Abstract
Gillian Brock, Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)
Brock’s book makes a significant contribution to the flourishing debate on global justice. The book has the structure of a spiral, with the first part outlining a set of core principles of global justice, the second exploring their implementation through various policies, and the third returning to theoretical issues, refining the core principles in light of the preceding, more practical discussions. A good way to summarize the book’s main claims is by considering how it construes what it takes to be the best understanding of cosmopolitanism. The book identifies three common distinctions regarding cosmopolitanism, and takes a specific stance within the conceptual space delimited by them. The first distinction is between ‘moral’ and ‘institutional’ cosmopolitanism (11–12, 315–16). The former is the idea that all human persons are equal sources of moral concern and respect for everyone. The latter affirms that all human beings should live under a common set of political institutions. Brock, like most players in the debate of global justice, endorses moral cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, she rejects the idea that there should be a world state. To that extent she does not endorse ‘institutional cosmopolitanism’ in a common (and in fact not very helpful), extreme understanding of that term. But she does not think that we can really accept moral cosmopolitanism without entertaining important institutional transformations, including the creation of new international institutions and the reform of existing ones. Even if we stop short of a world state (as we should given that for the foreseeable future it would either be infeasible to create or if it could be created it would cause more harm than good), we should pursue multiple institutional reforms that advance cosmopolitan goals. In the second part of the book, Brock explores several possibilities, including, among many other examples, the reform of international regimes of taxation and finance, the need for international agreements and agencies to secure fair policies regarding immigration and aid, and the reform of powerful existing international institutions such as the World Trade Organization. This renders Brock’s cosmopolitan approach (as she puts it) a ‘quasi-institutional’ one.
Another common distinction is between ‘extreme’ and ‘moderate’ forms of cosmopolitanism (12–13, 316–17). This distinction in fact has two aspects, one concerning the justification, and the other the content, of principles of justice. Regarding justification, extreme cosmopolitans affirm, and moderate cosmopolitans deny, that all principles of justice must be defended by reference to cosmopolitan principles or values. Regarding content, extreme cosmopolitans affirm, and moderate cosmopolitans deny, that the content of all fundamental principles of justice applies to the global population at large rather than to the members of an individual society. Brock suggests that her position can be classified as moderate on both counts. She does not think, for example, that the value of all special relationships must be traced to cosmopolitan values. And she is open to moderate cosmopolitanism about content as well, although she does not explore this issue in the book. An important substantive issue related to this distinction, and one pursued vigorously in the book, concerns the extent and kind of room that we should give to special relationships among compatriots. Brock’s position imposes strong limits on national partiality, while also leaving considerable space for it. ‘Nations have internal and external responsibilities. So long as individuals within the nation are adequately respected and positioned to enjoy decent lives, and provided that nations play their part in the collective project of ensuring a globally just world, there is discretionary space for nations to pursue national aspirations’ (324).
There is a third, common distinction between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ cosmopolitanism (13, 316–18). On this distinction, strong cosmopolitans endorse principles of global justice that are egalitarian, such as those requiring equality of opportunity to access advantageous positions such as rewarding jobs, or a global version of Rawls’s difference principle demanding that we choose the feasible distribution in which the level of advantage of the worst-off is maximized. Weak cosmopolitans settle for less demanding principles focused on securing minimally decent lives for all. Brock’s positioning with respect to this distinction is interestingly complex. Her view is more demanding than the standard cases of weak cosmopolitanism. But it is not as strong as the standard examples of strong cosmopolitanism. The core substantive principle of her account of global justice says that ‘we should all be adequately positioned to enjoy the prospects for a decent life, which entails special attention to be given to enabling people to meet their basic needs, protecting basic freedom, ensuring fair terms of cooperation in collective endeavours, and social and political arrangements that secure these’ (299, see also 119, 286, 322 and 326). This principle involves a ‘minimum package’ (299) that may appear ‘weak’ when compared with the more ambitious demands of strict egalitarianism. But this does not make it weak in the standard sense. For example, Brock’s account of ‘basic needs’ is quite demanding, including: ‘(1) a certain amount of physical and mental health; (2) sufficient security to be able to act; (3) a sufficient level of understanding of what one is choosing between; (4) a certain amount of autonomy; and (5) decent social relations with at least some others’ (328). Furthermore, Brock thinks that the more ambitious egalitarian demands do not really involve desirable goals, and that in any case her own construal does capture the kind of equality ‘that matters’, which, she argues, is a version of ‘relational egalitarianism’ focused not on securing strict equality in the distribution of certain material advantages but on securing the conditions that prevent certain relations such as those involving domination. Thus Brock thinks that the distinction between weak and strong cosmopolitanism, as it is commonly used, fails to properly chart the complexity of the debate about the options of global justice. It is a good idea, she argues, that we distinguish between ‘distributive’ and ‘relational egalitarianism’, and notice that cosmopolitan views favoring the latter may be ‘weaker’ than those favoring the former, but not in a pejorative sense: they are as strong as is desirable.
