Justice Standard Determines Emotional Responses to Over-Reward

Abstract

How do people feel when they benefit from an unfair reward distribution? Equity theory predicts negative emotion in response to over-reward, but sociological research using referential standards of justice drawn from status-value theory repeatedly finds positive emotional responses to over-reward. Researchers have proposed methodological explanations for these different findings, but we propose a theoretical explanation—that over-reward based on local comparisons with an interaction partner creates guilt and other negative emotions, while over-reward relative to an abstract justice standard leads to more positive emotion. We describe two experiments that address methodological explanations for the status value findings: (1) lack of tangible rewards and (2) lack of sufficiently large over-rewards. We find that people who are over-rewarded relative to their referential expectations still report less negative emotion and more positive emotion than those who receive expected rewards. We report results from a third experiment that demonstrate support for our theoretical argument.

Keywords

justice emotion referential comparisons equity theory

Much research in sociology focuses on the under-rewarded (see Hegtvedt and Isom 2014). Far less research examines reactions to over-reward. It is difficult to understand the workings of unfair social systems, however, without understanding the responses of those who benefit from such systems. It is the over-rewarded, after all, who have the resources and opportunities to correct injustices. For this reason, over-reward should be a central concern in sociology. Emotional responses of those who over-benefit from an unjust system can motivate either restoration of justice or defense of unjust advantages. Complacency about over-reward can serve to legitimize inequality (Cook 1975).

Research on responses to injustice is typically couched in terms of either classic equity theory or the status value theory of distributive justice. According to equity theory, injustice exists when there is imbalance across the inputs and outputs of individuals in the local environment, such as occurs in the workplace when equally qualified and hard-working coworkers are paid different amounts (Adams 1965; Homans 1974). The theory predicts that inequity leads to negative emotion, with over-reward eliciting guilt and under-reward evoking anger. Instead of focusing on local comparisons of the inputs and outputs of interaction partners, the status value theory of distributive justice emphasizes the importance of large referential structures, which are composed of generalized categories of others and the status associated with their inputs (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 1972). Using this framework, Berger et al. (1972) suggested that people experience injustice when they do not receive the “going rate” for contributions by people like them. Unlike equity theory, status value theory does not make explicit predictions regarding emotional reactions to injustice. Nonetheless, sociologists often use status value theory’s referential standards in studies of emotional responses to injustice (e.g., Hegtvedt 1990).

While research consistently finds that those under-rewarded relative to either a referential or equity standard feel distress and anger, research on emotional responses to over-reward have proven more variable. Several studies report that over-reward leads either to the same emotion as a just reward or even to positive emotion (Hegtvedt 1990; Stets 2003, 2005; Stets and Ascensio 2008). Other studies, however, find that the over-rewarded feel negative emotions, including guilt, and judge their outcomes to be unfair (e.g., Lively et al. 2008; Sprecher 1986; van den Bos et al. 2006).

There are key methodological differences between studies that may account for these varying findings (e.g., Hegtvedt 1990; Stets 2003). First, studies finding that over-reward produces positive emotion have not offered an actual reward for contributions. Hegtvedt (1990) used vignettes to manipulate the inputs and rewards. In the Stets studies (Stets 2003, 2005; Stets and Ascensio 2008), participants were over-rewarded with points allocated by another participant; the points had no monetary value. Second, researchers note that because people experience over-reward less intensely than under-reward (e.g., Jasso 1980; Walster, Walster, and Berscheid 1978), extremely high levels of over-reward may be necessary to create an emotional response that differs significantly from that elicited by a just distribution (e.g., Hegtvedt 1990; Stets 2003). Some studies may simply have provided over-reward at levels too low to produce a notable emotion response.

We argue, however, that the invocation of different justice standards—local equity versus referential—accounts for the variation in findings regarding emotional responses to over-reward. Local equity comparisons entail high levels of interdependence between actors who are producing and consuming resources within a shared system, such as between intimate partners or similar workers in the same company (Homans 1974). As a result, distributions are typically zero-sum, with one’s gain resulting in another’s loss (see Walster et al. 1978). Even when rewards are not zero-sum, equity formulas dictate that an actor is over-rewarded only by virtue of another’s under-reward (i.e., it is the comparison with another whose outcomes are lower despite equal inputs that creates over-reward) (Adams 1965; Homans 1974). Thus, equity comparisons are direct and personal, with actors aware of the fates of specific others in the local distribution system.

In contrast, actors are more loosely connected to comparison others in referential structures. Actors compare their outcomes to an abstract standard (a group of similar others) instead of to an identified, personalized other. The distal nature of this comparison process obscures the fact that receiving an outcome better than the going rate means that others are disadvantaged in the larger system relative to self. In referential comparisons, there is also no sense that one’s own over-reward results in reduced rewards for another. Consistent with social comparison theory, we argue that the lack of direct comparison and awareness of others’ outcomes provides emotional distance from the negative consequences of over-reward (see Messick and Sentis 1982). As a result, referential-based over-reward may produce a different social experience than does over-reward relative to a local equity standard (see Törnblom 1977; Cook and Hegtvedt 1983).

Patterns in the empirical research are consistent with our argument. Laboratory studies that invoke a referential standard generally find low levels of negative emotion associated with over-reward (e.g., Hegtvedt 1990; Stets 2003), while those that invoke a local equity standard typically find that the over-rewarded report higher levels of negative emotion and/or lower levels of positive emotion than do the justly rewarded (e.g., Austin and Walster 1974a; Hassebrauck 1986; van den Bos et al. 2006). Our argument would also explain the research findings within intimate relationships, where over-benefit relative to an intimate partner results in negative affect and low levels of satisfaction (e.g., Sprecher 1986). In addition, research finds that knowledge of a partner’s response to an outcome distribution guides an actor’s emotional response and perceptions of fairness, which supports the underlying logic of our argument (e.g., Hegtvedt and Killian 1999; van den Bos et al. 1997). Methodological differences between studies using referential and equity standards, however, preclude definitive conclusions. Thus, it is necessary to parse the effects of methodological design and of the justice standard itself.

