions for institutional entrepreneurship
What role, then, do individuals and organizations play in policy development according to institutional theorists? A central question has been how people manage to deviate from the institutions that at the same time constrain them: the paradox of embedded agency (e.g. Holm, 1995). In 1991, Powell and DiMaggio encouraged research on agency in institutional theory and since then, institutional entrepreneurship has attracted much interest (see Garud, Hardy & Maguire, 2007; Leca et al., 2008). One area of interest has been the enabling conditions under which actors are able to influence existing and evolving institutional arrangements. Some scholars have drawn our attention to endogenous factors such as actors’ skills (Fligstein, 1997), ability to reduce uncertainty (Beckert, 1999) or positions in organizational fields (Battilana, 2006). Others emphasize exogenous factors such as enabling and constraining conditions at the level of organizational fields (e.g. Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002).
Just like recent research in institutional theory, Kingdon (1984) focused on the role of influential human activity in policy-making. Although he acknowledges actors’ presence within the entire process, he directs particular attention to “policy entrepreneurs”, a concept which I will argue has much in common with institutional entrepreneurs. Kingdon (1984) referred to individuals in various locations, inside and outside government. He described policy entrepreneurs as “advocates for proposals or for the prominence of an idea” (Kingdon, 2003, p. 122) who may do so “because they want to promote their values, or affect the shape of public policy” (Kingdon, 2003, p. 123). These actors promote not only a specific policy but a whole ideological package compatible with surrounding values. Kingdon’s (1984) description of policy proposals which need to fit with contextual widespread perceptions about how to act is familiar to institutional theorists. Recognizing such values is essential for institutional theorists as captured in Scott’s (2008) normative element. However, Kingdon (2003, p. 133) also demonstrates that the ideologies underpinning policy-making may become so taken-for-granted that they provoke responses such as “how else would you do it?” Such a statement is an expression of the cultural-cognitive element in Scott’s (2008) analysis; the common framework of meaning in which people are not able to conceive of something else. Both perspectives explain how actors attempt to affect the regulatory element of institutions and how those attempts are inevitably linked to other institutional elements. However, whereas Kingdon’s (2003) policy entrepreneurs is a relatively narrow description of advocates in favor of changing a particular policy, the concept of institutional entrepreneurship offers tools to understand how actors may create or transform broader institutional arrangements through complex, ongoing struggles, that involve negotiation (Hardy & Maguire, 2008).
In line with Hardy and Maguire (2008), I argue for adopting a process perspective on institutional entrepreneurship, which emphasizes evolving activities at work rather than what makes unique individuals or organizations successful. Focusing on activities over time and emergent outcomes sheds new light on conditions for institutional entrepreneurship. The process perspective on agency is key in Kingdon’s (1984) model. He emphasizes that policy entrepreneurs persistently push their ideas in various forums as they seek to challenge the structures that constrain advancement in the policy process. They may develop their proposals early and then wait for a problem to come along to which they can attach their solutions. The success of the policy entrepreneurs will be highly dependent on acting at the right time. Thus, the primary concern of policy entrepreneurs is to manage time rather than tasks.
A process perspective on agency lets researchers uncover a fairly unexplored aspect in the institutional entrepreneurship literature, namely, the temporal one. Dorado (2005) suggests that institutional entrepreneurs are future oriented and must possess the capacity to imagine what action may lead to institutional change. Fligstein (2001, p. 282) acknowledges how critical institution-building occurs at certain “moments” or in “social situations” that may be hard to predict, and how the success of institutional entrepreneurs “requires a peculiar conjuncture of circumstances”. Other studies emphasize the so-far neglected crucial temporal dimension of policy and management situations in general (e.g. Roe, Waller & Clegg, 2008). As a part of the recent scholarly movement towards highlighting timing and temporality, windows of opportunity have been briefly mentioned but not yet strongly espoused in institutional theory (Cortell & Peterson, 1999; Fligstein, 2001; Rothenberg, 2007).
I suggest that the theoretical potential of temporality can be further unleashed by returning to the idea of the institutional process as multidimensional (see Proposition 1). When the problem, policy and political streams prove favorable simultaneously, the time is right in the institutional process and enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship occur. Such a perspective aligns with literature of institutional entrepreneurship which examines conditions at the level of organizational fields (Greenwood et al., 2002), but calls for attention to the temporal sensitivity in institutional processes.
Proposition 2: Enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship occur when the three streams in the institutional process are favorable at the same time.
Policy breakthroughs are thus dependent on both the institutional process and the activities of institutional entrepreneurs. Kingdon (1984) describes how breakthrough occurs at the opening of a policy window, what may also be called a window of opportunity. Next, I will demonstrate how the window may open up.
Institutional entrepreneurship at windows of opportunity
Kingdon (1984) describes how windows of opportunity are opened up by policy entrepreneurs who couple the three streams at critical points in time, attaching a policy proposal to a perceived problem and linking them both to politics. They can only do so when the conditions have changed in the institutional process, which can only happen in two of the streams. A change occurs either in the problem stream, as a new concern emerges on the agenda, or in the political stream, with changes within or around government. Some windows are predictable, others are not. Windows open very rarely, but once they do, actors must be prepared and immediately seize the opportunity for action. Kingdon (2003, p. 165) describes that a window of opportunity opens up as “a problem is recognized, a solution is available in the policy community, the political climate makes the time right for change and the constraints do not prohibit action”. However, the window does not stay open for very long. Kingdon (1984) explains the closing of a window with factors relating to either the institutional process, as the conditions in the streams are not beneficial anymore, or factors related to agency, as people feel satisfied, fail to achieve results, or change roles.
