Abstract
In the last two decades, an ever-increasing number of scholars have challenged the conceptual borders of political philosophy and the supposed universalism of its normative pre-commitments. Surprisingly enough, the normative underpinnings of this debate have had very little impact on contemporary disputes about pluralism. This article asks how contemporary disputes about the conceptual borders of political theory can help in constructing a more plural theory of pluralism. It shows that such contributions inspire three ways of constructing a more plural political theory of pluralism: a self-transformative approach, a dialogical approach and a pre-relational approach. While all three approaches progress towards less exclusionary theories of pluralism, I argue that a pre-relational approach can lead to a normative theory that is more plural than the alternatives.
1. Introduction
In the last two decades, an ever-increasing number of scholars have challenged the conceptual borders of political philosophy and the supposed universalism of its normative pre-commitments. 1 Some of the normative theses at the heart of arguments for rethinking the conceptual perimeter of mainstream political theory have inspired the global-justice debate, deliberative-democratic theory and arguments for cross-cultural dialogues and global democracy. 2 Surprisingly enough, the normative underpinnings of this debate have had very little impact on contemporary disputes about pluralism.
Scholars of pluralism tend to see inclusion as a desideratum by which normative theories can be judged. 3 This article asks how strands of political thought with a truly global sensitivity, such as certain versions of cosmopolitan philosophy and comparative political theory, can help in constructing an even more plural theory for diverse societies, societies in which individuals have a range of different worldviews, and where issues in many fields can become objects of intense disagreement. First, contemporary disputes about the borders of political theory, I claim, advocate, more or less explicitly, two normative proposals, a self-transformative approach and a dialogical approach.
Second, I argue that contemporary disputes about the borders of political theory offer a third normative proposal, which I call a pre-relational approach to pluralism. Thanks to such a view, we can cast lights upon a neglected but important element for all normative theories of pluralism: that is, disagreements between two or more subjects are always mediated by an object of common concern, a shared topic or the same referent. From such a perspective, disagreements can be read as compounds of two or more individual relationships with the same object of common concern, a shared topic or the same referent. Against this background, I argue that a pre-relational approach helps to construct a normative political theory where all individuals have a protected entitlement to display their distinctive relations with issues of public concern.
This article aims to take the first step towards constructing a more plural political theory of pluralism. To do so, I maintain that it is possible to progress towards more inclusionary responses to the fact of pluralism by reducing instances of exclusion, where exclusion, following the literature, is the intended or unintended act of not allowing someone to take part in those discursive relationships that lead to the construction of collectively binding terms of cooperation. 4 In the light of these assumptions, I try to lay the foundations for a possible way to construct less exclusionary theories of pluralism. In Section 2, I demonstrate that ongoing efforts to challenge the conceptual borders of political philosophy are committed to minimize instances of exclusion. Section 3 discusses two ways, self-transformative approaches and dialogical arguments, in which such a commitment can be translated into normative proposals for a truly pluralistic political theory. On this ground, Section 4 argues that contemporary disputes about the borders of political theory also express a pre-relational normativity which, despite being often implicit in the literature, can inspire a normative argument for a more plural theory of pluralism. Section 5 answers some possible objections. Section 6 concludes the article.
2. Contemporary disputes about the borders of political theory and inclusion
Over the past two decades, political theorists have been paying ever-increasing attention to the imagined and non-imagined conceptual borders of philosophy. Central to this discussion are disputes within and about comparative political theory and the universalist aspiration of normative political philosophy in the global-justice debate. On the one hand, comparative political theory, once considered as a marginal exercise of philosophical erudition, has gained popularity and risen to something like a sub-discipline with its own methodological debates, trends and competing research programmes. On the other hand, (allegedly) global normative thinking, for years the ultimate bastion of a liberal morality with universalist ambitions, is undergoing a process of internal reform that, despite being limited to an avant-gardist niche within a preponderant homogenizing narrative, aims to construct a global normative theorizing with much more sensitivity about others’ different ways of doing things. 5
Even though these two debates do not necessarily intersect, I think they share the same fundamental claim. Such claim has a descriptive element and a normative component. It says that there are other civilizations, voices, traditions, philosophies and ways of living that political theory has neglected for too long. This is the descriptive element. It also says that we must take seriously and include otherwise-neglected civilizations, voices, traditions, philosophies and ways of living as particular systems that are morally and historically on par with the mainstream liberal paradigm. This is the normative component. Certainly, deep, and perhaps irreconcilable, disagreements about how to undertake alternative modes of inquiry remain, but it is possible to bring these enterprises back to the foundational observation that philosophy, and especially political philosophy, marginalizes certain forms of knowledge production on the assumption that political thought currently taught in universities and schools can apply to all political constellations.