It is important to understand how people respond to over-reward if justice theory is to advance. Scholars have noted that over-reward poses a unique set of issues for justice theory, given the complex reactions people are likely to have to situations that are simultaneously beneficial to self yet violate normative standards (e.g., Jacques 1961; Peters, van den Bos, and Karremans 2008). According to justice theory, people desire to receive rewards that are consistent with their normative expectations, and this desire for consistency ultimately overrides self-interest, resulting in negative emotional reactions to over-reward (see Walster et al. 1978). Positive responses to referentially based over-reward, however, suggest a limit to the consistency motive. If the over-rewarded feel negative emotion only when the over-reward disrupts local comparisons, then the predictions of equity theory are limited in scope. While the theory may apply to salary comparisons between similar workers in the same company, for example, it may not apply to comparisons between a given worker’s salary and the typical amount that similar workers receive in the larger workforce. This is an important issue since there is often incomplete information regarding outcomes of those in the local environment—for example, employees are often unaware of their coworkers’ salaries (Colella et al. 2007). Thus, studying responses to referential justice structures will tell us a great deal about the lived experience of injustice.

In this article, we systematically examine emotional responses to the experience of over-reward in referential structures. We begin by addressing methodological issues that may explain previous findings by (1) using a monetary reward linked to task performance and (2) using a wide range of over-reward levels. The first experiment ties task-performance rewards to material outcomes (money) and examines emotional responses to over-reward, just reward, and under-reward. The second experiment continues to use monetary rewards explicitly tied to task performance but also compares emotional reactions to just reward and three different levels of over-reward. Here, we provide the first systematic analysis of threshold effects in response to over-reward.

We then conduct a third experiment to demonstrate that the theoretical distinction between local and referential standards is more important for emotional response and perceptions of fairness than the methodological features that are discussed in the literature. Before presenting these experiments, we review relevant theory and the empirical literature.

Theory

Classic Equity Theory and Local Comparisons

Classic equity theory is embedded in the social exchange paradigm (Homans 1974). A fundamental assumption is that people seek balance in social relationships, creating a consistency motive. This assumption is evident in the equity equation, which defines an exchange as equitable if there is balance across the inputs and outcomes of exchange partners. At the same time, equity theory also assumes that people are self-interested. Walster et al. (1978) argued that the equity norm developed as a way for societies to keep self-interest in check while maximizing collective outcomes. To promote adherence to the equity norm, groups punish those who violate the norm and reward those who follow it. As a result, people are uncomfortable with over-reward because they have been socialized to expect negative consequences from receiving more than they deserve (Adams 1965; Walster et al. 1978).

Studies using a local comparison support equity theory predictions. Sociologists have used this theory to explore emotional responses to over-benefit in intimate relationships, finding higher levels of negative emotion among the over-rewarded than among those who are fairly rewarded (e.g., Longmore and DeMaris 1997; Sprecher 1986, 1992). Most recently, Lively et al. (2008) found that perceived over-benefit in several relationship domains was associated with negative emotions, including distress and anger. Laboratory experiments have also found that those over-rewarded relative to a partner feel higher levels of distress and guilt and lower levels of positive emotion than those who are equitably treated (e.g., Hassebrauck 1986; van den Bos et al. 1997, 2006; Weiss, Suckow, and Cropanzano 1999). Similarly, those who are over-rewarded in a local comparison structure view their outcomes as more unfair than do those who receive just rewards (e.g., Austin and Walster 1974a, 1974b; Peters, van den Bos, and Bobocel 2004; van den Bos et al. 2006). These results are found in research using exclusively zero-sum distributions (e.g., Austin and Walster 1974a, 1974b) as well as research that includes studies with both zero-sum and non–zero-sum distributions (e.g., van den Bos et al. 2006, 2011).

Status Value Theory and Referential Comparisons

While equity theory focuses on fairness in local exchange relationships, sociological theories of justice focus on how inequalities are maintained in larger social structures. Drawing from Blau (1964), Berger et al. (1972) developed a status-value theory of justice that placed more emphasis on shared cultural expectations about the value of inputs of actors in different social positions. They proposed that actors in different social positions, with different statuses, produced inputs that the actors (and others) viewed as having different value. Actors experienced injustice when they did not get what that abstract referential standard indicated was their expected, just reward. This referential standard is used in the workplace, for example, when individuals compare the market value of their labor to their current compensation. Similarly, a referential standard may be used in the home when wives evaluate their share of household labor relative to a generalized group of similar women rather than their husbands (see Phelan 1994). There is considerable support for status-value theory, with research finding that under-rewarded people give greater weight to referential comparisons than to local ones when making allocation decisions (Webster and Smith 1978). Research also confirms that those who receive less than the going rate for their social position consider the outcome to be unjust (Hegtvedt 1990; Stets 2003, 2005).

Though status value theory does not make predictions regarding emotional responses to over-reward, studies have examined how people feel when they are over-rewarded relative to a referential standard. Unlike studies in the equity tradition, justice studies using a referential standard typically find that the over-rewarded view their outcomes as fair and report positive emotions. In a vignette study, Hegtvedt (1990) invoked a referential comparison by informing participants of the going rate for typing, which was the work performed by the actor in a vignette. Participants assumed the role of the typist. Role-playing participants in the over-reward condition (receiving $40 when the going rate was $30) rated their outcome as fair, with no significant difference between the fairness ratings of the over-rewarded and the fairly rewarded. Participants in the over-reward condition did not feel distressed. In fact, they reported lower levels of distress than did those in the just reward condition. The participants in the over-reward vignette reported slightly higher levels of guilt than those in the other conditions, but the level of guilt was so low that Hegtvedt concluded that it was not substantively important and that negative emotion was primarily associated with under-reward.

Stets’s (2003, 2005) results were consistent with Hegtvedt’s (1990) findings, though she used a different experimental manipulation and couched her research in identity theory terms. Stets manipulated reward level with points allocated to participants from a confederate supervisor. The participants, who believed they were randomly assigned as workers to a clerical task, were told via an instructional video that the expected award for an average performance was 100 points. Following completion of the task, all participants were informed that their performance was average. The confederate supervisor gave under-rewarded participants 50 points, fairly rewarded participants 100 points, and the over-rewarded 150 points. The over-rewarded in this study did not feel distress but instead experienced higher levels of positive emotion than did the fairly rewarded.

