Abstract
Although outsider CEOs are often brought into an organization to usher in strategic change, the successful implementation of these changes hinges on securing support from middle management. As a vital link between strategic and operational levels, middle managers can champion or resist change. Understanding how outsider CEOs, who are largely unfamiliar to organizational members, can gain support from middle management is crucial, given the pivotal role middle managers play in strategy implementation. This study examines the fundamental mechanisms through which these CEOs can foster middle managers’ buy-in for their proposed strategic change. We develop and test a model that focuses on the distinct and interactive effects of three key social influence factors that help explain whether middle managers buy into a strategic change: the outsider CEO’s reputation, the CEO’s framing of the change, and middle managers’ predispositions to the proposed change. We tested our assertions with a sample of working middle managers using a media-rich experimental design examining the introduction of big data analytics, an essential strategic tool for modern organizations, as a strategic change initiative. In doing so, our research provides new insights into, and empirical evidence on, the nuanced dynamics between CEOs and middle managers during the strategic change process, as well as the relational mechanisms that facilitate the implementation of CEO-led strategic change.
Keywords
Introduction
During critical phases in an organization’s lifecycle, boards often appoint a new CEO from outside the organization (hereafter, “outsider CEO”) to catalyze strategic change (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Schepker et al., 2017). Indeed, compared to insider CEOs who possess organization-specific knowledge and skills accumulated through prior experience within the organization, outsider CEOs are often valued as agents of change due to their novel knowledge and skills (Quigley et al., 2019; Schepker et al., 2017; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010). However, strategic change involves symbolic struggles over the organization’s purpose and direction (Fiss & Zajac, 2004) and the persuasion of organizational members to embrace new priorities (Ford et al., 2008; Hambrick & Lovelace, 2018). Thus, for outsider CEOs who are generally unknown to organizational members, 1 especially compared to insider CEOs, building support for strategic change is a potentially tall order (Karaevli & Zajac, 2013; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010).
When considering how an outsider CEO might build support for strategic change, it is important to recognize that organizational members differ in their influence over the success of proposed changes (Bunderson & Reagans, 2011; Smith et al., 2019). Indeed, research underscores the disproportionate importance of middle managers in strategy implementation (Tarakci et al., 2023). For instance, Mintzberg (1973) described middle management as the “nerve center” of an organization, acting as a bridge between its strategic apex and operating core. Wooldridge and Floyd (1990) provided early evidence of middle managers’ pivotal role in strategy execution, through which they later established “the middle-level view” of strategy (Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000). Huy noted middle management’s potential to “undermine [. . .] the success of ambitious changes in an organization” (2011, p. 1400).
While these studies substantiate the idea that an outsider CEO’s ability to implement strategic change depends on gaining the support of middle management who can “champion” the change (Tarakci et al., 2023), they still offer only speculative insights into how and why an outsider CEO can secure such support. While some scholars underscore the importance of “alignment” between top and middle management on organizational priorities (Gartenberg et al., 2019), we still lack a clear understanding of the relational mechanisms (i.e., the “relational black box”) through which CEOs, particularly outsider CEOs, successfully promote strategic changes to middle managers (Neely et al., 2020). To address these issues, we examine how middle managers respond to an outsider CEO’s attempt to initiate strategic change. Guided by social influence research, which explains how individuals’ attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors are changed by others (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Kelman, 1953; Wood, 2000), we focus on three factors—CEO reputation, message framing, and audience predispositions—that shape why middle managers support or resist such change.
Based on the identification of these key factors, we draw on insights from the strategic leadership and organizational change literatures to conceive of successful outsider CEO efforts to influence middle management as being rooted primarily in the outsider CEO’s reputation and their framing of the strategic change (Hambrick & Lovelace, 2018; König et al., 2020). Consistent with attitude theory, we define middle managers’ attitudes toward strategic change as their overall evaluative orientation toward implementing the proposed change, reflecting their cognitive and affective assessments of the desirability of engaging in the resource, process, and behavioral adjustments required by the initiative (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Reputation is a predominantly rational, socially constructed evaluation of a leader’s past actions and expected future performance based on stakeholders’ perceptions of the CEO’s competence, integrity, and visibility (Pollock et al., 2019). Research suggests that the reputation of outsider CEOs is a key factor in shaping socially constructed perceptions of these leaders (Graffin et al., 2012; Steele & Lovelace, 2023). Frames are “schemata of interpretation” that guide audience attention and simplify events by emphasizing certain elements while obscuring others (Goffman, 1974; Snow et al., 1986). As a boundary condition on the effects of reputation and framing, we consider how an outsider CEO’s efforts to advance a strategic change depend on middle managers’ predispositions toward the proposed change (Balogun et al., 2015; Ford et al., 2008).
Concretely, we examine how an outsider CEO’s reputation that aligns with the theme of a proposed strategic change (i.e., a theme-aligned reputation), versus a reputation not directly related to the theme (i.e., a non-theme-aligned reputation), will influence middle managers’ attitudes toward strategic change. We argue that a theme-aligned reputation will have a stronger positive influence on middle managers’ attitudes toward implementing change. We then consider how CEOs can present strategic change using either a promotion or a prevention frame (Rhee & Fiss, 2014), providing cues about the desired approach to strategic change. We argue that framing the strategic change in terms of opportunities, growth, and achieving ideal outcomes (i.e., promotion frame) is more likely to gain middle management support than framing it as a means of avoiding risks or mitigating threats (i.e., prevention frame). We then consider the interaction between an outsider CEO’s reputation and framing on middle managers’ attitudes toward the strategic change. We explain that when an outsider CEO uses a prevention frame, middle managers are more likely to scrutinize the CEO’s credentials and past success in handling similar challenges. Thus, the positive effect of a theme-aligned reputation on middle managers’ attitudes toward a strategic change is enhanced when the CEO uses a prevention frame, as it reassures them of the CEO’s ability to lead change. Finally, we contend that an outsider CEO’s (a) theme-aligned reputation and (b) use of a promotion frame will matter most when a middle manager is less predisposed to the strategic change.
Using a unique, media-rich experimental design, we test our hypotheses on a sample of working participants with relevant middle management experience (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014). Our results provide strong support for our theoretical framework and highlight the complex and intersecting issues related to CEO reputation, message framing, and middle manager predispositions in the context of an outsider CEO attempting to initiate a strategic change. Additionally, we employ the marginal effects technique to further examine the nuances of our results (Busenbark, Graffin, et al., 2022) and pinpoint “tipping points” where the impacts of a CEO’s reputation and framing become particularly significant for middle managers, varying according to their levels of predisposition toward the proposed strategic change.
