Social freedom as ideology

I Critical theory and the ideal/nonideal debate: Hegel’s critique of Kant and Marx’s critique of Hegel

This section aims to frame the present discussion by answering two preliminary questions. First, what is the relationship between critical theory and the ideal/nonideal theory debate? Second, how can the critical theories of Honneth and Mills be situated within that context?

In contemporary political philosophy, the debate concerning ideal and nonideal theory stems primarily from a Rawlsian framework and its adopted terminology; however, one of the aims of this article is to suggest that the general philosophical issues at stake in that debate are far from new and have significant precedents within the history of philosophy, particularly when viewed from the lens of the critical theory tradition. ² Stated in a cursory way, the ideal/nonideal debate concerns the procedure, nature, and aims of theorizing in political philosophy. As the term suggests, ideal theory in political philosophy concerns an ideal of justice under perfect or near-perfect conditions, ‘the principles of justice that would regulate a well-ordered society’, where ‘everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his [sic] part in upholding just institutions’ (Rawls 1971, 8). ³ The nonideal part of political philosophy assumes partial compliance (not everyone acts justly or does their part upholding just institutions) and ‘studies the principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice’. While these definitions of ideal and nonideal theory on their own seem rather uncontroversial, what is controversial is the priority given to ideal theory in connection with the decidedly nonideal conditions of society in which neither individual actions nor institutions can be presumed to be just. This priority of ideal theory can be understood in at least two ways. First, methodologically speaking, political philosophy must begin by outlining an ideal theory of justice before working out the various ways in which reality deviates from the ideal. Second, and more substantively, this is not simply a matter of best procedure; rather, ‘until the ideal is identified, at least in outline – and that is all we should expect – nonideal theory lacks an objective, an aim, by reference to which its queries can be answered’ (Rawls 1999, 90). This more substantive priority can be viewed as a claim about the priority of the ought over the is and their categorical separation: The ideal is not only the ultimate criterion by which we evaluate reality but, further, the ideal of what ought to be is something that can be formulated in complete or near-complete isolation from consideration of nonideal, actual circumstances that obtain in social reality.

Even from this admittedly sketchy formulation, we can see that critical theory will have a stake in this debate. At first glance, it looks like critical theory will side with nonideal theory and challenge the priority of ideal theory, both at the methodological and substantive levels. Indeed, in the classical formulations, critical theory describes itself in opposition to other types of social and political theorizing methodologically by describing itself as a type of social philosophy that both informs and is informed by empirical research, ⁴ and substantively by orienting itself with the negative aim of ‘concern for the abolition of social injustice’ (Horkheimer 2002, 242). ⁵ However, it might be more accurate to say that long before the division of labour instituted by the Rawlsian terminology of ideal and nonideal and inspired by a left-Hegelian philosophical framework, critical theory already saw a need to move beyond this dualistic approach to social and political theorizing and sought to integrate the ideal and nonideal dialectically. On the one side, critical theory contends that ideal theories are never as ideal as they purport to be: Philosophical theories and moral concepts concerning justice arise from specific times, places, and interests and are shaped historically thereby. The historical embeddedness of ideas suggests that ideals are always indexed to particular realities, whether or not this is explicitly acknowledged. As Marx writes: ‘By freedom is meant, under the present bourgeois conditions of production, free trade, free selling and buying’ (Marx 2000, 257). Critique is therefore required to prevent distortion, misunderstanding and the covering over of prevailing injustices that lack adequate visibility or articulation. On the other side, nonideal realities are not normatively neutral or mute with respect to providing guidance towards their own transformation and the reduction or elimination of particular injustices. Normative promises, learning processes, contradictions, failures, and crises are embedded within our actual institutions, practices, attitudes, and laws, which mean that nonideal reality can also guide the critical transformation of ideals that inform political theory and practice. Working from both perspectives – appreciating what is known in this tradition as the dialectics of immanence and transcendence – critical theory can be understood as a systematic ideology critique of the present that aims at both enlightenment and emancipation for historical agents. ⁶ As noted earlier, critical theory’s methodological and substantive commitment to the entwinement of the historical and the normative in its analysis of social injustice is fundamentally founded upon a Hegelian–Marxian framework. I want to suggest that far from being an episode of interest merely to historians of ideas, this philosophical context remains highly instructive for understanding the stakes and terms of the ideal/nonideal debate. To further understand this context, I now turn to the critical theories of Honneth and Mills.

