Abstract
After Rawls is an edited volume inspired by the conference ‘After Rawls’, which took place at the Jesuit University Ignatianum in Cracow, Poland, in June 2014. Both the conference and the book are strong indications that John Rawls’ legacy is receiving more and more serious consideration in Europe, which may be a new turn in a world that was all too willing to consider Rawls as a kind of neo-liberal. This volume contains 14 essays covering comments on and interpretations of Rawls’ domestic and international theories of justice, as well as the Polish reception of Rawls’ political philosophy. In this review, instead of following the order of the essays in the book, I will divide the essays into three thematic groups and offer summaries and criticisms as I go along. I will then conclude with some brief remarks on the book as a whole.
Rawls’ corpus has continued to be a source of inspiration, (re)interpretation and debate among philosophers. Indeed, more than half of the essays in this volume contribute to this still-growing base. In ‘The Original Position from Theory to Political Liberalism’, Paul Weithman carefully studies the role of the original position in both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. The first half of Weithman’s piece discusses the link between stability not with the principles of justice arrived at in the original position but instead with the very agreement that leads to the principles. In Weithman’s view, this agreement is ‘self-enforcing’, which is highly attractive because self-enforcing agreements are honored without a mechanism of enforcement. 1 In the second half, Weithman focuses on Rawls’ political turn and argues that although the later Rawls favors the ideal of citizenship and the overlapping consensus, the original position and the self-enforced agreement still make an essential contribution to the treatment of stability in political liberalism. Weithman’s interpretation is revealing because it connects Rawls’ ambition to achieve strict compliance in the third part of A Theory of Justice with his goal to achieve stability for the right reason in Political Liberalism, which highlights the sense of continuity between Rawls’ early and later works.
The philosophical and historical background of Rawls’ political turn is further discussed in Jon Mandle’s essay ‘Dewey and Rawls on Metaphysics’, where Mandle argues that Rawls answers John Dewey’s call for a ‘recovery in philosophy’ by situating moral and political philosophy independently from other parts of philosophy, such as metaphysics and epistemology, that engage with foundationalist pursuits. 2 Political liberalism is therefore an anti-foundationalist project to resolve the practical problem confronting modern liberal democratic societies in the Deweyian spirit. Anthony Laden emphasizes another dimension in Rawls’ political turn in ‘John Rawls and the Practice of Equality’. Instead of reading Rawls’ conception of justice in distributive terms, Laden proposes an interpretation to see it as intersubjective and relational. Equality in this intersubjective and relational picture becomes something that citizens actively pursue through developing the ability to offer and demand justification in a way that is accountable to others. 3 Laden concludes by affirming Mandle’s point that Rawls’ turn to political liberalism is essentially applying this intersubjective picture of justification to philosophy itself. Thinking about justice in this light will lead to a more open and collaborative enterprise carried out by citizens who strive for shared ideals.
The connection between Rawls and Kant is another area that continues to attract scholars’ attention. In ‘Human Dignity in Rawls and Kant’, Justyna Miklaszewska distinguishes the different contexts in which the two thinkers discuss human dignity. Although the combination of freedom with dignity can be found both in Kant’s ethics and political philosophy, and in Rawls’ theory of social justice, Miklaszewska argues that in the case of the latter, dignity is no longer defined in a substantial way with a metaphysical basis. Instead, Rawls encourages political philosophers to see dignity as a political value best manifested in a liberal democracy where individuals have the capacity to make their own decisions and contribute to the domain of the political. In ‘Public Reason: Kant vs. Rawls’, Jakub Szczepański examines the connection between the ideas of public reason presented by Rawls and Kant. The discovery Szczepański makes is that the connection is rather superficial. In light of Onora O’Neill’s work on Kant’s political philosophy, Rawls and Kant can be seen as most closely linked by their similar approach to rationality. In fact, as Szczepański concludes, Rawls’ concept of public reason owes substantially more to Rousseau, whose idea of a common will is highly compatible with the notion of public reason. On the topic of public reason, Rafał Prostak uses the case of United States v. Windsor as an example to evaluate the role of public reason played in the US Supreme Court ruling of hard cases. Although there is no reference to Rawlsian public reason or his conception of political justice in the Supreme Court’s judgments, Prostak argues that the case still serves as an exemplar of public reason.
