Abstract
The principle of majority rule is a concept that is often employed both in normative democratic theory and in practical politics. But not only that there are relatively few academic studies focusing exclusively on this concept, it is also possible to claim that the existing discussions usually overlook different dimensions of majority rule. This article aims to outline some suggestions for what these dimensions might be, such as: the nature of the participants, the subject matter of the decision and the context in which the decision is made. One underlying assumption in this study is that the normative prospects of the majority rule principle depend on the evaluation of these different dimensions.
Introduction
In contemporary political theory, there seems to be a curious mismatch between the normative authority of the majority rule principle and the justifications offered in support of it. 1 Theorists who do write on the subject are usually concerned with the justified limitations on the majority rule, rather than with the justification of the principle itself. 2 It seems as though there is a consensus on the idea that the justification of majority rule is nearly self-evident, either on practical grounds (i.e. its existing practicability) or on theoretical grounds (i.e. its inherent connection with the principle of equality among citizens). One common response to the question ‘why should we adopt majority rule?’ is to ask what alternative we have in place of it within the context of a democracy. Abraham Lincoln once put it as the following: ‘Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left’. 3 This strategy points out that one should accept the authority of the principle of majority rule simply because there is no other viable alternative to it.
For sure this ‘no viable alternative’ argument is not the only one available for us in support of the majority rule. Though few in number, there are some positive arguments that try to provide some kind of theoretical integrity to this principle. John Locke, for instance, defended majority rule principle with reference to the argument of ‘greater force’. 4 He asserted that where everyone has an equal right to decide which way to go and where they face a disagreement about the way, then the ones in the majority would place a greater force on the decision and their preference is the one that should be followed. Locke’s argument can be illustrated through a simple case where people with equal physical strength are trying to turn a rudder into opposite directions. Here, the more crowded (i.e. the majority) will eventually win out and the rudder will be turned in the way they favour. Similarly, Jeremy Waldron presents a positive argument in favour of majority decision by claiming that it is a requirement of respect for the individuals’ right to participation, which he sees as ‘the right of rights’ in the sense that the precise content of all other rights should be determined through the use of this right. Therefore, Waldron argues that even the legitimate limits on the majority rule should be decided by the majority rule itself. 5
The aim of this article is not to discuss the merits of pro-and-con arguments concerning the principle of majority rule. Instead, this article will try to point out some dimensions of majority decision that needs to be taken into account within such a discussion. 6 The hope is that when these issues are handled with greater care, the pro-and-con positions would be further clarified and the discussion among them would be more fruitful. The article is composed of four brief sections. The sections focus on the following issues respectively; the scope of the majority decision, the subject matter of the decision, the context in which the decision is made and the normative impact of the numbers involved in the decision.
I The scope of the majority decision: Which majority’s decisions are binding?
As a political decision-making procedure, the majority rule principle always takes place within a specific scope. When we are arguing in favour of or against the majority rule principle, we always need to give an answer to the question ‘which majority we are talking about?’. For sure in contemporary world order, the most familiar scope that we have in mind is that of a sovereign nation state, where the decisions are binding upon all citizens. In the national elections, the citizens vote for their favoured political parties or political leaders and the party which holds the majority of the MPs in the parliament (or forms a coalition with others parties to do so), or the leader who gets the support of the majority of the citizens gets the power to rule for a certain period of time. Yet regarding certain issues, it is clear that the national scope is not always the most feasible one. That is why in many states we have the practice of governance at different levels. In local elections, for instance, the local majority is given the authority to make binding political decisions, although it might be a minority at the national level. Say, the decision whether a park or a museum should be built in a municipality is usually made by a majority of the residents of that municipality, and not by the citizens of that country as a whole. At times, however, there occurs a strong tension among the local majorities and national majorities. If we take the recent case of the Brexit, for instance, the local majority in Scotland voted in favour of staying in the European Union, while the national majority in Britain voted in favour of leaving it. The tension between the local and national majorities might have serious political consequences. If these two different scopes of majorities persistently disagree on many of the vital political issues, since it is always going to be the national majorities that will win out, the local majorities might be motivated for succession. They would prefer to be a majority in their own state, rather than being a minority at another’s. Lastly, regarding some other issues that transcend the boundaries of national states (such as global economy, environment, peace, etc.), many theorists argue that instead of going downwards and consulting to local majorities, we should go upwards and consult to supranational majorities. To address these issues, what we need is a coordination of different states and pursuing common policies that are determined at an international level. 7