Given the landscape of contemporary political philosophy, it is not entirely surprising that Honneth begins FR by positioning his approach in opposition and as an alternative to ideal theory ‘decoupled from an analysis of society’ (FR 1). The key to Honneth’s project – both here and in his earlier works – is a Hegelian critique of Kantianism, and we can approach this framework in two ways. First, and in a move that appears to ally him with political realists, Honneth objects that the normative principles operative in contemporary political philosophy are constructed in complete isolation from consideration of the actual institutions and practices they supposedly govern. ⁷ Ideal constructions of justice and its principles are obtained via idealization procedures that ‘are then “applied” secondarily to social reality’, turning political philosophy into a kind of applied ethics, rather than an investigation of the existing norms of social and political institutions. ⁸ Second, we can understand Honneth’s Hegelian objection in terms of an institutional critique that defends the priority of what Hegel calls ethical life (Sittlichkeit) over individualized, transcendental, and proceduralist accounts of moral reflection through which the principles of ideal theories are derived (Moralität). The thought here amounts to the following: Although individual moral reflection on authoritative norms (e.g. autonomy and equality) and the extent of their application constitutes an important part of how political agents adjudicate actions and institutional action contexts, this highly developed form of moral reasoning is dependent upon historically achieved institutions and practices for both its genesis and its continuing operation and authority. ⁹ Specifically, the capacity and authority of moral reflection is achieved through institutions and practices of mutual recognition in various social and political contexts – most importantly for Hegel and Honneth: personal relationships, markets and nation states – which means that the normativity of these institutions themselves cannot in turn be simply grounded on the principles derived from individual moral reflection. ¹⁰ Insofar as moral reflection is a result and achievement of the historically developing institutions of ethical life, the normativity of institutions of recognition has both developmental and conceptual priority over the principles derived from individual moral reflection. As Honneth suggests, ‘recognition within institutions must precede the freedom of atomistic individuals and discursive subjects’ (FR 59; my emphasis).

Although much of this is familiar terrain for those acquainted with Hegel’s critique of Kant, Honneth also presents two distinctive ideas in FR that further develop his own approach to critical theory: the method of normative reconstruction and the idea of social freedom. ¹¹ Normative reconstruction sets out four methodological presuppositions for Honneth’s investigation into the primary institutions of ethical life: first, that social reproduction depends upon shared universal ideals and values; second, a theory of justice must be developed on the basis of those values, and institutions and practices are deemed just to the extent that they are capable of realizing shared values; third, the institutions and practices that can be shown to actually realize general values are ‘normatively reconstructed’; fourth, normative reconstruction should not simply affirm the existing institutions of ethical life, but must also criticize their failures in realizing the shared values that enable social reproduction (FR 3–10). Honneth’s method of normative reconstruction has been subject to criticism from various perspectives, and FR does not present an independent defence of this method for critical theory apart from a short presentation of the four premises in the introduction of the book. ¹² I would note, however, that nothing about the general thesis that ethical life has priority over individual moral reflection in a theory of justice entails this specific method of normative reconstruction, which means that one could accept key aspects of Hegel’s critique of Kant and ideal theories without accepting Honneth’s chosen method in FR.

