Towards a morally defensible concept of toleration: Insights from ancient Chinese thinking

Endurance and inclusion

Toleration, as political correctness, has become common sense today. However, when we use this word, its meaning might seem quite obscure. Especially in Chinese, ‘宽容’ (kuan rong), as a translation of toleration (and tolerance), has some differences with the original English word. Etymologically speaking, the word toleration is from the Latin word tolerationem, indicating a bearing, supporting and endurance. Even in today’s Merriam-Webster dictionary, the basic meaning of the word ‘toleration’ is still ‘capacity to endure pain or hardship’, followed by ‘sympathy or indulgence for beliefs or practices differing from or conflicting with one’s own’. Overall, the original meaning of the word toleration is quite passive, which could hardly be regarded as a virtue. ¹ Virtue requires us to actively function (ergon) to pursue a flourishing life, while mere sufferance or endurance of the existence of the people who are different could hardly be seen as a virtue, as there is no rational deliberation in this passive attitude. In short, the word ‘toleration’ connotes something second best, something we’d rather not do in an ideal world.

However, ‘kuan rong’ in Chinese is quite a positive word. The ancient Daoist thinker Zhuangzi ² used this word to describe a virtue of sage: ‘He is always generous and treats others with leniency (kuan rong), and does not encroach on any man; – this may be pronounced the height (of perfection)’. ³ Here, ‘kuan rong’ implies generosity, inclusion, broadness, treating others with leniency. In ancient Chinese, ‘kuan rong’ could be seen as a positive virtue, similar to Aristotle’s explanation of mega-lopsychia, great soul.

In modern Chinese, ‘kuan rong’, as a translation of toleration, means not only ‘sympathy or indulgence for beliefs or practices differing from or conflicting with one’s own’ but also means ‘do not care about some minor mistakes’. It expresses understanding of and even excuses some unimportant mistakes. In Chinese, there are idioms like ‘无伤大雅’, ‘无关大体’, ‘无关宏旨’, ‘无足轻重’, meaning ‘have only unimportant defects and do not affect the whole, involves no major principle and does not matter much, has nothing to do with big issues’, ‘irrelevant and insignificant’. These sayings more or less mean that some small mistakes and small deviations do not matter as long as they do not impair big principles. Let them exist, and do not treat them harshly.

In short, the word toleration in both ancient and modern Chinese does not connote an attitude of endurance as it does in English but is closer to understanding and forgiveness. This understanding assumes that (1) the object to be tolerant has some small mistakes, negligence and so forth and (2) this minor mistake is excusable. Small mistakes based on a certain reason in a specific situation could be tolerated. Here, the basic content of tolerance is not endurance but forgiveness based on consideration and rational deliberation.

In English, toleration refers to people who are different from us – the other. Toleration often requires us to have a kind of narrow-minded attitude towards others, and this may often push us towards a negative attitude towards others. For example, Thomas Scanlon defined toleration as a concept that ‘requires us to accept people and permit their practices even when we strongly disapprove of them’. ⁴ However, deeper emotions need to underpin accepting and permitting as a practice. In the next section, I will discuss three typical emotions – disgust, indifference and hunting for novelty – towards ‘others who are different from us’. These three emotions are largely negative and sometimes hidden, but in fact they often accompany the practice of toleration. What I want to emphasize is that the practice of toleration and the inclusive emotion do not necessarily come together.

Three problematical emotions underpinning toleration: Disgust, indifference and hunting for novelty

The most unequivocally intolerant emotion is disgust. Martha Nussbaum published a book From Disgust to Humanity in 2010, ⁵ analysing the emergence of ‘disgust’ on the issue of sexual rights and interests of minority groups. She argued why ‘politics of disgust’ must be abandoned, and the ‘politics of humanity’ should be seen as a better possibility. Nussbaum pointed out that disgust relies on moral obtuseness and imputes to the other a subhuman nature. The real problem is that people lack the ability to respect each other and sympathize with each other. Therefore, behind the struggle for equal rights of sexual minorities, it is fundamentally a matter of human nature.