Let us call the first type of scope that is mentioned above as the territorial scope. Another type of scope might be what we might call as the epistocratic scope. The territorial scope determines the boundaries in which the majority decision will take place in (i.e. the national, local or supranational level), where the epistocratic scope determines the level of knowledge expected by the participants that are involved in the decision-making process. To the question of ‘which majority are we talking about’, the first type of scope gives answers such as: the majority in this country, or the majority in this town, or the majority in this organization. To the same question, the second type of scope might give two different answers. It can either say that the majority we are talking about is a majority that includes only those that have some knowledge on the subject or it can say that the majority we are talking about includes also those who do not have such knowledge. In universities, for instance, often the former type of answer is employed. The juries in universities give decisions by majority rule, but in order to participate in these juries, one needs to show the level of knowledge required to use a vote. Holding a PhD degree or being a professor can be seen as such requirements. In the political decision-making process however, almost none of the modern democracies employ strict epistemic limitations on voters, hence they employ the latter type of answer. 8 The citizens are not asked to take a test or to have a certain level of education in order to vote. But still, the age and sanity requirements on voting can be seen as being related with this epistemic dimension. The reason why a child or a mentally disabled person is not allowed to vote has something to do with the fact of the lack of epistemic capacity of these people. Historically speaking, there were some other criteria to limit the scope of majoritarian political decision-making process. Up until the 20th century, when talking about a majority decision, many democracies had in mind a majority of property-owning males. So they had embraced the majority rule principle, but the scope of this decision-making procedure was highly restrictive.
The question of scope that we have discussed in this section reminds us that the agreement upon the majority rule principle as a collective decision-making procedure does not necessarily mean that there is an agreement upon the answer to the question ‘which majority are we talking about’. This is indicated by the fact that one might accept the legitimacy of majority rule in a one scope but might reject it in the case of another. For instance, one might think that majority rule is justified among Supreme Court judges when deciding on a court case but not strictly so among members of parliament when deciding on a legislative act. In the former case, the majority decision is final and fully binding, but in the latter case, it can be subjected to further review (either the review of a second chamber or a constitutional court). 9
II The subject matter of the majority decision: Which decisions of the majority are binding?
Which subjects are the appropriate targets of majority decision? Can majority rule principle be applied to all subjects or are there some issues that should not be subjected to it? These are some other questions that any account of majoritarianism should take into account. The response to these questions can be categorized under what might be labelled as the subject matter of the majority decision. For instance, I might be okay with majority rule while deciding on the place to have a dinner with friends, but I might not be okay with it while deciding on what food to order, especially if I have a very different taste than others. The stakes are much higher in political decisions. I might accept the majority decision on the desired level of income tax, but I might not accept it on the question whether we should establish a state religion or not. Or, a majority might have the authority to decide through a referendum whether Britain should leave the EU or not, but it cannot have such an authority to decide whether certain a group of ex-EU nationals who do hold British citizenship be expelled from the country. The widely excepted norm that there should never be a referendum on issues related with basic human rights is in line with this view. So human rights can be seen as an issue that should not be subjected to the majoritarian decision-making procedure.
To say that the majoritarian decision-making procedure should not be applied to certain subjects is another way of saying that individuals should have certain rights that cannot be violated by the political community in which they live in. Put in this way, what we are faced with here is a set of long-lasting discussions in political theory regarding the potential tension between human rights and democracy or the one between the private and public autonomy. 10 On the one side, rights protect the private autonomy of individuals against the interference of common political decisions. On the other side, democracy empowers those individuals with public autonomy, which permits them to make any binding collective decision they see to be fit; and majority rule is seen as the appropriate method to make these political decisions. So it is suggested that a potential tension always remains between majority rule and rights, and this is presented as a reason why majority rule should never be applied in questions of rights. Here, rights are portrayed as drawing the boundaries of an area that is exempted from the majoritarian decision-making process.
To justify such a limitation on the majority rule principle and to argue in favour of the supremacy of rights, often the following argument is made. The normative value of the majority principle must be derived from some kind of egalitarianism. The main idea behind the popularity of majoritarian decision-making is that it is seen as the only plausible method that satisfies the demand of treating people as equals. Since every citizen has an equal say in shaping political decisions and since the citizens often disagree, they use the majority rule as a fair method that does not violate the principle of equality among them. If equality is taken out of the picture, it would be much more difficult to justify majoritarianism. Based on this insight, an argument can be made that when a majority decision fails to treat people as equals by violating their rights, it betrays its own normative foundation. 11 For example, when a majority votes in favour of outlawing women to work in a job without getting their husbands’ written permission, that decision can be seen as being illegitimate, although it is approved by a majority. This paves the way to the idea of entrenching rights as legitimate constrains on majority rule or as issues that should be immune from its authority.