For the purposes of this article, social freedom is the more important concept defended in FR, and it better captures what is at the core of Hegel’s critique of Kant-inspired ideal theories. In contrast to negative freedom (freedom from external impediments and constraints; FR 21–28) and reflexive freedom (the self-relation of autonomous agents whose wills are guided by their own intentions; FR 29–41), social freedom denotes the relations of mutual recognition realized in the various spheres of action that make up ethical life. Social freedom is both a condition for negative and reflexive freedom, and represents a distinct form of freedom in which subjective aims and intentions find their full realization in the institutional contexts of objective reality. The key thought here is that individual freedom (autonomy, or what Honneth called in earlier works, a ‘practical relation-to-self’) requires objective conditions for its realization. At a general level, individual freedom requires mutual recognition, which ‘refers to the reciprocal experience of seeing ourselves confirmed in the desires and aims of the other, because the other’s existence represents a condition for fulfilling our own desires and aims’ (FR 44–45). At a more specific level, individual freedom is realized within specific institutional action contexts in which subjects give and receive different forms of mutual recognition (e.g. love, respect, and esteem), which are the enabling conditions for the realization of individual aims. When Honneth contends that a theory of justice should be thought of as an analysis of society, he means that justice should be concerned with an analysis of the objective, institutional, recognition-based spheres of action and their accepted, operative norms through which individual autonomy becomes a reality. Social freedom is thus the nexus of necessary, intersubjective, institutional conditions that make individual freedom an objective reality.

Given that FR is clearly an attempt to rewrite Hegel’s Philosophy of Right for the present, it is surprising that Honneth has not considered potential criticisms from a Marxian perspective, especially since Honneth works out of the tradition of critical theory. ¹³ This is pressing, not only because it speaks to the viability of such a project but, further, because other alternatives to ideal theories have been proposed from Marxian perspectives that are quite prominent in the literature, which have the potential of undermining Honneth’s Hegelian alternative as an approach in political philosophy (before it even began, insofar as much of this literature predates FR). ¹⁴ For many years and from a Marxian standpoint, Charles Mills has criticized ideal theory as an approach in political philosophy on the grounds that it serves an ideological rather than emancipatory function (ITI 170). For Mills, the problem with ideal theory is not simply that it abstracts from the social and institutional preconditions of the normative principles of a theory of justice; rather, the problem with ideal theory is that its idealizations often reflect the privileges and interests of dominant groups. These idealizations potentially both perpetuate dominant group privilege and obscure systematic forms of injustice and oppression experienced by non-dominant groups. This Marxian dimension of the critique of ideal theory is entirely missed in Honneth’s Hegelian critique, in part because it originates from Marx’s critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Although Honneth’s Hegelian critique of ideal theory reveals the ways in which the principles of a theory of justice are parasitic upon institutionalized spheres of recognition, Marx’s original critique of Hegel consisted in showing that the norms embedded in these institutionalized spheres – in particular, the state and civil society – reflected the interests of the revolutionary bourgeois class who forged these same institutions according to their aims. To be sure, the dispute between Hegel and Marx is far too complex to be settled here; for our purposes, what is important is that the embedding of norms in institutions of recognition does not inoculate them from the charge of ideology. ¹⁵

Mills’ approach to ideology critique has two dimensions, one narrow and one broad. On the narrower understanding, which takes up interpretive issues in Marx and Engels, Mills has defended a reading of ideology where it should be understood as referring primarily to the position of idealism and the prioritizing of the superstructural edifice of society as its key determining factor (mainly: the state and the juridical system, but also: religion and morality in the sense of what Hegel called Moralität) (Mills 1985, 2003). ¹⁶ On this narrower understanding, Kantian approaches to ideal theory would be ideological to the degree that they lead with principles that are derived from the superstructure disguised as a transcendental theory of individualized morality. The Hegelian approach would be ideological to the extent that it prioritizes the ideals of the superstructure over the functioning of the material base (roughly, natural and social reproduction in the family and civil society) as the essential determining factor of a theory of society. ¹⁷ On this score, the results are mixed, depending on whether one takes a conservative or revolutionary approach to Hegel, an issue that I will not address here. With respect to FR and Honneth’s work more broadly, the results are also mixed. On this narrow understanding of ideology, Honneth has resources to claim that his theory is non-ideological on the following grounds: (1) his earlier theory of recognition emphasizes the moral struggle of those who are not or misrecognized within current institutional contexts over the dominant, superstructural interpretation of norms and practices (Honneth 1995, 2003, 2007a); (2) although Honneth’s theory is still ‘weakly’ teleological, he, unlike Hegel, does not prioritize the state over and above the family and civil society or the market in his analysis of society (FR 254); ¹⁸ and (3) despite recognizing the normative advances of modernity that are tied to the idea of legal personhood and moral respect, Honneth emphasizes the limitations of these perspectives as well as diagnoses prevalent social pathologies associated with abstract conceptions of legal and moral freedom (FR 81–94, 104–20).