For instance, in the field of comparative political theory, Fred Dallmayr warns against the risk of interpreting all other societies through categories of our own. Comparative political theory, as he puts it, is a mode of theorizing that, in contrast to hegemonic modes of thinking, takes seriously ‘growing proximity and interpretation of cultures’. 6 Brooke Ackerley and Rochana Bajpai believe that challenging the marginalization of non-Western forms of knowledge production is the animating impulse of comparative political theory. 7 Similarly, Toby Rollo stresses comparative political theory’s commitment to identifying and removing residual exclusionary logics. 8 According to Chris Goto-Jones, the foundational premise of comparative political theory is ‘that the discipline of political philosophy is essentially ethnocentric’. 9 Adrian Little also argues that the unifying characteristic of comparative political theory is the attempt to bring non-Western political thought into the conversation. 10 According to Ackerley, cross-cultural dialogue may constructively support people at the margins by expanding the scope of human imagination. 11 In the same vein, Roxanne Euben calls for a critical reflection on exclusion enacted by the current framework of the cosmopolitan debate. 12 Within the parameters of such a debate, as Farah Godrej would add, ‘the result has been the exclusion from the discourse of political theory of ideas that come from other civilizations’. 13 Melissa Williams and Mark Warren share the idea that the dialogue between comparative political theory and democratic theory is conducive to a more inclusive global society, where deliberative processes are truly responses to the views of those subject to them. 14 In claiming to offer an approach to cross-cultural engagement that takes historically marginalized traditions seriously, 15 Leigh Jenco argues that Euro-American academic structures of knowledge production dominate the interpretation of a globally marginalized past such as Confucian use of the past. 16 She also writes that ‘research into “global” thought seeks inclusion of diverse cultural perspectives, but does so by means of those very discourses whose cultural insularity is what prompts critique in the first place’. 17
In contemporary normative debates about global justice, the dominance of liberal political values and the ignorance regarding the thoughts of distant others is apparent. 18 However, according to Richard Shapcott, whatever account of cosmopolitanism aims to be a global political project must factor normative pluralism into its own account. 19 Katrin Flikschuh also argues that the very status as a global debate depends on its intellectual inclusiveness. 20 Moreover, as she continues, unless mainstream global thinking includes contributions from otherwise-marginalized traditions, it is dogmatic more than philosophical. On this view, for a global political theory to be inclusive is not one among many desiderata, but philosophically necessary to meet such theory’s own universalistic standards and normative requisites. 21
These critical views leave us with the intuition that exclusion from the discourse of political theory is a morally relevant injustice because it presumes a pre-eminence of a certain core-values system over other such systems. By calling into question deep-seated horizons of understanding and lingering exclusionary logics, scholars in this field contend that if a normative system cannot articulate a political understanding that is consistent with the existing diversity of voices and traditions, possibly it is not the best available source of principles of political association.
The generalization of this sceptical stance, I think, introduces a way of thinking that has something to say to normative theories of pluralism. Problematizing the intellectual borders of political thinking also invites contributions from outside the purview of canonical moral and political thinking so that the question becomes: How can we include others whose practices and thoughts are different from our traditional horizon of understanding?
3. Two ways of problematizing exclusion
I think that contemporary disputes about the borders of political theory can be clustered in two groups that share the same normative commitment against exclusion. On the one side, we have scholars who stress the idea that including distant practices and thoughts is a subjective enterprise. It embodies a model of philosophical questioning that prescribes an ideal-typical self-transformative experience through which, from our first-personal perspective, we recognize the finitude and oddity of Western philosophy. The normative element of these theories is seen as effecting progress through recognizing the agency of otherwise-excluded individuals. 22 On the other side, we find scholars who, in including foreign practices and thoughts, recognize a model of genuine and inclusive deliberative cross-cultural dialogue. In this case, the normativity is seen as effecting progress through postulating the possibility of dialogue between parties who, despite disagreements, can find reciprocal grounding for positive communicative action. 23
Self-transformative approaches
One of the most prominent advocates of the self-transformative model is Leigh Jenco. Jenco proposes to recentre political theory. By immersing ourselves in foreign tradition, we acknowledge the finitude of our intellectual categories and, she argues, we can challenge parochial starting assumptions. 24 Recentring political theory is not a purely normative and aprioristic intellectual operation. It requires direct engagement with other traditions and the full acquisition of their theoretical and linguistic instruments. Once immersed in a new world, one, through cross-cultural encounter, experiences a process of self-understanding that unveils new problems and questions about political life. 25 On this view, taking seriously another tradition, Jenco says, is not only about acquiring more information (or cherry-picking what fits better with our theories). This process implies a self-transformation so that interpreters acquire a new perspective, treat new theoretical sources as deserving respect and question the validity of our deepest normative pre-commitments, our expectations about what counts as relevant knowledge. 26 Therefore, seen through these lenses, including non-canonical philosophical sources implies an active recalibration of our own intellectual position. Rather than passive potential receivers of new inputs, we should think of ourselves as active participants in a game in which our disciplinary and universalistic standards, thoughts and practices can change. In this vein, as Jenco writes, scholars ‘should transform their work to reflect the disciplinary standards of new audiences, and otherwise attempt to institutionally and politically transform the conditions under which they produce knowledge’. 27