Researchers have stressed how institutional entrepreneurship involves a significant amount of mobilizing, collaborating and relationship-building (Hardy & Maguire, 2008). Indeed, this is in line with DiMaggio’s (1988) definition, which referred to organized actors. According to this perspective, institutional processes are predominantly shaped by a collective of institutional entrepreneurs, who may join forces despite divergent interests (Wijen & Ansari, 2007) and create shared stories (Zilber, 2007). I argue that the organizational interplay to create a common ground is merely the first step in changing institutional arrangements. We should not predominantly seek explanations for institutional change in cooperation and dialogue per se, as Wijen and Ansari (2007) and Zilber (2007) did, but rather recognize how the collective targets its activities to temporal conditions in the institutional process. Time-oriented actors, as recognized by Dorado (2005) and Fligstein (2001), are however dependent on collective relationship-building activities through which recent studies (e.g. Hardy & Maguire, 2008) suggest that institutional processes unfold. Kingdon’s (1984) description of actors, as being able to open a window of opportunity through effective time management, should therefore be complemented with an organizing dimension when applied to institutional theory. Hence, I suggest that institutional entrepreneurs collectively relate their activities to temporal conditions in institutional processes to open up a window of opportunity.
Proposition 3: A collective of organized institutional entrepreneurs can open up a window of opportunity by relating its activities to the temporal conditions of the institutional process.
A window of opportunity for policy breakthrough is opened up by an organized collective of institutional entrepreneurs and a change in the problem or political stream. The window of opportunity concept tells us that there is a factor beyond the realm of actors, a factor highly dependent on timely situations. However, the notion of institutional entrepreneurs tells us that it takes agency for progress to occur and that it is necessary for actors to take advantage of the window of opportunity provided by favorable circumstances.
Methods and Data
Case studies allow for an in-depth understanding of complex phenomena (Yin, 1994) and a single case study of an issue at the forefront of the public and policy debates has particular potential to challenge existing theory (March, Sproull & Tamuz, 1991). The process to include aviation in the EU ETS is an example of policy breakthrough for a contemporary societal concern which attracted a range of actors colored by perceptions about how a policy ought to be designed. As such, the case is beneficial in advancing theory on institutional entrepreneurship.
Research on shifting institutional arrangements requires that the empirical case can be appropriately bounded in time (Campbell, 2004; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). The present study starts with the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997, a critical event for bringing attention to aviation’s climate change impact. It ends in September 2005 with the European Commission’s proposal to include aviation in the EU ETS where it expressed its clear intention to develop the new policy. My data analysis confirmed that from this Communication onwards, the policy process shifted focus from whether or not emissions trading would be appropriate to how it would work in practice. Determining 2005 as the end point for the time frame is obviously a limitation of this study, yet it was necessary to track and make sense of historical data leading up to a specific outcome.
I use multiple sources of data, most notably interviews and documents, collected September 2005–January 2008. Interviews were critical to gain a comprehensive understanding of the motives that guided key actors that had an influence on the policy development and its broader institutions; hence the selection of interviewees required mindfulness for influential actors regardless of societal and geographical domicile. The project started with a close reading of documents and websites to identify central organizations and individuals. They were considered to be central if they appeared to be actively engaged in the policy process up until 2005 and impressions were complemented by internet research, e-mails and telephone calls. The dataset includes 26 interviews with 23 different individuals, out of which 4 represented corporations such as airlines, airports and aircraft manufacturers; 9 business associations; 5 policy-makers; 1 consultant; and 4 non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Most interviews lasted between one and two hours. I posed open-ended questions and allowed for conversation within the boundaries of my research question. All 23 interviews, which the respondent had agreed to be recorded, were transcribed word-by-word to allow me to return to the raw data. For the 3 non-recorded interviews, I summarized my notes shortly after the interview. The transcripts and summaries amounted to approximately 137,000 words.
Documents proved particularly useful for the crucial timing component in a process study, as they record data at particular points in time. I added key documents from the climate policy development for aviation such as corporate position papers, press releases, speeches, and documents issued by governments and the EU. These data were supplemented by a textual analysis of Europe’s biggest environmental news service, Environmental Data Service Ltd, 1998–2005, and widely cited scientific and policy-oriented reports on the topic.
I used an iterative research approach through which theoretical understandings, empirical data and analytical insights informed each other. It implies an ongoing analysis of data and allows for flexibility to shape the study into a coherent whole (see Silverman, 2005).The iterative approach required a lengthy data collection, which raised a risk that interviewees would reconstruct their memories. To reduce this problem, interviewees’ statements were as far as possible verified through documents and other interviewees’ statements. The transcripts, summaries and documents were read several times to recognize data that either confirmed or called for a modification of the theoretical propositions. With the aim of analyzing a process, key observations were placed in temporal order using timelines. This revealed structural openings and intensifying activities during a limited time span, suggesting a window of opportunity. Actor maps were used as analytical tools to identify entrepreneurial promoting activities for emissions trading and its associated organizing. The institutional elements of the process and the entrepreneurs were revealed through descriptions and arguments in interviews and documents. Quotes from either data source were interpreted as indicating institutional elements if they reflected common norms and values in the debate. Supported by continuous understanding, a story unfolded of how aviation was included in the EU ETS.
Bringing Aviation into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
A climate policy breakthrough for aviation occurred when the European Commission announced that the sector should be brought into the EU ETS, in which several other energy-intensive sectors were already participating. The sector presented a special case in the climate change debate, involving somewhat different puzzles, actors, arguments, arenas and policy alternatives that deserve closer attention. This empirical section focuses on the institutional process of developing a climate policy in the issue field of aviation and the environment. It describes the temporal conditions in the problem, policy and political streams; the organized collective of institutional entrepreneurs which promoted emissions trading; and how they matched their activities towards a window of opportunity in the institutional process.