Nussbaum reveals the following points for us: (1) our instinctive reaction to those people and behaviours that we don’t agree with is disgust; (2) for those we don’t agree with, our intuitive reaction is first to exclude them from (normal) people’s scope; (3) moral insensitivity means that we are unaware that those who are different from us are also people who share our basic humanity. According to Nussbaum, respect and sympathy are the weapons to overcome moral retardation:

the capacity for imaginative and emotional participation in the lives of others is an essential ingredient of any respect worthy the name. Only this capacity makes real an ability that is a key part of respect, the ability to see the other as an end, not as a mere means. The politics of humanity includes, then, both respect and imagination, and imagination understood as an ingredient essential to respect itself. ⁶

There are two consequences of Nussbaum’s replacement of ‘toleration’ with ‘respect’ and ‘sympathy’. First of all, this positive attitude clearly rejects a neutral emotion of indifference, since indifference is often confused with tolerance. For example, one could claim to be tolerant to homosexual ménage, but in fact he or she could be merely indifferent rather than friendly tolerant. ⁸ Nussbaum’s emphasis on active intervention in the lives of others conquered indifference in this sense.

The second consequence of Nussbaum’s argument is more open to critique: her critique of disgust as an emotion underlying tolerance is not sufficient. There are two kinds of indifference. One is the indifference to the difference between others and us and denies that others are (normal) human beings. ⁹ This kind of indifference can indeed be overcome by Nussbaum’s emphasis on active intervention in the lives of others. The other kind of indifference emphasizes the difference between the self and the other and turns a blind eye to the fact that everyone is naturally a human. Both of these are morally problematic, and the later one is often harder to be noticed. In practice, the boundary of imagination and sympathy is vague, and sometimes this attitude of tolerance grounded in seeming indifference could actually be a (sometimes unfriendly) mentality of hunting for novelty that denies the full humanity of others and treats them as objects for fun. Nussbaum’s active intervention in the lives of others cannot readily overcome this kind of indifference.

Here is an example. In the past, there was a student in the department of philosophy at a leading university in Beijing. He was born as a female, and later transgendered into a male. This person has serious problems from morality to academic achievement, but from teachers to classmates no one openly points out his flaws. Whenever one talks about him, one would say that he suffered a lot and his life is not easy. No one will discuss the substance of his dissertation. No one cares about the defects of his character. All the focus is on his transgender surgery. Everyone whispers about his marriage, his child and his numerous affairs, while trying to be politically correct (not to make any judgments in any aspects towards him). This kind of attitude spread to the whole view of this person’s academic ability and personal character, to the point that it would seem politically incorrect to point out that his academic shortcomings or defects in his character.

In this example, there is no lack of sympathy, because everyone cares that he suffers a lot from repeated surgery. Nor does it involve lack of the capacity for imaginative and emotional participation in the lives of others. Quite opposite, imaginative and emotional involvements seem to be even a bit excessive. How to control the curiosity that we hide under the veil of politically correct toleration? How can we confront the sophisticated human nature and treat others properly, without a mentality of hunting for novelty? The capacity for imaginative and emotional participation in the lives of other could not really bring proper respect. This dubious tolerant attitude is mixed with another kind of indifference: acknowledging the differences of others in one (some) aspect, and digging their gossip in a unkindly curious manner (not sure whether the underlying attitude is disgust or not), and forcing themselves to treat it in an seemingly tolerant manner, then this unnatural compulsion spreads to the whole judgment of this person. Because of overemphasizing the difference of the other, it is impossible to regard the other as a full human being, rather than as an object for one’s amusement.

Nussbaum revealed several insights into the practice of toleration, reminding us there are various and complicated emotions under the cover of toleration. However, the problem is not just the lack of emotion underpinning indifference as it’s commonly understood that ignores the humanity of others. The problem is also the excess of emotion that magnifies the difference with others and treats others as objects for novelty. Both are detrimental to our discussion of ‘toleration’ (or the issue of how we should treat other people who differ from us). A morally defensible concept of toleration should not encourage people to be hypocritical or duplicitous, claiming to be tolerant but still holding the negative emotions towards others. We need to promote an inclusive attitude with understanding, so that the practice of toleration and the attitude of toleration could be in accordance.