However, two features of FR make Honneth potentially vulnerable to charges of ideology in the narrow sense. The first is Honneth’s commitment to what he views as the arch-ethical value of modern societies, ‘freedom, that is, the autonomy of the individual’ (FR 15). This means that despite the fact that individual freedom has intersubjective and institutional preconditions, a theory of justice is nonetheless essentially related to and primarily oriented by an idea of the autonomy of individuals. Institutional action-spheres are therefore assessed according to the degree to which they are able to realize this arch-ethical value, in addition to the other values that may be specific to respective spheres (e.g. emotional development in families, mutual respect and solidarity in markets, publicity and reaching understanding in democracies). The question here concerns whether Honneth is able to find a non-ideological (here: non-idealist and non-superstructural) justification for autonomy as the arch-ethical value. Taking individual freedom as the highest value of society could be viewed as taking what is a product of capitalist exchange relations as a universal and unimpeachable value (idealism) and transforming the language of legal rights and personhood into a transcendental morality, albeit in a slightly different fashion than Kantian theories (superstructuralism). ¹⁹ (In 2015, Honneth has continued to defend individual freedom as the arch-value of modernity by enlisting Hegel’s end of history thesis.)

The second feature of FR that makes it vulnerable to the narrow charge of ideology is the method of normative reconstruction itself. The key here is Honneth’s insistence that ‘the norms already underlying existing institutions’ are the sufficient criteria for assessing the degree to which the same, relevant institutions can be said to realize individual freedom (Schaub 2015, 111). Institutions are thus evaluated according to existing ideals and present ideals are assumed to be correct or sufficient insofar as they are the products of a historical learning process. In addition to existing norms being deemed sufficient, existing institutions are expected to be capable of realizing such norms in principle, even if at present they fall short of realizing their full potential (what Honneth calls a ‘misdevelopment’). This appears to be idealism in a fairly straightforward sense, insofar as relatively complete ideals – guided by the arch ideal of individual freedom – are the measure by which we assess reality. When institutions fail to realize existing norms, these are viewed as deviations or misdevelopments from the ideal, but never as a sign that an institution is itself contradictory or unfit for the realization of existing norms (let alone new norms or the reinterpretation of old ones). As has been noted by Schaub (2015), this seems to go against key tenets of critical theory, and I would also note, nonideal theory, insofar as it disables the thought that the transformation of ideals and reality go hand in hand. ²⁰

Although I think a lot more can be said on the score of the narrow understanding of ideology, the remainder of this article will focus on Mills’ broader understanding of this term. The broader understanding of ideology takes us beyond strict Marxian terminology while retaining its core critique, which renders it more useful for political philosophy. Whereas Mills’ narrow sense of ideology sheds doubt on the plausibility of Honneth’s specific approach to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Mills’ broader sense of ideology will reveal the FR project to be a highly flawed alternative to ideal theory from a variety of perspectives: from the perspective of Honneth’s own work on emancipatory struggles for recognition and ideology, from the perspective of a self-avowedly Marxian critical theory, and from the perspective of mainstream political philosophy where ideal theories have been consistently challenged from Marxian, feminist, and critical race perspectives.

