Research Opportunities

Abstract

Social psychology offers abundant opportunities for developing new understandings through research. In my career, many people and circumstances have brought opportunities that initiated, supported, and improved investigations. I illustrate that process with selected instances from my research on interpersonal behavior, theory development, and applications of theoretical work. Our field demonstrates many ways that explicit theory is preferable to common sense, and it also shows the importance of caution and discipline in applying theoretical knowledge for practical ends. Among current opportunities to extend social psychological understanding are developing ways to reduce the status value of certain characteristics and tracking the natural growth and decay of other status characteristics. I hope that social psychologists will become less reticent about sharing our skills, particularly in consulting to businesses and to government on policy formation.

Keywords

theory building modeling applied research gender changing status value experiments

I. Introduction, Acknowledgements, Opportunities

Thank you, Alison, for seeing the person I wish I could be. I feel humbled and grateful to receive this wonderful award.

To paraphrase a song, I get by with a lot of help from my friends. First is Joseph Berger. Joe and I have written a few papers together, but more important, for 50 years we have talked through many ideas and plans. My interest in social psychology developed at the Department of Sociology at Stanford University, and I continue to benefit from friends there. Sheldon Stryker accepted my first paper (Webster 1969) at Sociometry (which became Social Psychology Quarterly); he provided guidance on how to cut the manuscript by a third, the part he called “fat.” I thank my colleagues, collaborators, and friends Lisa Slattery Walker and Joseph Whitmeyer at UNC Charlotte, Jane Sell at Texas A&M University, and Alison Bianchi at University of Iowa. The National Science Foundation supported nearly all of my empirical research, starting with a Dissertation Improvement Grant. So many people have helped me along this journey that I won’t name everyone here, but I hope I have thanked you in person and that you know I am grateful.

Almost all of my work has been collaborative, so please remember that some of these ideas came from collaborators.¹ Collaboration has so many intellectual benefits that I am mystified when deans and tenure committees demand solo-authored papers. My collaborators have always been people smarter than myself, a strategy I highly recommend. Find collaborators who know things that you do not know and who are forthright when they disagree with you.

My topic is research opportunities, and the theme is that opportunities for social psychologists are endless. I illustrate opportunities by describing how they facilitated my work and outline some opportunities that others might pursue. I use my own work for illustration because it is what I know best.

Social psychologists can find opportunities everywhere: from other people, new theoretical developments, new technologies and measures, and events in society and professional discourse. Those four sources of opportunities—people, theories, technologies, and events—have furthered my work.

In Part II, I describe research on social interaction, focusing on one continuing line of empirical research involving others’ opinions and the self. Following that (Part III), I describe some studies of theory development. Next, in Part IV, I describe some applied work in which my collaborators and I applied theories to illuminate natural processes and engineer desirable outcomes. The value and uses of applied work also receive some attention. The final section, Part V, contains some thoughts on changing status value, the place of experimental research, the importance of spreading social psychological insights and knowledge, and some of my view of our future.

II. Studies of Evaluation and Interaction

Like most of us, I have long been interested in relations between individuals and social structures, and particularly in how a social context shapes thoughts and behavior.² Self-concept comes from others’ opinions, and self-evaluation is a part of that. I have been concerned with understanding how the processes work, from research on sources in the 1960s to contemporary theory and research on second-order expectations.

Sources of Evaluations

My first empirical work can be traced to the scholars after whom this award is named. Charles Horton Cooley (1902) and George Herbert Mead (1934), as well as generations of social psychologists, established that self-definitions are distinctly social; the social context forms and defines the individual through reflected appraisals. The self-concept forms through interaction with others and is maintained not solely by oneself but also by how others act.³

In graduate school, I studied Berger’s (1958) abstract view of interaction sequences in task-focused discussion groups such as the Bales groups (Bales 1950, 1983, 1999). Bales’s goal was to measure interaction and capture as much as possible of its complexity using the famous 12-category system. Berger’s approach, in contrast, was to simplify and conceptualize interaction abstractly.

Interaction may begin with an action opportunity, an implicit or explicit invitation to participate. An action opportunity may instigate a performance output, an attempt to move toward a problem solution. That is followed by a unit evaluation—“good idea” or “bad idea”—and at some point unit evaluations generalize into performance expectations, ideas of task ability: “He knows how to do this” or “He doesn’t understand this task” (Berger et al. 1966; Shelly 1997). Expectations then determine future interaction patterns and small-group inequality structures. The unit evaluation process appeared to be crucial in shaping interaction and establishing group structure.

