Ethics,politics and the transformative possibilities of the self in Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault

I Dynamic ethical and political engagement

Foucault and Arendt each develop a relational account of ethics and politics based on plurality and difference, and oppose the organization of multiplicity under a single, unifying ideal. The concern with unifying systems, is that everything becomes viewed through a single orientation that guides methods of inquiry as well as outcomes. An example of such a prevailing system that limits divergence, and elevates a particular perspective, is the role of scientific method in shaping modern modes of critique and investigation. The advances in the empirical understanding of the world that result from scientific investigation are astounding. It is therefore no surprise that this model of scientific investigation has extended to other modes of inquiry, including questions concerning ethics and politics. Yet, for Arendt and Foucault, to universalize a particular method – with very specific concerns – to inquiry in general, is representative of the destructive possibilities inherent in modernity. The extension of the scientific mode of inquiry to the ethical and political realms is problematic. The scientific notion of the progress of ideas is dangerous when applied to morality and politics, as it strengthens faith in modern norms and values by supporting the need to ‘discover’ a correct system, as if such a system is ever there to find. The uniformity and power of this approach are capable of leading to a situation in which alternative approaches either are not pursued or are disregarded. ³

Arendt believes the tendency to reduce every action or event according to one evaluative system limits the capacity to judge particular circumstances independently because it is grounded in a determinate interpretative horizon. This makes it more likely for people to readily adopt an alternative if circumstances dictate. Foucault shares Arendt’s view concerning universal moral and political systems, and finds the idea of an ethics or politics that is equally applicable to all to be disturbing, because of the potential dangers that can arise from the arrogant certainty of assuming only one way to be the right way. Ultimately, the problem is not so much with the specifics of any given system – for most have many positives to offer – but in the inability to entertain alternative approaches, or critique the possible limitations of whatever moral and political system is deemed most effective.

Analyses of issues and strategies for social or political problems are always affected by particular moral and political codes – for example, utilitarianism, in which, at its most elemental level, moral judgement is reduced to the evaluation of the greatest good for the greatest number. Issues are tested, particular approaches to problems criticized, but rarely is the system itself questioned. It is true that supporters of particular codes of conduct may do so in the attempt to change the world – perhaps for the better – yet these approaches leave certain pillars untouched. A case in point is Peter Singer’s recent book, The Most Good You Can Do, which found some popular success. ⁴ In this book Singer presents examples of appropriate evaluative judgements to guide individuals’ actions in order to maximize the betterment of all. Central to Singer’s arguments is the idea that by making the right choices it could become possible to alleviate global poverty, improve the average quality of life and maximize the greatest good for the greatest number worldwide. The arguments he presents include such things as practical advice on what charity to support so as to make the best use of the money donated, or career choices offering the highest salaries, which could then allow for donations to the causes already assessed as worthy and effective.

The changes Singer discusses are not the transformative events championed by Arendt and Foucault. The approach Arendt and Foucault take to systemic transformation concerns rethinking the very ideas that shape world-views, in order to reconceptualize the understanding of ethical and political action altogether. Singer, on the other hand, does not question current configurations of power and knowledge systems. Instead, he uses the capitalist model to inform his ethical account directed towards helping those groups identified to have the most need. As a result, in Singer’s approach the best career choice, for example, is not necessarily that of the artist because it is not the most efficient means to making a high income, which could then be put towards funding causes worthy of charitable donations. A stockbroker is much more efficient in maximizing earning potential. According to these particular guidelines perhaps it would no longer be the best idea to become a philosopher, since large wages are not guaranteed and the impact of a person’s ideas is unknown. Of course, Singer is justified in his choice of career, and sees himself making a valuable contribution to the ‘greater good’. However, this certainty of career choice is not necessarily clear according to the criteria his model sets up. The broad issue is that Singer’s moral philosophical approach does not challenge the underlying social and political order, but rather seeks to modify individual agents’ actions which, in aggregate, lead to a better outcome for some specific class of people or the natural world.

In Arendt and Foucault, transformative events occur in the unpredictable interplay of divergent and complex arrangements. Radical political or social change cannot necessarily arise when differences are united under a singular idea. It is for this reason that Arendt and Foucault embrace the notion of multiplicity. Instead of silencing difference according to predetermined categories it is important to question the meaning of certain behaviours and conditions, and allow different viewpoints, voices and ideas to rise up so as to create space for genuine change. Foucault describes this thinking about the meaning of the state of things as problematizations:

Actually, for a domain of action. A behaviour, to enter the field of thought, it is necessary for a certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a number of difficulties around it. These elements result from social, economic, or political processes…They [social, political, economic elements] can exist and perform their action for a very long time, before there is effective problematization by thought. And when thought intervenes, it doesn’t assume a unique form that is the direct result or the necessary expression of these difficulties; it is an original or specific response – often taking many forms, sometimes even contradictory in its different aspects – to these difficulties, which are defined for it by a situation or a context, and which hold true as a possible question. ⁵

The problem Arendt and Foucault identify with the dependence on a prescriptive system is that it prohibits the possibility of different sets of relations from manifesting. Singer’s concerns should not be derided; it is worthwhile trying to better others’ circumstances by thinking beyond personal interest. Yet Singer’s approach provides solutions to alleviating modern-day problems of poverty and suffering without questioning the normative principles informing his approach. Singer develops a system to better the overall good of the people – the greatest good for the greatest number – without looking at the underlying configurations of power and knowledge that shape world-view, influence methods of inquiry, and affect solutions to issues. The fate of the powerless, disenfranchised and poor depends on the pre-established categorization of worthy causes, decided and judged according to a fixed set of criteria.

