Abstract
There is a necessity to build a new republican regime in the Great Middle East, based on a broad sense of citizenship, on a respect for pluralism, and on re-evaluating difference as a positive element rather than as a threat. However, this re-building will succeed only when it is accompanied by a restoration of the religious space. The reformist national model is the best and most appropriate model for real situations within the current historical period. It is a model that is able to develop according to each society’s developmental and political experience.
Determining terminology: What is the crisis?
I begin this paper by identifying major concepts that I will refer to below, and that are already mentioned in the title. The first is the ‘Great Middle East’, a concept that is certainly not very precise. It is even linked to bad memories, especially among residents of the region. But this term may be considered as being the most neutral among those available. It helps avoid controversy raised by the old term ‘Islamic world’, especially the criteria of its ‘Islamic-ness’: are these criteria religious, cultural or social? As far as the hierarchy of identity is concerned, does the Islamic, Arabic, Turkish or Persian identity have precedence? We will not focus on this debate, as it will hinder our analysis of the main topic.
The second term is the ‘republican model’ or ‘state-nation model’, which is often defined as one of the possible forms of the state (other forms being the republican regime, monarchy, etc.) Rather, I would prefer to use the term in the sense suggested by Immanuel Kant (1999). The meaning that Kant suggested goes beyond the fact that the republican model is one of the systems of statehood. It is, rather, a form of governmental structure. Like most Enlightenment philosophers, Kant believed that this concept is based on the centrality of the principle of freedom, separation of powers, and equality among citizens in rights and duties.
The third term is ‘crisis’. There is currently a dominant feeling that there is a deep crisis, but a level of ‘feeling’ is not satisfactory. There should be a clear and reasonable analysis of this crisis’ traits and its causes. An agreement on the meaning of the term crisis does not necessarily lead to an agreement on identifying its main features. A citizen of the Northern Mediterranean coast feels the crisis for two reasons: political and economic. The political reason corresponds to the fact that the nation-state system, upon which the European countries were founded, had begun to decline since the fall, with all its threats, of the communist system. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the idea of European unity has taken a new, more active dimension as an alternative to the state-nation. This reflects, therefore, a deep conflict amongst those who follow this idea to its extremes: on one hand are those who call for a well-represented and constitutionally sovereign European Union and, on the other hand, are those who content themselves with the current, limited, formulation of this idea: open borders and the application of equal rights and rules among all citizens of all countries, without depriving them of their national affiliations.
The republican regime crisis between the two civilizational spaces
At the end of the Cold War, Europe’s new dynamism had succeeded in avoiding a return to the old conflicts, such as the historical conflict between Germany and France. However, it did not solve ‘marginal’ issues, such as that of the Balkans. Since then, this ‘margin’ has been swelling and threatening the stability of the centre. In addition to the unresolved Balkan crisis, which continues to the present day (Europe has failed to resolve it by itself), crises are currently taking place in Eastern Europe. Emerging there with the Ukrainian crisis are signs of restoring an ‘iron’ wall, which recalls the events of the Cold War. The European Union is no longer equivalent to peace and prosperity. It is now threatened by the prospect of risks, especially if we add the fact that it is threatened by danger from the South East (terrorism and illegal immigration). Therefore, a new sense of crisis is emerging, and Far Right movements are growing. The republican model is becoming a subject of debate; and the alternative of a new European Union is no longer satisfactory for many of its citizens. There is, therefore, a crisis of the political model.
There is no doubt that the political side is not easy to understand, due to the economic factors that have weakened European hopes of returning back to the state of prosperity that it witnessed during the ‘thirty happy years’. Even if Europe has remained a ‘giant’ economic force, it cannot influence the current path toward economic globalisation in a way that made this path indifferent to the principles established by the philosophy of the Enlightenment: a world of justice and peace. Recent Arab revolutions have confirmed the minor presence of Europe, and the limited role of some European countries. Equally, they have revealed their dependence upon the US, even on issues that are close to Europe, such as the case of Libya. Accordingly, the European economy has missed out on opportunities to benefit where Arab revolutions have succeeded in building democratic states with ‘open’ economies, and where the two Mediterranean coasts have become close to each other on the basis of common historical values. The failure of the Arab revolutions will not only lead to more terrorism threats and illegal immigration to Europe but will especially attack its economic prosperity. It will also deepen the political and social crises, making it, therefore, less powerful in the globalised economy’s fight against new poles.
