Abstract
A healthy and robust public political culture is generally regarded as being of utmost necessity for the maintenance of a stable democratic environment. Especially when a country is facing significant challenges and is in the process of devising and implementing radical reforms, the presence of satisfactory collective deliberation can ensure durability and stability. This article will focus on one type of argumentation that stands in the way of such healthy deliberation. It will explore the various forms that ad hominem arguments take and consider the harmful consequences of their wide prominence in the political culture of the country.
Introduction
The presence of an atmosphere of healthy public deliberation, while an important component of democratic politics, assumes even greater significance when a country undergoes wide-ranging political and societal structural transformation. The success and durability of reforms introduced to overcome significant problems depend to an important extent on whether the process includes fruitful collective deliberation. It seems to be no exaggeration to suggest that how planned changes in a society are discussed, devised and implemented are a major factor in whether those changes contribute to the creation and maintanence of a stable democratic environment. The present state of affairs in Turkey can be said to demonstrate in many ways the great relevance of deliberation for successfully meeting fundamental challenges.
Inspired by the current state of argumentation in Turkish politics, this article will critically analyze in some depth an aspect of public political discussion that actually poses an obstacle to effective and collaborative debate. Prompted by the prominent position ad hominem argumentation came to acquire in the public political culture in the country, the aim is to explore more generally the structure and different forms that ad hominem arguments take. Clearly, such arguments that aim to discredit the critic rather than address the criticism are by no means limited to Turkey and are an undeniable fact of political life in many other societies. Therefore, the analysis below is carried out at a certain level of generality in order to try to retain a broad reach and close pertinence for many instances in different political settings.
It should be admitted that ad hominem attacks tend to have a tenacious effectiveness when they are strongly lodged in the political culture. Especially when evaluated from the perspective of practical politics, it becomes extremely difficult to counter such attacks adequately. A central task of the analysis below is therefore to explore the ways in which prominent forms of ad hominem argumentation retain significant resilience in practical political discussions. Such a close scrutiny will also reveal how personal attacks of this sort immensely contribute to deepening division and polarization in the society. The second focus of emphasis in our analysis is therefore an investigation of how, as a major consequence of such polarization, independent and critical contribution to public debate becomes extremely difficult. The article will then conclude by underlining the corrosive effect on the democratic culture of this way of “silencing the critics” and the potential threat that it poses to any critical voice.
Types of ad hominem argumentation
A frequently encountered response to criticism in political debates, prevalent in but by no means limited to Turkey, is to divert the discussion away from the content of that criticism. Rather than addressing the substance of the issue, the reply usually takes the form of an attack against the person making the criticism. 1 This section will try to analyze the different forms that ad hominem attacks assume and scrutinize the ways in which they operate in practical politics.
Tu quoque
One of the more prominent types of an ad hominem reaction is generally described as tu quoque (or “you too”), a counter charge captured by the more familiar phrase “the pot calling the kettle black.” In such a response, the critic is taken to task for being guilty of similar or worse faults. The person levelling the criticism or making the condemnation is discredited as someone who in reality violates the very principles that she professes to advocate. Relying on such presumed hypocrisy and use of double standards, this type of riposte serves to dismiss the critic and consequently makes it easier to discard the criticism. The critic, as someone who allegedly “does not practice what she preaches,” is seen as “the last person who should speak” on such an issue. With the critic therefore not worthy of engaging with on the concern that is raised, any chance of a substantive discussion is lessened considerably.
It should be admitted that the (rhetorical) question of “Who are you to criticize/condemn me on this issue?” can be a very effective part of a potent counter attack in debates. Whatever the supposed merits of this strategy in terms of practical politics, it will be argued that the wide adoption of tu quoque responses (or ad hominem attacks generally), and the inevitable similar counter attacks that such responses generate, embody grave implications for the political culture. In order to examine closely how the wide presence of ad hominem arguments in public political debates poses significant barriers to a healthy state of deliberation and fruitful dialogue, it will be worth our while to look closely into the different ways in which the tu quoque reply may be used and what kinds of response it can in turn trigger.