We make several important contributions to the literature on strategic leadership, middle management, social evaluations, and organizational change. First, bridging the upper echelons and middle-level views of strategy, our findings shed light on the factors that influence how CEOs translate vision into action by exploring how a CEO’s reputation and framing approach affect middle managers’ responses to new strategic changes (see Neely et al., 2020). Specifically, we demonstrate that a CEO being recognized for specific attributes and qualities holds unique sway over middle managers, particularly when an outsider CEO pursues strategic changes. In addition, we show that no single framing approach is inherently superior for building support among organizational members. While some framing approaches may help outsider CEOs overcome organizational resistance, they could backfire with groups already favorably disposed toward the CEO’s initiatives. Finally, we highlight that CEOs’ social influence is not unilateral; instead, the predispositions of middle managers toward organizational priorities set “rules of the game” under which CEOs, particularly outsider CEOs, aiming to initiate change must operate.
Theory and Hypotheses
Outsider CEOs are frequently appointed during periods of organizational disruption, strategic stagnation, or leadership turnover. Their appointments are not only symbolic but also signal a deliberate break from the past and reflect a board’s desire for transformation (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Karaevli & Zajac, 2013; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010). However, findings on the impact of outsider CEO appointment on substantive strategic change and subsequent organizational performance are decidedly mixed (Quigley et al., 2019; Wangrow et al., 2025).
We believe such mixed findings can be explained by the fact that outsider CEOs encounter distinct challenges that can hinder their ability to lead strategic changes (DeCelles et al., 2013; Kanitz et al., 2022; Sonenshein & Dholakia, 2012). One major challenge is gaining the support of a critical mass of organizational members, particularly middle managers, whose receptiveness to and potential championing of the change are crucial to its successful implementation (Huy, 2002, 2011; Huy et al., 2014; Mintzberg, 1973). Prior work acknowledges the critical role that middle managers play in strategy implementation (Tarakci et al., 2023) because they are a bridge between top management and the rest of the organization (Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). The other major challenge is that outsider CEOs are generally unfamiliar to organizational members and, hence, subject to scrutiny and skepticism. Indeed, this “liability of outsiderness” is well documented across the social sciences (Brewer, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Thus, the question of how an outsider CEO might build support among middle management for a strategic change is both theoretically compelling and practically significant.
Existing empirical work that informs such an inquiry primarily examines how middle managers’ general perceptions of CEO characteristics influence their everyday workplace behaviors. For instance, Ou et al. (2014) found that CEO humility leads to greater top management team (TMT) integration, enhancing middle managers’ perceptions of an empowering organizational climate. Similarly, Kim et al. (2021) investigated how middle managers’ perceptions of CEO narcissism prompt them to adopt uncertainty-based coping strategies with subordinates, such as laissez-faire leadership and impression management. Finally, Gartenberg et al. (2019) examined the effects of the “alignment” of views between top and middle management concerning organizational priorities (i.e., corporate purpose, innovation). While these studies get closer to offering insights into how outsider CEOs might garner support from middle management for strategic changes, this work stops short of clarifying how CEOs effectively shape middle managers’ attitudes.
Outsider CEO Social Influence: Getting Middle Management on Board
An outsider CEO’s social influence efforts are particularly relevant during change efforts because of the uncertainty created for organizational members in these situations (Balogun et al., 2015; Bartunek et al., 2006; Hambrick & Lovelace, 2018). In our context, social influence refers to the conditions under which an outsider CEO shapes middle management’s attitudes toward a strategic change.
Social influence research suggests that the likelihood of outsider CEOs being able to persuade middle management to embrace change depends on three important factors: the attributes of the influencer (i.e., the CEO’s reputation), the attributes of the persuasion effort (i.e., the CEO’s message), and the target’s receptivity to the message (i.e., middle managers’ receptivity) (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Wood, 2000). We conceptualize these factors and their combinations as making up the CEO–middle manager “relational black box” through which outsider CEO change announcements are translated into middle management support (see Neely et al., 2020). We unpack this black box by examining the distinct and joint effects of (a) the outsider CEO’s reputation (influencer attribute), (b) the CEO’s framing of the announcement (persuasion effort attribute), and (c) middle managers’ predisposition toward the change (indicator of the target’s receptivity). Figure 1 presents the resulting framework and hypotheses.
Research Model.
The Influencer: The Effect of an Outsider CEO’s Reputation
Because it is difficult for audiences, even those internal to an organization, to constantly observe a CEO in action, they are likely to use a CEO’s reputation as a cue to evaluate subsequent actions and behaviors (Graffin et al., 2012; Pollock et al., 2019). For instance, a CEO’s reputation for achieving success communicates important information about the consistency and quality of their performance, instilling followers’ confidence that a CEO can lead the organization to success (Wade et al., 2006). In organizational settings, such reputational cues are commonly inferred from publicly available and internally circulated information, including a CEO’s prior roles, track records, and organizational or media communications (Graffin et al., 2012).
An outsider CEO’s reputation can play a particularly critical role in enabling such CEOs to secure organizational members’ support for change, as it signals the CEO’s suitability to lead change efforts (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Hambrick & Lovelace, 2018). Since outsider CEOs are relatively unknown commodities in terms of their direct relationships with organizational members, their reputation may provide a quick assessment of whether a CEO fits with the organization’s foreseeable environmental conditions, offering a basis for evaluating the CEO and their efforts to lead change. Importantly, these early reputational assessments lead middle managers to form expectations about the CEO’s domain-specific expertise and likely effectiveness well before observing the CEO’s behavior firsthand (Graffin et al., 2012; Hambrick & Lovelace, 2018). We contend that whether the outsider CEO’s reputation aligns with the theme of the strategic change is particularly crucial.
The Role of an Outsider CEO’s Theme-Aligned Reputation
Organizational members are willing to grant greater power to a leader when they perceive the leader as capable, because followers believe the leader is more likely to guide them toward desirable outcomes (Bass, 1990; Lord & Dinh, 2014). While an outsider CEO might have a strong reputation for success in general, that reputation may not convey contextual cues to middle managers about the CEO’s prior success in managing similar changes. Indeed, a CEO’s reputation can be generally positive or can also be perceived as positive and strongly aligned with a particular strategic change, such as a reputation for guiding turnaround efforts or for effectively capitalizing on new technological and data-driven trends in the industry (Bundy et al., 2021; Hambrick & Lovelace, 2018). Middle managers rely on such domain-specific reputational cues to assess whether the CEO’s prior experience and expertise “fit” the focal change initiative.
