A strong defence of democracy: Introduction to a symposium on Cristina Lafont’s Book ‘Democracy without Shortcuts’

Democracy is under pressure – worldwide. Autocratic political representatives are trying to push back democratic participation and the liberal rule of law, through a combination of neo-liberal and digital super-capitalism, state minimalism and, at the same time, undeniably cementing inequality based upon whiteness, wealth and/or other ethnic and religious categories. Simultaneously, anti-democratic attitudes could be identified in parts of the population in Europe even before the coronavirus pandemic, and these tendencies have grown and become even more exacerbated by the health and economic insecurity that has manifested itself in the wake of the pandemic.

On the one hand, in recent years, we have witnessed the many faces of citizen resistance and of activism directed against the political status quo and militant rights that appear martial in public and try to establish themselves in institutions: a short time ago, there was the Occupy movement and the so-called Arab Spring, while recently we have witnessed Fridays for Future, Black Lives Matter and other mass protests in many European and American cities, from London to New York to Rio de Janeiro, Belarus, and once again in Hong Kong. We are confronted with two developments which, at first glance, seem to point in different directions: democracy seems to be both in decline and to be on the rise, phoenix-like, being reborn from its own ashes. On the one hand, in Western societies, we are facing a growing alienation in politics between citizens and democratic institutions. On the other, citizens worldwide do not seem to be politically inactive or de-motivated at all.

No special cognitive ability is necessary to understand what many people feel. There is a lot at stake: namely, the democratic world as we know it – or – historically – knew it not so long ago. A world which, while not always empirically perfect, was one in which the claim that all those affected by decisions should also be equally involved in the process of legislation on which these decisions are based prevailed. The voice of each individual counts and should be included in political decisions. This historical legacy, as we are dramatically reminded in the light of the developments described, could be lost. It is the prospect of mourning for this possible loss that motivates us, in the spirit of Kant, to continue after all and to fight with all the means at our disposal for the preservation and possible improvement of this heritage.

Cristina Lafont’s book ‘Democratic Shortcuts’ seems to have been written in this spirit. It is concerned with nothing less than defending an idea of democracy that can be described as normatively desirable and empirically feasible. Lafont also presents this book at a time when the weakening of democracy in practice mirrors the vanishing of democracy in theory. This does not mean, of course, that there are currently no books in defence of democracy. But there are many that describe its decline, and, even more so, that make concessions to what is normatively expected. Lafont, on the other hand, is, one might say, steadfast in her adherence to a concept of deliberative democracy. A concept that has been repeatedly exposed to all kinds of criticism in recent decades. It finds itself under severe attack from different sides. Deliberative democracy is declared to be too consensus-orientated and too demanding normatively, so that it lacks institutional backing in reality; it is lampooned as assuming a false idea of a collective subject that does not exist, as being too old-fashioned to register the digital turn, and, moreover, as not being receptive to the phenomena of gatherings and protests in real public places and beyond institutional settings. The list of reservations concerning democracy has grown long. But are these criticisms justified?

Lafont addresses numerous objections in her own perceptive way. In particular, she focuses on three particularly prominent approaches, all of which she rejects.

A prominent understanding of democracy in our time can be called deep pluralism. Deep pluralism is the social condition under which democratic processes take place. The assumption here is that our societies are characterised by such profound contrasts and differences of opinion that it is legitimate to apply the majority principle for political decisions after the appropriate co-determination procedures have been established. Lafont objects that the losing minority will always be among the losers and that the fundamental principle of equal co-determination will thus be undermined, a supposedly democratic shortcut that could only lead to more political frustration or even to violence.

A second contemporary important approach is what she calls ‘epistocracy’. Epistocratic conceptions of democracy, despite their many different manifestations, aim to achieve substantially good results for all concerned. In view of the complexity of our world, a reasonable concern, one might think, which argues for giving experts and generally interested parties more influence, thereby ‘relieving’ the less motivated and ignorant citizens. This view, tempting as it may be for many who have lost confidence in democracy, especially in the face of rampant right-wing populism, also has serious shortcomings. One of these is that it itself leads to the exclusion of citizens from the political process within society, which is normatively highly problematical and empirically plays into the hands of populists. Moreover, some citizens must always blindly submit to the decisions of others, that is, without public discussion and reasonable argumentation. Another, fatal shortcut.

Finally, Lafont’s interest is directed towards the increasingly discussed notion of ‘lottocracy’ as a welcome alternative to the previous selection of representative political personnel. Sortition proceudre would function better and yet, at the same time, support the idea of equality if citizens were more strongly represented in all sorts of bodies, assemblies, juries, deliberative polis and much more, upon the basis of the lottery. Even if the idea of the equality of citizens is particularly strengthened here, this position overlooks the fact that a randomly selected group of citizens experiences an increase in power (e.g. through better access to information), which is also problematical. For one thing, all others must submit to the results of a tiny group, and even then, without a good explanation as to why the opposition’s votes do not play a role in the decision-making process, and, even more so, it appears – and this is a problem especially with regard to the populists – that the formation of opinions and wills would be legitimate even without the opposition. Lafont sees this as a further shortening of democratic procedures that stands in the way of legitimate justification of political decisions.

She argues, however, in the spirit of John Dewey, that the best remedy for too little democracy is more democracy. More publicity, more deliberation, more local and transnational democratic participation. Of course, given the long-standing debate about deliberative democracy, it would be easy to suggest ‘to just leave it as it is’. And Lafont is far from simply ignoring critical objections. Rather, she further intensifies her normative demand to avoid democratic shortcuts and also argues for ‘lifting’ the Rawlsian ‘burden of reasons’ through legal procedures, so to speak. The only agreement that exists in disagreement is itself an expression of a state of exhaustion, of resignation. It is, perhaps, empirically understandable, normative, but not tenable. Rather, citizens have a duty not to abandon the deliberative debate – until some kind of agreement is reached. Since this is difficult to achieve in practice, as Lafont is well aware, the judicial review, which examines whether or not the disagreement concerning fundamental rights is in accord with fundamental rights, is a useful tool. One might think that this is again a kind of retreat option into the area beyond democracy. But Lafont defends the important role of the courts and constitutional review as an institution of citizens, namely, ‘citizens in robes’.

The law, one might say, is given the role of testing democratic procedures, not their content. Whether this is a convincing and sufficient renewal of democracy in times of its decline remains to be seen, however. It is a strong argument for more democracy all the time.