Now we will move to the other side: the Southern Coast, where citizens strongly feel the crisis, but for different reasons. The Great Middle East includes a group of countries that are based on the nation-state system and that have adopted the standards set by the United Nations since its foundation in 1945. Yet most of these countries are still suffering from the crisis of legitimacy. The point here is not the legitimacy of the ruling governments and systems; they are mostly non-democratic, and they do not derive their legitimacy from elections and laws. The point is much more important: the legitimacy of the state itself.
The modern definition of the state is founded on three interrelated concepts: recognised, official geographical boundaries; a constitutional document agreed on by all citizens; and an administration that guarantees the continuity of the state. Generally, however, in the Great Middle East we see conflicts over geographical boundaries. We notice also that the stronger ideologies are those that consider these boundaries as colonial heritage, calling for their destruction to create the Arab United Nation, Islamic Caliphate, or Shiite Imama. To this must be added dozens of old, renewed conflicts with religious or ideological backgrounds, the battle between many alternative (declared or undeclared) states, and the threat of endless struggle.
Constitutions, however, are mainly documents that do not influence the real life of citizens. Some of them do not even believe in the idea of ‘constitution’ as a concept that requires a clear distinction between the country’s political identity and its cultural identity or identities, a fact that is not accepted in most societies.
Finally, the administration that represents the background to the modern state remains weak and sometimes absent, either because of the regime’s autocratic nature (the one-person or one-party system) or because of the traditional nature of society (state-tribe, state-sect). The administration follows the leader or the party or it is a continuity of the sect or the tribe.
It is clear then that the common feeling of crisis between the two Mediterranean coasts should not cover the reality, which is the different nature of the two crises, despite the similarities of the results and the outcomes.
The religious outcomes of the crisis
I limit my study below to an analysis of the Southern coast or the state of the Great Middle East from a very specific point of view, which is the religious outcome of the republican model or the state-nation crisis. From the 1970s, religion was the subject of a strong struggle between governments and oppositions. The ruling powers had been able to control the religious sphere, including the places of worship and religious rhetoric. It also included control over the preaching of lessons, religious educational curricula, religious programmes in the media, etc. This control was based on the governments’ financial and security services. Yet this control was limited. It has clearly degenerated since the 1970s. The mosques have turned into spaces for social protest, where the so-called Islamist movement formed, taking advantage of the relative liberty that mosque worshippers benefited from, as the sacred character of these places imposed limits on the power of the government to precisely control the worshippers. In addition, the governmental national crises that started in the 1970s were treated from a socio-political perspective. Governments thought that, by encouraging religiosity, they could restrict the popularity of syndicate groups, Leftist movements and human rights organisations. In most countries, the phenomenon of Political Islam was encouraged to reduce social and human rights pressures on governments. These governments never thought that Political Islam could grow to an extent that would contest their control over the religious sphere, and then their power.
In 1979 the Iranian Revolution began and the Islamic Republic emerged with the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini (d. 1989). Governments then started considering the fact that Political Islam could become a substitute for themselves. In 1981 Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian president, was assassinated when he was attending a military ceremony. Sadat had led the development of Political Islam in the ruling government. He encouraged all religious discourses: traditional, didactic, even the rhetoric from Islamist groups. He liberated many members of these groups and allowed them free activity. Besides, Sadat also insisted on being called ‘Muhammad Anwar’, although he had been known for decades as ‘Anwar’. He also adopted an official title: ‘the faithful President’. He worshipped and showed religious commitment during his time; the number of mosques doubled, and religious rhetoric was spread through all official media. All this could not prevent his tragic end, killed by an extremist religious group.
It was clear from the Iranian Revolution and the assassination of Sadat that the ‘tender (light)’ governmental religion protected by the ruling powers was witnessing a strong opponent, Political Islam, which was itself divided into two major parties: the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood movement and the Shiite Imama. Each had produced a number of groups and bodies, dissident and affiliated. Some of these were politically partisan, others were socially didactic, or violent Jihadists. The whole world became interested in news about these Islamist groups such as Hizb-Allah, Ansar al-Dîn, Ansar-Allah, Islamic Trend, Islamic Jihad, Al Qaida and Daesh, and many others with less provocative names such as Justice and Development, Islâh [Reform] and Nahda [Renaissance].