II Mills on ideology: A broader understanding

In his essay, ‘“Ideal Theory” as Ideology’, Mills presents a broader understanding of ideology in the context of criticizing ideal political theory as ‘obfuscatory, and…in part ideological, in the pejorative sense of a set of group ideas that reflect, and contribute to perpetuating, illicit group privilege’ (ITI 166). ²¹ To articulate this broader notion of ideology, Mills begins by distinguishing between two senses of ideal: ideal-as-normative and ideal-as-model. Ideal-as-normative concerns the values and ideals operative in any normative theorizing, regardless of the approach taken concerning the status of these ideals. Leaving aside this first sense of ideal, Mills focuses instead on what he calls ideal-as-model and distinguishes between a descriptive and idealizing approach. An IDM, as suggested by its name, provides a descriptive account of how something, P, actually works, an actual P’s ‘essential nature’ and ‘basic dynamic’. Even in descriptive modelling, certain abstractions will be made in order to capture what is essential, which means that any type of modelling will necessarily include certain abstractions. ²² An IIM, rather than trying to describe how an actual P works, presents an ideal P or an ‘exemplar’ of how P ‘should work’ (ITI 167). As Mills notes, the usefulness of producing an IIM cannot be determined a priori, but will depend upon its proximity to an IDM. If an actual P operates in a way that does not resemble the ideal P at all, clearly the IIM will be of limited explanatory and action-guiding value – the ideal will neither explain how an actual P works nor explain how we might transform an actual P into an ideal one. An IIM could be quite useful if the IDM closely resembles it, and we could even imagine a situation in which there is not much difference between an IDM and an IIM (Mills uses the example of a smooth, Teflon-coated plane suspended in a vacuum as being close to an ideal frictionless plane).

With respect to ideal models pertaining specifically to ‘human interaction and moral theory’, IIMs operate with both factual and moral idealizations. At the level of factual idealizations, human agents are attributed ‘capacities significantly deviant from the norm’, where ‘degrees of rationality, self-knowledge, ability to make interpersonal cardinal utility comparisons and the like’ do not in any way resemble the capacities of actual human beings (ITI 168). Morally, idealizations involve ‘the modeling of what people should be like (character), how they should treat each other (right and good actions), and how society should be structured in its basic institutions (justice)’. In addition to these general factual and moral idealizations, Mills specifies six further dimensions of idealization that are operative in IIMs constructed by ideal moral and political theories (ITI 168–69):

idealized social ontology (in most modern and contemporary political philosophy, humans relate to one another as equal, atomistic individuals free of relations of domination, exploitation, coercion, and oppression);

Mills’ charge is that ideal theories that construct IIMs along these dimensions, where IIMs do not sufficiently resemble IDMs, are problematic in at least two ways.

Ideal theories are at best ‘unhelpful’ and insufficiently action-guiding for the purposes of social and political transformation from the perspective of traditionally and systemically/institutionally oppressed groups (ITI 170).

Mills’ positive thesis, which is a defence of nonideal critical theory that does not eschew universalism, conceptualism, or realism, can be summed up in the following claim: ‘the best way to bring about the ideal is by recognizing the nonideal’ (ITI 182). Specifically, Mills proposes that nonideal critical theory is in a better position to develop ‘nonidealized descriptive mapping concepts’ (NDMCs) as part of theorizing IDMs that do not view them as simple deviations from IIMs (ITI 174–76). The importance of NDMCs lies in their ability to address the two problems with the above-mentioned ideal theories: Although they remain concepts (and hence, involve certain abstractions and generalizations like all acts of theorizing), NDMCs are more conceptually adequate with respect to a descriptive modelling of social reality. ²³ This improved conceptual adequacy not only improves our understanding of social reality but also allows us to see the interests of privileged groups as privileged interests and, thereby, is more helpful and action-guiding with respect to social and political transformation from the perspective of oppressed and underprivileged groups. Examples of NDMCs are abundant, even if not necessarily in common currency for mainstream political philosophy. Mills cites class society/capitalism (and its corollaries: alienation, exploitation, and reification), patriarchy, and white supremacy as key concepts for nonideal theory, but we could also add disability, as well as other familiar concepts from critical theory such as negative dialectics/nonidentity and one-dimensionality (Adorno 1973; Marcuse 1964). The overall claim is that critical, nonideal theory that aims at enlightenment and emancipation is better served by developing IDMs (a critical theory of society) that capture the essential dynamics of social reality with the aid of NDMCs, rather than the construction of IIMs that can be both unhelpful and obfuscatory. The priority suggested by ideal theories is thereby reversed: IDMs and their NDMCs are what give content to ideals like ‘equality’ and ‘autonomy’, without which such ideals are prone to becoming ideological in both the narrow and broad senses. In short, IDMs and NDMCs capture critical theory’s ‘dialectics of immanence and transcendence’ that likewise challenge the prioritizing of the ideal over the nonideal. The question for us now is how to situate Honneth’s FR project based on this broader notion of ideology.