I reasoned that someone outside a task group could affect expectations, interaction, and structure if that person could affect the unit evaluation process; call that person a source of evaluations (Webster 1969). A putatively highly skilled evaluator could affect expectations through expressed judgments, while an evaluator thought to have low skill was likely to be ignored. Barbara Sobieszek initiated a collaboration, and we verified and then extended the theory to cases of multiple evaluators who either agree or disagree and to cases where an evaluator’s ability is unknown but whose status is known (Webster and Sobieszek 1974).

The most general outcome of the source research is that whether an outsider’s evaluative opinions are effective depends largely on how competent the evaluator is thought to be. That leaves open what could be called the “coach phenomenon.” Most coaches could not outperform their trainees. Crundall and Foddy (1981) generalized the source theory to include experience, seeing a large number of performances as a reason that someone could be a source.

A further question might be called the “top of the pyramid” phenomenon. People at the pinnacle of achievement often seem to have fragile self-concepts. I suspect that reveals difficulty in finding evaluators whom they accept. If one is the best in the world, or close to it, whose opinions matter to maintain that self-concept? Since the self-concept needs opinions of sources to be maintained, we might expect people at the top to have unstable self-images, and that might produce defensiveness or excessive testing and seeking validation. I hope that someone will want to investigate this systematically.

Second-Order Expectations

Years later, I returned to these issues, but with more powerful theoretical tools. Two crucial theoretical advances were (1) the graph formulation of status characteristics theory (Berger et al. 1977) and (2) the idea that connections between status elements in a graph may have variable lengths, representing variable “strength” of effects on status generalization (Fisek, Berger, and Norman 1995). Those tools make it possible to represent status situations visually and calculate expectations precisely for empirical testing.

In source theory, evaluations come from an outside evaluator. A somewhat different process involves expressed opinions from an interactant, as when a task group member says, “I think you are doing better at this than I am.” Call that a second-order expectation. Basically, the issue is to understand when interactants will incorporate each other’s expressed opinions about how well they are doing a task, that is, when second-order expectations will affect first-order expectations. Joseph Whitmeyer, a mathematician as well as a sociologist, and I developed a model combining first- and second-order expectations (Webster and Whitmeyer 1999, 2002).

Second-order situations can be represented in a graph model status diagram using standard conventions with variable length paths for second-order expectations. Actors p and o (person and other) may possess differentiating or equating diffuse status characteristics (Ds) that become connected to task outcomes T+ and T– (task success or failure) through status generalization processes. Then second-order information that o imputes connects p and o to states of C*, task ability, and those connections have variable lengths depending on how much credence p puts in o’s opinion. The model that Whitmeyer and I developed predicts the length of the variable line, depending on conditions of the situation.

Two variant models also can be represented this way, one by Fisek, Berger, and Moore (2002) and one by Troyer, Kalkhoff and Younts (Kalkhoff, Younts, and Troyer 2011; Troyer and Younts 1997). The models presume somewhat different processes and make somewhat different predictions.⁴ We now have multiple experiments from slightly different designs and widely different populations. Lisa Walker and I are working with Lisa Troyer, Hamit Fisek, and particularly Will Kalkhoff to clarify the kinds of situations where each model does the best job of predicting outcomes. There is certainly opportunity for others to work with second-order expectations.

Theoretical and Common Sense Models

We have always been convinced of the value of theoretically grounded models rather than common sense for the second-order process—in fact, for every social process. Theorists sometimes face criticism that they are complicating what “everyone knows already.” Because theoretical models take a bit of intellectual work to understand, common sense might seem more appealing. The problem is that common sense predictions sometimes are wrong, and when that happens, we have no clear way to know why. (In contrast, when a theory’s predictions get disconfirmed, we have established ways to correct it by modifying initial conditions and assumptions.)

Lisa (Rashotte) Walker, Joseph Whitmeyer, and I modeled ten common sense ideas on reflected appraisals and compared them to the three theoretical models (Webster, Rashotte, and Whitmeyer 2008). Common sense explanations include “Hyacinth,” whereby only opinions of high-status people matter; “Clouds of Glory,” which predicts that only opinions from a young person are valued; and ingroup preference, outgroup preference, and a Ralph Waldo Emerson—type self-directed approach. Once they were stated explicitly as models, none of the common sense explanations did as well at predicting the data as did any of the three theoretical models.