What is worth underlining at the outset is perhaps the obvious point that the tu quoque response does not engage the critic about the rightness or the wrongness of the act that is being criticized. It leaves the substantial issue unaddressed, shifting instead the focus to the status of the critic. It may be thought that this reply leaves the criticized party vulnerable in an important way, since a response along the lines of “you do/did worse” or “you are no better” may amount to an implicit ackowledgment that “both sides are just as bad.” While attacking the critic in this way, the criticized side may indeed end up conceding indirectly a certain moral equivalence between the two parties. However, as will be explored below, despite this potential vulnerability, the tu quoque response proves to be surprisingly effective in silencing the critic or at least in diverting the topic of discussion.
There are especially two aspects to the tu quoque response that may be expected to affect its force, but are relatively ineffective in practice. First, it may be thought that whether the “you did worse” counter charge is factually correct or not should have a significant bearing on the strength of this attack. Second, if the charge is with basis, whether the critic in turn owns up to a past mistake may be assumed to play an important role in determining the result of the exchange between the critic and the criticized party. Yet, as will be examined in detail presently, the veracity of the factual basis of the tu quoque response or the attitude of the critic as to her own past behavior do not seem too significant when evaluated from the perspective of practical politics.
When the tu quoque reply is factually correct, the critic may be said to be put in a position of having to provide some explanation for the basis of this “you do/did worse” charge. It is of course possible that the critic will honestly admit to inconsistency or own up to a past mistake. In this way, the critic may actually accept the charge concerning her past behavior, and having come to terms with it, may invite the other party to engage in a fruitful and honest debate about the act that is currently under discussion. Such a response from the critic may be expected to give greater force to the condemnation and in a sense clear the ground for a substantive deliberation. Yet, it is usually a fact of political life that this type of an honest coming to terms by the condemner is rarely reciprocated. Indeed, the admission of a past mistake is frequently exploited in order to intensify the counter attack and score points in the political debate. The critic is chastised for her “sin” and the discussion becomes solely focused on her moral standing. An honest admission becomes interpreted as confirmation of guilt, and the critic is treated as an interlocutor not worthy of respect. Also, especially if the political culture is such that apology for a past mistake is seen as a sign of weakness and therefore rarely taken at face value, the concession by the critic may be treated as insincere and even perhaps seen as a trap laid in order to get the adversary to engage in “unnecessary” self-criticism. When participants in a debate have a marked tendency not to ever admit mistakes under any circumstance, the ground is rarely cleared for a proper and objective debate. This consequence of tu quoque will be taken up in greater detail in the next section.
A similar state of affairs can be expected to be experienced even when the tu quoque charge is without basis. In response to this charge, the critic may want to challenge the veracity or the strength of the claim by arguing that she is actually not guilty of inconsistency or of similar past mistakes. The critic can argue that indeed she consistently implements the principles she advocates, or that the conditions were relevantly different when she performed the previous act(s) she is now being attacked for. Such a defense can be expected to increase the force of her own criticism, or conversely deprive the “you too” counter charge of much of its force. Yet, it may be practically very difficult to prove that in politics one has a clean track record on relevant issues, and the issue of demonstrating satisfactorily that one is “sinless” in this regard may never be fully settled. Moreover, what is meant by “a similar wrong” is unavoidably so ambiguous in many cases that it may be nearly impossible to reach a clear conclusion. An important consequence of this is that the “you commit(ted) similar wrong” counter charge manages to shift the ground to a discussion of the status of the critic. By being put in a position of having to explain that the conditions were different in the past and/or that she committed no similar wrong, the critic is already drawn into a discussion that is distinct from the substance of her own condemnation. The debate now gets bogged down so much on the details of the tu quoque charge and the reply to it that the issue that provoked the condemnation in the first place is now hardly addressed, if at all.
“Whataboutery”
The above discussed consequences can also be encountered following a similar form of ad hominem response. The reply to the criticism or condemnation in such cases is formulated in a way that completes the following rhetorical question: “where were you when…?” Here, the critic is accused of having been silent in the face of comparable act(s) in the past. Having omitted to condemn previous similar instances, she is now accused of engaging in a certain “motivated selectiveness.” 2 The current situation is argued to be “conveniently” selected for condemnation, thereby suggesting an inconsistent implementation of the principles that should underly the moral stance of the critic. The critic is accused of choosing the instance in question for denunciation while disregarding similar acts which should also be objectionable from the expressed standpoint of the critic. In light of this “selectiveness,” it is held that the denouncer is engaging in hypocrisy, as the adopted moral principles are not wholeheartedly embraced in reality.