Given their position in the organization, middle managers will be primed to consider the CEO’s reputation, drawing on perceptions of their past success, as a basis for judging the potential merit of pursuing the strategic change (Cialdini, 2009). In short, the more an outsider CEO’s reputation conveys information relevant to the potential chances of success of the change (i.e., a reputation that is aligned with the focus of the strategic change—a “theme-aligned reputation”), the more positively middle managers will respond to the CEO’s introduction of a strategic change. Thus:
Persuasion Efforts: Framing Strategic Change
Frames, or “schemata of interpretation” as defined by Goffman (1974) and further discussed by Snow et al. (1986), guide audience attention and simplify events by emphasizing certain elements while obscuring others (Hunt et al., 1994; Williams & Benford, 2000). The concept of framing sheds light on how variations in CEOs’ stylistic influence efforts can affect middle management’s attitudes toward strategic change.
Promotion Versus Prevention Framing
We consider an outsider CEO’s use of two common framing approaches, a promotion frame or a prevention frame, that CEOs have been documented to use in communicating with organizational members and other stakeholders (Gamache et al., 2020; Graf-Vlachy et al., 2025). These framing approaches align with the notion that strategic change involves contention over the nature of the organization’s goals and how they will be achieved (Fiss & Zajac, 2006, p. 1173).
A promotion frame emphasizes growth, possibilities of what “could” be, and desires to attain an “ideal” state. In contrast, a prevention frame focuses on security, obligations of what “should” be, efforts to fulfill duties and responsibilities, and aiming for an “ought” state. While a promotion frame presents strategic change goals as maximal, a prevention frame makes them appear necessary by highlighting how change can prevent undesirable consequences (Johnson et al., 2015; Rhee & Fiss, 2014). Both frames outline pathways to goal achievement but differ in the nature of the goals articulated and the means employed to achieve those goals (Kammerlander et al., 2015). Further, under certain circumstances, a promotion frame could paint a CEO’s vision as unattainable, leading to dejection among middle managers. Conversely, a prevention frame might depict a CEO’s vision as prudent and manageable, fostering a sense of calm and assurance among middle managers (Idson et al., 2000). These frames are also inextricably linked to CEOs’ deeply held and relatively stable motivational orientations (i.e., promotion and prevention focus), such that they will naturally tend to frame scenarios in promotion- or prevention-oriented ways (Gamache et al., 2020; Graf-Vlachy et al., 2025). Therefore, outsider CEOs might find compelling reasons to adopt a promotion or prevention frame when announcing strategic changes.
While we expect the effectiveness of each frame to vary situationally, we argue that an outsider CEO’s use of a promotion frame to announce a strategic change will have a slightly more positive influence overall on middle management’s attitude toward this strategic change than a prevention frame. A promotion frame signals confidence and optimism that align with the nature of strategic change during the early mobilization stage (DeCelles et al., 2013; Sonenshein & Dholakia, 2012). In other words, a promotion frame positions strategic change as a potential opportunity and scenario in which middle management can be encouraged to think about gains, achievements, and ideals in the organization—that is, what “could be” (Idson et al., 2000). When strategic change is framed in such a manner, middle managers are not only likely to exhibit a great sense of control over their circumstances but also more likely to embrace new priorities in order to implement changes (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Thomas et al., 1993).
Conversely, in using a prevention frame, an outsider CEO positions strategic change as a necessity to counter possible threats and reduce challenges the organization faces (Johnson et al., 2015). This more sobering—even if at times necessary—emphasis on what “ought to be” may signal that the CEO wants to exercise care in pursuing strategic change (Hamm et al., 2015). In this manner, while a prevention frame can be necessary for overcoming resource rigidity, it may also paradoxically amplify routine rigidity (König et al., 2021), making it more difficult for middle managers to break away from those practices they are already familiar with, as these offer them a sense of safety and security managing transitions (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001). In sum, middle managers exposed to a promotion-oriented message become focused on the potential opportunities the future presents and a greater willingness to embrace new routines and priorities, as opposed to challenges the firm must seek to avoid and holding onto the known in order to weather the possible storm. Thus:
The Interplay of CEO Reputation and Framing
When outsider CEOs announce change, middle managers attend to two distinct cues: the CEO’s reputation (a signal of fit with the domain of the change) and the CEO’s framing of the announcement (a signal of how the CEO prefers to pursue the change) (Hambrick & Lovelace, 2018). In practice, middle managers are first presented with information about the outsider CEO’s reputation when the board announces a leadership change, and then receive the CEO’s announcement of a strategic change. However, we do not make overly strong assumptions about the order in which they process such cues when considering them jointly. Indeed, we know that individuals usually process multiple cues simultaneously to make sense of them (Calic et al., 2025; Pelli & Tillman, 2008; Rindova et al., 2010). As such, we focus on the joint interplay of reputation and framing; the relative weight of each increases when the other leaves greater ambiguity about the CEO’s fit with the change initiative.
A non-theme-aligned reputation is associated with greater ambiguity about the CEO’s fit with the change domain (Maitlis et al., 2013). Under these conditions, the CEO’s framing approach carries greater weight. A promotion frame that emphasizes opportunity, growth, and forward momentum operates as a confidence and competence signal that helps clarify perceived fit and feasibility and mobilize support (e.g., signaling and persuasion under uncertainty) (Cialdini, 2009). By contrast, a prevention frame, which highlights vigilance and risk, can reinforce existing doubts triggered by a non-theme-aligned reputation. Stated otherwise, the difference between the effect of a promotion and prevention frame on middle managers’ attitudes toward strategic change is largest when the outsider CEO has a non-theme-aligned reputation.
In contrast, when a CEO has a theme-aligned reputation, perceived expertise and fit already reduce situational uncertainty. Under these conditions, middle managers rely more heavily on this competence heuristic, and the incremental value of framing—including a promotion frame—is attenuated (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Cialdini, 2009). Thus, framing should matter less when the CEO seems well-matched to the change and more when reputation cues leave fit ambiguous. Accordingly, the positive effect of a promotion frame on middle managers’ implementation attitudes should be stronger under a non-theme-aligned reputation and weaker under a theme-aligned reputation. In other words, the difference between the effect of a promotion and prevention frame on middle managers’ attitudes toward strategic change is smallest when the outsider CEO has a theme-aligned reputation.