III Ideal as model in FR

As I will discuss further in section IV, Honneth has faced charges of ideology before on account of his theory of recognition, and he has attempted to provide a response to these charges in the essay, ‘Recognition as Ideology’ (2007b). However, before turning to Honneth’s approach to ideology, I want to first assess FR on the basis of the broader understanding of ideology put forward by Mills. In section I, Honneth was held to account according to the narrower understanding of ideology for the following reasons: (1) on the basis that Hegel’s Philosophy of Right has been subject to a well-known and highly influential Marxian critique; (2) on the basis that Honneth himself has advocated for nonidealistic (materialist, naturalist, pragmatist) approaches to Hegel (Honneth 1995); and (3) on the very general basis that critical theory’s methodological and substantive opposition to ideal theories has always been oriented by a Hegelian–Marxian framework, which automatically renders Marx’s critique of Hegel relevant. Even according to the narrow understanding of ideology, we began to see some of the potential shortcomings of the FR project as an alternative to ideal theory in political philosophy. In this section, I believe the encounter between Honneth and Mills, and holding Honneth to account according to the broader understanding of ideology is warranted for three further reasons. First, Honneth pitches his FR project specifically as a preferred alternative to ideal theories in contemporary political philosophy, which means that even if he does not engage directly with other alternatives to ideal theory, it is fair to assess whether his project is indeed to be preferred in comparison with other prominent alternatives such as Mills’. Second, I believe that the broader understanding of ideology put forward by Mills is a clear and systematic statement of how critical theory (most notably in the first generation) has always situated itself as a distinctive approach to social and political theorizing. Mills’ broader understanding of ideology distils the essential theoretical commitments of Marx for critical theory without (yet, or necessarily) requiring a commitment to specific details of Marx’s theory, which are of course subject to much dispute. Finally, although I will not discuss this dimension further here, I believe that Mills and Honneth share common metatheoretical commitments that make an encounter between them appropriate. For example, and despite their differing approaches in opposing ideal theories, both Honneth and Mills are, in a qualified sense, ‘pro-Enlightenment’ and committed to its universal values (Mills 1997, 129), and both aim to combine the resources of conceptualism and realism to defend a ‘moderate value realism’ (Honneth 2007b, 333–34). ²⁴ These common metatheoretical commitments make an exchange between them potentially productive and speak to their common aims within the critical theory tradition.

The first way to assess FR with respect to the broader understanding of ideology is to determine whether Honneth’s model of social freedom presented therein qualifies as an IDM or an IIM. This first question is already not easy to answer. Given Honneth’s Hegelianism and his emphasis on the existing norms of actual social institutions, it is clear that social freedom aims to be a model that describes how societies actually function and reproduce themselves. Although IDMs are of course descriptive, this does not mean that they are merely descriptive, insofar as describing how societies actually function and reproduce themselves includes accounting for the actually existing norms that guide such functioning and reproduction. This is just to clarify that IDMs are both descriptive and normative, and nothing about the fact that they are descriptive rather than idealizing precludes a robust normative discussion (Mills’ own flagship IDM, the idea of the racial contract, is also both descriptive and normative (1997, 5)). I would suggest that whatever the ultimate shortcomings of Honneth’s theory, it is clear that he intends for the model of social freedom to account for the essential nature and dynamic of basic modern institutions that are the primary sites of social reproduction – how they actually work and how they actually misdevelop. This also accounts for the high degree of historical and empirical detail provided in the chapter on social freedom, which takes up more than half the book. Although there is an affirmation of existing norms as authoritative, Honneth is interested in the actual historical development of personal relationships, markets, and democratic will-formation rather than their idealized forms, which would place social freedom in the category of an IDM.