II A concern with ethics and politics in later Arendt and later Foucault

In different ways, later Arendt and later Foucault embark on projects that attempt to develop a dynamic account of ethical and political engagement. Although some critics consider these respective shifts to conflict with their previous works, I will demonstrate that these apparent ‘shifts’ in both thinkers’ works do not run counter to earlier interests but continue to develop ideas that had previously been implicit. The mature writings of both thinkers explore the themes present in earlier projects – dealing, in Arendt’s case, with issues of political action, or, in the case of Foucault, with systems of power/knowledge – only from a different perspective, with both thinkers attempting to find alternatives to current socio-political arrangements while trying to avoid falling into the trap of developing an alternate prescriptive system.

There are several key features that Arendt’s and Foucault’s later analyses of the ethico-political subject share. First, under the influence of Nietzsche and Heidegger, both consider the search for meaning to be a continual attempt to make manifest the material conditions inherent to society, or to reveal the power and knowledge relations that constitute dominant truths and narratives. ⁶ Each recognizes the contingency of knowledge claims and world-views, and opposes grand narratives explaining social and political events – neither, for example, appeals to notions of human nature or world historical progress. Second, Arendt and Foucault both stress the importance of developing a critical relationship to truth. Both see truth as being historically contingent, and conceptualize it as something that is neglected, obscured and distorted. Third, both promote a personal, critical relationship to truth, and understand this relationship as a form of practice that is a potential source of resistance to the unquestioned acceptance of externally posited rules. As an underpinning principle of this relationship, both Arendt and Foucault regard the synthesis between words and deeds to be central to the public expression of truths and opinions. Fourth, both thinkers present accounts of freedom and action directed towards transformative events and modes of resistance. All 4 of these key elements combine to create a shared vision for developing a dynamic, ethical relationship with the self; a relationship that has political implications. Each thinker offers a distinctive alternative to universally applicable moral and political structures – which both consider to be potentially dangerous – and encourage the development of a dynamic ethico-political attitude. To this end, Arendt looks to the life of the mind, and Foucault investigates practices of the care of the self.

Arendt began exploring the meaning of thinking and contemplative withdrawal after attending the Adolf Eichmann trial in Jerusalem. After witnessing the trial, Arendt notes that Eichmann possesses an ‘almost total inability ever to look at anything from the other fellow’s point of view’. ⁷ The meaning of this accusation is fairly self-evident – it can be taken literally. Eichmann never once, from all accounts, displayed the ability to put himself in the place of another, imagine the situation from a different perspective, or think critically about the time and place in which he found himself. Eichmann’s abstinence from any critical reflection results in Arendt’s referring to his actions in terms of a ‘banality of evil’, because it seemed to require neither exceptional wickedness nor depravity, but only a profound thoughtlessness. ⁸ Arendt concludes that Eichmann committed the crimes he did because of his profound inability to think about and judge autonomously the particular situations of his time. ⁹

Refusing to assert that Eichmann is fundamentally evil, Arendt faces a complex philosophical problem relating to the very nature of moral judgement. Yet Arendt cannot address her concerns through her work on public space and political actors alone. As a result she becomes preoccupied with the role of thinking and autonomous judgement as they relate to moral and political concerns. She asks the question, ‘Why is it that during the unprecedented situation of Nazism some people are still able to say, “I cannot, this is wrong!” even when everything around them suggests otherwise?’ This question – about this ability to judge independently, even while at odds with the political and social views of the time – is a question Arendt repeatedly asks throughout her later work.

Arendt is confronted with questions on moral judgement and independent thought, and these lead her to her last work, The Life of the Mind. In this final, unfinished work, Arendt develops an account of the mind that is comprised of three mental faculties: thinking, willing and judging. For Arendt, the internal freedom of each faculty is a precondition for mental harmony, and good mental governance exists when all three faculties check and balance each other, without any being denigrated. Thinking, willing and judging each have different concerns, though they are all interrelated. In brief – thinking is a dialogic withdrawal from the world, re-presenting things that are absent; willing is future-directed, with the capacity to bring about the unexpected; and judging concerns evaluative decisions about particular events, without subsuming these events under pre-established, universal standards. Together, these faculties constitute Arendt’s life of the mind and prepare the ground for action which, despite her shift in focus, continues to be a primary concern.

Thinking, willing and judging offer the possibility of critique, freedom and consideration. Thinking looks for the meaning in everyday assumptions, and reveals that no idea should be accepted with absolute certainty. Willing creates the possibility of the completely new coming into existence, and shows a person’s character in the moment of action. Judgement assesses particular moments, rather than relying on overarching narratives to guide decisions. Arendt considers this third faculty of judgement to be the most political of all three faculties, because when the thinking ego returns to the world of appearances it is the faculty to judge ‘particulars without subsuming them under general rules which are taught and learned until they grow into habits that can be replaced by other habits and rules’. ¹⁰ Yet, Arendt believes, it is common in both educated and uneducated people equally for this faculty of judgement to be lacking, because people too readily follow prescriptive codes and external dictates without reflection.