Godrej also investigates methods to approach non-canonical texts and ideas that have the potential to surpass mere exegetical readings and move towards a radical change of our political and philosophical priorities. 28 On her view, including foreign sources implies a radical scrutiny of our position as detached but situated within a complex and global network of profoundly different traditions. Because of such a difference, ‘a good comparative political theorist’, Godrej writes, ‘will have to alternate between internal immersion in the lived experience of the text, and an external stance of commentary and exegesis of the text’. 29 Such an immersion, she argues, is transformative and disorienting. Specifically, as Godrej explains, it requires the ability to replicate the perspective of the other, penetrate their worldview and illustrate other forms of self-understanding through their internal logic, ideas and language. In this way, we situate ourselves in a new, unfamiliar context in which inclusion of local sources means to make intelligible the experience of displacement and then illuminate what this experience brings forth. 30
Jenco and Godrej are not alone in emphasizing how inclusion of foreign sources can be transformative. For instance, by observing a fundamental tension between our universalizing assumptions and the conceptual resources of peers that think differently from us, 31 Flikschuh asks herself how the encounter with foreign values, ways of doing things and philosophies impacts one’s attitude towards his or her own values system. Crucial to a careful consideration of foreign sources, she says, is the recognition that alien values are values which we ourselves might have had. 32 In the face of new philosophical contexts and ideas, when otherwise-dominant terms of discourse lack explanatory and normative power, Flikschuh writes, the rediscovery of our finitude is the necessary step to gain a perspective on things. Such an encounter therefore requires a major shift in self-perception, a reorientation of our thinking, from the view of liberalism as a universally valid tradition to the reflective awareness that ‘mutually exclusive but contemporaneously available local ways of life are morally and historically on par with one another’. 33 On this view, the encounter with foreign practices that challenge our assumptions, Flikschuh argues, relativizes our normative commitments and confirms the finitude of our perspective. All of us, she says, need some local framework, and the realization of the limited scope of such frameworks exerts political and philosophical pressure on our universalist self-conceptions.
Proponents of this model insist that before passing value judgments about a certain philosophy, we should interrogate the geographical and historical context in which it is performed. In so doing, self-transformative approaches do not offer explicit theories of moral progress, but rather they identify intersubjective conditions that enable us to recognize others as sources of legitimate and authoritative knowledge. Insights about the relationship between philosophical method and cross-cultural encounters gesture towards a theory of recognition where taking seriously differently localized claims promises to illuminate how we affirm our identities. On this view, we must resist the temptations of dismissing what the other is saying or of assimilating without doing justice to differences. So far, cross-cultural theory, Jenco writes, has been unable to ‘recognize modes of scholarly inquiry that exist independently of any one particular subjective viewpoint’. 34 Moreover, she also argues, ‘recognizing local particulars as sites of general knowledge-production, in turn, recognizes that local communities of inquiry and audience offer already-existing epistemological frameworks which themselves ground self-critique’. 35 In the same vein, Godrej argues that a properly constructed methodology with which to approach foreign sources should make otherwise-silenced others ‘see themselves as co-creators of meaning, inserting themselves into specific instances of dialogue with “native exegetes” and allowing their cultural account to be a result of their own participation’. 36 Because of the encounter with a different way of life, Flikschuh writes, ‘we come to recognize foreign values as values for others by recognizing them as values that are or might have been possible for us’. 37
Dialogical approaches
In contemporary disputes about the borders of political theorizing, another prominent strand of thought has a much stronger normative component. It argues that comparative political theory inspires a genuine and most commendable dialogical engagement and interaction. There may be several justifications for defending a dialogical ideal. As Andrew March notices, dialogue with non-Western traditions can be justified in epistemic terms. 38 Along the lines of instrumental justifications for including many types of perspectives, one may claim that truth-claims have greater validity when they arise from different traditions. 39 Alternatively, someone may say that comparative political theory aims at grounding rules of social cooperation through a kind of principled discussion. ‘The strongest warrant for a comparative political theory’, March writes, ‘is that there are normative contestations of proposals for terms of social cooperation affecting adherents of the doctrines and traditions that constitute those contestations’. 40
Like the self-transformative account, this perspective stresses the idea that insights cannot be gained from a neutral standpoint where familiar assumptions are brought to bear. 41 When philosophical assumptions and conclusions are constrained by the limits of our cultural and intellectual experience, cross-cultural dialogue helps to postulate an exemplary communicative action whereby those borders are discussed and contested. 42 In other words, self-understanding of parties in dialogue arises from participation in genuine dialogue and deep listening. 43 Specifically, the structure of question and response that informs our interpretative relations with texts and traditions motivates the search for a rethinking of cross-cultural dialogues so as to allow for reciprocal learning experiences to occur. 44 Given this orientation, individuals and groups should bring to the exchange their prior beliefs and then be open to corrections and revisions. As Dallmayr argues, this kind of open interaction requires that participants be intellectual modest, willing to listen and attentive to each other. 45 In this way, including foreign traditions and texts becomes an opportunity for mutual learning through which shared meanings and practices arise from mutual engagement and contestation between peers with different cultural frameworks.