The political use of Islam created a struggle between the two sides: the ruling powers’ use of religion versus the opposition’s. Things did not stop at this point. Political Islam, as noted above, recalled the old Sunni schismatic conflict in a way that pushed many ruling powers to come closer to Sunni Political Islam in order to avoid the threats of the Iranian schism, just as they did before to defeat the threats of the Left and Soviet Communism. Things did not stop at the ‘national’ use of Islam; Political Islam also became subject to international use. The US encouraged closeness between its regional allies in the region and between Political Islam groups in order to reach two strategic objectives: fighting the outcomes of the Iranian Revolution and fighting all possibilities of Soviet expansionism towards the oil-producing regions. In 1979 the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan, and the North Atlantic Alliance could not directly put an end to this war: this came about through Afghan Islamic groups engaging the Soviet Union in an exhausting war. And while these groups were describing themselves as Jihadists, and declaring their conformity to Sharia rules, the Western media was describing them as organisations defending freedom and confronting the communist totalitarian system.
It is obvious then that the ruling powers did not only lose their political manipulation of religion. They also lost the authority to make this decision at a national level. The issue of Political Islam became internationalised and the choice was no longer in the hands of Muslims themselves. The issue became much more complicated with the development of globalisation, from after the Cold War to the present. The era during which the ruling powers were able to regulate religious education programmes and the media was over. The development of the internet, of international satellite channels and social networks, together with the democratisation of travel and movement between countries: all of these factors represented an important part of the globalised religious space that no longer followed national politics. This phenomenon was simultaneously related to the crisis of the republican model itself, paving the way for Political Islam, which turned out to be a possible substitute for the republic, or the conversion of the republic to Islam. Religious people in Iran, for example, have chosen to name their country after the revolution, ‘The Islamic Republic’, as if they were referring to the idea that they have ‘introduced’ the atheist republic to the field of Islam; because the word ‘republic’ was originally a Western political concept. We can say that their project has succeeded to some extent. Structurally speaking, Iran did not change. It remained the same from the Safavide dynasty to the Pahlavi dynasty, and then to the Islamic Republic. It is a national force that tries to impose its presence and protect its interests in a very dangerous region.
However, things will not be the same for Sunni Political Islam, which does not refer to any clear national background. Its Sunni nature imposes on it many different requirements. We can, in this context, refer to the following comparisons.
Although the current Shiite perception of the state is a totalitarian one, this requires the state to serve religious purposes (just as the Catholic Church did in the Middle Ages). This perception was used historically to show the difference between the two spaces, political and religious, in a manner that makes clear the issue of religious leadership. This is in comparison to Sunni Political Islam, which does not refer back to any clear criteria in designing religious authority. For this reason, conflicts between radical and violent religious groups can be easily noticed among Sunni Islamic movements. In addition, dozens of groups and movements have emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood movement; each one overbids in Takfir (excommunication) and violence. We have moved, then, from the Hasan Al-Banna (d. 1949) community, to Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) and his concepts of takfir and Hakimiya (Allah is the only Legislator), Islamic Jihad and, in the latter phase, to Al-Qaida and Daesh. Historically speaking, Sunni Islam is the state’s official religion. For this reason, it is not easy for Sunni Islam to take the role of ‘the opposition’; this can be seen only if we take as an example those of the most radical positions, like Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), who has lived in a very specific historical period. Most ancient Sunni scholars were opposed to revolution against those who governed, or to any attempts to violently go beyond their rules. They accused the Karijis (an early Islamic sectarian group) who called for revolution and violence. Sunni Muslims and their community were based on advice and didactism or avoiding contact with tyrannical rulers. They argued against the principle of revolution, preferring ‘a tyrannical ruler, rather than long-lasting subversion’. In fact, from a Sunni theological viewpoint, violent subversion of those who rule is allowed only where there is strong proof of the ruler’s blasphemy. For this reason, Sunni Political Islam is forced to expel its rulers in order for it to find a theological background for its political work. It starts with excommunicating the ruler, his agents (taghut), then the whole society. But