A similar improper selectiveness is also implied in the response directing the rhetorical question beginning with “what about…?” The critic in this instance is accused of condemning the act in question while failing to denounce similar wrongs by others (“Why criticize A only and not B as well?”). In this type of counter charge, which can be labeled as “whataboutery,” the aim is again to discard the criticism by arguing that singling out one act for condemnation while overlooking (alleged) similar wrongs by others is a clear sign that the moral status of the critic is suspect. The counter charge therefore is that the moral principles that the denouncer refers to in her condemnation are clearly not embraced sincerely, but rather instrumentalized in order to achieve a certain (usually political) end. Such alleged use of double standards is then argued to reveal the bad faith of the critic, drasctically lowering the chances of engaging in a fruitful dialogue concerning the act in question.
It is clear that a common and more often than not intended consequence of this type of counter charge is that the rightness or wrongness of the criticism is left unaddressed. The “right” of the condemner to speak out on the issue is challenged, and this challenge is based on the alleged double standards or motivated selectiveness of the speaker. That this type of a counter attack reveals a certain vulnerability or weakness in failing to defend the act that is condemned was mentioned above. Nevertheless, it remains the case that “whataboutery” can be a very important tool in diverting criticism and disarming the critic. This is so especially when we turn to a consideration of how the two factors discussed above are also largely ineffective in weakening this type of ad hominem attack: (a) questions pertaining to the veracity of the ad hominem counter charge; and (b) the attitude of the critic in response to that counter charge.
Similar to our discussion above, when the “where were you when…?” counter attack is with basis, it is always possible for the critic to admit to her failure in condemning similar wrong(s) in the past. The critic may express regret about having been silent on comparable (past) wrong(s) and may own up to that failure. She may concede that this oversight was not due to the use of double standards, but simply the result of a relative neglect at the time of the moral importance of such issues. With now greater awareness and hindsight, the critic will accept that she indeed should have condemned similar previous violations and was wrong not to do so. Though clearly laudable, it is unfortunately the case that this attempt at honestly coming to terms with a past mistake and hence at hoping to clear the ground for discussing the act in question is rarely reciprocated in good faith. What is already admitted as a lapse in judgment is seen as proof of the fact that the critic is (morally and politically) not entitled to engage in condemnation of the other party. Moroever, as mentioned previously, in a political culture in which owning up to a fault is rarely credited, an honest admission of a mistake is seldom taken at face value. Such admission is treated with great caution since it may even be seen as a strategy towards “luring” the criticized party into “conceding” guilt.
It is of course equally possible for the critic to rebut the “what about…?” type of counter attack by arguing that the accusation is without basis and that she has indeed objected to similar wrong in other cases. This sort of challenge to the ad hominem charge may be expected to unsettle the respondent, enabling the critic to keep her moral status intact and consequently leave the force of the original criticism undiminished. It must again be said here that this expectation would be misplaced in many cases. For one, when the critic objects that she has actually opposed similar wrongdoing quite consistently and cannot therefore be accused of adopting double standards, the ambiguity over what is covered by the term “similar wrongdoing” is sufficient to cast doubt over her objection. The range of “similar” acts one needs to criticize or to have criticized in the past is so vague that, in practical political terms, this pre-condition to blunt the ad hominem attack becomes almost impossible to satisfy. Especially in the context of a heated dispute, it is clear that agreeing on which cases are “similar” or on when and how a proper condemnation was carried out is practically impossible. Even (quite unrealistically) assuming consensus on that aspect, the difficulty of preceding any criticism with a condemnation of all relevant and similar wrongdoings is so great that even a consistent and sincere critic is bound to be found lacking in this respect. What is more, there also seems to be a morally objectionable side to being required to always cover other similar wrongdoing when one is engaging in a condemnation: a denounciation such as “domestic violence is wrong” loses its significance and becomes somewhat trivialized when it always needs to be preceded or accompanied by an utterance to the effect that “all violence is wrong.” There will be many instances where a condemner may want, quite justifiably, to concentrate attention to a specific (type of) act, without wanting to broaden the discussion in a way that threatens to diminish the seriousness of the initial concern.