It can be said that many theorists have taken this potential problem with the majority rule seriously and it has caused them to spare some room to civil disobedience as a justifiable practice in a democracy. Rawls is a well-known example here. He says: At what point does the duty to comply with laws enacted by a legislative majority (or with executive acts supported by such a majority) cease to be binding in view of the right to defend one’s liberties and the duty to oppose injustice? This question involves the nature and limits of majority rule. For this reason the problem of civil disobedience is a crucial test case for any theory of the moral basis of democracy.
12
III The context in which the majority decision is taken
Like any other decision, political decisions subjected to majority rule always take place within a specific context. So, when considering the authority of majority rule, one should take into consideration the features of this context as well. Some of these features might be labelled as structural conditions. For instance, a majority decision made in a context that did not provide protection for freedom of speech would have a lesser normative weight than the one made in a context that provided such a protection. The structural condition of freedom of speech then has a direct effect on the normative weight of the majority decision. Apart from the case of freedom of speech, there are many other structural factors that shape the conditions in which the majority rule would take place. 14 The exclusion of force (or the threat of force) or the access to information related with the issue under question can all be seen in this light.
A crucial point about the structural conditions is that often they merely provide a capacity, rather than the actual exercise of these features. Again, if we take the example of freedom of speech, this structural condition aims to make sure that before a political decision is made, everyone would have the chance to speak out their mind. That is not to say that it will make sure that everyone would actually speak. The right to freedom of speech provides a condition in which it is possible for people to discuss political matters; it does not guarantee that such a discussion would indeed take place. Likewise, free access to information, or the existence of various independent media agencies, is a structural condition that is not related with the question whether people actually process this information or not. I do not mean to imply here that the normative weight of the majority rule is lessened if it is applied to people who are not informed about matters. Although this would possibly bring a limitation on the epistemic value of the majority decision, whether this would also bring a limitation on the normative value of the majority decision is a different question that I do not aim to discuss here.
In the case about the exercise of an actual discussion, however, the picture is slightly different. If there is no discussion taking place before a majority decision is made, then it might be claimed that the normative value of that decision is lessened. The adherents of the deliberative conception of democracy provide us good reasons why this might be so. Deliberative democrats, such as Jurgen Habermas, argue that what makes a political decision ‘rational’ is that it is the outcome of a discussion that seeks to find a ‘rationally motivated agreement’. 15 This communicative rationality can emerge only in an actual dialogue among citizens. In this deliberation process, the citizens will offer each other different arguments about what is a common good for all of them. The better arguments would gradually convince more of the citizens and eventually the citizens would reach a unanimous agreement. Habermas is well aware of the fact that this challenging model will not always be fully realized. Often due to time pressure, we might need to make a decision before we reach unanimity. In such cases where deliberation must end prematurely, it is admissible to consult to the majority rule. So the normative justification of the majority rule is dependent on the fact that it succeeds an actual deliberative process. 16 If such a process is absent, then the normative value of majority rule is lost. As Stephen White puts it; ‘Democratic legitimacy, for Habermas, is measured not just in terms of law being enacted by a majority, but also in terms of the discursive quality of the full processes of deliberation leading up to such a result’. 17
Reaching unanimity can be seen as one criterion that indicates when deliberation can be assumed to have reached a conclusion. There might be some other, less demanding criteria to decide when the deliberation is exhausted as well. For example, we can focus on the extent of subjects that have been discussed in the deliberation process. If many of the relevant issues are already covered in the discussion, then one might argue that it is time for a decision. Or, rather than focusing on the range of issues that have been covered, one can focus on whether everyone involved have spoken their mind or not. If each person had the chance of presenting an argument for the common decision to be made, then one can claim that it is time to conclude the discussion with a majority vote. Accordingly, these and some other features of the context in which the majority decision is made might influence the normative weight of that decision.