despite the fact that the majority of Sunni Political Islamic rulers are moderate, this excommunication process is imposing itself because it goes back to the early deep Sunni heritage, which was not able to play any role in opposition, as it has long been living and nurtured within the state. Sunni Political Islam does not refer back to any clear homogeneous social protectorship. For this reason, most of the time it finds itself in inner-contradictory and controversial situations. It is not the religion of the poor, as it embodies, to some extent, liberal capitalist principles. Nor it is that of the rich, as it often resorts to mobilising the popular social class. Equally, it is not the Islam of Arabs, because Islam addresses all people. The existence of ‘Arab’ non-Muslim minorities (Egyptian Copts, Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi Christians) makes reconciliation between citizenship and religion very difficult. Political Islam is not the religion for all people, as many of them are Muslims but non-Islamists, to which can be added the existence of non-Sunni minorities. Rather, it supports old and modern Islamic conflicts, and – like Shiist Islam – contributes to the spread of sectarian struggles in societies, and the mixture between political disputes and ancient theological debates. Sunni Political Islam encounters the same dilemma that Arabic ideological nationalism has been witnessing, which is the polarisation of Arabic states and societies. Arabic nationalism has declared its project to unify the Arabic world. Rather, though, it has deepened its divisions because all nationalist experiences were related to particular interests of particular states. No nationalist project of union has succeeded, and Political Islam could not find a solution to this problem. Societies were divided instead of being unified, because history has always proved that there can never be religious politics. Each policy that refers back to religion will turn into a sectarian conflict. Religion can unite people regarding their values, but it cannot unite them to make the same political choices and follow the same interests. Politics is not simply a group of values. It is a struggle about the interests of different social groups.
The current troubles and the possible choices
How can we face these historical troubles, which are continuously re-emerging? There are currently four major options for the states of the region.
The model of state’s religious neutrality
Since the nineteenth century Arabic ‘Renaissance’ there have emerged numerous calls for secularism. A hypothesis of religious neutrality of the state has two precedents: a modern one and a traditional one. The modern precedent is best exemplified in the works of the Shami writer Farah Anton, who was a resident of Egypt (d. 1922). He was an Arab Christian, one of the first truthful defenders of the state’s neutrality in an argumentative and practical work entitled Ibn Rush and his Philosophy (published in 1903). 1 An amazing debate took place between himself and the Egyptian reformist Mohammad Abduh (d. 1905), who was at that time the country’s Mufti. Abduh refused ideas of secularism and neutrality. Equally, he refused the idea of the religious state, suggesting as a substitute for secularism the concept of a civil state. This debate was fruitful, reflecting a clear, enlightening aspect. Anton defended a liberal philosophic enlightenment, while Abduh was looking for enlightenment within tradition itself. 2
This original attempt did not witness any deep extension to Arabic political rhetoric. The twentieth century liberal movement was not strong enough, despite the existence of some liberal scholars; neither could the reformist movement be successful. On the contrary, many fundamentalist movements have emerged, calling for a religious state and a return back to the Islamist Caliphate, which was abolished by Mustapha Kamal Ataturk in 1924. This decision has created strong disagreement. Ali Abd Al-Râziq, a Sheikh from Al-Azhar (d. 1966), even published a book entitled Islam and the Origins of Ruling (published in 1925), 3 criticising the idea of a religious state and the religious legitimacy of the Caliphate. He was attacked by many people. Therefore he decided to go no further in this field, especially after the decision by Al-Azhar to condemn him and ban his book. Unlike Anton, Abd Al-Râziq tried to go further in developing his thesis. His arguments were not philosophical but rather religious, providing an example of the state’s religious neutrality from a heritage viewpoint.
The secularist thesis seems nowadays to be reserved for intellectuals, and its opportunities for becoming widespread are limited, especially within the current situation, which is characterised by the growing authority of religiously-based discourses, both moderate and violent. There is an important aspect that should be taken into consideration here. If we remember the way in which the thesis of the state’s neutrality in the West was established, we can easily notice that it was the outcome of the sixteenth century’s religious tensions and the arrival of Luther and the many prior religious wars. The Middle East is currently witnessing an undeclared religious war that may lead, after a period of clashes with human and material loss, to a necessary conviction of the importance of a thesis of the state’s neutrality, and its value to the spread of societal peace.