In an extension of this work, Stets and Asencio (2008) conducted another experiment that used points as a reward for work. Here, there was one supervisor and two participants; the supervisor and one of the participants were confederates. Again, the researchers used an instructional video to establish the referential standards for task reward. The point structure was wider than the earlier study, with workers receiving 50, 100, or 200 points for their performance (after being told that 100 points was the typical reward for an average performance and being judged as an average performer by the supervisor). As in the earlier study, people generally experienced over-reward in a positive way, and there was little evidence of negative emotions as a result of over-reward.

In sum, the research on referentially based over-reward puts forth findings quite different from studies using a local equity standard of justice. Those over-rewarded relative to a referential standard report very low levels of guilt. Any negative affect experienced by the over-rewarded is either comparable to or lower than that experienced by the justly rewarded. The over-rewarded also do not view their outcomes as unfair.

Explaining Conflicting Findings

What accounts for the inconsistency in research on emotional reactions to over-reward? First, the inconsistency may be due to the fact that most studies using an equity standard have tied over-reward directly to outcomes, while studies using a referential standard of justice have not. Hegtvedt (1990) used a vignette design in which participants were asked to place themselves in the role of someone who was over-, under-, or fairly rewarded. Hegtvedt’s use of a vignette may explain her failure to find that over-reward led to negative emotion since some vignette studies that have manipulated equity-based over-reward report similar findings (e.g., Peters and van den Bos 2008). Meanwhile, Stets (2003, 2005; Stets and Asencio 2008) manipulated over-reward through the assignment of points that did not have any effect on participant payment—an approach unlike that used by researchers in the equity tradition. While the use of these methods are consistent with Hegvedt’s and Stets’s research questions and with status value theory, it complicates comparisons with local equity studies that tie over-reward to tangible monetary payments.

Second, previous studies may have manipulated over-reward at a level too low to evoke justice concerns (see Homans 1974). Both Stets (2005) and Hegtvedt (1990) attributed their nonsupport of equity theory predictions, in part, to the low levels of over-reward used in their studies (see also Leventhal, Weiss, and Long 1969; Sweeney 1990). This explanation is consistent with the equity theory argument that individuals are likely to engage in cognitive rationalizations regarding inputs and outcomes as long as it is expedient to do so (e.g., Walster et al. 1978). In fact, people typically view their own over-reward as more fair than they do a partner’s over-reward (Messick and Sentis 1979).

The argument that over-reward must reach a certain level in order to evoke negative emotion suggests a threshold effect. A threshold effect is consistent with Jasso’s (1980) distributive justice theory, although Jasso makes no predictions about emotions. Jasso’s equation to describe perceptions of fairness in outcome distributions (which she calls the “justice evaluation”) produces a parabolic function such that fairness perceptions of just rewards and slight over-rewards are very similar. As the level of over-reward increases, rewards are progressively more likely to be viewed as unfair. Though emotional response to injustice is not directly addressed by Jasso’s theory, her theoretical reasoning is relevant to emotions given that researchers typically have assumed that perceptions of unfairness lead to negative emotions (for an overview, see Clay-Warner and Robinson 2008). No empirical research, however, has searched for threshold effects in emotional responses to over-reward.

Once we correct for the methodological inconsistencies in the literature, we may find that levels of perceived fairness decrease with increasing levels of over-reward while levels of guilt increase as over-reward becomes more extreme. Such findings would confirm a negative response to over-reward regardless of the justice standard in place and provide strong support for consistency as the primary motive guiding reactions to injustice. Alternatively, failure to find negative emotional responses to referential over-reward in our studies would suggest that the source of justice comparison is key, necessitating a third experiment that directly pits referential- and equity-based over-reward.

Study 1

The first study examines emotional reactions to over-reward in a referential structure while tying task performance directly to tangible montetary rewards, as in equity research. We use a laboratory experiment.

Methods

Participants and Design

Participants were 74 undergraduate students (45 women and 29 men) at a large southeastern university recruited through flyers distributed in classes and placed in dormitories and classroom buildings across campus. The median age of participants was 19. The design of the study was a 2 (participant gender) × 3 (outcome) quasi-experiment, with gender as a naturally occuring covariate. We included gender as a factor because some research finds gender differences in emotion (for an overview, see Simon and Nath 2004) and in responses to injustice (see Clay-Warner, Culatta, and James 2013). Within gender, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: over-reward (n = 25), just reward (n = 24), and under-reward (n = 25).

Procedure

Experiments were conducted by trained research assistants. Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to determine whether “meaning insight,” an abilty to discern the meaning of unfamiliar words intuitively, was related to decision-making ability. Our use of a meaning insight task to manipulate reward condition follows Cook and Yamagishi (1983). In our study, participants were told there would be two phases of the experiment: the meaning insight phase and a later investment phase (in which decision-making ability would be measured). Participants believed they were participating with two other same-sex students and that the computer would randomly assign two of them to the role of “interpreter” and one to the role of “evaluator” for the meaning insight task.¹ In reality, the true participant was always assigned the role of interpreter. The other participants were computer-simulated.

During the task, we showed the participants a series of Cherokee language words on a computer screen and asked them, as interpreter, to select the English word that they believed most closely defined the Cherokee word. We told the participants that previous studies have found that while the average person correctly identifies 8 of 20 words in the meaning insight task, students at their university typically identify an average of 11 correctly. In this way, we compensated for the fact that most people evaluate their ingroups positively and might expect above average performance of themselves and their category members. Participants were told that the evaluator would decide how much each interpreter would earn but that the expected payment was $1 per correct answer. Money earned in the meaning insight task was to be used by the participant in a later investment task, and the amount earned during the investment study would constitute the final payment. Therefore, we gave the participant the understanding that the reward was real (monetary) and relevant for future accomplishment (the investment task).²

Following the meaning insight task, each participant was informed via computer that he or she correctly identifed 11 of the Cherokee words. The experimenter then presented the participants with a form labeled “Evalutor’s Allocation of Payment for Meaning Insight Task,” which informed them how much money they were awarded by the evaluator. This constituted the reward manipulation; participants in the just reward condition received $11, while those in the under-reward condition received $8, and those in the over-reward condition received $17. We selected $17 because it is approximately 150% of the just reward, which is consistent with the over-reward ratio in equity research using monetary-based rewards (e.g., Austin and Walster 1974a, 1974b; van den Bos et al. 2006). Participants then completed a series of emotion/attitude measures and were debriefed. There was no investment task. All participants were paid $17 for their participation.