Arendt’s later work on contemplation explores possibilities for thinking critically – her reflections are directed at dissolving accepted rules of conduct, and destroying or laying bare unexamined assumptions. ¹¹ She argues that it is crucial to develop ‘an independent human faculty, unsupported by law and public opinion, that judges anew in full spontaneity every deed and intent whenever the need arises’. ¹² She believes that by nurturing the critical faculty of thinking, people would be less likely to blindly follow a set of values or norms, or to be swept along with a dangerous consensus. The crucial point is a connection between thinking and judging. Arendt writes:

Human beings be capable of telling right from wrong, even when all they have to guide them is their own judgment, which, moreover, happens to be completely at odds with what they must regard as the unanimous opinion of all those around them…Those few who were still able to tell right from wrong went really only by their own judgment, and they did so freely; there were no rules to be abided by, under which the particular cases with which they were confronted could be subsumed. They had to decide each instance as it arose, because no rules existed for the unprecedented. ¹³

Arendt claims in one of her lectures on Kant:

By loosening the grip of the universal on the particular, thinking releases the political potency of the faculty of judgment – the potency that inheres in its capacity to perceive things as they are, that is, as they are phenomenally manifest. ¹⁴

Foucault, on the other hand, develops his interest in ethico-political practices of self-constitution while writing The History of Sexuality. He comes to realize that his historical account of sexuality and the sexual subject includes three modes of objectification that affect the constitution of subjectivity and can be understood only relationally: truth, power and ethics (or individual conduct). ¹⁵ The first mode – truth – concerns the scientific formations that refer to sexuality. The second mode – power – deals with regulating systems of power and concerns practices of manipulation and examination. The third mode – ethics – concerns ways in which individuals establish a relationship to the self, to facilitate self-understanding and recognize themselves as subjects of sexuality. Foucault recognizes that he has explored the first two modes in detail in previous works, but the third mode on the self-constituting subject is noticeably lacking among the theoretical ‘tools’ at Foucault’s disposal. Acknowledging that any account of the experience of sexuality is incomplete without a critical and historical analysis of the desiring subject, Foucault turns his attention to this third mode of objectification – ethics.

Inspired by his work on the desiring subject, Foucault’s interest expands to look more broadly at the idea of self-constitution. Through a detailed examination of practices of the self in antiquity, Foucault begins to explore the ethical and political implications of self-care for modern-day concerns. He presents an account of self-care that centres on developing an attitude that questions the personal relationship to truth, and puts to the test those ideas and truths held most dearly. Processes of self-care evaluate the consistency between those truths a person regards as necessary and a person’s actions in the world. Furthermore, these truths, although functioning as guidelines for action and judgement, are not fixed. As a consequence, Foucault’s aesthetics of existence is a never-ending work directed towards ongoing transformation.

Foucault considers such techniques of self-care to offer possibilities to shape and transform life, behaviour and relationships, rather than passively subscribing to predetermined definitions of the self-subject. The constant work of questioning and critique undermines the historically determined, rigid, object-like forms of subjectivity to create space for transformative events. Crucial to this process is recognition that the self is not given and does not have ontological precedence – and that subjectivity is transformable. As Foucault says in an interview, by finding the lines and fractures, it helps to ‘open up the space of freedom…[and] of possible transformation’. ¹⁶ The political task of working out forms of control and management, articulated in his writing on systems of power and knowledge, is not separate from the ethical task – formulating an ethos – that he presents in his work on practices of the self. ¹⁷

The critical task of self-care is to question and challenge forms of domination, at whatever level. However, the difficulty is in identifying the precise forms of domination that determine and restrict actions. In the late 1970s, Foucault clarifies the distinction between power and domination, a distinction that previously was made only implicitly. In summary, he argues that power and power relations are characterized by the interplay between strategic games and liberties. Domination is characterized by the shrinking space for freedom of action. Unlike power relations, which cannot exist without freedom of action, domination is a perversion that restricts power relations to such a degree that individual freedom is impossible. This distinction between power and domination is central to Foucault’s discussion of the ethical subject and political thought.

Freedom, for Foucault, lies in the attempt to identify alternative discourses to those that constitute subjectivity, and to shape life in the continual response to forms of government and self-government. It is the basis for challenging effects of power and domination and, although there is no end, freedom is most certainly a revolt within practices. As he says:

Nothing is more inconsistent than a political regime that is indifferent to truth; but nothing is more dangerous than a political system that claims to prescribe the truth. The function of ‘free speech’ doesn’t have to take legal form, just as it would be in vain to believe that it resides by right in spontaneous exchanges of communication. The task of speaking the truth is an infinite labor: to respect it in its complexity is an obligation that no power can afford to short-change, unless it would impose the silence of slavery. ¹⁸

Both thinkers are critical of the tendency to reduce all social and political problems according to predetermined ends and verifiable procedures. For Arendt, it is important to develop an approach that allows for an understanding of others’ opinions, to see the world from another’s perspective, and to judge particular circumstances without appeals to universal dictates. In questioning the relationship between self and truth, and in putting opinions to the public test of others, Arendt demonstrates that the world – as a common object of human understanding – reveals itself differently to each individual. The manner in which the political accommodates the plurality of lived experiences is central to Arendt’s overall project. In Arendt’s earlier agonistic work, plurality is manifest in the different opinions publicly expressed in the polis by political actors. In later works, plurality is equally important because of the important connection between multiplicity and independent judgement. On the other hand, Foucault values thinking about an event in terms of its meaning. For Foucault, philosophical activity is a condition of possibility for the articulation of the question of the self. For him, every judgement or evaluation is a particular historical event, which leads to the possible reimaginings of current configurations. Transformative possibilities open up in the recognition of the historicity of the question itself. Foucault believes that criticism should be conducted as a historical investigation into ‘a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving’. ²⁰ It is what Foucault claims the Greeks called ethos and it is what he terms a care of the self. ²¹ Just like Arendt’s ‘thinking’, self-care is not an abstract conception, or a guide for action, but rather it is what he refers to as a critical attitude.

Arendt and Foucault see in the alignment of the moral and political subject a possibility for change. Like with Arendt, ethics and politics are intertwined in Foucault’s conception of the care of the self – presenting a dynamic, critical relationship as a way to think differently about ethical and political engagement. By changing one’s comportment in the world in relation to the self and others, both Arendt and Foucault want to change the nature of ethical and political thought. Despite the difference between the ahistorical nature of Arendt’s theory of thinking, and Foucault’s continual grounding within a historical a priori, both understand the ethico-political self as a process of continual, critical development with no origin and no end, but which nonetheless questions consistently and purposefully.