Moving Targets: the Importance of Middle Manager Predispositions
Although outsider CEOs must garner the support of a critical mass of middle managers to implement strategic changes, it is important to acknowledge that middle managers are not a homogeneous group. Like all organizational members, middle managers have varied attitudes and predispositions toward strategic changes, which can influence the success of implementing these changes (Balogun et al., 2015; Bartunek et al., 2006; Ford et al., 2008). For example, in the context of introducing new technologies, research has emphasized the critical role of users’ predispositions toward new technologies in shaping their attitudes toward supporting strategic initiatives that incorporate new resources (Baird & Maruping, 2021; Rizzuto et al., 2014). This variability among middle managers underscores the complexity of implementing changes and highlights the need for nuanced approaches considering individual differences within this group.
CEO Reputation and Middle Manager Predisposition
We expect that middle managers’ predispositions to the content of a strategic change will moderate the relationship between the outsider CEO’s reputation and middle managers’ subsequent attitude toward implementing the change effort.
Middle managers with a negative predisposition may engage in a more elaborate form of selective perception regarding the outsider CEO’s reputation and discount the CEO’s credentials (Hambrick & Lovelace, 2018; Maitlis et al., 2013). Middle managers who are already resistant to the change will be more likely to dismiss even a highly reputable CEO’s expertise, as they seek out information that aligns with their skepticism (i.e., confirmation bias; Nickerson, 1998). As a result, they are less likely to be swayed by the CEO’s expertise related to any proposed changes (Hambrick and Lovelace, 2018; Huy et al., 2014).
However, even skeptical (but not fully resistant) middle managers may reconsider their stance if the CEO provides a persuasive signal that the strategic change is viable and well-supported, such as the CEO having a theme-aligned reputation (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). For middle managers with a more positive predisposition toward the change, a CEO’s theme-aligned reputation will further reinforce their commitment to the strategic initiative. For those already in favor of the change, it serves as an amplifying force, reinforcing their confidence in the initiative. Thus, we anticipate that the effect of a CEO’s theme-aligned reputation will be weaker when middle managers have a lower predisposition to the new strategic initiative and stronger as their predisposition becomes more positive. Thus:
CEO Framing and Middle Manager Predisposition
Finally, we envision that middle managers’ predispositions toward the content of a strategic initiative will moderate the relationship between the outsider CEO’s framing and middle managers’ attitudes toward the new strategic initiative.
When middle managers’ predispositions range from negative to neutral, they typically require more convincing and are more likely to be selective in their appraisals of a CEO’s proposed changes and their framing (Hambrick & Lovelace, 2018). We therefore argue that when middle manager predispositions are negative, the positive effect of the CEO’s use of a promotion frame will be amplified; that is, the difference between a prevention and a promotion frame will be most pronounced. However, as middle managers’ predispositions become more positive, they are increasingly likely to support the new strategic initiative regardless of how it is framed. Importantly, however, we are not arguing here that middle managers who are positively predisposed to the strategic change do not require some convincing to support the change, simply that they likely require less convincing than middle managers with a negative or neutral predisposition. As a result, when middle manager predispositions toward the content of the strategic change are positive, the positive effect of the CEO’s use of a promotion frame will become weaker relative to the effect of a prevention frame. Thus:
Method
We used an experimental design to facilitate the clear identification and examination of middle managers’ reactions toward a CEO’s announcement of a strategic change and to draw clear conclusions about causality (Bolinger et al., 2022; Shadish et al., 2002). In an experiment, many confounding factors that might influence middle manager attitudes can be held constant. An experiment also allows for higher levels of internal validity than cross-sectional and longitudinal studies by allowing researchers to make clear inferences about the relationships between variables of interest (Shadish et al., 2002). A potential drawback to this method is that external validity may be limited; generalizing to real-world settings is more difficult than generalizing from one real-world setting to another (Bolinger et al., 2022). However, as we later describe, we went to extensive lengths to strike the right balance between internal and external validity through (a) building the experimental scenario based on real-world instances of CEO announcements and communications and (b) selecting an appropriate sample, one in which participants were working middle managers.
Consistent with seminal recommendations for experimental design, we sought to model a setting in which the strategic change under consideration is of real-world importance (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014; Highhouse, 2009). We therefore anchored the experiment in the context of big data analytics (BDA). BDA is increasingly central to firms’ strategic toolkits as they seek better insight into markets, operations, and performance (Ghasemaghaei et al., 2017, 2018). At the same time, industry reports and scholarly work frequently note high failure rates for large-scale data initiatives and organizational barriers to their successful implementation (e.g., misalignment between strategy and employee adoption) that often outweigh purely technical challenges (Ataei et al., 2024; Tobin, 2025). Given both the centrality of BDA and the persistent implementation gap, this context is well-suited to testing our hypotheses.
Importantly, we conceptualize BDA as a moderate strategic change: Institutionalizing BDA as a firm-wide capability reconfigures routines, data governance, decision rights, and key performance indicators, embedding analytics into the strategy-execution system (Davenport & Harris, 2017). This qualifies as strategic change because it reallocates resources and reshapes processes and value delivery, even though it is path-consistent rather than a crisis-driven pivot or wholesale shift in strategic orientation. Building the scenario in this way allows us to isolate how outsider CEO reputation and framing, as well as middle managers’ predispositions, influence middle managers’ implementation attitudes in settings where the change is consequential yet evolutionary. As such, we recognize that the inferences drawn from our results are most applicable to moderate, path-consistent changes; we flag this boundary condition in our discussion section and outline avenues for examining more radical changes in future work.
Participants
We collected data from middle managers from different industries in the United States. Using version 3.1 of G*Power, we conducted a priori power analysis to determine the desired sample size for the experiment. We specified an anticipated effect size of 0.25, derived from an η2 = .06, a conventional value utilized in anticipation of a medium effect size (Cohen, 1988; Murphy et al., 2014). Following recommendations, we set the anticipated effect size as medium to ensure that the effect size chosen was “the smallest effect that would be meaningful in some practical sense” (Fritz et al., 2012, p. 18) and because large effect sizes are not common in behavioral science (Cohen, 1988, p. 284). In addition, we specified a desired α = .05 and power (1 − β) = .8. The power analysis revealed a desirable sample size of at least 125 participants.