Dependent variables

Negative emotion

We created a five-item negative emotion scale from the larger emotion assessment (α = .86). In the included items, participants indicated on nine-point Likert scales the extent to which they felt distressed, upset, sad, disgusted, and hostile.

Guilt

A two-item scale measured respondents’ reported guilt. Participants indicated on nine-point Likert scales the extent to which they felt guilty and ashamed.³

Distributive justice

One nine-point Likert item measured respondents’ perceptions of distributive justice. Participants were asked how fair/unfair was the amount of money they recevied.⁴

Results and Discussion

Manipulation check

Following Hegtvedt (1990) and Stets (2003, 2005), we verified the manipulation by asking participants whether they received the award they expected, more than they expected, or less than they expected. Chi-square analyses were significant at the .001 level, and 85 percent of participants correctly identified their outcome level. Responses during debriefing indicate that the cover story was successful, with participants generally accepting that meaning insight was a real skill and that the money earned during the meaning insight phase would be used in the investment task. Participants also believed that they were participating in the experiment with two other students, one of whom occupied the role of evaluator.

Analytic strategy

We conducted two-way ANOVAs separately for each dependent variable and Tukey post hoc tests, where appropriate.⁵ We report F statistics from the full factorial models, which include the reward level, gender, and the interaction between gender and reward level. However, gender did not interact significantly with reward level in any of the models. As a result, we collapse across gender and use marginal means controlling for gender in post hoc tests. A complete presentation of cell means is provided in Table 1.

Table 1.

Means (SE) for Emotions and Distributive Justice by Reward Condition—Study 1

	Negative emotion	Guilt	Distributive justice
Just reward	1.57 (.22)	1.57 (.26)	6.83 (.38)
Under-reward	2.18 (.22)	1.96 (.25)	5.12 (.37)
Over-reward	1.17 (.22)	1.52 (.25)	7.52 (.37)

Note: Marginal means controlling for gender.

Findings

The ANOVA predicting negative emotion yielded a significant overall F statistic, F(5, 68) = 3.04; p = .016. There was a main effect of reward condition on negative emotion (p = .007), which justified use of post hoc tests. As expected, Tukey post hoc tests revealed that the under-rewarded reported higher levels of negative emotion than did both the justly treated (p = .05) and the over-rewarded (p = .002). The over-rewarded, however, did not report higher levels of negative emotion than did those in the just reward condition (p = .21). In fact, the pattern of marginal means suggests that there may be lower levels of distress in the over-reward condition than in the just reward condition, though differences are not statistically significant (over-reward = 1.17 [.22]; just-reward = 1.57 [.22]).

We also found that over-reward produces very low levels of guilt. The two-way ANOVA model yielded an insignificant F statistic, F(5, 68) = 1.69; p = .15, with no significant differences in guilt across condition, F(2, 68) = .45; p = .64. Our finding that guilt was not associated with over-reward is consistent with Hegtvedt’s (1990) conclusion.

Finally, we conducted a two-way ANOVA to examine the effects of reward condition on perceptions of distributive justice, F(5, 68) = 4.67; p = .001. Despite the success of the reward manipulation (the over-rewarded recognized their reward levels as unexpectedly high, violating the referential standard), those in the over-reward condition did not judge their award level to be unfair. In fact, they reported significantly higher levels of perceived outcome fairness than did those in the under-reward condition (p < .001). Notably, their levels of perceived outcome fairness were statistically equivalent to those in the just reward condition (p = .19), with the pattern of means suggesting that there may even be higher levels of perceived fairness in the over-reward than in the just reward condition (7.52 vs. 6.83). These results replicate Hegtvedt’s (1990) findings. Since over-rewarded participants did not perceive their outcomes to be unfair, it is not surprising that they felt low levels of negative emotion and guilt.

In this first experiment, we addressed the possibility that the findings of earlier research about emotional responses to rewards above a referential standard might be explained by the lack of a tangible task-relevant reward. Since earlier studies had used either vignette/role-playing designs or manipulated reward level using points with no monetary value, we could not be sure if a real task with monetary rewards would yield the same results. It did. We find results very consistent with the earlier studies using a referential standard (e.g., Hegtvedt 1990; Stets 2003, 2005). We now move on to investigate whether threshold effects for over-reward can explain the inconsistencies in previous research, as both Stets (2003, 2005) and Hegtvedt (1990) suggest.

Study 2

Do negative emotions emerge when over-reward gets high enough? The most effective way to examine this question is to compare reactions to varying levels of over-reward. An implicit prediction of justice theories is that the intensity of negative emotion is related to the magnitude of over-reward since over-reward is more keenly felt at higher levels. Thus, if referentially based over-reward is associated with negative emotional response and perceptions of unfairness, we should find increasing levels of distress, guilt, and perceptions of injustice as over-reward increases. To examine these patterns, we employ three levels of over-reward: one level that is consistent with Study 1 and with previous local equity-based studies of over-reward that have produced negative emotion (e.g., Austin and Walster 1974b), one that rewards at an even higher level than this amount, and one condition with lower levels of over-reward.

Methods

Study 2 used the same basic recruitment strategy, research design, and dependent variables as Study 1. The negative emotion scale (distressed, upset, sad, disgusted, and hostile) was reliable (α = .77). Participants were 63 undergraduate students (44 women and 19 men) at another southeastern university who were paid for their participation. Participants’ median age was 20. There were four reward conditions: just reward of $11 (n = 20), over-reward of $15 (n = 17), over-reward of $17 (n = 13), and over-reward of $20 (n = 13). All participants were paid $20 at the end of the experimental session.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation Check and Analytic Strategy

The manipulation of outcome level was successful, with the Pearson chi-square test significant at the .01 level (χ² = 17.29). We conducted a series of ANCOVAs (controlling for gender) to determine whether means of reported emotions and fairness perceptions varied across reward condition.⁶ Cell means are reported in Table 2. We used Tukey post hoc tests when appropriate.

Table 2.