III Freedom and transformation

Arendt and Foucault consider world-views and reigning ‘truths’ to be shaped by complex sets of socially and historically contingent circumstances. Accepting the contingency of pre-established systems of thought and power, Arendt and Foucault adopt different approaches to undermine socio-political arrangements. Each believes it is with the refusal to accept the inevitability of present circumstances that resistance and change become possible. While both reject the necessity of the prevailing circumstances, each adopts a different approach to counter the arrangement of dominant moral and political systems. Arendt embraces the idea of novelty as offering the potential to bring about radical social and political change – whereas Foucault talks of problematization, where ‘invisible’ concepts and forces become manifest and reveal possibilities for different arrangements. However, the change both seek to effect is not a simple modification of already existing concepts. It is radical, transformative change that alters understanding to the point where previous approaches no longer hold true (taking truth in the perspectival sense already discussed). ²²

A crucial aspect of this transformative attitude is an openness to abandoning established concepts, categories and principles that are invoked to make sense of the world. It is what Foucault terms ‘blueprints for change’, and what Arendt calls ‘banisters’. Central to both instances is a permanent attitude of critique and development, as it relates to finding the meaning of a personal relationship to truth – the willingness to go about daily activities without the need to depend on ultimate values. Dianna Taylor finds ‘it [is] this counter-attitude toward complexity and the refusal to revert to easy answers in the face of it, [that] is precisely what makes [Arendt’s and Foucault’s] work relevant within a contemporary context’. ²³ Arendt and Foucault argue for the importance of taking account of multiple perspectives. They both consider the capacity of prescriptive models to unify difference to be, at best, limited in scope; and at worst to be capable of justifying acts of domination leading to catastrophic results.

Taylor’s identification of Arendt’s and Foucault’s counter-attitude refers to their respective opposition to systems of bio-power. Arendt and Foucault are of the view that bio-political systems limit the possibility of transformative events through state control of physical and political bodies. ²⁴ In Arendt’s case, she ascribes to totalitarianism a denial of accidental, coincidental and arbitrary events, and regards the concentration camp as a prime example. The concentration camp is an example of totalitarian rule because it manifests the denial of the random by attempting to efface spontaneity through the regulation of human behaviour. Foucault claims, similarly, that bio-politics subsumes random, accidental and unpredictable events through the continual regulation of the life of a population. The strict regulation of human behaviour restricts individuals’ freedom to act, limiting it to a set of predetermined ends. Action is controlled, monitored and shaped in order to minimize the possibility of unforeseen events and spontaneous occurrences. It is true that, unlike Arendt, Foucault acknowledges that systems of power can be both repressive and enabling. However, when bio-political regulations erase difference, the possibility of alternate subjectivities becomes limited and the ability to act in different ways is further reduced.

As Taylor identifies similarities between Arendt’s and Foucault’s views on bio-power, she also alludes to the critical-creative practices present in both of their works in matters of independent thought and action. Taylor recognizes their shared refusal to offer ‘banisters’ or ‘blueprints’ to make sense of the world. Taylor’s emphasis on the importance that both place in a critically creative attitude for practices of freedom supports my claim that Arendt and Foucault remain faithful to themes present in earlier works. Without reference to Arendt’s contemplative withdrawal or Foucault’s care of the self Taylor mentions, in her comparison of Arendt’s and Foucault’s discussions on bio-power, this critical ability to think independently of prescriptive guidelines. Yet, despite mention of this critical attitude towards the present, Taylor’s lack of discussion concerning similarities in Arendt’s and Foucault’s later work highlights the way comparative studies of the two thinkers are generally taken up. As mentioned in the Introduction, since Agamben’s Homo Sacer there have been numerous publications, like Taylor’s, comparing Arendt’s and Foucault’s accounts of bio-power, with very little interest in other areas of their shared thought; most notably the shared interest in a dynamic, ethico-political attitude, developed to counter normative moral and political systems through constant processes of self-critique.

Arendt and Foucault do not save their first mention of the idea of freedom for their final works. However, it is in these final works that each elaborates the connection between freedom and a critical self-relationship. To a large extent, both consider the significance of this critically creative attitude to manifest in times of extreme domination. Revealing the inherent threats of bio-power is one thing, but to also have the freedom to resist particulars that emerge from such systems is equally as important. In the Foucaldian sense, it is the concrete capacity of people to say ‘No!’ to being governed in a particular way, or to governing themselves in particular ways. It is the capacity to refuse. ²⁵ This capacity to say ‘No!’ is no different from Arendt’s interest in the capacity to say ‘I cannot, this is wrong’ even if everything else around says otherwise. Freedom for both is the attempt to identify alternative discourses to practices that constitute subjectivity, and shape life in the continual response to forms of external government and self-government, which challenges effects of power and domination, and is a revolt within practices.