Following recent research (Enke et al., 2022; Sullivan et al., 2023), we utilized the services of Dynata (www.dynata.com) to recruit our sample. Dynata has access to 62 million people and performs sophisticated panel management to maintain data quality. They validate the identity of the participants by authenticating information about them, including their postal code and their work email addresses. We paid Dynata to recruit participants and administer our experiment. Dynata incentivized participation by entering participants into sweepstakes or prize draws upon completion, consistent with provider policy. 2 Unlike other frequently used samples (e.g., employees from the same organization/occupation and students), our approach allowed for the efficient administration of online surveys and the recruitment of motivated, voluntary, and willing participants who diligently complete the surveys to obtain compensation (Dumas et al., 2013). In addition, our approach is effective when responses to questions may include behaviors that are perceived as potentially threatening or embarrassing, such as reluctance to support a strategic change (Gnambs & Kaspar, 2015).
To strengthen confidence in data quality, we applied some basic quality assurance mechanisms: We discarded participants who (a) provided similar answers (e.g., all 1s) to all questions, (b) did not complete the entire experiment and survey, (c) did not answer the quality assurance question 3 properly, or (d) finished the experiment in less than 5 minutes (the average time to complete the experiment was 10 minutes) (Ghasemaghaei & Turel, 2021). In addition, before participants could complete the experiment, we used several screening questions to ensure they met our sample frame requirements. First, given our focus on middle managers, participants needed relevant management experience. Thus, we asked participants about their roles in their organizations. Individuals without the prerequisite middle management experience in their firm were excluded from participating in the study. Additionally, to ensure that we recruited a sample with relevant management experience, we asked participants about the number of people they supervise. We excluded individuals not supervising any employees in their organization. After applying our screening criteria, we retained 149 study participants (from an initial pool of 200). As an overview, the sample consists of 76.5% males, 82.6% Caucasians, 83.3% individuals older than 36, and 84.7% with a bachelor’s degree or higher. 4
Research Design and Procedures
Development and Validation of Experimental Material
To develop the experimental material, we followed recommendations to adhere closely to real-life cases (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014; Highhouse, 2009). First, we consulted prior research and business media coverage to understand how CEOs communicate major strategic changes and other initiatives throughout their organizations, as well as how organizations are discussing the critical issue of BDA. This led us to develop media-rich experimental material in which a fictitious outsider CEO sends a short video out to announce a strategic change, as has become common practice in real-world situations. This aligns with recent work employing video metrics and other media-rich methods to study CEOs (Neely et al., 2020; Petrenko et al., 2016).
Second, we consulted the reputation literature (Bundy et al., 2021; Lange et al., 2011) to develop a reputational profile for our CEO that is aligned (or not) with the focus of the strategic change. To ensure that our operationalizations were valid, we sent our materials to four subject matter experts who study reputation and asked them to identify which profile outlined a theme-aligned reputation and describe their understanding of the CEO’s reputation. All four subject matter experts accurately identified the theme-aligned reputational profile and described the CEO’s theme-aligned reputation as being in BDA/technology.
Third, to develop the scripts for the video manipulations of CEO framing, we obtained a sample of CEO letters to shareholders (LTS) for firms listed in the S&P 500 between 2011 and 2013 (N = 338) and analyzed them using Gamache et al. (2015) dictionaries. We examined the LTS, having produced the top 10 scores in promotion-oriented language to determine if there were paragraphs that could be pulled from them to assemble our scripts. 5 Ultimately, we developed a short script based on paragraphs drawn from Lowe’s 2011 LTS and Boston Scientific’s 2012 LTS. Next, we changed the promotion-focused words in the script for prevention-focused words to create our two framing conditions. We then sent our scripts to four subject matter experts who accurately categorized our scripts as having a promotion frame or prevention frame (see Online Supplement A).
Finally, we ran a pilot study using 50 managers to test our manipulations before recruiting the full sample. Based on the findings of the pilot study, we made minor changes to the scenarios in the experiment before collecting the current sample. 6
Data Collection
We conducted a 2 x 2 between-subjects design embedded into an online survey. In part I of the study, after answering standard screening questions to ensure their appropriateness for our study, participants answered a series of questions related to their predispositions to big data analytics prior to any exposure to the experimental manipulations. Next, the participants were directed to the initial scenario in which they were told that they were a manager at Systec (a fictitious consulting firm) and given brief information on their job description. Then, the participants were shown a memo circulated within Systec announcing the appointment of a new outsider CEO.
At this stage of the procedure, the outsider CEO’s reputation was manipulated as reflecting either a non-theme-aligned or theme-aligned reputation (in the technology/BDA area). After the participants read the memo, they were presented with a mock email from the new CEO. It contained an embedded video of the CEO announcing a strategic change emphasizing big data for Systec. This video was recorded using a state-of-the-art studio at one of the authors’ institutions, which enabled us to add important finishing touches, including a digital background and text overlays so that the video would resemble the numerous examples we viewed when designing our experiment (for an image of the mock email with embedded video, see Online Supplement B). In this video, the CEO’s framing was manipulated to represent a prevention or promotion frame. After watching the video, participants answered questions to assess their implementation attitude, reflecting their evaluative reactions to the CEO’s reputation and the framing of the announcement of Systec’s impending strategic change. For each scenario, we asked questions targeting participants’ attitudes toward BDA—that is, the extent to which they were favorably inclined to implement BDA. These questions formed our dependent variable. In part II, participants answered questions related to their functional backgrounds, demographics, and cognitive attributes.
Participants were randomly assigned to each experimental condition, a process designed to ensure that groups were comparable with respect to potentially confounding variables. It is important to note that while random assignment enhances the equivalence of groups, it does not necessarily result in numerically identical group sizes, given the inherent variability of random allocation (i.e., each participant has an equal probability of being assigned to each experimental condition). Despite this, the groups in our study were similar, with 44.3% of study participants assigned to the CEO non-theme-aligned reputation, 55.7% assigned to the CEO theme-aligned reputation scenario, 40.27% assigned to the prevention frame, and 59.73% assigned to the promotion frame scenario. Further, consistent with a successful random assignment process, we found no significant demographic differences between groups assigned to each experimental condition. This reinforces the validity of our experimental results by indicating that any observed outcome differences are more likely attributable to the experimental conditions than to underlying demographic factors or other unobserved confounding conditions.