The Islamic cross-countries model
This is an ancient/new idea that emerged just after the terrorist attacks on New York (2001), Madrid (2004) and on London (2005). This idea has emerged from a belief in the necessity of founding a globalised, cross-country Islam based on ‘moderation’, the task of which was opposition to the globalised terrorism represented by Al-Qaida. This idea was strongly supported by many Western countries, whose only objectives were to avoid new terrorist attacks on their homelands, and the spread of terrorist thought among their Muslims communities. At the beginning, many Islamic countries were competing to host this project. Yet it seems that only one party could succeed here.
London witnessed some signs of similar experiences in a period when terrorism had not yet become the prime international preoccupation. In March 1987, the founding meeting of what was called the European Council of Fatwa and Research was held at the invitation of the Islamic Organisations Unions, which represented the Muslim Brotherhood Organisation in Europe. Sheikh Yusuf Qardawi was appointed as the president of this council. He was a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. He left Egypt during the rule of Jamal Abdel-Nacer. He then stayed in the Gulf and was given Qatari citizenship. This experience was inspiration for the foundation of other, much more important, organisations. The power of the new foundation was not restricted to European Muslim minorities. It concerned all Muslims across the world, in minorities and majorities. In the same British city, London, in 2004, the founding meeting of the World Muslim Scholars Union took place. It was, of course, chaired by Sheikh Qardawi, whose voice was reaching millions of Muslim families, thanks to a weekly religious TV programme on Al-Jazeera called Life and Sharia.
The Union called upon a great number of Muslim ‘scholars’ (in the meaning of religious people). Most of them had historical attachments to the Muslim Brotherhood Organisation with its worldwide branches. It also had many independent religious persons as members. The Union tried to spread its branches through all countries, but the majority of countries (Muslim and non-Muslim ones) had reservations about this. The Qatari capital Doha became the principal office for the Union’s activities, and the place of residence of its president, Yusuf Qardawi. It was expected that he would become the Muslims’ ‘Pope’. His wasati (moderate) fatwas, together with those of the Union, were to be considered as a reference for Muslims all over the world, especially when Al-Azhar and other traditional religious institutions’ fatwas became weak and were unable to compete with Jihadi fatwas issued by violent, globalised organisations. After the Arab revolutions, and with the rise of the political power of organisations in accord with the spirit of the Muslim Brotherhood, it was thought that the problem for Islam was that there was an absence of a representative board, and that the Union was the most apt organisation to undertake this mission. This idea was spread by both Islamist political movements and some thinkers and decision-makers in London and Washington, who considered it to be a pragmatic and beneficial one that could limit the development of Jihadist movements and the orientation of Muslim minorities in the West towards radical positions.
The reformist national model
It is well known that the modern state in the Great Middle East is a phenomenon that appeared between the mid-nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century, with some local variations. The Egyptian state emerged in 1805 with the rule of Mehmet Ali (1805–1849), while other countries could only achieve national liberation during the mid-twentieth century. It is worth noting that, in general, the emergence of new states was often related to the appearance of reformist religious discourse, which tried to introduce some reforms through this discourse to give legitimacy to those political and economic reforms necessary to the existence of the modern state. We will not discuss in detail the historical background to these discourses, but we would like to focus on an important issue in relation to the topic discussed in this paper. The course of any modern state’s rise is strongly related to the appearance of the principle of citizenship, 4 as a substitute for the old authoritarian regime. Accordingly, what distinguishes most the reformist movements are their continuous attempts to reinterpret the ancient religious heritage to better fit the idea of citizenship.
It is not by chance that this idea took shape first in Egypt, Tunis, Sham and Turkey, as these regions witnessed the beginnings of the formation of citizenship within the modern state during the nineteenth century. There is no doubt that the famous Egyptian and Arabic writer Rafaa Tahtawi (d. 1873) was so close to the concept of citizenship because the critical thought of this scholar was related to the Khediv Dynasty project for Egyptian independence from the Ottoman Caliphate, instituting a ruling power inspired by European nationalism. The first constitution in the Tunisian Kingdom appeared in 1861. In this kingdom the movement for independence from the Ottoman Caliphate started from the era of Hammuda Pacha (1782–1814) and was maintained during the era of Ahmed Bey (1806–1855). Both Hammuda and Ahmed were influenced by the French Revolution. All countries were following the same path, though with considerable differences in detail and intellectual content. It is generally perceived that the beginnings of the construction of each modern state were accompanied by the rise of a new religious reformist experience, each state having its own traditions and religious heritage.