The goal is not to import insights to a well-established and predominant model but to cultivate a normativity that motivates the construction of shared principles and practices through interaction with different traditions and practices. This normative ideal can take the form of a constructive confrontation between parties which jointly contribute to a philosophical enterprise. 46 As Ackerley writes, it encourages the development of collectively recognizable practices ‘through interpreting cross-culturally, drawing on the strengths of various traditions, learning from dissenting voices within and across them’. 47 For Melissa Williams and Mark Warren, dialogue is the very essence of all kinds of political theorizing. Political theory requires a critical distance from our own way of thinking and openness to alternative viewpoints. Within this context, comparative political theory has the special merit of revealing the political imaginaries that operate as background assumptions in foreign contexts. 48 For this reason, comparative political theory epitomizes a form of deliberative conversation across boundaries. It is, as they continue, ‘a deliberative practice that extracts claims and positions from their taken for granted context and transforms them into assertion, which functions as justification that can be understood by others’. 49
The dialogical model helps us to think of a deliberative ethos that parties can take up despite being in disagreement on many other things. The archetype of an open intercultural deliberation is certainly promising. However, the duties of reciprocity and openness, though desirable, are the harbingers of new exclusionary practices on grounds that are more capacious than, but substantially analogous to, those justified by current responses to the fact of pluralism in contemporary liberal democratic societies. Let me explain. It is not necessarily true that all individuals can live up the necessary deliberative ethos. Even within a very open and inclusive deliberative public, someone who refuses to perform the fundamental deliberative posture may be excluded from the construction of principles of social cooperation. This criticism is not new. By being forced to accept the rules of conversation, as Jenco also writes, ‘non-democratic political theories are rendered toothless, if they are recognized at all’. 50 Moreover, as Antony Black argues, getting to know better other traditions may justify hostility and, perhaps, give reasons to enact new exclusionary practices. 51 Among strangers, who have low degrees of trust, as Diego von Vacano adds, it is difficult to have the common ground that is necessary for successful deliberation. 52 And, within this context, voices that are not accommodating are given no opportunities to channel their dissent, therefore lending the theory a universalist tone, which is the very thing that comparative political theorists and other philosophers with a truly global sensitivity are trying to avoid. 53
Problems with dialogical and self-transformative approaches as arguments against exclusion echo frequent criticisms of deliberation and recognition, when understood as universally applicable normative standpoints. Within the context of this article, the key reason for rejecting dialogical approaches as arguments for inclusion concerns the essence of deliberation. Deliberation is not, in itself, a mechanism for distributing entitlements for inclusion but a mechanism through which already-entitled individuals filter biases and reciprocally weigh the merits of reasons. 54 Even though the dialogical approach emphasises the idea that a common ground between radically different doctrines is possible and desirable, it begins with the assumption that parties holding different and competing views can enter the deliberative process; and, when some of the parties do not conform with the requirements of rational discussion, it does not offer any guarantee against exclusion during the process of deliberation. 55
The key reason for rejecting self-transformative approaches lies in the logic of recognition. If seen as a normative standpoint, recognition may lead to the consequence that one’s expression of agency on an object of common concern depends on the positive acceptance of other individuals, who define what is enough for a claim to recognition to be well founded. 56 However, the construction of an identity based on unconventional practices, differences and unsettling demands has been a critical step towards inclusion for several otherwise-marginalised members of the society. 57
Dialogical and self-transformative approaches reverberate a common trait of several normative theories of pluralism. Specifically, since scholars focus on how and why individuals can accept collectively binding principles (or arrangements) despite the persistence of moral disagreement, they stipulate that all relevant parties have made their perspectives visible. 58 While in some cases, it is true that all parties in disagreement display their distinctive perspective (I think of a disagreement between a finite number of states that try to regulate issues of common interest), a very large body of literature, inside and outside critical theory, has demonstrated that the very entitlement to show one’s genuine view on issues of public concern is far from being equally granted in societies marked by the fact of pluralism. 59 For this reason, there remains the question whether, for all parties who want to say something on issues of public concern (or, of course, who want to demonstrate that a certain problem should be of public concern), the fundamental prerequisite that all parties have displayed their genuine perspective has been met.