Dependent Variable: Implementation Attitude
Because our theoretical focus is on the early mobilization stage in which an outsider CEO’s reputation and framing of a strategic change influence middle manager support, we conceptualize implementation attitude as middle managers’ evaluative reactions to the CEO’s reputation and announcement of the strategic change, capturing managers’ willingness to embrace the resource and process adjustments required by the initiative (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Given our empirical context of a new big data strategic initiative, we adapted the measure developed and validated by Hassanein and Head (2007) to measure participants’ attitudes toward big data analytics after exposure to the manipulations in our study. Our measure of participants’ attitudes toward big data analytics included three items, as follows: “I would have positive feelings toward implementing big data analytics,” “The thought of implementing big data analytics is appealing to me,” and “It would be a good idea to implement big data analytics.” Participants answered each item on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). These items formed an internally consistent and reliable measure (α = .88).
We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess the measure’s discriminant validity. The results indicated that answers to the three target items loaded on a distinct construct compared to the items used to measure participants’ predispositions to big data, as described below (CFA loadings of .8 and above for target items; .0–.4 range for other items). Our final measure was the average of the responses to the three items described previously.
Finally, to evaluate the common method bias, we conducted a marker-variable analysis (Lindell & Whitney, 2001). To this end, we used emotional stability (i.e., tendency to keep a stable affective state) as a marker variable (Liu & Yu, 2019). The average correlation between the key constructs and the marker variable was .06, which shows that common method bias is unlikely to be an issue in the data (Lindell & Whitney, 2001).
Independent and Moderator Variables
CEO Reputation
Participants were randomly assigned to a condition in which the CEO had a non-theme-aligned reputation or a theme-aligned reputation. The non-theme-aligned condition was coded as 0; the theme-aligned condition was coded as 1.
CEO Framing
Participants were randomly assigned to a CEO framing condition, with the prevention frame condition coded as 0 and the promotion frame condition coded as 1.
Middle Manager Predisposition
We measured participants’ predispositions to big data analytics using the measure developed and validated by Agarwal and Karahanna (2000) at the experiment’s outset to eliminate concerns over reverse causality (Hill et al., 2021). The measure includes four items, as follows: “I feel that I would look for ways to implement big data technologies”; “In general, I am not hesitant to try out big data technologies”; “I am willing to try out big data technologies”; and “I like to implement big data analytics tools.” Participants answered each item on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). These items were reliable and consistent (α = .92). Thus, our final measure was the average of the responses to the items described previously.
Control Variables
To further account for potential individual differences that may influence the findings in our study, we controlled for participants’ individual characteristics, including gender, age, education, race, and participants’ managerial role.
Estimation Approach
We tested our hypotheses using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses. Consistent with best-practice recommendations for testing moderated relationships, we mean-centered all continuous variables included in the interaction terms (Aguinis & Gottfredson, 2010). Given the nature of our empirical design, in addition to enhancing the interpretability of our results, contrast coding our focal independent variables and centering our moderator provided a natural methodological advantage to help reduce potential multicollinearity by minimizing the correlation between predictors and their interaction terms (Aguinis & Gottfredson, 2010). To further rule out concerns related to multicollinearity, we also examined the correlation matrix for any anomalies and high correlations among our focal independent variables, incrementally included interaction terms in our models to observe changes in the coefficients with the introduction of interaction terms, and examined variance inflation factors (VIF) (Aguinis & Gottfredson, 2010; Mansfield & Helms, 1982).
To gain a complete understanding of the interactions in our analyses (i.e., H3–H5), beyond examining their coefficients in our models and visually depicting their simple slopes, we employed a marginal effects technique, which is “likely the most precise way to interpret the main effect in the presence of a moderator because it addresses the disadvantages of looking at only the main effect in isolation as well as of using just conventional simple slopes analyses” (Busenbark, Graffin, et al., 2022, p. 152). All analyses were conducted in Stata 19.0.
Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for participants’ implementation attitude in each experimental condition. Demonstrating the strength of our design, we note the differences in the mean values of participants’ implementation attitudes for the framing (t = –5.282, p = 0.000) and reputation (t = –2.650, p = 0.005) conditions. While the mean difference between participants’ implementation attitudes across the promotion framing and reputation conditions was not as strong as the differences across the other conditions, this result is not entirely surprising given the arguments presented to develop H5. 7
Descriptive Statistics by Experimental Conditions.
Table 2 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations of all variables included in our main analyses. In closely examining the correlations between our focal independent variables, we note that none exceed |0.20|, which is well below a value at which a correlation would indicate that multicollinearity might be a significant problem (Cohen et al., 2003). In looking at the VIF values of our regression coefficients, we note that all VIF values were well below the common threshold of 10 (the maximum VIF was 1.01), further substantiating that multicollinearity was not a serious concern in our models (Shrestha, 2020).
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations.
Notes. N = 149. All correlations greater than |0.16| are significant at the p <.05 level.
Table 3 presents the results of our regression analyses. Model 1 includes only control variables, Model 2 adds our focal variables, Models 3–5 introduce each interaction term individually, and Model 6 constitutes the full model that includes all interaction terms. Importantly, we note here that the full model explains about 52% of the variance in middle managers’ attitudes toward implementing strategic change.
Results of OLS Regression Analyses.
In assessing the main effect of a CEO’s reputation (i.e., H1), the results of Model 2 suggest that the impact of a CEO theme-aligned reputation (vs. non-theme-aligned reputation) on middle managers’ implementation attitude is positive (β = 0.291, p = .016). Further, the main effect of CEO theme-aligned reputation remains positive in Models 3–5 and the fully specified model (i.e., Model 6). Taken together, these results provide support for H1.
Turning our attention to examining the impact of CEO framing (i.e., H2), the results of Model 2 demonstrate that the impact of CEO framing (promotion vs. prevention) on middle manager implementation attitude is positive (β = 0.636, p = .000). Further, the main effect of CEO framing remains positive across all subsequent models, including the fully specified model (Model 6). These results provide support for H2.