This book has many virtues. It is clearly and lucidly written. It presents an excellent overview and critical assessment of many of the key recent contributions on global justice, and could be used as a reliable survey of many current debates. Although it is always risky for philosophers to attempt to make policy recommendations, the second part of the book actually includes many well-informed and interesting such recommendations. The theoretical parts of the book (the first and the third) fit nicely with those recommendations, and the book duly exploits the links between more theoretical and more practical considerations as beneficial to both. I disagree with some of the central substantive theoretical claims. Before turning to these disagreements, I want to emphasize that I find many key theoretical claims to be sound and their articulation quite illuminating. This is particularly the case regarding the discussion of the limits of nationalism, and the brief but important discussion of feasibility (in the last chapter of the book). 1
Let me turn to two disagreements with the book’s rejection of distributive egalitarianism.
(1) The metric of equality: global egalitarians demand that people across the globe be granted equal shares. But equal shares of what? This is a taxing issue for domestic egalitarians. But the difficulty in specifying the metric of equality is even harder for global egalitarians. This book claims that such egalitarians face a dilemma involving unpalatable options. Their ideal of global equality either will be (a) very abstract, in which case it will turn out to be ‘insufficiently attuned to cultural difference’, or it will be (b) more concrete, in which case it will be ‘too weak to rule out disadvantage and discrimination on morally arbitrary grounds’ (62). Brock illustrates this dilemma by referring to the attempt to apply the idea of fair equality of opportunity globally. Fair equality of opportunity is the demand that any two individuals with the same levels of ambition and natural talent should have the same opportunities to achieve positions of advantage. An example of (a) would be to say that two equally endowed and ambitious individuals should have equal prospects to be investment bankers, even if one of them is born in rural Mozambique and the other is the son of a Swiss banker. An example of (b) would be to say that individuals should have access to positions which are not identical, but which nonetheless exhibit comparable value in their respective contexts. 2 Taking (b) avoids the problem of (a), as there is no assumption that all should value the same specific positions. But it has the problem, according to Brock, that it takes for granted cultural configurations that may include unacceptable cultural patterns, such as those involving discrimination. Brock’s metric of advantage, focused on basic needs, would avoid these problems, as it both has broad global appeal and can serve to criticize some specific cultural practices.
Brock is correct to point out that global egalitarians face a formidable task when specifying the relevant metric of their theories, and she identifies important challenges that need to be addressed. However, I think that the dilemma articulating her discussion is spurious. First, the metric of basic needs that Brock identifies is, as she says, significantly demanding. An obvious consequence of this is that it may not be as broadly appealing as she thinks. This is not necessarily a problem if our criterion of value is not merely to be based on reporting what people already happen to value. Our account may often be critical of what people currently believe, and aim at what they could come to reasonably agree to. But if this is the case, then why not go for an account that is even more demanding than Brock’s? The second point is that we can identify demanding cases of both cases of (a) and (b) that do not involve the risks Brock mentions. In the case of jobs, we can construe a version of (b) that is coupled with critical standards that rule out discrimination and other violations of the equal moral standing of all persons. And we can imagine versions of (a) ranging over access to forms of education and health care that go beyond any threshold of decency (even the not so minimal ones identified by Brock) while also being obviously sound (from the point of view of value) for every person across the globe. In other words, plausible global egalitarian metrics that are more demanding than Brock’s are conceivable. They need not fall prey to cultural bias or imperialism, or defer to unjust conventions.