Shifting to a more critical perspective, both Anna Krzynówek-Arndt and Piotr Andryszczak criticize Rawls’ conception of the person. In ‘Persons, Public Reason and Democratic Constitutional State’, Krzynówek-Arndt argues that different interpretations of the conception of person will lead to different forms of public reason, and Rawls’ idea of citizens as free and equal persons is too narrow to support the principle of reciprocity and mutual respect among citizens. Andryszczak writes in ‘Is It Possible to Be a Political Liberal?’ that a political liberal understanding of persons will generate both internal conflict within individuals and external tension among citizens. Rawls’ vague and at times inconsistent discussion of persons leaves enough room for further exploration and debate. Both discussions touch upon a controversial issue in Rawls’ political philosophy. However, neither author explicitly explores the link between Rawls’ conception of the person and his idea of reasonableness. In fact, the main source of controversy in Rawls’ conception of the person has to do with his understanding of reasonableness as including both an ethical component and an epistemic component, which has become a crucial point of disagreement between political liberal theorists and liberal perfectionists. 4
In ‘Rawls and the Missing Concept of Solidarity’, Paula Szydłowska argues that the concept of solidarity is missing in Rawls’ theory of justice, which leaves out an entire dimension of social interaction that ought to be included in any discussion of justice. Although Szydłowska is correct to point out the overly individualistic focus of many liberal theories, Rawls’ justice as fairness as presented in A Theory of Justice included, she has neglected the important change Rawls makes in Political Liberalism, where the rational subordinates to the reasonable. As both Weithman and Laden make clear in their respective essays, to be reasonable is to take others into consideration, and the advantage of political liberalism over the rationalistic approach of justice as fairness hinges upon this crucial addition of interpersonal perspective. Moreover, one might argue that a sense of solidarity is indeed assumed in political liberalism, because free and equal citizens are expected to draw values from their shared public political culture in order to arrive at a reasonable conception of justice. In other words, the practice of deliberating over justice among reasonable citizens in the domain of the political is the very manifestation of civil solidarity in a liberal democracy.
The second theme of this volume is concerned with expanding Rawls’ intended scope of political liberalism to cover more than existing and well-ordered liberal democracies. In ‘Expanding the Framework of Political Liberalism’, Alessandro Ferrara highlights key ideas in his now published book. 5 In this short yet engaging essay, Ferrara points out that one of the challenges to the Rawlsian legacy in the 21st century is the increasingly inhospitable condition for democratic polities. Ferrara is convinced that political liberalism is the most promising framework to neutralize these toxic conditions that suffocate advanced democracies and to slow down the global process of democratization. Specifically, Ferrara recommends four ‘directions of conceptual expansion’. 6 First, we need to include the virtue of openness to the understanding of democratic ethos. Second, we ought to consider the possibility that some free and equal citizens might disagree with some parts of the constitutional essentials. In response, conjectural arguments that offer reasons to endorse the constitutional essentials from within their comprehensive doctrines ought to be adopted. Third, in the extreme case where even conjectural arguments fail, Ferrara argues that we ought to appeal to the last resort of a modus vivendi type of agreement on the basis of prudential reason. Fourth, inspired by the theory of multiple modernities, Ferrara suggests that different religious and civilizational contexts share enough common ground to be considered ‘variants of a recognizable democratic ethos’, yet remain different enough in their presupposed political virtues and values to generate ‘multiple versions of the “just and stable society of free and equal citizens” at the center of political liberalism’. Emphasis Original. 7 The last direction is particularly telling. Reasonable pluralism, the motivating factor of political liberalism, is no longer limited to advanced liberal democracies. Regions that used to be defined by homogeneity have witnessed an increasing influx of pluralistic comprehensive doctrines as well as gradually divided populations that yearn for something more. In order for political liberalism to maintain its theoretical rigor and practical applicability, it cannot afford to overlook these parts of the world that Rawls used only to tolerate without substantial engagement.