These constructive reformist experiences can nowadays be nationally supported as the background for a reconstruction of religious discourse according to current requirements. Previous reforms focused on the conception of the state, because the main requirement was independence from the unstable Caliphate regime. It is now possible to focus on pluralism, democracy and human rights in order to achieve total autonomy from the traditional republican system that was subject to, on one hand, globalisation effects and, on the other hand, revolutions. The intention here is not to return to the early reformist position, but rather to be inspired by their liberal and audacious spirit, to face everyday problems.
Because the reformist religious heritage differs between countries, the intention would not be to found an international Islamic committee responsible for issuing fatwas, or to appoint a religious person to become a great representative of Muslims; it would not be the creation of Islamic parties that would make use of religion to gain political power. What is required is to promote encouragement within their different national contexts, reinforcing these reforms’ shifts in meaning from one context to another. From my personal point of view, this is the ideal solution. It is different from the classical relationship between state and religion. The objective is neither the use of religion to serve the state’s interests, or vice versa. Rather, the objective is the integration of religion into the general social movements in a way that makes religious discourse develop according to the development of society, liberating itself from the conflicts in which it had been entrapped when it was a medium for justifying ruling regimes or their opposition, or for serving sectarian and partisan purposes.
The fahlawi model
The term fahlawi is a popular orientalist term, used by the Lebanese psychologist Dr Mustapha Hidjazi. 5 Hidjazi explains the way in which the feeling of oppression can lead to contradictory behaviours marked by excessive emotions and violence.
We think that this fahlawi is applicable to religious behaviour nowadays because traditional religious institutions have lost control; no other powerful institutions could replace them; and because the old criteria of religious discourse have been disturbed. No substitute for them has been found. Fatwas became marked by chaos: numerous fatwas of different genres are widespread. Some are trivial and ridiculous, such as the fatwa of the non-turning globe or what is being presented as Koranic scientific ‘Ijaaz (inimitability)’, together with many other strange fatwas (breast-feeding adults, etc.) Some of them are scaring and terrifying, and were used as an argument to kill people and destroy societies. Other fatwas even dared to claim that the Koran tolerates slavery. When the Muslim Brotherhood reached authority in many countries thanks to the Arabic revolutions, they held a religious discourse very far from reality and they presented many fahlawi fatwas. Fatwas concerning the World Bank and International Monetary Fund Credits, for example, became Halal (religiously authorised). Deceit during electoral campaigns became tolerated and Halal. These fatwas were used against many political opponents. The Syrian Revolution was ‘aborted’ due to Jihadist fatwas that opened the door to jihad for criminals coming from different parts of the world. Many other examples can be cited in this context. It would not be preferable, however, to talk in detail about this model because it is a purely negative one.
Conclusions
It is a necessity to build a new republican regime, based on a broad sense of citizenship, on a respect for pluralism and on re-evaluating difference as a positive element rather than as a threat. Two reasons should be mentioned here: on one hand is globalisation, and on the other hand the explosive changes in the region that are associated with Arabic revolutions. Because globalisation is a common phenomenon between the Great Middle East and the countries in the rest of the world, an inclination toward this new regime unites the northern and the southern Mediterranean coasts. However, this re-building will succeed in the Great Middle East only when accompanied by a restoration of the religious space. We believe that the reformist national model is the best and the most appropriate for real situations and the current historical period. It is a model that is able to develop at some point, according to each society’s developmental and political experience. It is also a part of the management of the crisis of the republican regime and its religious outcomes, as discussed in this paper.
Footnotes
A version of this article was presented at the Reset-Dialogues İstanbul Seminars 2015 (“Politics Beyond Borders. The Republican Model Challenged by the Internationalization of Economy, Law and Communication”) that took place at İstanbul Bilgi University from May 26–30, 2015.