Freedom is as relational as power, as historically changeable as the subject, and is both the condition of possibility and the task of ethical practice. Arendt’s and Foucault’s criticisms are directed against the tendency to reduce all social and political problems according to predetermined ends and verifiable procedures. For Arendt, it is important to develop an approach that allows for an understanding of others’ opinions, see the world from another’s perspective, and judge particular circumstances without appeals to universal dictates. In questioning the relationship between self and truth and in putting opinions to the public test of others, Arendt demonstrates that the world, as a common object of human understanding, reveals itself differently at different times. Consequently, what Arendt aims at is ‘an independent human faculty, unsupported by law and public opinion, that judges anew in full spontaneity every deed and intent whenever the need arises’. ²⁶ To stop and think critically dissolves accepted rules of conduct and makes it less likely for people to get swept away unthinkingly. ²⁷

Foucault, on the other hand, values thinking about events in terms of meaning. For him, every judgement or evaluation is a particular historical event that leads to the possible reimaginings of current configurations. Transformative possibilities open up in the recognition of the particular circumstances a person finds himself or herself in. Foucault believes that criticism should be conducted as a historical investigation, ‘into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking and saying’ – this investigation he terms the care of the self. ²⁸ Instead of the passive acceptance of predetermined definitions of ethics, politics and the self, Foucault considers techniques of self-care to offer possibilities to change life, behaviour and relationships. Through the constant work of questioning and critique, a space is created for the possibility of transformative events. Central to this process is the recognition that the self is not given and does not have ontological precedence, and that subjectivity is transformable. Foucault searches for the lines and fractures in systems of knowledge and power to ‘open up the space of freedom…[and] of possible transformation’. ²⁹ As with Arendt’s concept of thinking, self-care is not an abstraction, or a simple guide for action, but the development of a specific, dynamic, critical attitude.

Arendt and Foucault both conceive freedom as a critical and creative attitude that provides the condition for ethical and political transformation. Arendt’s arguments on novelty (and earlier natality) are more pronounced than Foucault’s, yet both present ideas of freedom that are not simply a freedom from constraint. It is the attempt to question internally and externally defined values. It is a freedom to dismantle foundations, and create new ideas to serve as new ‘truths’. Furthermore, it is the freedom to subsequently discard these truths, if need be, and recreate anew. It is freedom understood as process that can perhaps bring about the never-before-seen; not just personally, but in ways that have broader social and political implications. This idea of freedom as process refers to a life lived in constant critique and re-creation, rather than the achievement of a final end. The uncritical acceptance of externally posited systems and prescriptive dictates limits the transformative possibility of freedom, in Arendt’s and Foucault’s accounts, by limiting the questions asked, problems identified and solutions offered according to specific evaluative systems. Only by challenging governing socio-political ideas and values can a space for transformative events become possible.

Neve Gordon argues that the central role of personal resistance in Arendt’s theory of freedom distinguishes her approach from Foucault’s. Primarily referencing The Archaeology of Knowledge, Madness and Civilisation and the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Gordon approaches Foucault’s work from the premise that machinations of control are ubiquitous and leave little, if any, room for resistance. In short, Gordon interprets Foucault’s discussions on knowledge and power as follows: every institution, political office and field of research involves statements that manifest themselves in constitutions, regulations, mandates, memberships and contracts. The knowledge that enables answers to questions pertaining to a particular field is always informed by the discursive practice constituting and demarcating that field. Based on his reading of the first volume of The History of Sexuality, The Will to Knowledge, Gordon posits that Foucault’s genealogical examination of sexuality reveals an artificially unified concept of sex which, as with knowledge and power, appears to circumscribe human sexuality in established orthodoxies. Gordon argues sexuality is understood as a construct and site of social control that both shapes and represses individuals. As a ‘false unity’, sexuality is nothing but manifestations of power that create hierarchies, facilitate domination and organize the control of subjects.

While this characterization of Foucault could be argued to be an accurate account of the first volume of The History of Sexuality, it is problematic to claim that this approach is applicable to Foucault’s broader project. Gordon limits his discussion of Foucault to the circumscription of objects existing in the world (madness, in this case), and descriptions of the processes by which objects of investigation are constituted. ³⁰ If Gordon had engaged with the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality (The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self) it would have become evident that Foucault’s account of the experience of sexuality does not match this interpretation. The result of Gordon’s exclusion of volumes 2 and 3 of The History of Sexuality from his discussion, along with some of Foucault’s later papers and interviews, leads to his mistaken assumption that no space exists for personal resistance in the Foucaldian schema.

In short, Gordon argues, Foucault’s account of the production of distinct modes of visibility, used to control society through manifestations of power, does not recognize that the same power producing such modes of visibility is also concomitantly dependent upon them. Consequently, this visibility, produced by manifestations of power, is also a necessary component of resistance. The underlying premise of Gordon’s criticism rests on the assumption that Foucault never adequately explains how people can resist mechanisms of control in a world where power is ubiquitous. As such, he concludes, Arendt’s ideas of freedom, power, plurality and natality can serve as correctives to Foucault by making room for resistance, without assuming humans can ‘exit power’s web’. ³¹ Yet Gordon’s entire ‘Arendtian corrective’ is completely unnecessary, because the space he creates for resistance within a power-system is already present in Foucault’s account of the care of the self.

Gordon correctly acknowledges that Arendt and Foucault share a non-essentialist ontology and that both reject notions of a fixed human nature or essence. He also recognized both to have a relational understanding of power. However, where Gordon identifies Foucault’s account of power to centre on the relation of multiple forces, he sees Arendt’s position as corrective to this because she conceives freedom and power as manifesting when people act in concert. It is this idea of people uniting that presents possibilities for creating something new, and it is this freedom to act that Gordon believes Foucault’s account is lacking. For Gordon, Foucault’s non-subjective account of power constitutes, naturalizes and makes relations essential by separating and homogenizing human beings. Arendt’s notion of power, on the other hand, offers the potential for humans to break free and disrupt the hold of Foucaldian power. Yet what Gordon fails to identify is that resistance is present in all Foucault’s work – in a way that aligns with Gordon’s claim that visibility is a necessary component of resistance, due to the power that produces visibility being concomitantly dependent upon it. Much of Foucault’s corpus concerns the mutual dependence that Gordon identifies. However, only in later work does Foucault explicitly explore ideas of personal resistance.