In ‘Religious and Patriotic Values in Public Reasoning: The Case of Post-Communist Transformation in Poland’, Dariusz Dańkowski, SJ, explores the possibility of expressing the principles of Catholic ‘Social Teaching’ and the patriotic ethos in the Polish culture in terms of free-standing political values for the sake of establishing and maintaining a stable liberal democracy in Poland. This essay is a perfect example of how political liberalism can inspire and offer theoretical support for democratization in a society not by imposing liberal ideals and institutions but by drawing resources from within a specific cultural ethos. Dańkowski, SJ’s insights are certainly intended to solve a particularly Polish problem, but his warning against a reductive view that we must choose between liberal and traditional values is applicable to many other societies experiencing similar social and political transformation. Rawls never took actual steps to illustrate what he would imagine the process of democratic establishment to be, because for the most part Political Liberalism is limited to existing and well-ordered liberal democracies. But the project of updating and extending political liberalism to envision, facilitate and realize democracy in parts of the world where people finally have the chance and capacity to be their own masters is certainly motivated by the philosophical courage embodied by Rawls and political liberalism. Dańkowski, SJ’s essay sets an impressive example for theorists who wish to establish creative dialogue between liberal democracy and local ethos by applying the conceptual tools in political liberalism.
The third theme of the book deals with Rawls’ theory of global justice, which is often eclipsed by Rawls’ domestic theory of social justice. Law of Peoples, Rawls’ last work, has long been the subject of debates among cosmopolitan and statist scholars, as well as political philosophers in general. It is refreshing to read in this volume the exchanges between Rawls and Philippe Van Parijs in 1998 prior to the publication of Law of Peoples. These letters offer readers a glimpse both of Rawls’ humble personality and of his intellectual earnestness. Specifically, the letters revolve around three main issues: the relevance of the duty of assistance among liberal or decent societies; the tension between international and domestic redistribution of wealth and labor; the ideal model of global justice and its implication for the EU. These issues are by no means resolved even in today’s literature, and they continue to generate philosophical discussions that will contribute to a clearer understanding of global justice.
In ‘Should Liberal States Tolerate Non-Liberal States? Problems with Rawls’s Idea of International Toleration’, Rafał Wonicki engages with both Rawls and his cosmopolitan critics to arrive at the conclusion that Rawls’ notion of international toleration is too narrow and ought to be broadened to include more states in the society of peoples by reconsidering the requirement of political participation. Wonicki’s conclusion is based on the argument that Rawls’ analogy between domestic and international toleration is not sound. For instance, in the domestic case, reasonable pluralism among comprehensive doctrines is considered in an entirely liberal context as the outcome of human reason under burdens of judgement and enduring free institutions. On the global level, however, reasonable pluralism among states is understood differently because non-liberal peoples and their comprehensive doctrines must now be taken into consideration. Wonicki also questions the necessity of having political participation as a factor in determining who can and cannot be tolerated, if the analogy between domestic and international toleration no longer holds. Wonicki’s suggestion is to include non-liberal states that do not prioritize meaningful political participation but still respect basic human rights in a non-paternalistic fashion. Accordingly, like decent societies, both benevolent absolutisms and burdened societies ought to be tolerated by liberal societies. Wonicki’s attention to non-liberal states is urgently needed in the contemporary world as international stability is increasingly contingent upon the interaction between liberal and non-liberal states. However, it is problematic to downplay the significance of political participation in international toleration. The permanent fact of reasonable pluralism, which motivates Rawls to make the transition to political liberalism, can certainly be interpreted as part of the liberal history that best manifests itself in well-ordered democratic societies. But this does not mean that reasonable pluralism on an international level must only be understood as existing between liberal and non-liberal states. The same phenomenon is also happening within non-liberal societies, where their unique historical circumstances, interactions and even confrontations with other societies have led to the co-existence of a wide variety of comprehensive doctrines. It is thus very difficult, if not impossible, for the authority of the state to represent a whole society without at least allowing some meaningful degree of political participation, without which some groups of citizens would be under-represented and have no effective way to voice their concerns, especially when their basic human rights were to be violated in the name of the shared common good. To be fair, Wonicki does not go so far as to eliminate the necessity for political participation, but more qualifications should be given to better articulate it as a criterion to determine who should be tolerated on the global level.