Against this background, we may want to take more seriously the idea that disagreements of all sorts are in fact compounds of individual perspectives with a sufficiently analogous referent. On such a view, disagreements are not just intersubjective discursive relations between two or more parties who exchange different reasons and beliefs. That conceptualization of disagreement is one, and certainly the most popular, way to understand disagreement in contemporary political theory. 60 However, such an approach tends to neglect a rather straightforward observation: that is, disagreement is always about something. All kinds of disagreements, therefore, can also be seen as mediated discursive relations, where an issue of public concern brings together individuals who happen to have different perspectives with the same referent. In this way, parties in disagreement would not be seen only as poles of a subject-to-subject relation, but rather the same parties would be primarily understood as poles of different subject-to-object relations, which have the same object. 61
This shift in understanding disagreements suggests that scholars of pluralism, at least those who consider ample inclusion as a desideratum and think that normativity is desirable, should also find ways to protect the entitlement to display perspectives on issues of common concern. As I shall argue in the next section, I think contemporary disputes about the conceptual borders of political theory invite another approach to the issue of pluralism. To be sure, to my knowledge none of the scholars in the field have defended this view explicitly. However, by exploring aspirations to engage questions about the nature of political and moral concepts from different perspectives, it is possible to identify a proposal that is neither self-transformative nor dialogical but is equally seeking to see individuals as co-creators of meanings and is in principle compatible with the self-transformative and dialogical strands of thought. According to this third proposal, normativity is seen as effecting progress through postulating the possibility of a pre-relational normativity, which entitles all individuals to display their relationship with issues of public concern that matter to them.
4. Another way of problematizing exclusion
As we have seen, there are many ways to argue for a rethinking of conceptual borders in political theory, but, if brought at the level of normative theory, these arguments seem to accept intersubjective relations as their starting point. Self-transformative approaches demand people to ask themselves how to overcome barriers that affect intercultural discursive engagements. Dialogical arguments stress the idea that deep listening to different and foreign voices may improve the quality of our discursive exchanges. Self-transformative arguments imagine a pre-existing relational tie between two or more relevant subjectivities and they argue that, by reimagining such a pre-existing relation on grounds that are more respectful of one of the poles, it is possible to surpass exclusionary logics and impact on other poles’ worldviews. In this vein, properly constructed cross-cultural encounters are seen as opportunities to ask new questions, recalibrate expectations and erase modes of self-understanding that expanded within geographically and historically specific conditions. 62 And, as dialogical approaches point out, such cross-cultural encounters are also seen as practices of communication that, by engaging participants’ ideas on their own terms, call into question one’s traditional horizon of understanding, enlarge the domain of political theorizing and enrich participants with new possibilities in thought. 63
In this section, I shall argue that a closer reading of contemporary disputes about the borders of political theory illuminates a pre-relational normativity. A pre-relational normativity is pre-relational because it conceives disagreements as always mediated by an object of common concern, a shared topic or the same referent. On this ground, such a normativity, therefore, would entitle the individual to make her perspective on the object visible and, through this perspective, enter discursive relations with other individuals.
Indeed, although it is not explicitly stated, a theme common to most contributors to the debate about the conceptual perimeter of political theory is that, from different perspectives, a system of objects of referent can have different configurations while being taken to have political and philosophical significance. There are many discourses, and these discourses may be relatively independent from one another, but cross-cultural exchanges and comparisons do not demonstrate only that visions of reality are multiple, they establish the prospect that there are points of contact between seemingly alien and divergent discourses. 64 For instance, Jenco argues that Chinese conversation contributes to solving methodological puzzles within political and social scientific analysis. It offers a means by which political theorists within different traditions can show the logical and political significance of their claims about philosophical and political issues. 65 For Euben, comparative political theory introduces non-Western perspective into problems about transcultural questions such as the value of politics. 66 According to Tully, confrontation with other political traditions and their views on issues of common concern and philosophical significance may call into question our deep-seated horizon of understanding of that same thing. 67 Moreover, several scholars have tried to contrast and compare perspectives of different traditions on same concepts and political problems. Kwame Appiah compares the Asante conception of the person with views of the person from the West. 68 Erin Cline parallels the sense of justice in the work of John Rawls and the early Chinese philosopher Kongzi. 69 Masolo offers a comparison between Western and African communitarianism. 70
If we try to extrapolate the relational architecture of these approaches, it is possible to identify a component that is prior to the constitution of disagreements. Specifically, comparisons are possible because, antecedent to the philosophical operation of associating two conceptions, there are many different discourses with the same objects of reference. These discourses can include claims about the value of politics – the domain of the political, legitimacy, justice, and the person – but also notions such as sense of justice and community. Comparisons also imply that one or more subjectivities connect with an external object of reference and establish what we might call a subject-to-object relation. Of course, these discursive relationships are not the only kind of subject-to-object relation that an individual can have. 71 Nevertheless, they help us to see that disagreements are in fact a compound of subject-to-object relations where individuals have the same discursive object of reference.