Introducing key actors
Institutional theorists call for attention not only to the durable social structures that guide behavior but also increasingly to the actors and activities influencing institutional processes (DiMaggio, 1988; Leca et al., 2008). Kingdon (1984) suggests that we need to make an analytical distinction between the actors who engage in a policy process and the actors who actually influence policy breakthrough. In empirical terms, I conceive of actors engaged in the dialogue of any climate policy to address aviation as part of agency in the institutional process. I distinguish the actors that used the institutional context to push for emissions trading and analyze their activities as institutional entrepreneurship.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the key arena for global climate change negotiations. Through the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the UNFCCC delegated the responsibility to deal with international aviation to another UN body, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1998). In Europe, the EU had examined the possibility of regulating the greenhouse gas emissions from aviation since the early 1990s, without any significant progress. Instead, the UNFCCC’s decision to delegate the mandate to ICAO marked the beginning of a new intensified phase in the matter. In the EU, the European Commission’s duty to draft legislation makes it the foremost venue for lobbying activities (Greenwood, 2011) and aviation’s climate change impact then engaged the DG Environment and DG Transport and Energy in particular. NGOs worked continuously to highlight aviation’s climate change impact. Consultants and academics undertook research to support the debate; and the media reported about the latest developments and next steps. Both EU member states and other governments took interest in the regulatory ideas. Finally, the aviation industry, including airlines, airports and manufacturers of aircrafts and aircraft engines, exercised significant interest representation.
The broader environmental impact of aviation had been discussed since the 1960s, although the early debate mainly concerned local pollution and noise (International Civil Aviation Organization, 1992). ICAO was an established forum for these debates. The EU’s prime focus with regard to aviation’s climate change impact in the 1990s was on investigating the possibility of imposing a tax on aircraft fuel. Although these efforts did not succeed, the EU was already a key arena for discussions on aviation’s climate change impact when they intensified after the Kyoto summit in 1997.
The institutional process
This section describes the development of a climate policy for aviation in the EU during 1997–2005, in broader institutional terms. Hence, I describe evolving conceptions of preferred or desirable policies to address aviation’s climate impact. The institutional process is described in a predominantly chronological order, although evolving debates on certain policy options have been thematically organized. Each sub-section starts with a snapshot of conditions in the problem and political streams during the period of the subsequently described policy debate and its associated institutional elements and entrepreneurs.
Voluntary agreements, infrastructural and technological improvements
The outlooks for a climate policy breakthrough for aviation were gloomy in the immediate post-Kyoto period. The scientific character of the problem was largely unknown. The main conclusion on climate change from the first ICAO meeting after it received its mandate from UNFCCC was that further research was necessary (International Civil Aviation Organization, 1998). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on aviation’s climate impact in 1999, however, raised some awareness of climate change in the sector and presented estimations of the global aviation sector to account for approximately 2% of anthropogenic CO2 and 3.5% of total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. The politics was focused on the global level; the issue was seen as truly global in character, thus should be regulated internationally. At this point in time, aviation’s climate impact was not prioritized in the EU arena, although a policy dialogue existed.
In parallel, the EU investigated widespread ideas prescribing policy options for addressing aviation’s environmental impact. While a broad EU climate change strategy took shape and discussions of an EU-wide emissions trading scheme began, specific measures were considered for the transport sector. It was a signal of widespread perceptions that aviation was a particular case. Quite early, it was clear that aviation would not be part of EU ETS Phase I (European Commission, 1999a).
In 1998, the European Commission was inspired by a voluntary climate agreement with European car manufacturers (Environmental Data Service Ltd, 1998a). Voluntary agreements for climate change control at the EU level were hailed by politicians and industry, although environmental groups and the European Parliament remained skeptical. The EU encouraged the aviation industry to propose voluntary approaches in a similar manner (Environmental Data Service Ltd, 1998b). Aircraft operators and manufacturers developed a proposal for voluntary emission reduction agreements (Environmental Data Service Ltd, 1999), but the idea of a voluntary approach was dashed as the aviation sector and the European Commission could not agree on annual reductions in fuel consumption (Environmental Data Service Ltd, 2000a). Hence, the divergent views on the choice and desirability of a voluntary agreement stemmed from different perceptions of whether it would be sufficient.
The aviation sector instead promoted emissions reductions by improving current air traffic management (ATM) systems and new technological developments, reflecting shared conceptions of the potential for efficiency improvements and a widespread trust in technological progress. The European Commission said, however, that efficiency improvements would not be sufficient to replace other regulatory action (Environmental Data Service Ltd, 2000b). More environmentally friendly engines and aircrafts would require massive fleet renewals. The Association of European Airlines (AEA) and the aerospace industry association Association Européenne des Constructeurs de Materiel Aerospatial stated jointly that major emission reductions through new technology developments would only be possible after 2012. This clashed with the perceived urgency of the issue.
While the European Commission encouraged efficient air transport systems and alternative modes of transport, they also suggested stricter international emission standards (European Commission, 1999a). In summary, the post-Kyoto period was characterized by norms and values in the EU arena which prescribed that the climate change impact of aviation should be addressed differently compared to other sectors, and also a raging discussion on whether voluntary agreements, standards and efficiency improvements in infrastructural and technological aspects would be a sufficient regulatory response.
Economic instruments: Charges, taxes or emissions trading
Although there had been some recognition of aviation’s climate impact as a problem since ICAO’s first Assembly meeting in 1998, at ICAO’s next Assembly meeting, in October 2001, the issue was overshadowed by the unforeseen 11 September terrorist attacks. The main outcome of the meeting with regard to climate change was to continue encouraging states to promote scientific research and to request cooperation between the organizations involved (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2001). The following years saw several global challenges to the aviation sector, including rapidly increased jet-fuel prices and demands for tighter security.