What does our model-testing exercise show? Not that the common sense explanations are wrong. I believe, in fact, that all ten of them probably are correct—sometimes. The problem is that each of them is correct only under certain conditions, and we don’t know what those conditions are. That is a problem with unconditional prediction. Common sense ideas might claim to be correct in all cases and all circumstances, but of course they are not. An important part of a theorist’s work is specifying conditions under which the theory can make predictions and other conditions under which the theory is indeterminate. Berger (1974), Walker and Cohen (1985), Thye (2014), Foschi (1997), and Tootell and colleagues (Tootell, Bianchi, and Munroe 1998), among others, have clarified the value of explicitly stating conditions and making conditional predictions.

The appeal of common sense models, theories, or partial explanations lies precisely in their ambiguity. Paradoxically, the less precisely an idea is stated, the easier it is to think of instances of it. Common sense is seldom stated precisely, and for just that reason, it is appealing. We have all seen instances of it. Vague statements might seem alluring, but they communicate very little. The philosopher Karl Popper ([1935] 2002) wrote that the information value of a sentence—that is, what it tells us—is a function of the number of observations that potentially could disconfirm it; Movahedi and Ogles (1973) adapted that definition for sociology. Vague statements are hard to disconfirm, and for that reason, their information value is low.⁵

III. Working with Theories

Making Ideas Explicit, Clear, Testable, and Generalizable

Many sociology programs, even graduate programs (Markovsky 2008), omit any use of simple logic or mathematics. As a consequence, students sometimes say that formal theories, and especially mathematical formulations, are “hard.” I believe the opposite is true. The goals of theory building include making clear the basic structure of ideas, removing ambiguity, making it easier to share ideas, and extending explanations to cover more cases. Those are goals of my work on theory.

Formalization

Richard Savage, a probability mathematician, proposed formalizing the first version of the source theory.⁶ The result provides an alternate view of the theory, improves its logical structure, and produces quantitative rather than ordinal predictions for experimental data (Savage and Webster 1972). That’s a lot of improvement from a simple theoretical exercise!

Abstract Concepts and Theories

David Willer offered to collaborate on a paper about what we saw as sociology’s need for more abstract theory (Willer and Webster 1970). We suggested using abduction, an iterative process of induction and deduction, to get from concrete phenomena to abstract concepts.⁷ Timmermans and Tavory (2012; Tavory and Timmermans 2014) now provide greater detail on the abductive process. Contemporary collections of abstract general theory include Burke (2006), DeLamater and Ward (2013), and Lawler, Thye, and Yoon (2016).

Reductionism

In the 1970s, some sociologists wrote that all sociology and social psychology can be explained by principles of psychological theory; in other words, sociology can be reduced to psychology. An extreme reductionist view would deny that there are any opportunities in social psychology; opportunities would remain only in psychology. But after studying philosophers and sociologists, I concluded that (1) psychological principles do not adequately explain social phenomena and (2) it would take a great deal of work, as yet not even begun, to demonstrate even a limited reduction of one sociological explanation (Webster 1973). The lack of any demonstrated reduction to date shows the difficulty and complexity of the task, and I remain convinced that it is very unlikely. I hold the same view regarding claims to explain all social behavior with principles of economics. In other words, the fields of social psychology and sociology both constitute opportunities to better understand the social world.

Creating and Spreading Status Beliefs

Probably everyone who studies status has wondered how status beliefs come to exist. If, say, gender and race were simply nominal characteristics without status value, many problems that vex our societies would vanish. Ridgeway (1991) pioneered theory on how status differences can come into being and to spread and persist, and she has worked steadily extending the theory. One idea in her early theory was that a regular difference in exchangeable resources of interacting groups is sufficient to create status beliefs. If one group, say, males, commonly controls more wealth, that resource inequality can create beliefs about general worth and competence that attach to members of the gender groups. To Ridgeway’s impressive theoretical foundation, Stuart Hysom and I offered modest generalizations (Webster and Hysom 1998). First, the inequality across groups need not be exchangeable, as money is; status-valued or prestigious objects should suffice. Second, interaction itself may create status beliefs. I am pleased to say that research by Ridgeway and colleagues (e.g., Ridgeway and Erickson 2000) and Hysom (2009; Hysom, Webster, and Walker 2015) partially confirms those ideas.⁸

A second route was proposed by Berger and Fisek (2006): status can spread from existing status characteristics to new unevaluated characteristics. For instance, if new immigrants from Country X are lower than natives on education and occupational prestige, the low-status value from those characteristics can spread and attach low status to the group of X-ers. Comparable processes can spread positive status value to other groups. Experimental tests confirmed that process (Walker, Webster, and Bianchi 2011). So we have two explicit theories of how status characteristics get created: (1) through differences in possessions and interaction patterns and (2) through spread of status value from established status characteristics. The two theories have minor differences in scope of applicability, and they have much overlap. Both offer great opportunities for research.