What makes this categorization more difficult is the particular method of normative reconstruction in FR. Insofar as Honneth is interested in measuring reality by reference to existing shared values and ideals, his analysis and modelling of social institutions is, in a sense, ideal, because the actual is also normatively rational due to two factors. First, as mentioned earlier, existing norms are rational due to their being the result of historical learning processes. Despite the fact that ‘we can no longer share Hegel’s optimism that modern societies follow a continuous path of rational development’, Honneth nonetheless defends a teleological account whereby present norms (especially individual freedom) are the ‘outcome[s] of a centuries long learning process’ (FR 2–3, 17). ²⁵ These learning processes ‘can only be reversed at the price of cognitive barbarism’, which suggests that present norms are taken to be or at least are operationally close to, ideal (FR 17). Second, existing norms are rational and operationally ideal because subjects actively participate in and support their reproduction: ‘The fact that subjects actively preserve and reproduce free institutions is theoretical evidence of their historical value’ (FR 59). ²⁶ Honneth’s idealism here with respect to correlating the rationality of existing norms with agents’ participation in institutions is optimistic to the extreme, despite his earlier dismissal of Hegel’s optimism. Regarding agents’ participation in markets, he suggests that if the economic market failed to uphold or deviated from accepted norms and values, ‘subjects would no longer be willing to actively participate in the economy’ (FR 190–91). Given Honneth’s methodological approach that takes actual norms as rational and operationally ideal, there are grounds for claiming that the model of social freedom in FR can be categorized as an IIM. That is, in aligning the actual and the ideal as closely as he does, and arguably, forcing the reconciliation between them in favour of the ideal, the agents and institutions of social freedom start to look highly idealized and increasingly unrecognizable as a model of actual social reality. To follow out the example quoted earlier, the modelling of the action-sphere of the economy looks like this: Agents committed to rational, moral norms of mutual respect and solidarity (acting as consumers and labourers) are fully able to abstain from participating in the economy, should the economy that is already governed by those same moral norms start to misdevelop or fail to realize individual/social freedom in some way. ²⁷ This model of the functioning of the economy is surely ideal rather than descriptive. ²⁸

I want to now turn to the six dimensions presented by Mills that for him represent the keystones of ideological idealizations, focusing in particular on 1 (idealized social ontology) and 4 (idealized social institutions), which are the most relevant from the perspective of Honneth’s neo-Hegelian project.

IV Honneth on ideology: Material fulfilment

I want to now suggest that even on Honneth’s own account of ideology, there are reasons to worry that FR’s presentation of social freedom and its institutions are potentially ideological. The ideology charge is not new for Honneth, and he has attempted to answer it before, specifically in reference to his recognition theory. I argue that what are characterized as ‘misdevelopments’ of the various institutions analyzed in FR could in fact be viewed as evidence that forms of social freedom have taken on an ideological character, despite Honneth’s efforts to insist otherwise.

Although earlier I suggested that Honneth presents an overly idealized account of social institutions, a large portion of his discussion of social freedom concerns what he calls misdevelopments, or instances where past or current realities deviate from the rational, normative kernel that make the institutions in question realizations of social freedom. For example, neo-liberal deregulations that have led to lower wages and decreased job security for a majority of workers are viewed as a misdevelopment of the rational norms embedded in moral economism (FR 245–46). ³⁴ Honneth defines a misdevelopment as follows:

The misdevelopment that we will encounter in our discussion of relational institutions does not consist in systemically induced deviations…but [are] rather anomalies whose sources must be sought elsewhere, not in the constitutive rules of the respective system of action. (FR 129; my emphasis)