In the political stream, interest representation towards the EU was apparent but not very organized, the public mood was not directed towards aviation’s climate impact and few actors had seriously singled out aviation as a priority. One reason for this was that the formal responsibility was still with ICAO. However, ICAO’s lack of progress triggered a discussion about an appropriate locus of responsibility. The ICAO Assembly perceived such potential interference as a threat to its own authority, and repeatedly called on the ICAO Council not to leave aviation matters related to the environment to other organizations (International Civil Aviation Organization, 1998, 2001, 2004). However, as an immediate response to the ICAO Assembly meeting in October 2001, the Council of the European Union announced that the EU would take action to curb the expected growth of emissions from the sector if ICAO had not agreed on such action by 2002 (European Commission, 2001). Thus, the EU expressed a possibility of unilateral action.
In between the ICAO Assembly meetings, the EU continued to examine appropriate policies. One discussion concerned economic instruments, in particular a follow-up of the 1990s discussion of the possibility and appropriateness of imposing taxes on air transport. Taxes had been used frequently in EU environmental policy due to its perceived environmental benefits. Alongside taxes, other economic instruments such as en-route charging were also considered (European Commission, 1999a). Preparatory work to examine economic instruments was focused on taxes and charges, while emissions trading was only briefly mentioned (European Commission, 1999b). The European Federation for Transport and Environment (1998), a Brussels-based NGO, stressed the need for research into all policy alternatives.
Regarding taxation of aircraft fuels, the European Commission concluded in March 2000 that “it would not be practicable or desirable … at present time” (European Commission, 2000, p. 5), thereby shifting their position on taxes. Underpinning this conclusion was the estimated limited environmental effects of such unilateral action (CE Delft, 1998). Moreover, making any new fiscal arrangements at the EU level was depicted as a daunting task, taking many years to formulate (European Commission, 1997). The European Commission, however, reminded member states of the possibility of fuel taxes being imposed on domestic flights and bilaterally on international routes (European Commission, 2000). This suggestion was attacked by AEA who argued that taxes would bring “a high cost, both in money and jobs, which was out of all proportion to the microscopically small environmental benefits” (Environmental Data Service Ltd, 2000b), giving voice to the maxim that any climate policy must not cause any financial harm to the sector. Instead, the AEA restated the industry’s willingness to enter a voluntary agreement.
EU representatives were disappointed with ICAO’s slow progress on climate change. By 2002, ICAO had not made any regulatory proposal considered satisfactory and the Council of the European Union (2002) invited the European Commission to consider specific action. EU Environment Commissioner Wallström (2003) referred to the recognition of a need for European solutions as both “timely and welcome[d]” at a climate change seminar hosted by British airport operator BAA. Shortly thereafter, the Council of the European Union (2003) once again called on the European Commission to make proposals before 2005.
Influenced by surrounding institutional prescriptions, the European Commission put economic instruments at the forefront of the policy debate. Wallström insisted on discussions about emissions trading, fuel taxatio, and en-route environmental charges on flights (Environmental Data Service Ltd, 2003). The European Commission reiterated their interest in economic incentives when they commissioned CE Delft to undertake a study on the topic (Wit & Dings, 2002). This study mentioned emissions trading as an “attractive option because they give the sector the flexibility to take steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at least cost” (Wit & Dings, 2002, p. 13), but the study also directed attention to two en-route charge options. The report concluded that no legal obstacles to imposing charges existed and that emissions could be reduced. In a similar vein, the world’s largest business association in the aviation sector, the International Air Transport Association (IATA, 2001a, p. iii), had also concluded that emissions trading was “likely to be an appropriate tool to meet emission reduction commitments”.
Emissions trading
The EU’s steps to initiate unilateral action point to increased problem recognition in Brussels. Particular problem recognition also developed within one of the EU member states: the United Kingdom (UK). As the UK government had formalized its objective to increase airport capacity in the country (Department for Transport, 1998), it triggered a lengthy discussion about aviation’s contribution to global warming. UK policy-makers faced significant public pressure on the issue, with 500,000 submissions received during the consultation over the plans for national airport expansion (Department for Transport, 2003), carrying the message “don’t expand until you have got on top of climate change” (Interview A). At the height of attention, around 2003, a forthcoming change in the political stream occurred as the UK was scheduled to take over the rotating six-month-long EU Presidency in 2005.
The policy discussion within the EU became increasingly positive towards emissions trading. The EU expressed cautious optimism over emissions trading in July 2004 (Council of the European Union, 2004). Its main focus was the use of economic instruments. While confirming its determination to continue demonstrating leadership in international efforts to mitigate global warming, it recognized the difficulties of implementing taxes, charges and voluntary agreements. The documents described how “some EU states have expressed interest in pursuing the possibility of extending the scheme to cover emissions from aviation” (Council of the European Union, 2004, p. 6). In particular, representatives from the UK had begun to suggest emissions trading for aviation in domestic and international speeches. These speeches were made by a number of actors, such as business representatives and government officials, in anticipation of their upcoming EU Presidency. The UK government and the UK aviation industry lobbied hard for emissions trading, pressuring “the entire European hierarchy” (Interview B), of the EU. British airlines also stated their support for emissions trading within trade associations (Interview C).