(2) The ‘ equality that matters’: I have just mentioned the idea of egalitarian distributions going beyond the ‘minimum package’ advocated in the book. But Brock says that we need to ask ourselves the question of what is ‘the kind of equality that matters’ (247, 298, 317). And she claims that combating certain inequalities is significant only to the extent that this is conducive to achieving the ‘relational equality’ that a conception of the kind recently advocated by Elizabeth Anderson suggests. Brock frames her discussion as follows: I ask: What kind of equality should a model of global justice be reflecting – what kind of equality is compelling? … Some have argued variously for equality of resources, welfare, capability, power, or for the elimination of brute luck in our lives (though each of these suggestions has also attracted much criticism). While all the elements listed above can have an important bearing on our equality, proponents sometimes neglect a view of equality, often called ‘relational equality’, that is more fundamental (because it illuminates why our equality matters). An account of relational equality better allows us to appreciate the role of these other considerations in promoting equality … A prominent version of relational equality is presented by Elizabeth Anderson in a theory she calls ‘democratic equality’ … [which] makes a centerpiece of standing to one another in relations that aim to eliminate inequalities of respect, recognition, and, importantly, power. A certain level of functioning, or at least the capability for the relevant functioning, is central to achieving this goal, but equality of resources, welfare, or luck are not in themselves the right objects on which to focus if we want to create the kinds of communities in which people stand in the relevant relations. Moreover, when people stand in relations that embody equality of respect, recognition, and power, they enjoy equal levels of the kind of positive freedom that matters (roughly, non-domination). The point is to bring people into certain kinds of relations so that we make available to everyone the prospects of a good life, as they see it, by enabling them to have the freedom to choose lives they think worthwhile. (298–9)
There are at least two problems with this approach. First, it is somewhat vague about the role of concerns about equality other than those tracking relational equality. There are at least three possibilities: (a) such concerns do not matter at all; (b) they matter but only instrumentally, as functional to securing relational equality; (c) they matter intrinsically but not singly, as relational equality also matters. Brock’s text does not clearly distinguish between these possibilities, and aspects of her discussion can be taken as illustrating all three of them.
Second, I think that the right view is (c), but unfortunately Brock’s discussion seems to lean toward (a) or (at its best) (b). I think that Brock is right in three respects. First, she is right that an account of equality, both domestic and global, should take into account relational issues of respect, recognition and power. Second, she is right that some issues of material distribution concerning welfare and resources can be seen to have derivative significance (for example, by shaping bargaining power and thus prospects for domination). Third, she is right that Anderson and others have identified some important problems with the ‘luck egalitarian’ view according to which distributive egalitarianism’s point is just to impede that unchosen circumstances determine unequal life-prospects. But I think that the view Brock embraces – involving either (a) or (b) – is not satisfactory, either for domestic or for global justice. First, the luck egalitarians still have an important point, which is that there is a worrisome unfairness whenever some have worse life-prospects than others through no choice or fault of their own. This intuition is not captured by the relational view. A and B may overcome relational inequalities concerning liability to domination, exploitation, or lack of respect and recognition, but still have unfairly unequal life-prospects through no choice or fault of their own. Why does this inequality not ‘matter’? 3 The idea of ‘positive freedom’ involves more than securing ‘non-domination’. It involves opportunities for living a flourishing life. Unfair inequalities in these opportunities are worrisome even if they are not so glaring as to cause, or spring from, relational inequalities of the kind that Brock thinks matter. I agree that the latter do matter. But the former matter too. 4
Why not go for a more demanding egalitarian view that combines, in a pluralist way, relational concerns of the kind emphasized by Brock with concerns about fairness of the kind emphasized by luck egalitarians (and others)? Brock has an additional concern about distributive egalitarian views (to be distinguished from those framed by her ‘relational egalitarianism’). It is that they may favor a scenario in which A and B have equal but extremely low opportunities over another in which they have somewhat unequal but quite decent opportunities. This is the common leveling-down objection. And distributive egalitarians have available two strong possible rebuttals. First, one can combine concern for distributive equality with concern for efficiency (seeing the latter as internal to the former), so that advocating equality amounts in practice to advocating equality at the highest level that resources allow (or, if that is infeasible, selecting the closest unequal distribution that is achievable). Second, advocacy of distributive equality can be seen as a component in a pluralistic package of claims, including some other forms of equality (such as the relational ones) and some forms of sufficiency (regarding goods meeting very urgent basic needs). Any sensitive defender of distributive equality would agree that there can be reasonable judgements selecting, for example, sufficientarian (or relational demands) when their fulfillment conflicts with demands of distributive equality. Thus, although it is true that securing certain ‘decent opportunities’ to meet ‘basic needs’ should be the ‘primary goal’ when it comes to the agenda of global distributive justice (62), it is important to note that it is not true that this goal exhausts the agenda of cosmopolitan concern. Such agenda can involve a pluralistic package that gives distributive equality a place, even if it is sometimes outweighed by other considerations that also belong in the package (such as those of efficiency, sufficiency and relational equality). 5
I do not want to overstate my disagreements with Brock’s book. Besides the many virtues referred to above, her extension of the notion of relational equality to the global domain is fruitful, as it identifies an important consideration within a theory of global justice. My point is that cosmopolitan concern for the equal moral worth of all should also yield a concern for distributive equality. I think that a pluralist framework is the right focus for future work on global justice. And Brock’s book is certainly an important contribution that must be taken into account in any such future work.