The dao of zhong and shu (忠恕之道)

Whatever one thinks of the concept of toleration in the Anglophone world, the practice existed in history before the appearance of the word that may have been described in different concepts. In the same vein, I will appeal to similar concepts in ancient China long before the concept of tolerance appeared and try to develop a concept of tolerance in a normative way, combining rational deliberation and emotional compassion.

During the Spring and Autumn Period (c. 770 BCE–476 BCE), there were numerous battles in China, and all vassal states were separated by means of walled cities. They all wanted to achieve unification through war. The political chaos of the Spring and Autumn period is closely related to the system of three earliest dynasties, namely, Xia, Shang and Zhou. The decentralized feudalism made the central government unable to effectively control different regions. However, thinkers from that era often invoked desirable political values from the three earliest dynasties. Confucius refined the unique core values of the Chinese civilization from the Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties and put forward ‘the dao of zhong and shu’ (忠恕之道). ‘Zhong’ (忠) is the meaning of ‘just mind’, demanding that rulers put the common interests of people before private ones. ‘Shu’ (恕) is ‘as what mind tells’. If the mind is righteous, then you must act like this just mind. ¹⁰

This idea was more clearly defined in the Song Dynasty (960–1279). The great Confucian scholar Zhu Xi ¹¹ further elaborated the meaning of ‘zhong and shu’. ‘Zhong’ is honesty and magnanimity, namely the obedience to the dao of heaven. ‘Shu’ is the use of an honest and magnanimous mind in practice, namely the dao of human. Unitary principle as One (the principle of heaven) Divided principles as Variety (the principles of human) (理一分殊, li yi fen shu). The former is in accordance with Zhong, and the later in accordance with Shu. According to Zhu Xi, the principle of heaven is beyond any question, while divided principles are the expressions on earth of the unitary principle. He revealed an aspect that could combine the unitary principle and diversity. Because the unitary principle is one, it needs to be rigorous and clear. Meanwhile, human affairs are various and complicated. Different people have different ways for the interpretation of heavenly principles.

In ancient China, there was frequent warfare and persistent conflicts among different regimes and different ethnic groups. Buddhism was introduced to China in the Eastern Han Dynasty (25–220). The Nestorian religion entered China in the early Tang Dynasty (618–907). The Tazik religion (influenced by Islam) entered China in the late Tang Dynasty (618–907). Later, there were also struggles among different religions. Despite the splits and war caused by contradictions of different regimes, ethnic groups and religions, China could always achieve political reunifications. ¹²

The different belief systems were often combined and unified. From the perspective of culture and religion, China has seen the integration of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, while Islam has also infused Islamic thought with Confucianism. In the specific practices, the dao of ‘shu’ in the ‘dao of zhong and shu’ has been widely used to unify belief systems while respecting differences; and this principle was not only the virtue of the exemplary persons valued by the Confucianism but also shared by different ethnic groups, religions and cultures. The basic idea is to show a general commitment to a principle of unity, while allowing for the flourishing of difference in practice. Such an idea allowed for both the repeated political unification of China and appreciation for religious and cultural differences in everyday life. ¹³ This is very different from monotheism.

According to Zhao Tingyang, only monotheism could easily lead to hatred of other cultures, which expressed as exclusion, especially Christianity. Monotheism means all the other spiritual worlds are false. The exclusivity of one religion assumes there is only one correct religion on the world that can judge and criticize other religions and cultures, even force others to convert. ¹⁴ ‘Christianity is the basis of so called “universal culture” of Western world, and also the very reason of cultural conflicts’. ¹⁵ Zhao elaborates that, for Christianity, other religions and cultures are intolerable paganisms, which have to be excluded or converted. The spirit of exclusion of Christianity resulted in the war among cultures. Nowadays the spirit of exclusion often takes the form of the argument that there is an ‘end of history’, that is, one normatively correct political system that ought to be exported to the whole world.