David Ingram’s essay ‘Rawls and Habermas on Human Rights: Reconciling Political and Cosmopolitan Approaches Beyond Legalism’ confirms the previous point. According to Ingram, although human rights do not conceptually imply democracy, history shows that democracy is empirically required for the secure implementation of human rights. 8 A legitimate human rights regime ‘must be democratic in a way that permits both political and cosmopolitan forms of representation’. 9 Ingram’s comparative study of Rawls’ and Habermas’ views on human rights leads to the conclusion that reductionist approaches to human rights tend to neglect important functions served by human rights. Instead, Ingram thinks that ‘we must begin with the basic capabilities, needs, goods, and interests that mark our evolving understanding of human agency in its diverse cultural manifestation’, and only then should reductive discourse theories of human rights be incorporated to specify the meaning of human rights in a way that is just and fair to all. 10 The implication of Ingram’s argument is far-reaching. If human rights are indeed ‘universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’, as suggested by the conclusion drawn by the delegates to the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, then a reasonable theory of global justice that aims to specify and defend human rights must be able to address not only the philosophical and political distance between liberal and non-liberal societies, but also the economic and developmental gap between developed and developing countries. 11
Despite some critical moments, the book as a whole is filled with admiration for Rawls’ philosophical legacy, which continues to influence scholars in and beyond the Anglo-Saxon world. What I find somewhat disappointing about the book is the imbalance between the amount of interpretive and comparative studies of Rawls’ political philosophy, and its application in the European (and in this case Polish) context, especially since the book is intended to demonstrate both the intellectual essence and the far-reaching influence of Rawls’ works. Most of the essays by the Polish scholars engage with theoretical and in some cases abstract concepts without giving the discussions a uniquely local perspective. These are of course valuable endeavors, but it is equally important for political philosophers after Rawls to explore the implications of Rawls’ legacy and how Rawls’ theories can be defended and updated to deal with challenges that Rawls did not fully confront or even anticipate in his own time.
In the limited amount of space devoted to these pursuits, the book nonetheless sets an excellent example for further research on Rawls’ political philosophy. There are many urgent issues in the contemporary world that Rawls did not satisfactorily address. For instance, Rawls’ political philosophy is not particularly concerned with the issue of democratization in non-liberal and non-democratic parts of the world. Unlike some political liberal theorists who leave out the non-liberal world for the sake of argumentative strength, Ferrara’s and Dańkowski, SJ’s attempts to expand the scope of political liberalism to support the establishment of liberal democracy in areas that lack the theoretical foundation are laudable. More explorations ought to be made even beyond the European context. In addition, Rawls’ theory of global justice is underdeveloped in comparison with his theory of domestic justice. As Ingram’s essay makes clear, how to understand, specify and protect basic human rights through multilateral cooperation while maintaining a meaningful degree of local sovereignty is a problem that neither Rawls nor Habermas fully solves. Also lacking is the discourse on the economic inequality between developed and developing countries in relation to global justice. Together, these issues point to a path that Rawls himself was not able to follow. For scholars after Rawls, addressing these problems with the support of the richness of Rawls’ political philosophy is the best way to honor his legacy.