Means (SE) for Emotions and Distributive Justice by Reward Condition—Study 2

	Negative emotion	Guilt	Distributive justice
Just reward	1.74 (.18)	1.38 (.24)	1.15 (.37)
$15 over-reward	1.51 (.19)	1.59 (.26)	1.41 (.87)
$17 over-reward	1.31 (.22)	1.81 (.30)	2.08 (1.89)
$20 over-reward	1.23 (.22)	1.96 (.30)	1.85 (1.52)

Note: Marginal means controlling for gender.

Findings

We found no evidence that over-reward produced negative emotions. The ANCOVA predicting negative emotion was statistically insignificant, F(4, 58) = 1.35; p = .26, as was the ANCOVA predicting guilt, F(4, 58) = .70; p = .6. We also found that perceptions of outcome fairness were not significantly different across reward condition, F(4, 58) = .72; p = .66. These results replicate and extend our findings in Study 1. Notably, increasing the over-reward to almost twice the just amount failed to produce a meaningful negative emotional response or perceptions of unfairness. Because we instantiated over-reward at levels comparable to (and above) the levels instantiated in local equity based studies, the failure of previous research to find negative emotional reactions to referentially based over-reward cannot be attributed to the levels of over-reward used in those studies.

One might argue, however, that our failure to find statistically significant results is due to sample size, given the relatively low effect sizes typically associated with emotional responses in laboratory studies. To address this issue, we conducted supplemental analyses for positive emotions. A finding that levels of positive emotion increase as over-reward increases would refute this argument. In contrast, if we find that the over-rewarded report lower levels of positive emotion than do those who are justly rewarded—or that levels of positive emotion decline as over-reward increases—then the emotion predictions drawn from equity theory would be supported in at least one sense. We examined the effect of reward condition on several one-item measures of positive emotion (satisfaction, pride, enthusiasm, excitement, and gratitude). As in the other analyses, we control for gender.

Results reveal consistently positive relationships between the amount of over-reward and positive emotions, which supports the original interpretation of our results (see Table 3). For example, the ANCOVA for satisfaction was significant, F(4, 58) = 4.24, p = .004; and it produced a statistically significant F statistic for the effect of the reward condition on satisfaction, F(3, 58) = 5.63; p = .002. Tukey post hoc tests indicated that mean levels of satisfaction in all three over-reward conditions were higher than those in the just reward condition ($15 vs. $11, p = .03; $17 vs. $11, p = .002; $20 vs. $11, p = .001). Similarly, the ANCOVA predicting pride was statistically significant, F(4, 58) = 4.32; p = .004, as was the F statistic associated with reward condition, F(3, 58) = 4.85; p = .004. The mean levels of pride were higher in all three over-reward conditions than in the just reward condition ($15 vs. $11, p = .012; $17 vs. $11, p = .005; $20 vs. $11, p = .002). The ANCOVA predicting excitement was also significant, F(4, 58) = 2.75; p = .037, and those in the $20 over-reward condition reported higher levels of excitement than did those in the just reward condition, F(3, 58) = 3.12; p = .03; $20 vs. $11, p = .004. Differences in levels of excitement between those in the $17 over-reward condition and the just reward condition approached significance (p = .06).

Table 3.

Means (SE) for Positive Emotions by Reward Condition—Study 2

	Satisfaction	Pride	Enthusiasm	Excitement	Gratitude
Just reward	4.28 (.44)	3.36 (.45)	3.84 (.46)	4.60 (.45)	3.47 (.45)
$15 over-reward	5.71 (.47)	5.06 (.48)	4.42 (.50)	5.53 (.49)	5.53 (.49)
$17 over-reward	6.56 (.54)	5.42 (.55)	5.35 (.57)	5.97 (.56)	6.87 (.56)
$20 over-reward	6.79 (.54)	5.73 (.55)	6.12 (.57)	6.74 (.56)	7.87 (.56)

Note: Marginal means controlling for gender.

Interestingly, levels of both gratitude, F(3, 58) = 14.36; p < .001, and enthusiasm, F(3, 58) = 3.66, p = .017, increased across levels of over-reward. Not only were the means for gratitude higher in all three reward conditions than in the just reward condition ($15 vs. $11, p = .003; $17 vs. $11, p < .001; $20 vs. $11, p < .001), but those in the $20 condition were more grateful than were those in the $15 condition (p = .003). Likewise, the means for enthusiasm were significantly higher in the $17 and $20 conditions than in the just reward condition (p = .046 and p = .003, respectively), and there were also significantly higher levels of enthusiasm in the $20 condition than in the $15 over-reward condition (p = .029). These findings indicate that as levels of over-reward increase, so too do positive emotions.

Discussion of Studies 1 and 2

In the first two experiments, we addressed methodological issues that may have affected the ability of previous studies in the status value tradition to find negative emotional responses to over-reward. Though we tied rewards to tangible outcomes, we found no support for the idea that over-reward leads to negative emotion when over-reward is manipulated using a referential standard. The results of the second study indicate that higher levels of over-reward are not likely to elicit higher levels of negative emotion even when rewards are substantially above the norm. Instead, higher levels of over-reward evoke higher levels of positive emotions. These findings reinforce the results of previous studies that have found that over-reward via a referential standard elicits positive emotions (e.g., Oliver, Shor, and Tidd 1999; Stets 2005; Weiss et al. 1999) and suggest that people’s emotions are influenced more heavily by outcome favorability and self-interest than by outcome justice in referential standard situations.

Reconciling Findings and Justice Theories

Our results demonstrate that methodological differences in the manipulation of over-reward cannot explain the inconsistent findings. We therefore must consider whether the two types of justice standard employed might represent fundamentally different social experiences. Participants over-rewarded relative to a local equity standard are part of an interdependent system, where actors’ rewards are tied to one another and are frequently zero-sum. In contrast, referential comparisons are more distal, which may allow actors to distance themselves from the unjust outcomes and from those who are under-rewarded. As a result, self-interest may overwhelm the consistency motive that underlies the preference for balance across systems of distribution in equity theory. While Studies 1 and 2 provide strong evidence that referential over-reward does not produce negative emotion, it is impossible to determine whether there are differences in the emotional experience of equity and referential over-reward without a direct comparison. We provide this test in Study 3.