Gordon identifies the Arendtian potential for resistance as lying in her account of freedom, understood in the context of plurality and natality. Natality offers the potential to bring the never-before-seen into the world, and the condition of plurality creates a space for people to rise up together. ³² Yet, in his explanation, Gordon seems to disregard Arendt’s work post Eichmann, where her concern is with possibilities of resistance once plurality, and the potential to rise up in concert, become impossible. Additionally, she comes to modify her account of freedom in subsequent works as a consequence of her contemplative withdrawal. Later, Arendt understands the ability to instigate the never-before-seen not only in terms of natality, but also in her account of willing, where through acts of the will a person has the potential to bring about the completely novel. Although Gordon’s description of Arendt’s and Foucault’s early works is not incorrect, his scope is limited. By not engaging with either thinker’s later work Gordon incorrectly assumes Foucault’s account lacks possibilities for resistance to forces of power, and reduces Arendt’s idea of resistance to public manifestations where people unite.

Freedom in Arendt is always political, having the potential to create something new. However, in later work, this idea of freedom extends beyond plurality and natality to take account of personal freedom when the public, political space has been eroded. Similarly, Foucault’s work on the care of the self concerns personal freedom, understood in relation to practices of the self that can create a space not only for personal forms of resistance, but also for transformative moments where people might unite and rise up in resistance. Although Gordon offers an interesting account of Arendt and Foucault, his ‘Arendtian corrective’ is unnecessary, since ideas of freedom, resistance and transgression exist in Foucault and are, as I have shown, overtly articulated in his later work on practices of the self.

IV The figure of Socrates

Arendt’s and Foucault’s later works differ insofar as, where one considers thinking to be the greatest good to befall the city of Athens, the other sees the much-overlooked idea of the care of the self to be central. ³³ Yet, despite this apparent divergence, both draw on similar themes when it comes to their respective accounts of the figure of Socrates, even if using different terms – thinking in Arendt’s case and care of the self in Foucault’s. Furthermore, each suggests Socrates’ task is to demand thinking or self-care of each citizen, and to ‘sting’ the citizens into thought or care, so as not to ‘sleep on undisturbed’. ³⁴ Where Arendt sees Socrates encouraging others to think independently, so as not to continue slumbering, Foucault similarly identifies Socrates’ role as waking his fellow citizens to a concern with the self. The care of the self is viewed as the instant of first waking, when a person’s eyes open and access the light. ³⁵ Furthermore, both Arendt’s and Foucault’s discussions on Socrates’ efforts to rouse his fellow citizens reference the same comparison between Socrates as a gadfly/horsefly. For Arendt, Socrates the gadfly stings his fellow citizens into thinking and examining; whereas in Foucault, Socrates the horsefly bites his fellow Athenians to drive them to a concern with the self. ³⁶

Arendt and Foucault both use the figure of Socrates as an exemplar of a person that embodies their respective interests. I will not revisit the details of Socrates’ relationship to either of these notions, but I will discuss the similarity between Arendt’s and Foucault’s appropriation of the figure of Socrates to highlight some specific ideas each presents in her or his reading of particular Socratic dialogues. The comparison is informative, because both Arendt and Foucault draw on similar Socratic qualities concerning the synthesis of his words and deeds in the public expression of his opinions. However, where Arendt sees Socrates as the embodiment of the importance of knowing yourself, and the opposite of the ‘professional thinker’, Foucault identifies in him the beginning of a concern with the self and the embodiment of a philosophical attitude to life.

Arendt’s examination of Socrates is primarily focused on the Apology, Phaedo and the Gorgias. ³⁷ She does not provide a close reading of any of these dialogues, instead she picks and chooses from each what she needs to further her account of the activity of thinking. The main elements she draws from these texts concerning the activity of thought are: the destructive nature of thought in questioning and breaking down commonly held beliefs without positing anything new; the necessity to withdraw into solitude; the importance of a life lived in thinking and examination; the two-in-one, and Socrates’ attempt to lead and encourage others to live a life of thoughtful critique.

Foucault, on the other hand, while referencing numerous texts in his discussions on Socrates, provides several close readings to support his view of the importance of the epimeleia heauton [care of the self] – in particular the Apology and Alcibiades. ³⁸ Foucault’s interest in Socrates is not as the embodiment of the activity of thinking. His interest is in the ways in which the care of the self makes its first appearance around the figure of Socrates. Foucault emphasizes the link between the care of the self and others, as well as the importance for Socrates to inspire others to care for themselves. ³⁹ Foucault, like Arendt, discusses the importance of self-reflection (Arendt’s ‘winds of thought’), but presents these elements as a concern for philosophers in general rather than solely in relation to the figure of Socrates. Nonetheless, despite a slight divergence in focus, for both, Socrates represents the critically creative attitude each values.

Arendt demonstrates how Socrates encourages his fellow citizens to question such things as virtue and, without settling on a fixed definition, involves them in a process to make them more virtuous. Foucault also mentions Socrates’ suggestions of people becoming more virtuous by questioning these ideas. Foucault paraphrases the passage in the Apology where this is mentioned without offering much commentary. ⁴⁰ Yet this account of a person becoming more virtuous, through processes of self-care, shares features with Arendt’s account. Arendt’s Socrates claims that by thinking about terms like virtue, a person becomes more virtuous; Foucault’s Socrates suggests a similar outcome through practices of the self. At the core of each elaboration lies a concern with the meaning of ethical and political action.