The British influences directed towards the EU arena were a result of the national debate in the UK about airport expansion and the perceived need for legislation to curb emissions from aviation. The aviation industry was heavily dependent on receiving permission to expand the airports, acknowledging that it would require “a good position on environmental issues” (Interview D). However, the UK government’s intention to prepare a long-term national expansion of air traffic in absence of a response to climate change was received with dismay among environmental groups who, “insulted” by “the idea that a fast-growing industry should get a free-ride” (Interview D), “picked on” the aviation industry (Interview E). Still, suggestions for a climate policy for aviation before the airport expansion debate took off in the UK were met with skepticism, as “people didn’t see the need for the industry to be very proactive” (Interview F). With regard to the climate impact of aviation, “it seemed to be almost a political impossibility of doing anything about it” (Interview G), and “emissions trading seemed to be a solution to a problem that people didn’t understand” (Interview H). However, alongside pressures to deal with the environmental impacts such an expansion would have generated, the aviation industry began to realize what an important stake they had in climate change. Major airports and airlines, most notably British airport operator BAA and British Airways, took interest in climate change in general and emissions trading in particular. An interviewee at British Airways described how emissions trading “begun to crystallize as something we ought to embrace” (Interview F) and how “the rest of the aviation industry in the UK were thinking along similar lines” (Interview F). The British Air Transport Association also noted that “parts of the aviation industry … had already invested quite a bit of time thinking about the right way forward” and were “keen on emissions trading”, just like the UK government (Interview I). Inspired by the global talks in ICAO where analysis had suggested that emissions trading “would be a much more cost-effective approach for the industry rather than a tax-based approach” (Interview I), BAA and British Airways “started to argue for emissions trading” (Interview D). Whereas a voluntary approach “was seen as too little, too late” (Interview F), the aviation sector saw a strategic necessity in drawing the UK government’s attention to emissions trading which was seen as “the only viable policy mechanism that the government could choose that would also allow us to grow” (Interview J). Industry representatives described that “if you didn’t argue for emissions trading, you would end up with taxation” (Interview D) and emissions trading was seen as “the least worst option” (Interview H). The industry disliked the idea of a tax for two main reasons: it would suck money out of the sector with no guarantees that the tax revenues would be earmarked for tackling the issue at hand, while it would dampen demand and impose a major constraint on growth (Interviews D, F, J, I).
The aviation industry tried out their ideas on NGOs and governmental representatives and a common idea of emissions trading began to take shape, which was described by an interviewee as key, since “there were a lot of people collectively” that “provided a coordinated voice in favor for it” (Interview K), many of which referred to the consultancy reports that had demonstrated its cost-effectiveness. The organizations that frequently met to discuss this issue strategically expressed their support for emissions trading through industry-wide coalitions, some of which were created with the aim to promote emissions trading, such as Freedom to Fly and Sustainable Aviation. For the UK government, 2005 represented “a unique set of opportunities” to achieve breakthrough on climate change (Blair, 2005) and show leadership in the issue. The British debate peaked with the launch of the UK government’s White Paper on the future of air transport. In this document, emissions trading is said to be the best way forward and the UK government and their stakeholders agreed to “work hand in hand before and during its Presidency of the EU to help get this push going through Brussels” (Department for Transport, 2003, Interview J).
The 2004 ICAO Assembly session was still deeply concerned by other issues, such as decreasing passenger traffic and sharpened security demands. On environmental matters, ICAO concluded that it should “[endorse] the further development of an open emissions system for international aviation” (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2004, p. 48). This statement was later interpreted as cautious support in the sense that “the existing international legal framework for aviation does not constitute a barrier” for emissions trading (Wit et al., 2005, p. 178).
A collective of institutional entrepreneurs for emissions trading
As 2005 approached, the conditions for policy breakthrough gradually changed in the institutional process of developing a climate policy for aviation. Statistics, revealing that while total greenhouse gas emissions fell by 5.5% in the EU-15 between 1990 and 2003, emissions from international aviation increased by 73% (Wit et al., 2005), increased recognition of the problem. There was significant pressure to address the sector’s climate impact as an important upcoming change in administration was foreseen for the second half of 2005 when the UK took over the EU Presidency. Emissions trading promoters organized themselves in anticipation of this event. The organized collective of institutional entrepreneurs, that promoted emissions trading, consisted of actors from the European aviation industry, NGOs, consultants and think tanks, and governmental representatives from European nation-states and the EU. Many central actors in this collective were British. Although there was not enough time to get emissions trading adopted during the UK Presidency, “there was this window of six months” to get it proposed (Interview I). By matching activities towards early fall of 2005, the proposal could be adopted by the Environment Council in December and thereby become formally included in the EU policy process.
Activities towards developing a climate policy for aviation, and examining the feasibility of emissions trading in particular, intensified in the EU arena as 2005 approached. The Council of the European Union reiterated its invitation to the European Commission to make proposals in 2005, saying that it “looks forward to the study by the Commission on addressing the climate change impacts of aviation through the EU emissions trading scheme” (Council of the European Union, 2004, p. 5). Following this invitation, the European Commission asked CE Delft to perform a study, developing concepts for including aviation in the EU ETS in November 2004 (Wit et al., 2005).
While the launch of the overall EU ETS for a number of other sectors on January 1, 2005, did not attract a lot of attention in the field of aviation and environment, other initiatives did. The European Commission’s intention to issue a regulatory proposal was officially announced in January 2005 (European Commission, 2005a). An upcoming Communication was to “suggest an approach and set out options for economic instruments to reduce the climate change impact of aviation” (European Commission, 2005a, p. 26). The announcement was a clear signal of the intention to go further than, say, measures to encourage technological and infrastructural improvements. The CE Delft report concluded that emissions trading for aviation did not appear to pose many challenges that had not arisen in the existing EU ETS (Wit et al., 2005).
An interviewee representing AEA described how “95 percent of my time was devoted to drafting a policy on emissions trading” during a period of time in 2005 “because the UK Presidency indicated that it would be the priority for the aviation sector” (Interview C). The priority was described as temporary: “six months ago it was another subject, and in six months’ time it will be another subject” (Interview C). To instigate the process of preparing a Communication, DG Environment arranged a public stakeholder consultation March–May 2005 (European Commission, 2005b). Thereafter, aviation was devoted one full day during the annual EU Green Week. In addition, the European Commission reminded that the discussions on the feasibility of including aviation in Phase II would “provide timely input for the planned review” (European Commission, 2005c, p. 2) of EU ETS Phase I, scheduled for June 2006.