Study 3

In Study 3, we manipulate the justice standard in order to compare reactions to local equity-based over-reward to those produced by abstract, referentially based over-reward (what “people like me” deserve). As in the previous two studies, we measure perceptions of outcome fairness as well as negative emotion and guilt. We predict that levels of negative emotion and guilt will be higher in the local equity over-reward condition than in the referential over-reward condition. We also expect that participants will perceive referential over-reward to be fairer than local equity over-reward.

Methods

Participants and Design

Participants were 123 undergraduate students at a large southeastern university (62 women and 61 men). The median age of paricipants was 20. The design of the study was a 2 (participant gender) × 2 (outcome) × 2 (reward standard) quasi-experiment, with gender as a naturally occuring covariate.⁷

Procedure

Study 3 followed the same basic procedures as the previous two studies, with a couple of small changes. We simplified the cover story by removing mention of the fictitious investment phase and instead tied the payment even more directly to performance. We told participants that we were interested in the decisions made by the evaluator, which is the type of decision that managers must make in the workplace. We then told participants that the amount of money awarded by the evaluator would constitute their final payment. Participants in this study also completed an index of social value orientation (McClintock et al. 1973) when they signed up for the study online at least 24 hours before the laboratory experiment. We added this measure to verify that our earlier findings were not a consequence of individual variation in responses to injustice.

Unique to this study is the instantiation of two different justice standards: a referential standard and a local equity standard. The referential standard condition was manipulated as in the previous studies: participants were told that while the evaluator makes the payment decision, in similar studies evaluators generally award $1 per correct answer. This procedure established the going rate for payment. All participants were told that they answered 11 questions correctly. In the just reward condition, participants received $11; the over-rewarded received $17.

Consistent with previous research, our local equity standard manipulation involves a third party distributing a pool of resources between participants who have performed equally well on an experimental task (e.g., Austin and Walster 1974b; van den Bos et al. 2006, 2011). Specifically, in the local equity standard condition, participants were told that each correct answer contributes $1 toward a pool from which the evaluator will make allocation decisions. After completing the meaning insight task, participants were informed that both interpreters answered 11 questions correctly, resulting in an allocation pool of $22. They were also informed of the amount that both they and the other interpreter had been awarded. In the equity standard/just reward condition, the participant was told that both interpreters received $11. In the equity standard/over-reward condition, the participant received $17 and was told that the other interpreter would receive $5.

As in the first two studies, participants completed an emotion questionnaire and attitude measures after receiving the award information. In this study, we presented participants with payment in cash so as to increase the salience of the award amount. We used the same two-item scale for guilt and the same single-item scale for perceptions of distributive justice as in the previous studies. We employed a four-item mean scale of negative emotion comprising distress, upset, sad, and disgusted (α = .73). We control for social value orientation in all analyses.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation Checks and Analytic Strategy

The manipulation check for reward condition indicated that those in the over-reward condition were significantly more likely that those in the just reward condition to report that they received more money than they expected (χ² = 30.34; p < .001). In addition, all participants correctly identified their justice standard condition (going rate is $1 per correct answer vs. each correct answer contributes $1 to an allocation pool). We present two-way ANCOVAs (reward × justice standard), controlling for gender and social value orientation, in the prediction of negative emotion and guilt. Because there was a three-way interaction between gender, reward, and justice standard in the prediction of perceptions of distributive justice, we present results of a three-way ANCOVA for that analysis. Following significant global F tests, we employ one-tailed post hoc tests for directional hypotheses.

Findings

Negative emotion

The full factorial model predicting negative emotion was significant, F(10, 111) = 2.2; p = .02. There was a significant main effect for justice standard, F(1, 111) = 4.8; p = .03, with those in the equity standard conditions reporting higher levels of negative emotion than those in the referential standard conditions. As predicted, this main effect is conditioned by an interaction between the justice standard and reward level, F(1, 111) = 4.28; p = .04. As seen in Figure 1, the form of the interaction suggests that participants had higher levels of negative emotion in the over-reward equity condition than in the over-reward referential standard condition (see Table 4 for cell means). This is confirmed with one-tailed Tukey tests (t = 3.08; p = .01), controlling for the main effects of gender and social value orientation. Participants also reported significantly higher levels of negative emotion in the equity over-reward condition than they did in the equity just reward condition (t = 2.29; p = .05), confirming the results of previous studies. In contrast, and as expected, there was no significant difference in levels of negative emotion between those over-rewarded or justly rewarded relative to a referential standard (t = −.71; p = .89).

Figure 1.

Estimated Marginal Means of Negative Emotion by Justice Standard and Reward Level

Table 4.

Means (SE) for Emotions by Reward Condition—Study 3

	Negative emotion	Guilt	Distributive justice
Referential standard
Just reward	1.18 (.18)	0.94 (.24)	6.86 (.48)
Over-reward	1.05 (.19)	1.35 (.26)	7.02 (.52)
Local equity standard
Just reward	1.19 (.18)	1.19 (.25)	7.69 (.50)
Over-reward	1.59 (.17)	2.56 (.25)	3.30 (.47)

Note: Controlling for social value orientation and gender.

Guilt

The ANCOVA predicting guilt was statistically significant, F(10, 111) = 7.42; p < .001. There were significant main effects for reward level, F(1, 111) = 27.21; p < .001, and for justice standard, F(1, 111) = 18.43; p < .001. As predicted, there was a significant interaction between justice standard and reward level in the elicitation of guilt, F(1, 111) = 7.8; p = .006. This interaction is plotted in Figure 2. Consistent with this figure and with our predictions, the Tukey tests, controlling for main effects, reveal that those in the equity over-reward condition reported statistically higher levels of guilt than did those in the referential over-reward condition (t = 5.0; p < .001). Participants in the equity over-reward condition felt more guilt than those in the equity just reward condition, as equity theory would predict. (t = 5.74; p < .001). Notably, there was no difference in reported guilt between those over-rewarded and justly rewarded relative to the referential standard (t = 1.66; p = .35). See Table 4 for cell means.

Figure 2.