Honneth’s conception of misdevelopment and his staunch insistence on their anomalous character is surprising given his own account of ideology. In an attempt to defend his recognition theory (and by extension, the account of social freedom) against Althusserian and Foucaultian critiques, Honneth proposes a helpful account of ideology based on two distinctive features. First, Honneth suggests that

ideological forms of recognition cannot simply represent irrational systems of beliefs; rather they must mobilize evaluative reasons possessing sufficient power to convince under given circumstances in order to motivate their addressees rationally to apply these reasons to themselves. (2007b, 340)

The second feature of ideologies attempts to address the tricky question of how exactly we can distinguish between ‘justified and unjustified forms of social recognition’, or forms that enable social freedom and forms that are ideological (2007b, 340). To answer this question, Honneth suggests that in addition to providing a rational, credible normative promise, recognition requires fulfilment in material, non-symbolic terms (2007b, 345). That is, if there is a notable ‘discrepancy between evaluative promises and material fulfillment’, then practices of recognition are revealed to be irrational and ideological on the very simple basis that they cannot fulfil their promises in material terms (2007b, 328). In the terms I employed earlier, this seems fairly straightforward: Ideal actualities or best-case scenarios are not materially fulfilled realities, not only for disadvantaged groups, but in some cases, like the market, for the majority. Honneth himself employs two examples to spell out his case, that of advertisements and ‘“creative” entrepreneurs’ (2007b, 342–44). In both cases, the evaluative promises of advertisements and the interpellation of wage labourers as creative entrepreneurs (in advertising: the promise of substantial change in life practices, happiness and satisfaction; in becoming an ‘entrepreneur:’ increased individual self-fulfilment and autonomy) cannot on any reasonable measure claim material fulfilment. Insofar as an ‘abyss’ opens up between promise and material fulfilment, Honneth contends that his examples are in fact instances of ideological recognition (2007b, 346). Although he warns off a self-certain hermeneutics of suspicion on this basis, he nonetheless argues that the criterion of material fulfilment is an important and useful test with respect to assessing whether or not a form of social freedom can be viewed as ideological. With respect to our assessment of FR, I would suggest the following: Honneth’s own criteria for ideology here are preferable to his conception of misdevelopment from the perspective of a nonideal critical theory. The question of material fulfilment, particularly with respect to disadvantaged groups, is a much more helpful criterion for assessing whether and the degree to which a form of social freedom is or has become ideology. Rather than presenting the deviations from ideal actualities as anomalous misdevelopments, which operates with a conservative bias, Honneth would be better off framing his analysis of social institutions with the following question in mind: to what extent can the normative promises of institutions of social freedom find material fulfilment for their addressees, particularly from the perspective of the most disadvantaged groups in society? If FR had instead been framed according to this line of questioning, Honneth’s analysis of social institutions would produce highly different normative results, ones that would find plenty of rational grounds for claiming that current forms of social freedom are in fact ideological and unjust.

V Conclusion

In this article, I have employed Mills’ Marxian model of ideology critique in order to argue that Honneth’s FR is problematic both as a piece of critical theory and as a preferred alternative to prominent ideal theories in contemporary political philosophy. I suggested that we have reasons for preferring Mills’ Marxian approach, which is particularly attuned to developing concepts and explanatory models that map the nonideal realities overwhelmingly affecting disadvantaged groups. Specifically, I have defended three claims. First, I argued that Hegel’s critique of Kant and Marx’s critique of Hegel provide an important historical and conceptual background for the ideal/nonideal debate and critical theory’s relation to it. Second, I argued that on both a narrow and broader understanding of ideology, and according to Honneth’s own concept of ideology, the modelling of social freedom in FR can be viewed as ideological. Third and finally, and in light of the above-mentioned arguments, I suggested that a Marxian understanding of ideology critique remains the best model for critical theory moving forward (a thought that was evident to critical theory’s first generation) and as the best model when viewed as an alternative to ideal theorizing in political philosophy. Marx’s method remains as relevant today as ever, particularly if critical theory is to have any hope of developing concepts and models that can capture what is undoubtedly one of the key struggles of our time: The critique of capitalism from the perspective of those groups who, both historically and at present, suffer most from its proper functioning.