Arendt and Foucault consider Socrates to have lived his truth, in the sense that there is no conflict between his word and deed. Additionally, both thinkers distinguish Socrates from Plato by stating that Socrates displays no interest in positing any universally applicable rules about what such truth entails. His interest centres on making Athenians live more truthfully, in the non-essentialist sense already discussed, by revealing the unquestioned assumptions and contradictions inherent in people’s beliefs and points of view. Socrates does not judge the validity of another’s view on the basis of who that other’s teacher had been, the other’s reputation, what philosophical school the other belongs to or the other’s prior intellectual work. Instead, through a dialogic process, he attempts to make others take account of who they are, by turning each person’s views into a problem to be investigated. Foucault interprets this as a process of care where the definition of self does not concern titles or achievements, but the form of personal existence. Arendt refers to something similar when distinguishing between revealing what a person is (titles, achievements) and who a person is (the character revealed through actions and deeds). Arendt and Foucault highlight similar positives, such as synthesis of words and deeds, willingness to break apart core beliefs, and the attempt to live justly and truthfully. The primary argument both thinkers make is for the necessity of a critical attitude towards self and world, understood as a never-ending quest for meaning, and independent of prescriptive guidelines. Arendt calls this critical attitude the thinking enterprise, and in Foucault it is the practice of self-care.

The following passages from volume 1 of the Life of the Mind highlight the close link Arendt sees between Socrates and thinking, and also demonstrate the difference in approach between Arendt and Foucault in relation to the figure of Socrates. This passage refers to Socrates as gadfly and electric ray; later, he will be midwife:

Let us look briefly at the three similes. First, Socrates is a gadfly: he knows how to sting the citizens who, without him, will ‘sleep on undisturbed for the rest of their lives’ unless somebody comes along to arouse them. And what does he arouse them to? To thinking and examination, an activity without which life, in his view, was not only not worth much but was not fully alive. (On this subject, in the Apology as in other cases, Socrates is saying very nearly the opposite of what Plato made him say in the ‘improved apology’ of the Phaedo. In the Apology, Socrates tells his fellow-citizens why he should live and also why, though life is ‘very clear’ to him, he is not afraid of death; in the Phaedo, he explains to his friends how burdensome life is and why he is glad to die.) ⁴¹

The connection between Arendt’s account of thinking and examination, and the Delphic motto ‘know yourself’, points to a difference between her and Foucault’s interpretation of Socrates in the Apology. Where Arendt argues that thinking as self-knowledge first appears with Socrates, Foucault stipulates the care of the self also first appears. In agreement with Arendt, Foucault argues that in the Apology the founding expression, to ‘know yourself’ [gnothi seauton], makes its first appearance with Socrates, but that another equally important and long-forgotten maxim, the care of the self [epimeleia heauton], also appears. Additionally, just as Arendt claims, ‘the appearance in Athens of thinking and examining represented in himself [Socrates] was the greatest good that ever befell the City’, ⁴⁴ Foucault says much the same, only in reference to the care of the self:

[‘]And if anyone argues and claims that he does care…don’t think that I shall let him go and go on my way. No, I shall question him, examine him and argue with him at length…For you should understand that this is what the god demands, and I believe that nothing better has befallen this city than my zeal in executing this command.’ This ‘command,’ then, is the command by which the gods have entrusted Socrates with the task of stopping people, young and old, citizens or strangers, and saying to them: Attend to yourselves. This is Socrates’ task. ⁴⁵

Foucault, influenced by Pierre Hadot, distinguishes between philosophy as a quest for knowledge and philosophy as a way of life. ⁴⁶ Of course, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive; but Foucault points out that the latter regards philosophy as a mode of existence and is no longer prevalent in modern thought. Schools dedicated to teaching both doctrines and ways of living are absent from today’s philosophical landscape, and philosophy is regarded as a discipline with particular aims, much like the philosophical pursuits Arendt is so critical of. Yet Foucault believes that a philosophical life is not just the life of Arendt’s ‘professional thinkers’. Philosophy is also a way of life, made manifest through practices of self-care that are always a part of the multiplicity of the world and the public realm.

V Critical self-creation

Arendt and Foucault both put forward accounts of dynamic processes of self-engagement to counter what they regard as the reduction of ethico-political agency to universally applicable codes and systems. Each considers blindness to the underlying structures that shape methods of investigation – such as science, technology, progress and, for Foucault, rationality – to be potentially dangerous, because of the tendency to reduce, destroy and dismiss alternative approaches. The inability to question fundamental values stifles genuine critical analysis by limiting different possibilities or approaches to the complexities within the world. Exploring themes of critical self-development as a means of resistance, aimed at transgressing current configurations, Arendt and Foucault promote a critical engagement between self and world to counter universally applicable moral and political structures. Both approach notions of self, ethics and political action as ends in themselves, and not a means to achieving a pre-established goal.

In earlier works, Arendt approaches the problem of universally applicable moral and political structures by developing an account of performative political engagement, where political actors continually present opinions to be publicly judged by other political actors. In later works, Arendt develops her account of thinking as a means to test commonly held beliefs and world-views. In both approaches the dynamic process of developing a personal relationship to truth guides and informs ethical and political engagement. Similarly, Foucault’s description of self-care presents processes of self-creation where the concern with meaning about self, truth and freedom is central, and in which these notions are not conceived as metaphysical categories, or historically constant. Truth and freedom occupy the position of an ethical principle. Yet there is the recognition that these notions are constituted by historically contingent forces and structures, and can be transformed through various modes of resistance. Critical thinking (or philosophy), political struggle and practices of self-care make the space for such transformation possible. Truth, freedom and the ethico-political self are all viewed as processes rather than as predetermined systems or concepts that aim to destabilize ossified structures and prevent the imposition of others.