IV The magnitude of the majority and its normative impact
One question that should also be addressed in an account of majority rule principle is whether the magnitude of the majority does have a normative effect or not. When a political decision is made by the approval of say 71% of the participants rather than 51%, does it make this decision more legitimate or not? Does the normative weight of the majority rule principle increase as this majority becomes larger than 51%? In certain conceptions of deliberative democracy, this must be the case since the increase in the majority would mean that we have come closer to unanimity, which is the ultimate aim to achieve. But in some minimalist conceptions of democracy, it is doubtful whether this is really the case. 18 For the minimalists, the majority principle comes into picture mainly in the process of choosing the political elites that will be empowered with the authority to rule. It will be these elected elites that will actually be making the political decisions. Whether these elites are chosen by a 51% or a 71% would not really make a big difference since it will be exactly the same elites making the same decisions. For sure the elites that are chosen by a higher percentage would argue that this has improved the legitimacy of their decisions, but it would be difficult for them to justify this argument. In what sense their decisions have become more legitimate? Is it because the decisions of the elites now represent the choices of a bigger percentage of the population? Or is it because the decisions are made by elites that represent a bigger percentage of the population? In other words, one has to decide whether the decisions or the elites have become more representative as the magnitude of the majority vote increases since these two do not necessarily overlap with each other. 19 For instance, a group of political elites that is chosen by a high percentage might nevertheless pursue policies in the interest of a small minority. In this sense, these decisions do not necessarily represent the preferences of the larger percent of the population.
In the case of referendums, the picture seems to be slightly different since in this case it is not the representatives but the citizens themselves that make the political decision in question. In such a case, there seems to be a more suitable ground to argue that the normative value of the decision in a referendum increases as the percentage of the majority that voted in favour of it increases. In the example of Brexit, for instance, one of the reasons why the decision is highly disputed is that 48% of the population voted against it, which means that almost half of the population is not happy with it. If the result had been 71% to 29%, then perhaps the normative weight of this decision would have been increased.
The idea that a higher percentage of majority decision is linked with a greater political legitimacy seems to be evident in the concept of a ‘qualified majority’ that is often employed in constitutional amendment procedures. Although a simple majority in a parliament has the authority to issue laws, many constitutions hold that in order to make an amendment in the constitution, the parliament needs to find a qualified majority such as 3/5 or 2/3. Since constitutional provisions signify higher political norms when compared with ordinary laws, a higher percentage of majority in parliament is required to change it. Putting it differently, many parliamentarian systems hold that a simple majority in the parliament is enough to form a government and to have both executive and legislative authority, but it is not enough to have an authority to amend the constitution. A similar idea is employed in the practice of ‘double majority’. Here the decision is required to pass two different majorities. Among others, an example of this is the decision-making procedure of the European Council. When voting on a proposal coming from the European Commission, the Council seeks the approval of 55% of the member states and the 65% of the total EU population. 20
This reminds us that the principle of majority rule might be used in different senses. We have already mentioned the two: the simple majority (i.e. 51%) and the qualified majority (i.e. 2/3 or 3/5). A third sense of majority rule refers to plurality or relative majority. This third type of majority can actually be seen as the biggest minority rather than a majority since it indicates a group that is smaller than the 50% of the population. A daily life example would be the following. 21 Suppose that we are five friends who want to go to a movie. There are four movies in the theatre. Two of us want to go to the same movie, but all others want to see different movies. In this case, the majority rule principle suggests us that the group should go to the movie that the two favours, since for all other movies there is only a single person that voted in favour of. This might seem as a paradoxical result due to the fact that the majority of the group (three of five persons) does not want to see the movie that is suggested by the majority rule. Yet the argument of the plurality version of majority rule is that going to any other movie will make a greater amount of persons in the group unhappy. So although the movie favoured by the two is not favoured by the majority of the group, still it is the movie that is favoured the most in the group.
Conclusion
The above discussion suggests us that the prospects of the majority rule as a plausible normative principle cannot be sorted out once and for all. If majority rule principle is a method to be applied to a collective decision-making process, then its plausibility depends on several issues such as the subject matter of the decision under question, the nature of the participants involved in the decision and the context in which the decision is made. Accordingly, majority rule principle seems to make sense only under certain conditions and for any defence of it, it is vital to clarify what these conditions are. For sure, consideration of these and other related issues is relevant to any principle regarding collective decisions, including the principle of equality, fairness or democracy. Yet although there is a huge scholarly literature on discussions related with these other principles, the literature on majority rule is comparatively undeveloped. Moreover, on the practical domain, throughout many polities around the world, political leaders are increasingly relying on the discourse of ‘fifty percent plus one’ or the authority of the ‘majority’. The lack of theoretical scrutiny on the one hand and the dominance of such a practical discourse on the other should urge political philosophers to develop a more sophisticated and nuanced account of majority rule. The aim of this article is to present a brief reflection on some of the dimensions of majority rule and to raise some preliminary questions. The answers, however, require such a detailed account of majority rule to be provided by its defenders.