Fixed Roles and Situated Actions

A few years ago, Lisa (Rashotte) Walker and I had an opportunity to clarify what we see as very different views of where gender differences come from, how they affect behavior, and what maintains them (Webster and Rashotte 2009).⁹ The older view, tracing from structural functionalism, holds that women and men act differently because from birth we are trained to display different behaviors, attitudes, and interests. This is rooted in the family division of labor, where father is the task specialist and mother is the social-emotional specialist. He earns money, establishes and enforces rules, and maintains order. She comforts, remembers birthdays and anniversaries, writes thank-you notes, and manages feelings. That role differentiation was thought to be so important to social systems that it is oversocialized. Men and women have trouble understanding how each other thinks. Men have trouble accessing feelings and expressing nurturance, and women have trouble speaking assertively and initiating directives.

Whatever its other merits, the older view is deficient in its evidential base. Evidence shows that people are more skillful and adaptable than such a dichotomous view presumes. A newer situational view sees task and social-emotional behaviors as within the repertoires of most people but evoked in different circumstances. One circumstance is status position: high-status behavior is proactive and task focused; low-status behavior is reactive and social-emotional.

Research by Gerber (1996) shows this. Among two-person police car teams, status is seniority. The more senior officer typically is seen by both officers as “a take-charge guy,” the one who immediately gets down to business, sometimes frightening or antagonizing citizens or hurting their feelings. The lower status officer is more sympathetic and caring and manages socioemotional issues for the team. Importantly, those findings come from all-male police teams. In other words, a man in a low-status position is fully capable of activating and displaying the socioemotional, nurturing behaviors that the older view would say are almost impossible for him to access because of his socialization.

On the other side, consider the well-known women who have occupied high-status positions: three former U.S. secretaries of state and several CEOs of Fortune 500 companies. Does anyone doubt that they can display assertiveness and task focus? The general point is that many behaviors that the older view would say are learned and overlearned and inextricably tied to gender are better understood as consequences of status position. Put a person—male or female—in a low-status position, and you will see deferent behaviors, communal motivations, and socioemotional expressions. Put a person, even the same person, in a high-status position, and you will see task focus, individual initiative, and influential behaviors.¹⁰

An additional point is that behaviors that actually are guided by structural positions often get interpreted as personality traits. The lower status police officer in Gerber’s study was seen as having a caring personality and the partner as having a dominant personality. Wagner (2015) conducted an experiment in which observers rated personality traits of people in either high-status or low-status positions. Observers attributed instrumental traits to targets described as high status and expressive traits to those in low-status positions. Thus, we see how structural position can create what others call personality traits. And because those behaviors are expressions of social position rather than of trans-situational traits, when a person moves to a new position, the behaviors and imputed personalities will show corresponding changes.

The “fixed gender roles” approach has led to some well-meaning but flawed remedies. One was teaching women to act assertively, particularly in business.¹¹ Leaving aside the demeaning implication that there is something wrong with women that needs fixing, I note that those programs often have unanticipated negative consequences. The problem is that they only address women’s beliefs and actions; they don’t treat men’s beliefs about appropriate behavior of women. If women act in unexpected ways—displaying confidence or even (gasp!) interrupting speakers, they are likely to stir resentment and legitimacy concerns, and social control efforts arise to restore what is seen as appropriate—that is, low-status—behavior. As social psychologists, we know that when the problem is an interaction situation, if you are going to intervene, you need to treat all participants to the interaction. A successful approach would modify the social situation, not try to “fix” only some individuals within it while leaving others unchanged.

IV. Applications

Classroom Expectations

Doris R. Entwisle invited me to work in applied research when she observed that ideas about interaction sequences might have applications in school classrooms. Students attempt to solve problems, teachers and students distribute evaluations, teachers and students form expectations for the likely quality of students’ future performances, and expectations affect future interaction patterns. We conducted six studies (e.g., Webster and Entwisle 1976) in schools in Baltimore. By giving children positive unit evaluations, as the theory predicts, we were able to raise expectations for the selected children, and those raised expectations led to increased participation rates, a behavior that is recognized to improve learning outcomes.¹²

After our work together, Doris continued to study expectation effects in schools with other collaborators. In one striking finding from their work, parents’ expectations for their children correlated positively with standard tests of reading level and with reading marks, conduct marks, and work habits as rated by teachers and correlated negatively with absences and academic referrals (Entwisle, Alexander, and Olson 1997). Parents’ expectations were measured just once, right before first grade, and those effects are still visible at the fifth grade. Parents’ expectations probably correlate with other unmeasured factors, and we might predict that they would affect parent—child interactions and children’s self-expectations for school success.