Estimated Marginal Means of Guilt by Justice Standard and Reward Level

There was also a significant interaction between reward level and gender, F(1, 111) = 7.28; p = .01. This interaction is plotted in Figure 3. Tukey post hoc tests indicate that over-rewarded women reported higher levels of guilt than did over-rewarded men (t = 2.98; p = .02).

Figure 3.

Estimated Marginal Means of Guilt by Gender and Reward Level

Fairness perceptions

The ANCOVA for perceived distributive justice was statistically significant, F(10, 111) = 13.36; p < .001. There were significant main effects for reward level, F(1, 111) = 39.79; p < .001, and justice standard, F(1, 111) = 18.74; p < .001. As expected, there was a significant interaction between justice standard and reward level, F(1, 111) = 45.99; p < .001. Tukey tests confirmed that the form of this interaction is as we predicted (see Figure 4): those in the equity over-reward condition perceived the outcome to be significantly less fair than did those in the referential over-reward condition (t = −7.96; p < .001). There were no significant differences in perceptions of distributive justice between referential just and over-reward conditions (t = 1.73; p = .31), while equity over-reward was perceived to be less fair than equity just reward (t = −9.42; p < .001). This interaction is qualified, however, by a three-way interaction between justice standard, reward level, and gender, F(1, 111) = 12.05; p < .001. Thus, we present plots separately by gender (Figure 5a and Figure 5b) and report two-tailed post hoc tests since we did not present theoretical predictions for differences by gender.

Figure 4.

Estimated Marginal Means of Distributive Justice by Justice Standard and Reward Level

Figure 5.

Estimated Marginal Means of Distributive Justice by Gender, Justice Standard, and Reward Level

As expected, in the local equity comparison conditions, both men (t = −8.24; p < .001) and women (t = −4.99; p < .001) perceived the just reward to be more fair than the over-reward. The slope of the line is steeper for men than it is for women, however (see Figure 5). In support of our central hypothesis, both men and women also perceived local over-reward to be less fair than referential over-reward (men: t = −6.81; p < .001; women: t = −4.23; p = .001). As predicted, there were no differences in perceptions of outcome fairness across the referential just reward and the referential over-reward conditions (men: t = 1.93; p = .53; women: t = −1.45; p = .83). These findings serve to bolster our claim that equity theory arguments about emotional response do not apply to conditions of referential over-reward.

Summary

The results of Study 3 lend strong support to our argument that over-reward via a referential comparison is a substantively different experience than over-reward in comparison to a local other. The distal referential comparison allows over-rewarded actors to disconnect their own outcomes from those who are, inevitably, under-rewarded in the larger system. As a result, tangible self-interest plays a larger role in guiding emotional reactions in referential over-reward than does the desire for consistency. In contrast, the consistency motive overrides tangible self-interest in local equity comparisons.

Discussion

The results of our first two investigations show that reward above a referential standard does not lead to negative emotion, even when those rewards are tangible, valued, and linked directly to task performance. Even quite high levels of reward above a referential standard do not lead to negative emotion; instead, they trigger positive emotion. Moreover, over-reward relative to a referential standard is consistently judged as fair. The results of our third study reveal that the reason that emotion predictions drawn from equity theory are not supported in status value theory experiments derives from the referential (non-local) justice standard. When a local equity comparison and a distal referential standard are compared in a single experiment, the local equity conditions support equity theory emotion predictions, but the referential status value conditions do not conform to those predictions.

Equity theory was developed specifically to address local comparisons, as reflected in the equity equations of Adams (1965) and Walster et al. (1978). However, elaborations of the theory that highlight people’s need to maintain “justice with the world” leave the door open for application of equity theory predictions to situations beyond direct, local comparisons (Austin and Walster 1974a; Gray, Ward, and Norton 2014). Our findings do not challenge the core predictions of equity theory. Indeed, our findings in Study 3 were completely consistent with the theory. Our findings do suggest, though, that justice theories must develop in ways that account for emotional reactions to referential-based over-reward. This is particularly important given the ubiquity of referential comparisons in the social world and their demonstrated importance in shaping attitudes and behavior (Buckingham and Alicke 2002; Shore, Tashchian, and Jourdan 2006).

Thus, the next step is to determine the specific mechanisms that account for differing emotional responses to referential versus local equity-based over-reward. One likely mechanism is the knowledge that one is benefitting from another’s loss. This knowledge is most salient in zero-sum distribution systems, such as the one that we and many other researchers construct to manipulate outcomes in studies of local equity structures. In referential comparisons, however, there is no sense that similar others are receiving less as a direct result of the actor’s over-reward. If experiencing advantage as a result of another’s disadvantage accounts for negative emotional responses to over-reward, then we would expect to see more pronounced negative emotions in response to equity based over-reward in zero-sum distributions than in non–zero-sum distributions. Others have noted the unique nature of zero-sum distribution systems (Cook 1975), and some research has found that actors allocate resources differently in zero-sum systems than they do in non–zero-sum systems (Boldero and Rosenthal 1984). Similarly, appraisal of responsibility—and not just the appraisal of advantageous injustice at another’s expense—may be an important antecedent to emotional reactions to over-reward. Appraisal theories (see Siemer, Mauss, and Gross 2007) would suggest that being able to absolve one’s self from responsibility for an over-reward would lessen its impact on one’s emotions. Examining these issues will contribute to a more theoretically based understanding of when and why favorable unjust rewards result in negative emotion.

Moving beyond traditional equity and justice approaches, our findings speak to recent research on the effects of over-reward on self-esteem and identity. Consistent with self-enhancement models of social cognition, De Cremer and Van Kleef (2009) argued that people may view over-reward as a confirmation of abilities, thus leading to elevated self-esteem. In support of this argument, they found that people who are given a reward that is greater than they deserve report higher levels of domain-specific self-esteem than do people who have been given the same information about their performance but have not been informed of the reward they will receive. They also found that over-paid participants reported higher levels of self-esteem when they believed that the under-rewarded other was happy with the outcome decision than when they believed that the other actor was disappointed. While people may use over-reward as an opportunity to self-enhance, social context affects the extent to which the self-enhancement motive operates. Thus, it is important to consider ways in which context may either heighten or limit the enhancement processes associated with referential over-reward. Relationship closeness, for example, is a contextual factor that may affect reactions to referential over-reward, just as Homans (1974) theorized that relationship closeness impacts reactions to local inequity.