At the philosophical level, the spirit of exclusion often takes the form of the concept of respect that masks a deeper form of tolerance. According to Immanuel Kant, the concept of respect means that we have ‘the ability to see the other as an end, not as a mere means’. We should treat others as human beings not as objects. Others are human beings as well, so that we have duties to tolerate them even if we often disagree with what they do or say. However, Bernard Williams has insightfully criticized the Kantian concept of respect. ¹⁶ In Williams’ view, Kant’s concept of respect is non-empirical, complex and obscure. Kant’s concept of respect is actually a secular analogue of the Christian concept of the respect owed to all people as equally children of God. Both the secular version and the Christian version are to abstract people as non-empirical individuals, and such individuals as ends, or as the children of God, have metaphysical equality. Williams believes that this metaphysical respect cannot provide any basis for the equality we value in everyday life. Williams has repeatedly emphasized that we do not discuss abstractly a person’s respect but try to perceive a person’s own understanding of the world and of his/her own being from a humanistic perspective. A person is indeed a rational being. Reason is of course of vital importance. However, what reason brings is not only respect but also the ability to perceive and understand. A person is not just a rational moral agent. S/he is also a conscious and understanding being. One must be conscious of him or herself and of the particular world he or she lives in. In turn, people in the real world are always worth being understood in their particularity. It is precisely this understanding that can underpin proper respect. We effectively experience moral life in its particularity. This capacity of awareness and understanding allows us to have an understanding of the good and to be able to make efforts for happiness.

Williams’ view of proper respect for human beings in their particularity is quite in accordance with the dao of ‘zhong’ and ‘shu’ in ancient China, which expresses a spirit of inclusiveness. ¹⁷ Every human being deserves to be understood, and to be appreciated, not because humans are equally abstract beings but because each person has a unique existence and can flourish in his or her own way in accordance with the Dao (way) of nature. On the other hand, the Dao of nature needs diverse existences to show its grandeur and inclusiveness.

From the perspective of a modern concept of toleration inspired by the ancient Chinese idea of zhong shu, toleration requires people having an inclusive mentality, and this positive moral mentality itself is closely related to people’s capacity for compassion, reflection, perception and understanding. In this sense, a defensible concept of toleration requires people to actively try to understand themselves and the world they live in. When they chance upon people who are different from them, they won’t judge them or ignore them in the first place but will remind themselves that these people have their own way to flourish as long as the difference is not directly harmful to harmonious flourishing of the community, including appreciation for diverse cultures and religions. Instead of regarding ‘others’ as dangerous outsiders or objects of novelty and amusement, they are viewed as friends, neighbours and opportunities for learning and enrichment.

This idea of ‘zhong shu’ is not mere speculation. Arguably, it helped to inform Chinese history. The theoretical foundation of political unity formed by the repeated unifications in ancient China can be seen as the expression of the ‘dao of zhong’: the unified polity is ‘One’ (zhong) while the specific rules for different contexts and appreciation for different rules and ethnic groups, religions and cultures are ‘Variety’ (shu). ‘Variety’ is indispensable for the existence of ‘One’, because only with diverse phenomena can the essence of ‘One’ be expressed in a magnificent way.

Conclusion

The word ‘toleration’ in English has its own historicity. As Williams puts it, we didn’t need it before the word appeared, and in a highly inclusive society in the future, we won’t need it as well. ¹⁸ In Chinese, whether it’s the ancient ideal of ‘zhong and shu’ or the modern Chinese ideal of ‘kuan rong’, there are important differences from the ideal of toleration in English. In modern times, the word ‘kuan rong’ is relatively close to understanding based on rational judgment and emotional resonance, which is influenced by the ancient dao of zhong and shu. In ancient times, the dao of zhong and shu was the basic principle of the Chinese society, with respect to rituals and appreciation for diversity. Zhong contained the idea of oneness and shu required diverse practices based on compassion and rational judgments. In history, the dao of zhong and shu provided the theoretical basis for the ideal of unification and appreciation of cultural diversity in ancient China. Nowadays we can learn from ancient Chinese insights to develop a rational and compassionate concept of toleration that is both inclusive and appreciative of difference.