Suppose we are to study a straight line. This line connects two points (A and B) and passes through a midpoint (C). We can see A and B as two parties having different worldviews, C as an object of disagreement, AC and BC as two perspectives on the object of disagreement, which each party has because of her worldview. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that A and B have two different perspectives on the same issue of common concern. The segment connecting A and B through C is the intersubjective discursive relationship of disagreement in which two parties (A and B) have different perspectives (AC and BC) on the same object of disagreement (C). Segments such as AC and BC are the analytical units of pre-relational approaches.
On this view, C is necessary to connect A and B in that specific discursive way; or A and B are poles of the same intersubjective discursive relationship because they are both endpoints of segments of equal length, whose other endpoint is C. According to a pre-relational normativity, rather than looking only at disagreements as if they were relationships connecting two parties (A and B), we should think of disagreements as sums of two or more perspectives (AC and BC) that connect two or more parties through a common object of disagreement (C).
Therefore, a pre-relational normativity begins with the image of a subjectivity that refers to an independently existing object of reference about which she can form beliefs, and from which, in certain cases, she can construct reasons for action in a larger domain. Because of these systems of objects of reference, subjectivities can expect others to relate to the same objects, and, because of these common referents, they can coordinate actions at the intersubjective level.
On the contrary, by recognizing an intersubjective relation as the most fundamental normatively relevant unit of analysis, we are bound to first make normative decisions about how and why subjectivities should relate to one another. Let me clarify this abstract claim by using the example of a town hall assembly where participants are debating ‘the construction of a mosque on a commercial street’ within a deeply divided neighbourhood. The normative standpoint of dialogical approaches would require participants to find a common ground upon which they can have a fruitful exchange of reciprocal reasons despite significant differences in their worldviews. The normative standpoint of self-transformative approaches would require participants to embrace a positive attitude towards other participants for their distinctive features, and, perhaps, it would imply an obligation to treat one another in a certain way. Both views, however, depend on the assumption that all members of the community can enter the town hall assembly, and, on this assumption, they offer ways to recalibrate the interactions among participants.
Moreover, to use intersubjective discursive relationships as our first unit of analysis, we must accept a series of more or less explicit stipulations: we assume that an intersubjective discursive relation has a special value, and we presuppose that theoretical regress should not go any further than the discursive relationship between two subjectivities. In our example, we would assume that all members of the community can participate in the town hall assembly. In some cases, we would also assume individuals are inherently social beings. On such a perspective, in virtue of being embedded from the outset in networks of public relationships, human beings develop themselves as persons through social interactions. Because of this impact on individual development, intersubjective discursive relations are more relevant than other typologies. In this vein, ‘the intuitively sense of deeply rooted reciprocal dependence of one person on another’, as Jürgen Habermas writes, ‘finds expression in an image of the human being’s place in the world’. 72 Furthermore, as he continues, ‘for the individual mind is imbued with structure and content by locking into the “objective” mind of the intersubjective interactions of intrinsically socialized subjects’. 73
The observation that intersubjective discursive relations may be very relevant for personal growth tells us that they are important for us. It does not tell us that such relations are the most fundamental unit of analysis. After all, in that occasion, participants in the town hall assembly discuss with one another because of an object of shared interest, ‘the construction of a mosque on a commercial street’. Or, if seen from another perspective, ‘the construction of a mosque on a commercial street’ mediates the relationships between otherwise-isolated individuals and, in this way, offers a common ground to engage with one another. With this idea in mind, my contention is that contemporary disputes about the borders of political theory also tell us that normativity should remove exclusionary logics that prevent someone from displaying her distinctive relationship with the shared referent.
Unlike the normative standpoint of dialogical and self-transformative approaches, a pre-relational normativity would not only work during the exchange between participants, shaping how participants can/cannot interact with one another. It would also require such an assembly to be constructed in a way that ensures all members of the community, who want to show their relationship with the object ‘the construction of a mosque on a commercial street’, have a say. This means to construct interactions in which all subjects have an entitlement to disclose how and why common referents and objects of public concerns matter to them in specific and distinctively individual ways. According to the standpoint of a pre-relational normativity, points of contact introduce us to different ways of seeing the same thing and show that an appropriate task of political theory is that of constructing exchanges where different parties can press a broad range of issues through discursive engagements. In this way, the telos of political theories of pluralism would become that of inspiring properly constructed disagreements in which all subjectivities in a conscious relation with an object of public concern are entitled to express the character of such a relation in public.