Bias
In addition to the “who are you to criticize me?” and “where were you when?” types of ad hominem attacks, another very common way of trying to disarm the critic is encapsulated in the following rhetorical question: “You would say that wouldn’t you!” Here, the charge is that the critic has a certain bias in advancing the criticism. Pointing out this “bias” allegedly reveals that the condemnation is not made in good faith, but is simply used to defend or further the (hidden) interest(s) of the speaker. The motivation behind the denounciation is in reality argued to be not a wish to make an objective contribution, but rather the desire to serve a “hidden agenda” held by the speaker. 3 As in other types of ad hominem attacks, referring to the presumed “vested interests” or “hidden agenda” of the speaker can be very effective in casting doubt on the objectivity and impartiality of the critic. However, the force of this attack may lead many to lose sight of the fact that standing to gain from the acceptance of one’s standpoint or intervention need not always be wrong. For instance, the fact that she “stands to gain” from acceptance of her views is clearly not a reason to discard the criticism when a woman condemns unequal pay. 4 It must also be conceded, on the other hand, that when the “agenda” that a criticism is alleged to serve is morally objectionable, then the ad hominem attack assumes significant force.
The sort of bias that forms the core of the above-mentioned type of ad hominem response can in many cases be “hardened” in such a way that the (alleged) affiliation of the speaker comes to the fore. When an individual is seen as an unwavering member of a certain (especially opposing) group, the criticism is not taken to be impartial or sincere because the latter is thought to have been “bound to say this” or that “anything different could not be expected from her.” More broadly, the identification of the speaker with a certain group, doctrine or cause may be so close that her arguments will be seen as simply serving the interests of that group and hence as “too tainted” to merit proper inclusion in a debate or require a direct response. When in this way the “source” or the affiliation “poisons” the arguments or the criticism to such an extent, the ad hominem counter charge leads to an easy dismissal of the criticism. 5 Evaluating this, it seems correct to object that a “hardened bias” of the sort discussed here may go against the spirit of an open discussion where the parties are at least expected to approach the issue with an open mind. At the same time, caution may be needed here because to be consistent in one’s views and to draw conclusions that are compatible with one’s general outlook are not features that are characteristically unsuitable in a debate and may indeed be commendable.
Whatever force the “hardened bias” accusation lends to ad hominem attacks, an important consequence for our discussion here is how perceptions of group affiliation or close and uncompromising identification with a certain cause leads to what can be called “ad hominem heuristics.” 6 Especially in polarized societies, participants in a debate often prefer to take the “short-cut” of identifying the affiliations of the speaker and then of developing their own position accordingly, without concentrating on the content of the argument. For instance, if the person is thought to belong to the opposing group, she cannot be “expected” to develop a convincing reasoning, so consequently there seems to be little need to engage with that argument. Therefore, when the participants have a tendency to have recourse to ad hominem heuristics, information about the affiliation of the speaker with a certain cause or group will be sufficient for discarding, or, conversely, unquestioningly accepting, the argument presented. A self-reinforcing consequence of this also seems to be that it will be very difficult for any speaker to claim to voice “independent” arguments. To be portrayed as being close to a certain cause or group will mean that the arguments will be judged according to that affiliation. On the other hand, when one voices arguments that are seemingly inconsistent with the outlook of one’s “identified group,” the reception will be one that questions the sincerity of the speaker and doubts whether the seemingly independent argument, through subterfuge, actually serves a different and sinister “hidden interest.” Wider consequences of ad hominem heuristics will be dealt with in greater detail in the next section.
Direct ad hominem
The different ways in which ad hominem replies to a certain condemnation, that we discussed above, usually also act as a lead-in to direct personal attack. 7 By first drawing attention to the inconsistency, selectiveness or the bias of the critic, the charge often culminates in a personal blame with the accompanying accusation of dishonesty. With her character blemished, the speaker is taken to be someone not worthy of engaging with in a fruitful dialogue. Thus, challenging the status of the critic, the way is paved for dismissing her criticism. While this conclusion is already addressed above, what is also worth noting here is that it is also common to see attribution of bias or ad hominem consideration even when it is not apparent or is explicitly denied by the critic. This is the tendency to dismiss the criticism by making it in a way “personal,” asserting that the real reason the critic engages in condemnation is not her concern for the issue under consideration, but actually her hatred or dislike of the person condemned or “the other side” more generally. While the criticism is cloaked with the appearance of an objective argument in order to give it more respectability, this particular attribution of motive goes; in reality it is simply a reflection of the sinister disposition of the critic. It hardly needs elaborating that this way of “uncovering the real reason” behind a seemingly objective intervention in a public debate is hardly conducive to a healthy dialogue.
