Abstract
This brief introduction expounds the reasons behind the collection of essays entitled ‘Nature, Value and Normativity’. Political and social philosophers have usually a hard time finding a role for considerations about nature (and human nature in particular) in their accounts of normativity, due to the risk of committing the naturalistic fallacy and/or running against people’s autonomy. Scepticism about appeals to nature in normative accounts of politics and society, however, seems bound to clash with the fact that nature constrains human action. The essays of the collection tackle some specific questions about the role of nature in accounts of value and normativity: the fact–value distinction, the relevance of emotions for normativity and values, the role of intersubjectivity in normative theory, as well as free will and action.
Political and social philosophers have usually a hard time finding a role for considerations about nature (and human nature in particular) in their accounts of normativity. Considerations about nature are generally seen with suspicion, for at least two reasons. On the one hand, if nature were naturalistically construed, it seems it would be of no use in an account of normativity, for obvious reasons related to the naturalistic fallacy. Attempts to use biological knowledge for normative theories would indeed yield the most bizarre results. For example, even if we could establish homologies between mice and human behaviour, the fact that mice have intraspecific aggressive behaviour would not by itself justify aggressiveness among humans. On the other hand, if nature were interpreted metaphysically, appeals to it would raise the suspicion that unwarranted limitations are imposed on human freedom and on an autonomous choice of values.
Scepticism about appeals to nature in normative accounts of politics and society, however, seems bound to clash with the fact that nature must be relevant for normativity. What we can expect from humans, what reasons can intersect their motivations, what values can be taken to hold for them on the basis of their typical desires and inclinations, how rationality can be embodied in their lives are examples of issues that seem to constrain – if not determine – any account of normativity.
The ambivalent significance of nature sets an important challenge to any normative theory: it should explain how what we know about our nature and the nature of other beings with which interact – including both knowledge that we gain through science and knowledge that we attain through less objective forms of cognition (e.g. the grasp of intentions) – can be kept together in an account of normativity able to account for our motivations and for the values we can acknowledge. This challenge was taken by the editors of this section together with Marko Fuchs, acting director of the Forschungsstelle Methoden der Normbegründung (Centre for Normativity) of the Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg, in Germany. In 2017, the Centre organized a series of workshops on Nature, Value and Normativity. At each workshop, two philosophers were invited to discuss together a particular aspect of this general problem. The essays collected in this section ensue from the discussions held at three of these workshop. Mario De Caro and Olaf Müller discussed about the fact–value distinction on May 10, 2017, while Carla Bagnoli and John Hacker-Wright discussed about the relevance of emotions for normativity and values on June 21, 2017. The essays by Juliet Floyd and Gabriele De Anna deal with intersubjectivity in normative theory, a topic which was debated in a workshop that the Law School of the University of Udine (Italy) organized in Udine on the March 10 and 11, 2017, in collaboration with the Bamberg Centre.
Our hope is that the articles collected here will contribute to the advancement of the discussion concerning one of the most relevant issues of contemporary philosophy.