A pre-relational normativity, therefore, places emphasis on subject-to-object relations, but the significance of this perspective may be conducive to a kind of individualism that would undermine the commitment to remove residual exclusionary logics. From the perspective of a pre-relational normativity, it is true that subjects gain a certain prominence, but this analytical standpoint does not entail a denial of how shared efforts, responsibility and mutual interactions count for one’s self-development. The intent is the opposite. By saying that discursive intersubjective relations are not given, I aim to show that exclusionary undercurrents of social relations may have their cause in failing to recognize the individual processes of assimilation and transformation of external objects of reference. On such an account, intersubjective relations are determining factors, but a proper construction of such relations requires awareness of what brings two or more subjects together.
Nevertheless, just as I distinguish several different subject-to-object relations, someone may object, subsequent normative proposals that account for the distinctive aspects of each relation would force us to take an ‘anything goes’ perspective, one according to which right and wrong are products of different frameworks of assessment. But that is not the position a pre-relational normativity would support. It does not take subject-to-object relations to be stand-alone fragments. What determines the significance of subject-to-object relations is the observation that they are fundamental components of intersubjective discursive relations. Seen in this way, subject-to-object relations and an intersubjective discursive relation constitute two interconnected spheres, where the former is a relevant analytical unit because it is a part of the latter. Because of this interdependence, a non-exclusionary normativity would be one that all constituent parts of a discursive intersubjective relation can uphold in order to enter such relationships.
There is another way to understand the reason why a pre-relational approach to pluralism does not equate with an ‘anything goes’ perspective. Actually, a pre-relational approach to pluralism protects subject-to-object relations, when different parties have perspectives with the same discursive object of reference. And, this commitment implies two normative levels: namely, an entitlement (all individuals should be able to express their perspectives on discursive objects of disagreement) and a requirement (in each disagreement where parties can express their perspectives on discursive objects of disagreement, all relevant perspectives have the same referent). Within this conceptual framework, binding norms would be acceptable (I) when such norms are the result of a process in which all parties are able to express their perspectives on discursive objects of disagreement, (II) when only those parties with perspectives on the object of disagreement can affect the outcome. Therefore, in searching for collective binding norms, a pre-relational approach to pluralism would not require a balance between inclusion and other normative pre-commitments (e.g. avoiding norms we judge as morally appalling). Collectively binding norms are acceptable when they reflect the normative commitments of parties with an entitlement to express their perspectives on discursive objects of disagreement. Collectively binding norms must reflect such commitments through procedures that only parties with an entitlement to show their perspective on the object of disagreement (and with a perspective on the issue under discussion) have accepted or contributed to construct. 74
Despite defending the construction of discursive intersubjective relationships in which different subjects can engage on their own terms with the same external object of reference, I think that a pre-relational normativity does not contradict neither self-transformative approaches nor dialogical arguments. By deconstructing their intersubjective component into its constituent parts, this standpoint would lead to a normativity that may help self-transformative approaches and dialogical arguments to take an even more inclusive direction. For instance, reading existential immersions in the unfamiliar as a union of two (or more) subject-to-object relations that have the same object of reference may strengthen the idea that other subjectivities should be seen as co-creators of meaning. At the same time, the study of a pre-relational normativity can inspire new dialogical arguments. On my view, to the extent that there are different subject-object relations with the same discursive objects of reference, a genuine dialogue should be one in which subjectivities can show different ways of seeing the problem because their primary claim to protect the relation with the object is warranted. By recognizing participants primarily as subjects with a relation to an object, we subordinate all normative decisions concerning the quality and manner of dialogue to the presence of several subjectivities who are equally entitled to have a say on the same discursive object of reference. This might make it particularly difficult to find suitable grounds for conversation, but, assuming that it is possible, such grounds would be better placed to claim for universal validity.
Therefore, the primary activity of projecting a worldview onto external discursive objects informs the search for a new normative standpoint. This normative standpoint should also be a standpoint that all potential right-holders can affirm as a condition of possibility for their presence in the intersubjective relationship that defines more specific standards of justice. Within this framework, a fundamental entitlement to access discursive objects should be seen as prior (but compatible) to other discussions about the scope and justification of a general normativity in plural societies. On this view, collectively binding norms with a universal aspiration should be traceable back to the primary activity of all potential right-holders
5. Objections
At this point of the argument, I would like to address three central objections. The first objection questions the desirability of a more plural theory of pluralism. The second objection challenges the possibility of a pre-relational normativity. The third objection denies the validity of external discursive objects as midpoints between poles of discursive relations.