Beauty, Sexual Orientation, and Occupation as Statuses

Another applied study tested a theoretical explanation for the wide range of benefits, both admirable and otherwise, that beauty confers. James E. Driskell and I believed that the benefits would make sense if beauty were a diffuse status characteristic and status generalization produced high expectations for attractive people (Webster and Driskell 1983). To test the idea, we constructed questionnaires with photos, previously judged highly attractive or highly unattractive, and asked respondents to estimate various specific and general skills.

Results show that beauty is indeed a status characteristic, affecting both general and specific performance expectations. The world favors pretty people because in task situations, they seem to perform better (among other reasons). Recent studies of beauty’s effects (Frevert and Walker 2014; Jackson, Hunter, and Hodge 1995) document new consequences, including higher wages, success in civil lawsuits, and marketing, and those findings are complemented by studies showing comparable effects of height and other personal characteristics.

Sexual Orientation and Occupation

Johnson (1995) analyzed stereotypes of gay people and showed that many stereotypes include the same notions as diffuse status characteristics. Following that lead, Elise Fullmer, Stuart Hysom, and I assessed status beliefs associated with sexual orientation and occupation by modifying the design used for the beauty research (Webster, Hysom, and Fullmer 1998). Here, we took advantage of the factorial vignette technique that Rossi (1979) and Jasso (2003, 2006) developed for studying comparison processes. Vignettes included sexual orientation and occupation in describing target individuals and the questionnaire measure of status beliefs. Respondents were students at San Francisco State University (SFSU) and at University of North Carolina (UNC) Charlotte. Status beliefs did indeed attach to orientations as well as to occupations. Both male and female gay target persons were rated lower on intelligence, reading ability, and “things that you think count in this world.”

Also the status effect for orientation was just as strong among SFSU students as among UNC Charlotte students. This is not surprising since status processes take place below the level of consciousness. Status operates through a different mechanism than attitudes or expressions of tolerance. Changing historical circumstances, including legal and cultural developments, create opportunities for more research on status processes associated with sexual orientation, as I mention in the following.

Status Aspects of Race

Race in America has complicated historical, moral, legal, economic, cultural, and many other aspects, but here I only address one aspect: race carries status advantages and disadvantages. Because of that, I have long been interested in applying what we know about status processes to find ways to control unwanted status generalization from race.

James Driskell and I conducted experiments with white women in South Carolina who we told and showed on video that their partners were African American (Webster and Driskell 1978). (Video was then just becoming practical for laboratory use.) In a baseline condition, the white women formed high self-expectations and low expectations for their partners. In other conditions, we introduced specific ability statuses and showed that the black partner had performed highly on them. As predicted, that treatment overcame unwanted status generalization from race.

Recently, Lisa Walker, Sharon Doerer, and I (2014) developed interventions for discussion groups of white and African American women, taking advantage of another technology, computer controlled action opportunities. Our goal was to intervene in the interaction process itself to affect expectations and influence. We adapted a setting developed by Goar and Sell (2005). In the control condition, as expected, black women participated less often and had less influence over group decisions. In an experimental condition, the computer distributed action opportunities and increased the participation rate of the black women. Sure enough, that increased participation raised expectations for the black women and increased their influence over group decisions. We hope to study other interaction components to see whether those also affect expectations and group structure.

Types of Applied Research

Thinking about applied research led Joseph Whitmeyer and me to analyze applications that had grown out of several theoretical research programs (Webster and Whitmeyer 2001; Whitmeyer 2004). We identified five sorts of applications. The simplest is interpretation, showing that some outcome can reasonably be considered an instance of a general case. The most complex is full social engineering, designing a social system according to theoretical principles to achieve a desired outcome.

Among our concerns were to note the value of the simpler types of application and to recommend proceeding through the five stages rather than jumping immediately to full engineering. The problem with jumping to full engineering is that if something doesn’t work as intended, there is usually no way to tell what went wrong or how to fix it. In this we agree with the sociologist and university president Teresa Sullivan (2012:2) who wrote in a somewhat different context:

I have been described as an incrementalist. It is true. Sweeping action may be gratifying and may create the aura of strong leadership, but its unintended consequences may lead to costs that are too high to bear.