In July 2005, six business associations representing the European aviation industry presented a joint climate change position paper to the European Commission (Association of European Airlines et al., 2005). The position paper shows that emissions trading was clearly favored over other economic instruments, as the industry recognizes that “work within ICAO has shown that emissions trading is potentially the most environmentally effective and cost-efficient approach … and, consequently, it appears to be a more promising option than taxes and charges” (Association of European Airlines et al., 2005, p. 6). Even more enthusiastically, Airports Council International Europe (ACI Europe) argued that “the first policy measure should be the early integration of EU aviation into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme” (Airports Council International Europe, 2005, p. 1). Although IATA (2001b) had recommended their airlines across the world to adopt a proactive coherent strategy to influence the debate, non-European actors were not that visible at this critical point in time. The NGO community warmly welcomed the European Commission’s tougher stance on aviation’s climate impact, but remained skeptical of a strong emphasis on emissions trading although it “can have a role to play” (European Environment Bureau et al., 2005, p. 1).
When the European Commission adopted its Communication on September 27, 2005, it concluded that “the best way forward, from an economic and environmental point of view, lies in including the climate impact of the aviation sector in the EU emissions trading scheme” (European Commission, 2005c, p. 10). In the accompanying press release, Vice President and European Commissioner for Transport Jacques Barrot added that: “there is a growing consensus in the aviation sector that emissions trading represents the best way forward to cut greenhouse gas emissions” (European Union, 2005). The Communication marked the beginning of a new phase in which the proposal for emissions trading was further refined. In November 2008, an amendment to the EU ETS Directive so as to include aviation was finally announced (Official Journal of the European Union, 2009).
Analyzing Institutional Entrepreneurship at Windows of Opportunity
Next, I demonstrate how the empirical findings of the process of including aviation in the EU ETS can be analyzed through a combination of institutional theory and Kingdon’s (1984) framework, and how the policy breakthrough can be seen as an outcome of temporal conditions for institutional entrepreneurship.
Policy Development as a multidimensional institutional process
Building on research which has demonstrated policy development as institutional and explaining how Kingdon (1984) describes the process as multidimensional, I formulated a first proposition suggesting that policy development is a multidimensional institutional process and consists of the problem, policy and the political streams. These streams run independently, at different paces. I conceive of the institutional process as the overall effort to develop a climate policy for aviation.
The first stream in the institutional process is mature when there is a problem, to which a policy is needed, that is sufficiently recognized. The empirical case study suggests that it was not given that aviation would be regulated for its climate change impact at all, rooted in widespread norms and values regarding political possibilities, but also the significance of the problem as such, factors that were not considered to be sufficiently researched. Moreover, there were a number of competing issues on the aviation agenda. In the climate change community, aviation was perceived to be a special case difficult to fit into the emerging regulatory framework. A regulatory response was already being discussed in the late 1990s, but remained low priority in both the climate change and aviation communities for a long while.
In the policy stream, several proposals were discussed over time. As predicted by both Kingdon (1984) and institutional theorists, the policy proposals represented a broader ideological package underpinned by normative and cultural-cognitive elements which prescribed appropriate means to regulate. With regard to voluntary agreements, actors expressed divergent views on whether these would be sufficient. Proposals in favor of infrastructural and technological improvements mirrored shared conceptions of the potential for efficiency improvements and trust in technological progress. In the early 2000s, the EU signaled a preference for two of the economic instruments, taxes and charges. Traditionally, taxes had been seen as a policy that generated significant change in behavior, but several actors, including the European Commission, instead voiced the perception that it would provide limited environmental benefits. In addition, it was feared that it would cause financial harm to the aviation sector and that the urgency of the problem would not match the long procedures of EU fiscal legislation. Emissions trading, although initially described as a solution to a problem that people didn’t understand, was increasingly linked to arguments of providing flexibility at least cost. These discussions were driven by the European Commission, think tanks, NGOs, academics, government representatives, as well as corporations and their trade associations. For a long time, however, positions were unorganized. As time went by, a shortlist of ideas crystallized for consideration and the alternatives boiled down to three economic instruments: taxes, charges or emissions trading.
The political stream consists of intra-governmental activities such as changes in administration as well as extra-governmental factors such as interest representation by pressure groups and the public mood. The responsibility for developing a policy for the climate change impact of aviation was largely left to ICAO. Therefore, the EU directed its attention to the international level for several years, although unilateral action was considered in parallel in continuous stakeholder dialogue. Frustration grew gradually in Europe over the lack of progress. It was one of the reasons why UK policy-makers faced pressure over their plans for national air transport in the UK.
For many years, the institutional process of developing a climate policy for aviation was not sufficiently mature for a breakthrough. Applying a perspective of the institutional process as multidimensional illuminates how the three streams were not favorable at the same time. Thus, the problem was not sufficiently recognized, the politics did not single out aviation’s climate impact as an explicit priority, and no policy was sufficiently tested and backed up. Actors promoted various policy proposals, but actors promoting emissions trading remained unorganized and largely unheard. However, in the mid-2000s the enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship emerged.
Enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship
Previous studies have revealed how institutional entrepreneurs influence institutional arrangements (see Leca et al., 2008), including formal legislation (Fligstein, 2001; Maguire & Hardy, 2006). I have demonstrated how Kingdon’s (1984) policy entrepreneurs have much in common with institutional entrepreneurs and how institutional theorists can learn from his conceptualization of actors’ dependency on timing. Having combined the two perspectives, I related this theoretical discussion to the literature on enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship. Against this backdrop, I developed a second proposition which predicts that enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship occur when the three streams in the institutional process are favorable at the same time.