Consequences of ad hominem argumentation
The above discussed presence of ad hominem argumentation holds significant political and social costs. As will be examined presently, ad hominem arguments feed from, but also contribute to, further polarization in the society, encouraging a certain tribalism in any political discussion of significance.
First of all, when a society is deeply polarized, any contributor to public deliberation will find it extremely difficult to avoid becoming committed to one side of the divide. Low levels of interpersonal trust in the society, coupled with a divisive and antagonistic ethos between groups, will make it almost impossible to act as a non-partisan critic. With existing institutions not strong enough to provide reliable social and political (not to mention intellectual) protection, there will be an overwhelming tendency to depend on the support of groups. As it becomes next to impossible to convince others that one’s contribution is independent and impartial, the costs attached to being seen as “not one of us” and hence as “unreliable” also become significant. Under such conditions, an inevitable consequence of seeking to minimize the feared costs will be to look for a safe “harbor” and associate oneself with dependable “allies.” Even in the absence of a desire for finding such comfort and safety, contributors may feel compelled, in light of deep social cleavage, to identify themselves with one side if they think that otherwise their views will not be effectively heard. As discussed earlier, when recourse to ad hominem heuristics is pervasive, it will be the case that the listener(s) will need to clearly identify the position of the speaker on the political spectrum in order to give serious consideration to her contribution. To make certain platforms available in order to effectively express her views, the critic may feel the need to “belong” to one of the existing camps. Yet, whatever the reasons, such desire to belong to a certain side brings important personal, societal and political costs of its own, as will be explored presently.
While the difficulties attached to trying to stay as an independent contributor to public debate are significant, they can be said to be even greater once one is clearly identified with a specific group. For, as a result of a certain “tribalism” coming into effect in light of deep polarization, disagreement within one’s camp also becomes extremely difficult. Voicing of opinions that diverge from the dominant view becomes open to criticism, if not attack, for “making our enemies happy.” The question of “whose cause/side does the argument benefit?” becomes an important yardstick for evaluating any contribution to public debate. The anxiety of providing grist to the mill of the opposing group becomes such an important concern that many instances of internal disagreement become stifled. What is more, the serious risk of being labeled a “traitor” emerges when not only there is an apparent failure to “toe the line,” but also in many attempts at trying to open a dialogue with the opposing side. The hardened belief that the opponents cannot be relied on to engage in a well-meaning dialogue makes this endeavor at best too trusting and at worst morally suspect in the eyes of the members of one’s group. Consequently, the prospect of being accused of weakening the resolve of one’s side acts as a clear deterrant for voicing independent opinions. Deep social division leads to putting great premium on loyalty, with the consequence that any attempt at self-criticism or at building bridges with the other side becomes suspect.
What is more, when after honest reflection one decides to defy dominant thinking in one’s side and incur the considerable costs of exit attached to being labeled a “turncoat,” this demonstration of candor is rarely appreciated by the other camp. Owning up to having been wrong in the past and showing the courage to engage in self-criticism is not reciprocated in the same spirit by one’s previous adversaries. Instead of seeing this move as an opportunity for fruitful collaborative deliberation with a view to instituting greater societal understanding, the person is usually accused of being naïve or gullible for not having seen the mistake earlier. What is more, in the constant tug of war, this shift in position is often seen in instrumental terms and hence as an opportunity for scoring points against adversaries. What is also very likely is that the “newcomer” will be put under an obligation to “repent” to an extent that never seems sufficient in the eyes of the members of one’s new group. Continuation of attempts at critical and independent thinking becomes subject to another round of questioning of allegiance to the newly formed position, though this time by the new “allies.” When a contributor is no longer thinking like “them,” the expectation that she should always be thinking like “us” therefore remains uncompromising. Consequently, while the “advantages” of being consistently in line with the accepted view in one’s camp become more pronounced, the intellectual “burden” of independent thinking becomes proportionately lighter. It needs hardly pointing out that the obvious cost of this for the existing political culture is the inevitable impoverishment of the quality of debate.