The objection I consider now is that there is no enough grounding to consider a more plural theory of pluralism as desirable. For instance, it is likely to be conducive to individualism and normative relativism. Then, if it is so desirable, why do we not pursue it much more enthusiastically than all available alternatives? While discussing all possible normative proposals, someone may object, we should ask whether it brings about a certain desideratum, but we should also ask whether the fulfilment of such a desideratum is worth having, and the extent to which the fulfilment of such desideratum remains worth having. Actually, according to the vast majority of political theorists who work on pluralism, it is highly important to bring about the desideratum of inclusion as much as possible given some hard constraints, such as logical, natural and human limitations, and soft constraints, such as the institutional and political context of this world, but also given the fact that we have to factor other possible desiderata in the moral calculus. 75 By drawing upon contemporary disputes about the conceptual perimeter of political theory, I have tried to show that a possible theory which considers the requisite of being non-exclusionary as a desideratum would have certain characteristics. In so doing, I do not want to say that the theory is desirable all things considered. However, I can plausibly infer that, if the requisite of being non-exclusionary is a desideratum, and desirability is a scalar category, 76 a non-exclusionary theory would be comparatively more desirable than the available alternatives.
A pre-relational normativity, someone may argue, would bring up the thought that the inclusion of illiberal members of the society causes others to be excluded. A pre-relational normativity would protect the fundamental individual entitlement to extend one’s agency to external discursive objects. Such entitlement being prior to subsequent discussions about the scope and justification of other standpoints of justice, its protection would allow for inclusion without causing others to be excluded. We might want to go back to the town hall assembly to clarify this point. Susan is an illiberal member of the society whose political discourses aim to exclude Sharon from participation in the assembly because of her religious creed. Every time Susan says so, she is also affirming her right to extend her agency to the hypothetical discursive object ‘composition of local assemblies’. In an ideal society constructed upon a pre-relational normativity, Susan is fully entitled to do so, but Sharon cannot be denied the same right to extend her agency to the hypothetical discursive object ‘composition of local assemblies’. Since this entitlement is normatively prior to other possible regulations of interactions between parties in disagreement, it remains possible to think that inclusion of otherwise-excluded illiberal voices does not necessarily cause others to be excluded.
Now I address the third objection. A pre-relational normativity depends on the idea that two or more subjects compose a discursive intersubjective relation because they have a common external object of reference. But, problems and theses, as Kwasi Wiredu writes, can be culture relative or even language relative. 77 It is therefore not easy to identify the object of reference in all possible scenarios. There are several reasons why I think this objection would be misplaced. First, a pre-relational normativity does not argue that discursive intersubjective relations are always possible. It might be possible that discursive intersubjective relations do not occur. A pre-relational normativity says that, when discursive intersubjective relations are possible, and we want them not to be exclusionary, normative proposals should protect subject-to-object relations. The second reason to think this objection does not undermine an argument for a pre-relational normativity is that a normativity which protects subject-to-object relations (as constituent of properly constructed intersubjective relations) has evaluative value on those relations that are constructed on similarities that in fact do not exist. It gives reasons to demonstrate that such relations are not properly constructed. Moreover, a non-exclusionary normativity would support actions that, against exclusionary logics, create conditions for intersubjective relations to exist. Between radically different traditions, finding midpoints and acknowledging multiple registers of political meanings so that discursive intersubjective relations can be constructed are two of these essential actions.
6. Conclusion
I have argued that contemporary disputes about the borders of political theory incorporate three normative proposals (self-transformative, dialogical, pre-relational) that, despite being implicit and not fully recognized, we can use to think more moral plural theories of pluralism. Among these three normative standpoints, I have argued that a pre-relational normativity can inspire more plural theories of pluralism than the alternatives.
Nevertheless, someone may object that contemporary efforts to rethink the borders of political theory are just attempts to demonstrate an even more capacious liberalism. I am not able to judge whether authors are genuinely committed to the intellectual enterprise of finding an alternative to liberalism. I can, however, say that there are explicit variations from one approach to another. On the one hand, by stressing the local character of the liberal paradigm, self-transformative approaches try to relativize the assumptions and aspirations of liberalism. This does not necessarily mean a dismissal of the tradition, but certainly does entail a problematization of past and present narratives. On the other hand, I am more inclined to think that, as they look for a normativity that can ultimately prove better suited to justify coercion through deliberation in very diverse contexts, dialogical approaches may be read as attempts to construct an even more capacious liberalism. Notwithstanding these variations, I believe that, whether or not scholars are genuinely committed to rethinking the assumptions of liberalism, existing attempts to challenge the borders of political theory enable us to appreciate what our normative proposals leave out, and they call for new accounts of political phenomena, institutions and practices that can unsettle our assumptions and priorities. One of these questions, I argue, is the status of certain individuals as poles of mediated discursive relations.