The recognition of the problem was taken to a new level as the EU initiated a process to take unilateral action on aviation’s climate impact in early 2005, revealing underlying norms that they needed to act regardless of progress in ICAO. Many stakeholders, such as NGOs and the media, had contributed to highlighting the problem but particular pressure originated from the UK. Among the number of policies discussed in the EU arena, only the three economic instruments were perceived as sufficient: taxes, charges or emissions trading. The preparations for unilateral EU action coincided with a particular interest in emissions trading.
The political stream saw several events that triggered change. On the formal administration side, at least two important events in the intra-EU political stream can be identified. First, the rotating Presidency of the European Union stands out as an important event in the political stream. As the UK announced its intention to push for inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS under their Presidency in the second half of 2005, DG Environment seized the opportunity to kickstart the policy process by launching a formal stakeholder consultation. A second opportunity in the political stream at the EU level was the review of EU ETS Phase I. Steps taken by the European Commission, as well as the UK Presidency’s announcements, indicated that aviation would face climate legislation. Interest mobilization among pressure groups increased hand-in-hand with signals of increasing pressure to address the problem of global warming, and the perceived organized political forces became apparent through various communication flows. People looked around to find that many organized interests were in favor of or at least not blocking an emissions trading proposal. The European aviation industry came across as united in their conditional support for emissions trading (Airports Council International Europe, 2005; Association of European Airlines et al., 2005) and NGOs did not oppose it.
In sum, the different streams had quite independently reached favorable conditions in 2005. At this critical juncture, the problem of aviation and climate change was recognized as something that needed to be addressed, a policy – emissions trading – was available, and political conditions allowed for change. However, the simultaneously favorable conditions in the streams were not a pure coincidence. Actors were indispensable for policy breakthrough and I argue that they should be analyzed as institutional entrepreneurs (see DiMaggio, 1988). Quite different from agency in Kingdon’s (1984) process streams, the focus of my analysis of institutional entrepreneurship is the individuals and organizations that promoted emissions trading and their activities, being influenced by and influencing the institutional context.
Hence, enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship occur when the three streams in the institutional process coincide. Adopting a process perspective on institutional entrepreneurship cast new light on the scholarly discussion on its enabling conditions. Whereas research directing attention to organizational fields (Greenwood et al., 2002) beneficially recognized contextual institutional elements, I argue that the process matters more than is currently recognized. One explanation for the successful activities of the institutional entrepreneurs is that they promoted emissions trading while paying critical attention to timing aspects.
A collective of organized institutional entrepreneurs
Scholars who have directed analytical attention to actors’ skills (Fligstein, 1997) or positions (Battilana, 2006) should keep in mind recent studies that show how institutional entrepreneurship is heavily dependent on organizing activities (Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Wijen & Ansari, 2007). My third proposition suggested that a collective of organized institutional entrepreneurs relate their activities to temporal conditions in the institutional process.
The organized collective of institutional entrepreneurs that promoted emissions trading consisted of European, particularly British, actors from the aviation industry, NGOs, consultants and think tanks, and governmental and EU representatives. Both press releases (Association of European Airlines et al., 2005; Airports Council International Europe, 2005; European Union, 2005) and interview data confirmed how emissions trading was generally seen as a way forward. Although a number of policy options had been discussed over the years, sometimes in contestation, the empirical data did not indicate any distinct turning point towards emissions trading. Rather, support emerged through a gradual process.
The industry organized itself both in a narrow sense, to represent airlines, and in a broader aviation industry sense, to represent airlines, airports, manufacturers and a range of other actors with an interest in air transport operations. They strategically built their pro-emissions trading arguments on consultancy reports demonstrating its cost-effectiveness and flexibility and used the associations created for the aim of promoting emissions trading as platforms. They brought forward their ideas at EU level but the emissions trading proposal also has origins in the UK where the idea about bringing aviation into the EU ETS was developed in dialogue between a range of actors. Individuals and organizations in the domestic aviation industry with an early interest in emissions trading met with other societal actors and the idea of emissions trading took shape in a collective. What started out as floating ideas, mainly in the UK aviation industry, only became forceful with the formation of the collective that favored emissions trading. Actors at the center of the institutional entrepreneurial activities then used their European trade associations, such as AEA and ACI Europe, to widen the collective and perceived support for emissions trading.
It is clear that the institutional entrepreneurial collective based in the UK developed in its particular institutional context and that the members acted according to their interests. The reasons for promoting emissions trading varied, however, and different proponents did not always share the same emphasis. Private actors, such as airports and airlines, were particularly keen on getting emissions trading into the policy process, as their growth prospects were largely dependent on an environmentally responsible image. Their ultimate objective in pushing for an emissions trading proposal was to secure a legitimate expansion of air traffic in the UK and avoid taxes in the future. Legitimacy would be achieved by proactively responding to the expected negative environmental effects of such an expansion, and joining the EU ETS would provide such a response. Within the UK government, emissions trading for aviation was, among other things, a way to take achieve a tangible output from their EU Presidency. The British collective’s interest in achieving cost-effective cuts in greenhouse gas emissions and demonstrating leadership in climate policy became a fundamental motivation for promoting emissions trading. As such, the entrepreneurs behind the proposal linked arguments about emissions trading to norms and values in the institutional context to promote their preferred policy proposal. These norms were in turn built up by pressure-building carried out by a larger group of actors involved in the process.