Presence of deep social polarization and recourse to ad hominem heuristics also help to create an atmosphere where the participants are prone to thinking that they are locked in an almost existential struggle, with very real accompanying risks. The tendency to assume unquestioningly that “the stakes are far too high” strains most instances of public debate in a crucial way: merely trying to convince those who think differently seems insufficient, the aim rather becomes one of “defeating” or even “eradicating” opponents. While perceptions of (real or imagined) threats and the feeling of being “under assault” add a certain element of hostility towards adversaries in public debates, another consequence is that reinforcing the stance of one’s own side becomes an important priority. Accordingly, “no one should expect me to criticize my group when significant danger is faced” becomes a familiar response when it is thought that extraordinary circumstances prevail. What is more, in such urgent times even attempts at nuanced thinking are seen as unnecessary “nitpicking,” as they are thought to distract from the vital interests at stake.
Finally, the sense of an existential struggle is also inevitably accompanied by a zero-sum understanding of politics. When it becomes true by definition that what is acceptable to one’s adversaries must embody harm to the interests of one’s own group, any compromise solution is rejected out of hand. An obsession with what the other side may gain as a result of a certain settlement, and equating a “gain” to the opponents as necessarily to a “loss” for one’s camp, make it almost impossible to trying to find mutually beneficial solutions. However, for a society facing common problems that require resolution in a satisfactory and permanent way, it is clear that the “winner-takes-all” type of outcomes can only result in instability and a deepening of the social and political divide. To make matters worse, it is unfortunately a fact of political life that, under such circumstances, political actors may act on the clear incentive of soldifying their base at the cost of producing further polarization, rather than trying to reach out to other sections of the society.
Conclusion
It cannot be denied that presence of ad hominem attacks is a frequently encountered fact in political life. It must also be admitted that in most cases such attacks are found to be titillating by the public at large. 8 Apart from this dubious excitement that they may provide, in many cases ad hominem counter charges may also be a way of expressing annoyance at the hypocrisy of those engaging in criticism or condemnation. There may be a justifiable protest against the use of double standards in political debates and ad hominem attacks may even be seen as serving to take the critic to task in this regard by revealing the dishonesty involved. That said, however, as we have tried to show above, ad hominem responses are also a major factor in making any type of sincere and open self-criticism very difficult. In this regard, whether or not they may be seen as a reaction to alleged hypocrisy, they are also certainly very much a cause of lack of sincerity.
At any rate, we should not be deterred from noticing that, especially when wide-spread, recourse to ad hominem arguments has a corrosive effect on public political culture. Such attacks lead to the impoverishment of public deliberation in significant ways. One is that important social and political issues that need thorough discussion are hardly ever treated with a focus and seriousness that they require. A satisfactory scrutiny of the issue under consideration becomes hampered as a result of the debate being diverted away from the substance. Second, the fear of having to face ad hominem attacks deters many from entering the public arena and contributing to what should be a process of collective deliberation. An important consequence of the impoverishment of political culture is that significant issues that a society may be facing do not meet a stable and successful resolution. As a result, remedies devised in an environment that lacks wide participation and reasoned argumentation become bound to be fragile and usually temporary. Needless to say, especially during times when a society needs to operate on the basis of a broad consensus and unity, such fragility presents a significant handicap.
Even more worryingly, wide presence of ad hominem argumentation has the potential to pose another significant danger to democracy and to democratic deliberation. This is that the “who are you to critize” type of attacks can move from dismissing the critic and denying the legitimacy of her contribution to denying a voice to the critic, and ultimately to denying expression and a platform to any criticism. Attacking the moral status of those who, we claim, have no “right” to criticize may be the precursor for the creation of an atmosphere where any criticism or difference of opinion is treated as illegitimate. In other words, ad hominem attacks may be one way of silencing critics, but it cannot be overlooked that, under extreme circumstances, they may ultimately lead to a much more disturbing form of “silencing.” This potential for contributing to a highly undesirable atmosphere is perhaps the most important reason why ad hominem arguments should be vehemently resisted.
The current rise of populist politics experienced in many countries does not seem to give grounds to the hope that the vicious cycle of ad hominem attacks and counter attacks is likely to break soon. Perhaps under such circumstances one can do no more than try to raise awareness of how the pervasiveness of ad hominem argumentation has a detrimental effect on democratic deliberation. Finally, and on a more positive note, it can perhaps be expected that sooner or later the time will be ripe for those political actors who will see gain to be made by moving away from strategies where recourse to ad hominem attacks thrive, avoiding polarization and all the factors leading to it.