Finally, our results speak to the issue of injustice more generally. Equity theorists have long argued that guilt motivates the over-rewarded to “rebalance” the equity equation (e.g., Walster et al. 1978). When guilt is significant, the rebalancing requires the over-rewarded to either increase their inputs to match their outcomes or return their undeserved rewards. Without negative emotion, we would not predict such reapportionment. In this way, the results of our experimental research address the perpetuation of inequality in larger society. Even with clear evidence that their rewards were above the just, going-rate, our participants who compared their outcomes to a distal standard judged over-reward to be fair, felt very little guilt, and reported high levels of positive emotion. In other words, our over-rewarded participants reported responses often attributed to social actors holding favorable positions in real-world stratification systems (e.g., Della Fave 1980; Shepelak and Alwin 1986). Understanding that there are substantial differences in the experience of referential- and equity-based over-reward therefore contributes to our knowledge of the social psychological processes that undergird inequality.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Laura Johnson, Long Doan, Tiffani Everett, Stephen Foy, Elizabeth Hordge-Freeman, Paige Jann, and Daniel B. Shank for assistance with data collection. We also thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.

Funding

This research was funded by two grants from the National Science Foundation (SES-0966536 and SES-0519969). The authors also received financial support from the University of Georgia’s Office of the Vice-President for Research.

1

Our meaning insight task was a modified version of the task used in the status characteristics theory research paradigm (see Berger, Cohen, and Zeldtich 1977; Conner 1964; ). The primary difference was that we replaced the fabricated “primitive language” with the Cherokee language and used actual Cherokee words. Pilot testing showed higher rates of believability with this modification. None of our participants were Cherokee speakers.

2

Previous research documents the difficulty of over-rewarding participants in a believable way (e.g., Austin and Walster 1974a). By having the over-reward come at the hand of a fellow participant (the evaluator) and allowing participants to believe that there will be another phase of the research, participants are less likely to believe that their outcome was a result of experimenter error, as occurred in the experiment.

3

Research in both the equity and status value traditions typically uses a one-item measure of guilt (e.g., Hegtvedt 1990; Krehbiel and Cropanzano 2000; Pillemar, Hatfield, and Sprecher 2008; Stets 2003; Walster, Walster, and Traupmann 1978; Weiss, Suckow, and Cropanzano 1999). We employ a two-item measure since multi-item scales often have better measurement properties than do single-item scales. We also ran analyses using a one-item measure of guilt, however, and the patterns of significance are identical to those we report here.

4

Like much of the previous research on responses to over-reward, we employ a single-item measure of distributive justice that measures how fair one judges a particular outcome (e.g., Hegtvedt 1990; Lively et al., 2008; Pillemer et al. 2008; Stets 2003; Stets and Asencio 2008). Two-item measures that combine judgments of fairness and justice are also sometimes used (e.g., Loseman et al. 2009; Peters, van den Bos, and Bobocel 2004; van den Bos et al. 2006). These studies report extremely high correlations between the fairness and justice items (.98 in Loseman et al. 2009; .97 in ), which suggests that the single-item measure likely captures the same underlying construct as the two-item measure.

5

Even though exchange theory offers directed hypotheses, we use post hoc tests rather than planned comparisons because of the degree of inconsistency in previous research. However, the form of test makes no difference in the findings.

6

There were no significant main effects for gender in any of the Study 2 analyses. We also tested for interactions between gender and reward level and found that participant gender did not interact with reward condition in the prediction of any of the dependent variables in Study 2.

7

These conditions were embedded in a larger experimental design that manipulated orthogonal conditions that are not relevant to the current study.

Bios

Jody Clay-Warner is Meigs Distinguished Professor and head of the Sociology Department at the University of Georgia. She has chaired ASA’s Sociology of Emotion Section and is currently a member of ASA’s Social Psychology Section Council as well as the Executive Board of the International Society for Research on Emotion. She is the recipient of the 2010 Outstanding Recent Contribution Award from the ASA section on Emotion for her coedited book Social Structure and Emotion (with Dawn T. Robinson), the 2010 Outstanding Contribution to Sociological Perspectives Award, and the 2013 American Society of Criminology Outstanding Teaching Award. Her research examines responses to injustice, emotion measurement, and causes of criminal re-victimization.

Dawn T. Robinson is a professor of sociology and Fellow in the Owens Institute of Behavioral Research at the University of Georgia where she codirects the Laboratory for the Study of Social Interaction and the Computational Social Science Work Group. She was selected as a 2009 Kavli Frontiers of Science Fellow by the National Academy of Sciences. She has chaired the Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity Section; the Social Psychology Section; and the Sociology of Emotion Section of the American Sociological Association and served on the Board of the International Society for Research on Emotion.

Lynn Smith-Lovin is Robert L. Wilson Professor of Arts and Sciences in the Department of Sociology (with secondary appointments in psychology and neuroscience and in women’s studies) at Duke University. She received the 2006 Cooley-Mead Award for lifetime achievement in social psychology from the American Sociological Association Section on Social Psychology and the 2005 Lifetime Achievement Award from the Section on Sociology of Emotions. She has served as President of the Southern Sociological Society, Vice-President of the American Sociological Association, and Chair of the American Sociological Association Sections on the Sociology of Emotion and on Social Psychology. Her research examines the relationships among identity, action, and emotion.

Kimberly B. Rogers is an assistant professor of sociology at Dartmouth College. Kimberly’s publications examine behavioral and emotional responses to stereotyped groups, compare consensus in identity sentiments within and between cultures, explore emotions as both symptoms and sources of inequality, and review the interdependent cultural, relational, situational, and biological mechanisms of emotion construction. Her recent work applies a Bayesian generalization of affect control theory to explore variation and dynamic fluctuation in identity meanings during social interaction, to show how stable patterns of interaction can emerge from uncertain perceptions of identities, and to explore the potential for gradual meaning change through social experience.

Katie R. James is an assistant professor at the University of Southern Mississippi. She holds a joint appointment in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology as well as the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies. Her research examines the relationship between gender and justice particularly in the realm of unpaid labor. She has explored these issues in the home, the workplace, and schools. Her current work examines the psychological consequences of participation in elder care.

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