A window of opportunity for policy breakthrough opens up by an organized collective of institutional entrepreneurs and a change in the problem or political stream: hence, both exogenous and endogenous factors matter in institutional entrepreneurship. Actors involved in the institutional entrepreneurship successfully coupled the streams in the process, thereby allowing for a climate policy breakthrough in the field. Awareness of the upcoming constructive conditions in the process triggered a number of organizing activities through which institutional entrepreneurship intensified. Only under these conditions could actors set forth their support for emissions trading. Once a window in the streams opened, actors rushed into action. Announced changes in the political stream allowed for a certain degree of predictability in the opening of such a window. The opportunity had to be seized as the window was not open for long: after the September 2005 Communication, emissions trading was considered a core policy for addressing aviation’s climate impact, to be further developed and turned into a Directive.
Although 2005 is treated as an end point of this study, it also marked the beginning of a disputed process towards developing and implementing the Directive. Subsequent developments altered the picture of a unified collective in favor of emissions trading. Several governments and industry alike later objected to emissions trading due to its design and scope, although British Airways in 2012 still described themselves as “a longstanding supporter of appropriately designed carbon trading”, i.e. emissions trading (British Airways, 2012). The design of the scheme has been key, and similarities with a tax were fiercely rejected. However, the theoretical lens applied in this study also predicts that conditions in the three streams will change over time. For example, a changed financial situation for many airlines, problem recognition for climate change and political support for emissions trading may have contributed to questioning its feasibility.
Conclusions
This paper has presented a theoretical framework for exploring the temporal conditions for institutional entrepreneurship with support from an empirical case study of the development of a climate policy for aviation. An essential message from this study is that temporal conditions exist both at field level and at actor level, which implies caution when distinguishing enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship in this way (see Leca et al., 2008). I have argued that we need to view the institutional process, at field level, as defining the counterpart towards which institutional entrepreneurship plays out and separating the two analytically. By understanding regulation as evolving in institutional processes and being attentive to the specific time at which significant progress occurs, we can better understand how and why regulation develops in a certain way. Chances for regulatory progress thus depend on both exogenous and endogenous factors, since institutional entrepreneurship is situated in a powerful temporal context dependent on a window of opportunity that opens only rarely and briefly.
I have shown that a climate policy breakthrough in the field of aviation and environment was possible largely because several conditions in the institutional process proved to be favorable at one particular time. Given the many dimensions of institutional processes (Scott, 2008), I have argued that we should consider how various institutional elements interact over time. Analyzing the process as comprising three separate streams (Kingdon, 1984) allowed for a demonstration of how favorable conditions had simultaneously arisen. Sufficient pressure had built up to force the problem to be recognized, emissions trading was available and backed by a strong constituency, and political opportunities arose in the EU arena.
The actors and activities that promoted emissions trading have been analyzed in terms of institutional entrepreneurship. These organizations and individuals introduced a new policy to the aviation industry by using elements in the institutional context. Their activities were carried out with timely consideration of the institutional process, which implies an awareness of time and favorable situations that Dorado (2005) and Fligstein (2001) touched upon without seriously exploring the advantages of analytically viewing institutional processes as multidimensional (Scott, 2008). Actors depend on temporal conditions in the separately running streams to get their message across. They do not simply organize themselves (Hardy & Maguire, 2008) and seek common ground (Wijen & Ansari, 2007; Zilber, 2007), but they must also stay attentive to the specific time towards which they must focus their efforts. This temporal dimension represents a key contribution to institutional theory. When the time is right in an institutional context made up of political, policy and problem streams, essential conditions for institutional entrepreneurship arise. Besides telling us that actors are important, such an approach gives us an idea of how, why and when they are important.
Hence, the climate policy breakthrough for aviation can be seen as the outcome of a window of opportunity that opened in the EU arena in 2005 because of two main factors: changes in the institutional process that provided favorable conditions in the three streams at the same time and an organized collective of institutional entrepreneurs which related their activities to timely circumstances in the process. Institutional entrepreneurs contributed to the opening of a window of opportunity by coupling (1) emissions trading to (2) pressures to deal with the problem of the climate change impact of aviation and (3) upcoming political opportunities for policy creation. They matched their ideas towards the institutional process, but could only achieve policy breakthrough when conditions proved favorable.
As with all empirical research, this study also has limitations. The end point in 2005, which leaves out the shifting positions that followed and the related struggles, is one such limitation. An extended empirical time period could also more clearly have brought to fore literature that emphasizes the contestations involved in institutional entrepreneurship. In addition, results from single cases may depend on a particular combination of factors (March et al., 1991), although these can be generalized to theoretical propositions (Yin, 1994). The three propositions developed in this paper can further push institutional theorists’ understanding of institutional change in general, and policy breakthrough in particular, through further empirical investigation. In particular, I suggest further exploring the relationship between institutional entrepreneurship and windows of opportunity. What can we learn from cases in which conditions for a window of opportunity are available, but lack of institutional entrepreneurship means that the chance passes by, unexploited? Are there circumstances under which institutional entrepreneurs can succeed without sufficient advancement in the problem, policy and political streams? And finally, can criteria be developed to suggest a degree of maturity in the three streams to indicate when they create enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship? Windows of opportunity have been identified in studies of policy processes before and an increased attention to the temporal conditions of institutional entrepreneurship may reveal patterns that further develop institutional theorists’ understanding of change.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
This article builds on the author’s doctoral thesis, for which Professor Kerstin Sahlin, Associate Professor Linda Wedlin and Professor Lars Strannegård at the Department for Business Studies, Uppsala University, were academic advisors. The author sincerely thanks the Special Issue Editors, three anonymous reviewers, and Dr. Helena Buhr for insightful and constructive feedback on this manuscript. Also, gratitude is owed to the interviewees.
Funding
Funding for this article was provided by Handelsbanken’s Research Foundation (grant number W-2009-0194:1). The doctoral thesis that this article is based upon was funded by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.