Social engineering, like all engineering, requires understanding interrelated processes and structures. At present, we are far from having complete theoretical understandings, so it is wise to intervene incrementally and assess the effects of each intervention. Dobbin (2009:21), writing about equal opportunity programs in business, observed the following:

One of the most surprising things about the compliance regimes that corporations popularized is that they remain largely untested. They spread among firms, and were vetted by courts, without evidence of their efficacy in equalizing opportunity. We still know little about whether the recruitment programs of the 1960s, the performance evaluations of the 1970s, the harassment grievance procedures of the 1980s, the diversity training of the 1990s, or the diversity councils of the 2000s actually helped to integrate workplaces.

So we do not know what desirable effects the programs may have had, nor do we know what unintended negative consequences they may have created. That sounds like a problem waiting to happen.

V. New Opportunities, Challenges, and Hopes

Losing Status Value

Many of us hope that some present-day status characteristics will lose their status connotations.¹³ Gender, race, beauty, sexual orientation, occupation, education, motherhood, and other characteristics would then simply be descriptive terms without connotations of inequality. This suggests two sorts of research opportunities. First, the theories of status construction and spread of status value predict not only how a characteristic can acquire status value but how it can lose status value. The analyses have been partially verified empirically and might be useful in devising interventions for particular situations. For instance, Lucas (2003) improved acceptance of women team leaders in a simulated organizational setting by modifying gender-based status beliefs.

Second, even without intervention, there are reasons to think that the status beliefs associated with some characteristics may be changing due to legal, cultural, and regulatory developments. Institutional changes usually then change cultural beliefs, and of course, changes in other cultural forces may further change institutional logics. Thornton and Ocasio (2008) describe mechanisms. Measurement techniques already existing, including interaction designs and questionnaires, could be used to track the historical decline of status value of some characteristics as well as the acquisition of status value by other characteristics.¹⁴

Experiments

Surprisingly, misconceptions persist about the use of experimental methods in social psychology. The general misconception is that experimental results tell little about natural situations because the laboratory is artificial, results are not generalizable, and laboratory experiments lack external validity. Some have said that those objections invalidate the method and the findings it generates. But any serious examination of the objections shows that they are not well grounded.

Those worries might apply for hypotheses lacking theoretical foundation, what Zelditch (2013) called “effect experiments” of the 1940s and 1950s. But most contemporary experiments in social psychology test predictions derived from general theories. Given appropriate initial conditions, theories can predict to a laboratory and to a natural setting such as a school or business organization. Entwisle’s research, mentioned previously, adapted ideas from laboratory experiments on sources of evaluation to school settings. Laboratory tests had confirmed predictions of source theory, and Entwisle subsequently confirmed other predictions derived from that theory in a natural setting. If predictions are confirmed in a laboratory, then we have some confidence that related predictions from the same theory will be confirmed in natural settings also. Direct generalization of findings is never the goal. Theory bridges the gap from laboratory to, for instance, a school or a business organization.

Artificiality, far from invalidating findings, is actually a great advantage of experimental work. It allows an experimenter to create features of important situations that occur rarely or unpredictably in natural settings. Again, the goal is to create abstract features of natural settings, guided by theoretical principles, not to try to reproduce a natural situation in all its historical complexity. Theories abstract features of natural settings. Experiments test theories. Theories explain phenomena that occur in the laboratory and that also occur in natural settings.

There is by now a considerable literature dealing with uses of experimental methods in social science. Artificiality, external validity, and generalizability are not simple matters, and thoughtful treatments of those and other topics are available. Many of us have considered issues related to experiments (see the Online Appendix). Discussion becomes more valuable when we can move beyond rehashing the same few criticisms and consider new developments and issues that they raise.

Outreach

Jonathan H. Turner (1998) has argued with characteristic style and energy for developing social engineering, a term he recognized suffers from negative connotations. I understand it to mean showing how theoretical knowledge can be used to alleviate social problems. Social psychologists have considerable knowledge that would benefit others and society, yet in comparison with other disciplines, it seems to me we have been strangely reticent to promote our expertise. Two areas where we could usefully share expertise are consulting to businesses and improving social policy.