In looking at the interaction between CEO reputation and framing (i.e., H3), based on the results of Model 3, we can see that, as expected, the interaction term between CEO reputation and framing on middle managers’ attitude toward implementation is negative (β = –0.570, p = .015) and remains negative in the fully specified model. To interpret the nature of the moderation, we visually depict the results of Model 6 in Figure 3, which illustrates that the impact of a CEO’s reputation (non-theme-aligned vs. theme-aligned) on middle managers’ attitudes differs depending on the CEO’s use of a promotion versus prevention frame. When a CEO has a theme-aligned reputation, the CEO’s use of a promotion versus prevention frame is not significant. However, when the CEO has a non-theme-aligned reputation and the CEO uses a prevention frame, the attitude of managers toward strategic change is much lower than when the CEO uses a promotion frame. As such, in support of H3, the results indicate that a new CEO with a non-theme-aligned reputation who uses a prevention frame obtains the lowest level of middle manager buy-in for strategic change.
Finally, we examine the moderating effects of middle managers’ predispositions. First, the results of Model 4 do not reveal an interaction between a new CEO’s reputation and middle manager predispositions. However, the results of the full model (Model 6) suggest a modest positive interaction between the two variables (β = 0.164, p = .099), offering some support for H4. The results of Model 5 indicate that the moderating impact of individual predisposition on the relationship between CEO framing and middle managers’ attitude toward strategic change is negative (β = –0.269, p = .006). This interaction remains negative in the full model, altogether, providing support for H5. We depict the results from Model 6 in Figures 2–4.
CEO framing by reputation.
CEO reputation by middle manager predisposition.
CEO framing by middle manager predisposition.
Table 4 presents the results of our marginal effects analysis. Following Busenbark, Graffin, et al. (2022) recommendations, we specified values for middle manager predisposition at its minimum, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles and at its maximum. The results show that the effect of CEO theme-aligned reputation becomes positive once middle manager predispositions reach their midpoint, but remains stable as predisposition increases. Further, a promotion frame has a very positive impact at low levels of predisposition (the minimum and 10th percentile values), and its effect tapers off as predisposition increases. Overall, the results provide support for our theory and hypotheses.
Marginal Effects of Interactions.
Notes. N = 149. dy/dx refers to the marginal effect, and the p-value refers to the p-value of the marginal effect.
Supplemental Analyses and Robustness
Alternative Models
Recognizing that in a between-subjects experiment, where the participants are randomly assigned to a condition, it is not technically required to include the control variables, we specified an additional OLS regression model that included solely the focal independent variables and dependent variable. We obtained results consistent with those reported previously. Specifically, the main effect of a CEO’s reputation in this model suggests that the impact of CEO theme-aligned reputation (vs. non-theme-aligned reputation) on middle manager implementation attitude is positive (β = 0.435, p = .001). Further, the main effect of CEO framing demonstrates that the impact of CEO framing (promotion vs. prevention) on middle manager implementation attitude is positive (β = 0.756, p = .000).
Assessing Potential Endogeneity
Even though middle managers’ predisposition was measured before the experiment, we recognize that it is not experimentally manipulated, making it endogenous to the outcome and raising possible concerns that our results might be biased due to an omitted variable (Hill et al., 2021). To examine this possibility, and given recent evidence that two-stage instrumental variable techniques “are inefficient and can produce more bias than OLS unless they adhere to strict and often unattainable standards” (Busenbark, Yoon, et al., 2022, p. 41), we followed recent work and employed an impact threshold of a confounding variable approach (ITCV) to demonstrate how strongly correlated an omitted variable would have to be to impact results (Busenbark, Yoon, et al., 2022).
Using the konfound package in Stata 19.0, we calculated the ITCV for middle managers’ predisposition to be 0.330 at a 10% significance level, meaning that for an omitted variable to invalidate our findings, it would need to be correlated at r > 0.330 with both predisposition and implementation attitude. Examining the correlations in Table 2, no control variable is correlated with both variables at a level close to the ITCV. In addition, the robustness of inference to replacement (RIR) was 69.61%, meaning that 69.61% of our estimate would have to be biased to invalidate our findings. Alternatively, this means that an omitted variable would have to nullify significant results in 104 of our observations. This seems unlikely. Therefore, we have strong reasons to believe that endogeneity due to an omitted variable biasing middle managers’ predisposition is highly unlikely in our analyses.
Discussion
Although outsider CEOs often reflect a board’s intention to (re)align organizational leadership with anticipated environmental shifts (Finkelstein et al., 2009), the successful implementation of strategic change efforts is not assured (Kanitz et al., 2022). Indeed, the success or failure of these strategic changes largely depends on the ability of outsider CEOs, who are often largely unfamiliar to organizational members, to persuade middle managers to support new priorities (Huy, 2002; Tarakci et al., 2023; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990).
Altogether, our findings show how an outsider CEO’s theme-aligned reputation and prevention/promotion framing, in concert with middle manager predispositions, shape receptivity to strategic change. By articulating these interacting levers of outsider CEO influence, we sharpen theory on the social mechanisms of building support and offer practical guidance for crafting communications that build receptivity among middle managers.
Theoretical Contributions
Answering calls to expand on the relational interactions of executives (Neely et al., 2020; Wowak et al., 2017), we advance strategic leadership research by expanding our understanding of how CEOs influence firm outcomes through their engagement with important organizational stakeholders—namely, middle managers. While prior work has theorized about the role CEOs play in motivating organizational stakeholder support, we identify novel, empirically supported insights into the relational black box between CEOs and middle managers. By examining the importance of a CEO’s reputation (i.e., non-theme-aligned versus theme-aligned reputation) and framing of change (i.e., prevention versus promotion) to a middle manager’s response to a proposed strategic change, we show how both a CEO’s reputation and framing play unique roles in the social influence process. In doing so, we drew attention to processual aspects that help us better understand how a CEO’s inclinations are reflected in key organizational behaviors and outcomes, or how an organization becomes a reflection of its CEO. Our theory and findings reinforce the idea that how CEOs frame their initiatives, the nature of their reputations, and the characteristics of middle management are all critical aspects to this process that researchers and practitioners need to consider together.
Next, we also advance the organizational change literature by investigating how individual predispositions directly interact with CEO characteristics to influence middle manager reactions to a proposed strategic change. While prior work on organizational change notes that such an undertaking involves several micro-processes, most approaches to studying change are not “fine-grained enough to show how change was actually accomplished on the ground . . . its dynamic, unfolding, emergent qualities (in short: its potential) are devalued, even lost from view” (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002, p. 568). In line with this perspective, we demonstrate that gaining middle management support for strategic change is a contingent and relational process. In part, doing so depends on the nature of the CEO’s reputation, how a CEO frames the change, the CEO’s interdependence, and how these factors are contingent on varying levels of middle management predisposition. As such, our results emphasize that while it is important to understand the critical role of executives in implementing change, the characteristics of organizational members are equally important to consider in this process. In other words, we demonstrate that middle managers’ predispositions toward a strategic change establish the “rules of the game” that outsider CEOs must navigate when initiating change.