Arendt uses the three faculties of the mind to offer an account of ethico-political judgement (and resistance) that is independent of the public arena, while retaining her fundamental notions of plurality, dialogue and the potential to bring about the unforeseen. Practices directed towards self-constitution, critique and reflection offer alternative approaches to current conceptions of ethics and politics. At the heart of Arendt’s ethico-political action is a space for the free and open exchange of conflicting ideas, and the ability to judge particular situations without subsuming them under fixed standards. Public performance is central to Arendt’s understanding of political action, and the key to this performance is the demonstrable unity of words and deeds. Additionally, in her investigation into the three faculties of the mind, the problem she confronts concerns the possibility of making independent judgements that are not necessarily determined by pre-established codes of conduct. The ability to approach particular circumstances without blind faith, without obedience to governing rules and doctrines, can have profound ethical and political consequences, particularly in times where liberties and abilities to resist publicly are eroded – such as under totalitarianism.

Arendt’s concern with independent ethico-political action is mirrored in Foucault’s discussion of the practices of self-care. Resistance and transgression are recurring themes throughout his work on power and knowledge, but only with the care of the self do these themes become explicit. Despite claims that the subject does not exist outside of systems of power and knowledge, resistance has always been possible. However, the publicly performative aspect championed by Arendt is not the key feature of resistance in Foucault. This does not mean that Foucault disregards the possibility of public performance as political action (after all, Foucault, unlike Arendt, was actively involved in public, political action); however, this performative aspect is not fundamental to his view of resistance. The very structure of his discussions, on epistemic changes and approaches to categorization, are examples of resistance in practice. A space is created for the possibility of different correlates by magnifying some of the underlying structures shaping conceptions of self and world. Extending on this idea of resistance through critique, the self-constituting subject – understood as a critical relationship between personal identity and external structures that constitute existing truth claims – offers one such possibility of transformation.

In the context of responding to particular events, the ability to examine firmly held beliefs and truths allows a person to question and judge each situation afresh. Arendt’s and Foucault’s respective accounts of the critical and dynamic, ethico-political attitude share two features: (1) a propensity for openness; and (2) a lack of fear concerning transformative events or ideas. The first feature regards an openness to others’ opinions, world-views and claims to truth. It is also an openness to question and make visible the purpose, function and effects of the systems of power that are at play. These include, but are not limited to: techniques of governance, institutionalized practices, ossified beliefs, religious dogma, the scientific world-view, normative constructs and universal truths. Furthermore, this critical attitude is directed not only at the social and political world, but at personal opinions, beliefs and truths as well. It is the second feature that makes it possible to extend the questioning of externally enforced systems of knowledge and power to the truths and principles that guide and inform personal opinions, actions and judgements. A lack of fear about transformative events is necessary for the attempt to question internal and external truths that anchor beliefs and world-views. Numerous historically and socially contingent constructs guide actions, and govern questions and solutions. As such, a person must be open to critically assessing even those ideas held to be most sacred. It is necessary to be unafraid of ideas crumbling under the weight of interrogation. Of course, it is impossible to be completely free of the social, cultural and historical constructs that shape the meaning of the world. However, in developing the openness to examine the conceptual apparatus that determines the meaning of self and world, small spaces for new experiences and ways of understanding can open up.

Conclusion

In this article, in contrast to common comparisons between Arendt and Foucault, I argue that the two thinkers’ works have more in common than a shared fight against normalization and conformity. It is true that Arendt and Foucault consider the modern configuration of prescriptions – because of the ever-present attitude towards the homogenization of plurality – to have an inherently destructive potential. Central to Arendt’s and Foucault’s critical exploration of a dynamic, critical attitude is an openness to examining ideas and systems that shape personal, social and political understanding. As the earlier discussion on Gordon illustrated, this critical attitude is not independent of the systems and ideas in question. Normative systems of power, knowledge, history, society and governance all affect the focus and modes of critique. In the attempt to critically engage with the prevailing guiding principles and systems of knowledge, the focus shifts from a passive acceptance of norms towards ongoing critique. Investigation becomes continual critical inquiry into the connections between systems and particular events, and the meaning this has for personal responsibility and judgement.

Yet, Foucault’s ‘care for the self’ and Arendt’s ‘thinking’ are not one and the same. Arendt speaks of the disruptive ‘breeze’ or ‘wind’ of thought that is achieved in a public space of interaction or in a private space of withdrawal. Foucault, on the other hand, would portray someone reflecting on what he or she is making of himself or herself in acting in a certain way. Nevertheless, both are alike in recognizing a certain structure – a tension between the powers (including moral authority) that form a subject, and the power of subjects (isolated or interacting) to distinguish between what the established rules declare to be ‘ethical’ and what those subjects can judge as right, or as wrong. Both Arendt’s and Foucault’s later works develop an account of self-constitution centred on the critique and analysis of self, world and others. Most simply, each presents an idea of personal existence as a willingness and openness to put even the most sacred ideas to the test, and this offers possibilities for transformation, political resistance and change.

For both thinkers this critical attitude, which judges anew each particular circumstance (Arendt), or manifests in the effective problematization by thought (Foucault), is a process of continual labour. Neither is interested in establishing a new ethical structure, and each advocates a particular attitude to living that questions the meaning of world-building systems and points of view. The critical task is to question and challenge oppressive systems of power and control. The abilities to refuse, to judge particulars, to identify forms of domination, all contribute to the opening-up of the space of freedom. Freedom is the capacity to refuse to participate and say ‘No! I cannot’, and to sound a warning through actions and deeds. It is the freedom to judge particulars independently, regardless of governing dictates. Freedom is the capacity to identify personal and cultural contingencies, to discard that deemed unnecessary, and retain that which is not. In both Arendt’s life of the mind and Foucault’s care, ethics and politics cannot be separated, because both are constitutive features necessary for informed civic activity.