Business consultants are overwhelmingly trained in psychology, so they naturally bring a psychological perspective to analyses. Those analyses would benefit from including social structures and social definitions. I have already mentioned misguided programs to teach women to act more assertively. Recent misuses of psychology, and particularly the facile use of psychological testing, can produce ineffective or sometimes harmful recommendations. Recently, many companies have become concerned to promote women and people of color to managerial and executive positions. One large company that I know of hired consultants to identify barriers. Not surprisingly, the consultants identified two problems that I would call “bad attitudes” and “deficient personalities.” First, the consultants concluded that many supervisors had prejudicial attitudes, as revealed by their responses on an Implicit Attitudes Test. The proposed solution: identify the attitudes and tell the supervisors to change them. Second, promotion candidates often seemed to lack the combination of personality traits of the company’s top management, as shown by a modification of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. The solution: administer the MBTI to all employees and promote the ones, if any, who show the same personality types as current managers.

What’s missing is any recognition of the importance of social structure and one’s position within it. As a general rule, if someone is in a supervisory position, he or she is likely to activate habits of control, cognitive efficiency, and single-minded pursuit of goals. If someone is in a subordinate position, that person is likely to display caution and uncertainty and await direction from above. And crucially, if a person moves from a subordinate position to a superordinate one, his or her behaviors and cognitive traits will adjust to the demands of the new situation. In other words, do what the army has done. Designate women, African Americans, and Hispanics as team leaders. You will see that they act effectively in those positions. More importantly, if a leadership position is legitimized, as it is in the army, team members will respond appropriately and accept guidance from the leader. But from a purely individual perspective, the importance of social structure and the flexibility of humans are harder to see. Business consultants need some structural understanding, and I hope that social psychologists will want to help businesses more successfully address the real problems that they have.

The government also needs us. Politicians and other policy makers often automatically look to economists, even for questions that have been studied for years by sociologists and social psychologists.¹⁵ Economists may naturally see things through their standard theories: markets are highly efficient and individuals know what they want and always act to maximize their payoffs. While that economic viewpoint clarifies many situations, it is incomplete. For instance, justice and injustice fall outside its explanatory realm. But social psychologists have a good understanding of the sources and consequences of feelings of justice and could be helpful (e.g., Hegtvedt 2006; Hegtvedt and Isom 2014; Jasso 2007; Jasso and Rossi 1977). Emotions (e.g., Stets and Turner 2014) also are absent from economic theory, but emotions interact with most economic phenomena, including negotiations, housing prices, gambling, and jobs.¹⁶ Overall, I believe that the design of social programs and policy in many areas could be better formed by including advice from sociologists and social psychologists.

Some Thoughts along the Journey

First, opportunities abound. I have found enough important and intriguing questions to occupy many lifetimes, and almost always, solving a set of problems uncovers exciting new questions.

Second, everyone brings fresh ideas and insights. Our section, our discipline, and the world’s intellectual society contain many brilliant, generous individuals. The world of ideas is not zero sum; it is synergistic.

Third, incremental work pays off.¹⁷ Building on and extending our own and others’ work almost always leads to the growth of knowledge. I am proud to have contributed to the body of work on status processes and to be part of distributed networks of social psychologists.

Fourth, dismiss superficial naysayers. People who haven’t read or thought in much depth may say that sociology can be reduced to psychology or economics. If we look at the question closely, it becomes obvious that’s wrong. Other people who haven’t bothered to read about experimental methods may say that experiments are artificial and lack external validity. Again, if we examine the issue seriously, those objections lose force.

When Brian Powell called to tell me I would receive this award for lifetime achievement, I thought, “I haven’t done enough yet.” I still feel that way, but lately I’ve been focusing on the word yet. The work is even more exciting than when I began this journey, and there are so many more puzzles that I hope to explore.

Social psychology is only a little over a century old, if we count from Cooley’s book (1902) or from the first book in sociology with that title by E. A. Ross (1908). The years have seen great advances in understanding through development of theoretical research programs and new research techniques. Many theories now are stated explicitly and make precise enough predictions that they can be tested and extended. We have new data collection methods and have improved some of the older methods. And we have a variety of analytic techniques and statistics. Progress has been remarkable, and it is accelerating. Our future looks bright.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I thank the members of the Cooley-Mead Award Committee: Brian Powell, Robert K. Shelly, Gary Oates, Monica Johnson, Gary Alan Fine, and Deborah Carr. NSF grant SES-1260342 partly supported preparation of this manuscript. Lisa Troyer, Linda George, and the SPQ Editors provided thoughtful comments that are incorporated here. All views, conclusions, and interpretations are solely the author’s.

Supplemental Material

Additional supporting information may be found at .

1

Space prevents me from describing all of my collaborations. I am grateful to everyone who has agreed to work with me.

2

Merolla et al. (2012) expand this idea, showing effects of social structure on identity and identity change.