Also, by integrating the information systems literature on the adoption of advanced technologies with strategic leadership research on the introduction of new strategic initiatives, we were able to promote a more comprehensive understanding of how individual differences play a key role in the acceptance of new technology initiatives. Prior work in information systems research has emphasized such things as users’ predispositions and their perceptions of technology as important factors in impacting their attitude toward using new technology (Baird & Maruping, 2021; Rizzuto et al., 2014). By recognizing that many new technological advancements in organizations reflect major organizational changes and that the CEO plays a critical role in initiating such changes, we demonstrated that social influence processes are critical to the adoption of new technologies in organizations. As such, we were able to bring together key perspectives across these prominent research streams to reveal critical information that will help organizational leadership more effectively introduce new strategic initiatives.
Practical Contributions
Our findings provide valuable insights for CEOs and other strategic leaders wishing to initiate change. First, we demonstrate that securing buy-in from organizational members, especially middle managers, requires a deep understanding of the interplay between various factors that can either foster or hinder middle manager support. CEOs must consider not only their reputation but also how they frame change, particularly given middle managers’ predispositions toward the focus of a strategic change. Our research suggests that while careful framing of strategic changes is important, its effectiveness ultimately hinges on how well it aligns with organizational members’ existing receptivity to the CEO’s message.
Additionally, we recognize that boards often hire outsider CEOs to usher in a new strategic direction for the organization. Our findings indicate that a CEO’s reputation can be a strong indicator of fit for the “current and foreseeable contextual requirements” boards are attempting to address (Chen & Hambrick, 2012, p. 225). This does not imply that CEOs with generally positive reputations would be unable to implement the board’s envisioned strategic direction. However, appointing CEOs whose reputations align with the anticipated new direction may be more effective in garnering support from skeptical organizational members, especially when coupled with appropriate messaging.
Limitations and Future Research
While we designed our experimental scenario following best-practice recommendations to optimize internal and external validity (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014; Highhouse, 2009), some limitations suggest concrete directions for future work.
First, our scenario-based experiment with middle managers strengthens causal inference but may understate real-world constraints and organizational politics. For instance, our observed effect sizes were smaller than anticipated when conducting the power analysis to determine the desired sample size for the experiment. Thus, future research could employ field experiments, quasi-experiments, or comparative case studies to capture contextual factors (e.g., resource slack, interunit dependencies) and naturally occurring variation in message delivery. In addition, our single-shot design cannot capture temporal dynamics as information and performance feedback accumulate, so longitudinal approaches (e.g., panel surveys linked to implementation milestones, repeated framing interventions) can assess how framing and reputation interact with feedback over time, how messages cascade through managerial networks, and how initial attitudes convert, or fail to convert, into sustained implementation. Furthermore, our participants were incentivized via entries into sweepstakes/prize draws, so future work could use incentive-compatible designs that tie payoffs to decisions (e.g., bonuses linked to allocation or implementation choices) to further bolster external validity.
Second, we operationalized support as implementation attitudes (proximal support for strategic change) rather than observed behavior. Subsequent studies should test behavioral outcomes (e.g., adoption rates, timing/depth of implementation) and examine attitude–behavior gaps under varying incentive, accountability, and resource regimes. Relatedly, we did not directly observe the cognitive and affective processes through which middle managers interpret and carry forward the CEO’s message. As such, process-tracing (i.e., think-aloud protocols), experience sampling, and lab-in-the-field designs could unpack mechanisms such as identity threat, perceived organizational justice, and psychological safety, while testing heterogeneity at both the CEO level and the middle manager level.
Finally, our theorizing and tests focus on outsider CEOs and a path-consistent strategic change, so generalizability to insider CEOs and radical or crisis-driven changes may be limited. To probe these boundary conditions, scholars can focus on different types of CEO succession events, vary change type and magnitude (e.g., turnarounds, crisis responses), manipulate alternative CEO framings (e.g., performance/process improvement, stakeholder/moral frames), and compare reputation dimensions (e.g., integrity vs. competence signals).
Conclusion
While previous efforts in strategic leadership suggest that appointing an outsider CEO is often intended to facilitate change, the successful implementation of strategic change remains difficult, especially for outsider CEOs who are unfamiliar with members of their new organization. In this study, we expand the focus beyond the CEO to the CEO–middle manager relational process, the “relational black box,” that links change announcements to middle management support. We demonstrate that the CEO’s reputation, the framing of the change, and middle managers’ predispositions operate jointly within this relational black box to influence the successful pursuit of strategic change efforts.
Supplemental Material
sj-docx-1-oss-10.1177_01708406261459061 – Supplemental material for Building Support: How outsider CEO reputation and framing impact middle management acceptance of strategic change
Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-oss-10.1177_01708406261459061 for Building Support: How outsider CEO reputation and framing impact middle management acceptance of strategic change by Maryam Ghasemaghaei, François Neville and Jeffrey B. Lovelace in Organization Studies
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We are thankful for the highly constructive comments and developmental suggestions we received from our anonymous reviewers and editor Alex Bitektine. We would also like to thank Jon Bundy, Joanna Campbell, Danny Gamache, Scott Graffin, Joseph Harrison, Aaron Hill, Jason Kiley, Gerry McNamara, Brett Neely, Mike Pfarrer, Tim Pollock, and Matt Semadeni for their feedback on our research and earlier drafts of this article. Finally, we would like to recognize the McMaster University Arts Research Board for its generous contributions in support of this work.
Ethical Considerations
This study was approved by the Research Ethics Board of McMaster University (MREB 2446) on October 29, 2019.
Consent to Participate
All participants provided written informed consent prior to enrolment in the study.
Author Contributions
Maryam Ghasemaghaei and François Neville contributed equally and are listed alphabetically.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the McMaster University Arts Research Board.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Data Availability Statement
The datasets generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are not publicly available, as participants were explicitly informed during the consent process, via the letter of information, that “only the researchers named above [at the top of the letter of information] and the research assistant will have access to the data, which will be stored securely on the researchers’ password-protected laptop computers.”
Supplemental Material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
Notes
Author Biographies
References
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