3

Ralph H. Turner showed me that Cooley adapted his well-known lines on the looking glass self from the American poet of individualism, . Cooley’s view contrasts sharply with Emerson’s—Emerson praised the person who forms a self independently of others’ opinions—but perhaps Cooley thought that readers would recognize the stanza.

4

Troyer and colleagues also studied effects of different motivations, which I do not consider here.

5

Reviewers of research proposals sometimes ask, “What possible pattern of results would lead the investigator to conclude that the theoretical argument was wrong?” For a vague theory, almost any outcome can seem to be confirmatory, so the information value of research—what we learn from testing such a theory—is close to zero.

6

I replied to a letter from Savage after some famous sociologists to whom he previously wrote ignored him. Their loss, my opportunity.

7

provides a full description of abduction in theory building.

8

showed additional effects of status-valued objects. In that research, poker chips previously held by individuals of different status positions themselves acquired measurable status value.

9

Meeker and O’Neill (1977) showed that many supposed gender differences were better understood as status differences. Johnson, Clay-Warner, and Funk (1996) found few behavioral differences between all-male and all-female discussion groups. Work of those scholars is foundational for our analysis.

10

Burke, Stets, and Cerven (2007) showed that placing someone with a gender status disadvantage in a position of legitimate authority partially counteracts effects of status disadvantage. showed that role-taking skill varies by social position, being higher among low status individuals. Several articles in the special issue of SPQ, September 1996, deal with issues of gender, status, and behavior.

11

Ellen Pao, an executive at a venture capital firm, was passed over for promotion. She claimed that she was told she did not participate aggressively enough in meetings. The New York Times reported () that the company offered to enroll her in a course to teach her to interrupt more.

12

The improvement in interaction was larger than the consistent but small positive effects found in many studies of self-esteem. The explanation may lie in differing operational measures of self-esteem, many of which include liking oneself along with thinking highly of one’s performances. Only the latter is close to the idea of performance expectations. Another difference is that expectations are relative to others in a group such as in a particular classroom or study team, while self-esteem is usually conceptualized as an individual trait.

13

It is important to remember that not all status generalization is undesirable. When status position corresponds to performance capability, it can improve functioning of task groups. A professor of computer science may well know more than a student about how to fix problems with a program, and if they interacted as equals, problem solution would take much longer. In complex, dangerous situations where immediate compliance with directives is crucial, status can enhance a leader’s ability to control and coordinate a large team.

14

For instance, public opinion has changed on the question of same-sex marriage. Is that change accompanied by change in the status value of sexual orientation?

15

One reason for choosing economists is probably that economics has a Nobel Prize. That is a highly status-valued goal object, and we have some theoretical understanding of effects such objects will have on performance expectations. Another reason may be a view that sociologists have designed some social programs that didn’t work well or that produced effects that some politicians disliked. Whatever the reasons, I believe that our government would benefit from more input from sociologists and social psychologists.

16

I do not mean that all economists are uninterested in emotion or that they believe emotions do not exist. Some have noted the importance of emotions and have begun to model their effects (e.g., Loewenstein 2000). Standard microeconomic theories, however, do not incorporate emotions. Scholars studying behavioral economics (e.g., ) acknowledge incompleteness of standard microeconomic theories; in fact, that specialty grows from experimental results that do not show the maximizing behavior at the core of those theories. In other words, the field grew from findings where the standard theories are disconfirmed. Disconfirmation is most useful as a starting point for developing better theories. To me, that means including social psychological phenomena in the maximizing assumptions of economic theories.

17

“Transformative” (a current buzzword) ideas usually haven’t gone anywhere, and sometimes they have led to pernicious outcomes. Eugenics and social Darwinism were transformative and pernicious. Other transformative fads were just silly; they wasted sociologists’ time and diminished our authority.

Bio

Murray Webster, Jr. studied sociology and social psychology at Stanford University with three future recipients of the Cooley-Mead award: Joseph Berger, Bernard P. Cohen, and Morris Zelditch, Jr. He studied at UCLA with two more: Ralph H. Turner and Melvin Seeman. None of them and none of the other recipients and future recipients whom he has been privileged to know and to learn from bears responsibility for any misdirections in his work. Currently he is a professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Besides regular and visiting appointments at other universities, he has twice served as program director for sociology at the National Science Foundation and has served on its regular and dissertation review panels. He lectures and conducts workshops on proposal preparation. Webster’s Cooley-Mead address describes some research on status and expectation state processes, theory building, and applying social psychological principles to natural settings.

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