Abstract
Carl Cassegård attempts to establish a theoretical framework based on critical theory that allows us to examine the relationship capitalist society has with nature. The work appears amidst a swath of contemporary attempts to reclaim nature from dominating mechanisms inherent in capitalism. To distinguish this work from other theories, Cassegård clarifies the emancipatory potential of a theory specifically based on Frankfurt School philosophy. In my assessment, he succeeds in providing a theoretical foundation for a theory of nature based in the Frankfurt School’s blend of critical theory. Yet he falls short in providing concrete examples of the theory’s practical application, and therefore fails to illustrate a cogent solution to the problem of utopia. However, Cassegård’s treatment of utopia does successfully demonstrate the optimism inherent in Dialectic of Enlightenment by illustrating utopian potential as a tool for criticism.
The book consists of ten chapters which can be reasonably divided into two categories. The first six chapters, in addition to the tenth, establish positive arguments for the validity of a critical theory of nature and outline the problems that such a theory must solve. Chapters seven through nine situate the critical theory of nature within the larger field of ecological critique. Specifically, Cassegård spends these three chapters contrasting a critical theory of nature with eco-Marxism, world-ecology, dark ecology and new materialism to highlight the failures of these theories and establish sufficient critical impulse toward social reform. Cassegård handles these theories with care and demonstrates exceptional familiarity with each of them, but his real accomplishment lies in the first six chapters, where he elucidates his theory’s foundation.
Chapter two distinguishes the three interpretations of Marx’s materialism – causal, practical and critical – and argues that the idea of critical theory is ‘best expressed in critical materialism’ (22). Cassegård provides a clear explanation of the various interpretations of Marxist materialism through his analysis and subsequent rejection of causal and practical materialism. The first is dismissed on account of its contemplative methodology and failure to break with traditional theorizing, whereas the second is forgone for its elimination of the possibility for the experience of non-identity between nature and human praxis. Non-identity is an idea borrowed from Adorno that is central to critical materialism. Non-identity is what is experienced when the contradictions are highlighted between objective nature and the capitalist forms imposed on it. This idea underlies critical materialism, an approach where capitalism is understood as a negative totality in which critique functions through the confrontation between capitalist forms and the matter they are forced upon. Cassegård writes that ‘In critical materialism, matter is not a foundational concept, but exists outside conceptual systems, as a force capable of disrupting them’ (38). In utilizing this disruptive force, critical materialism becomes the most suitable interpretation of Marxist materialism for critical theory because it offers a mode of critique that escapes the reification of concepts under capitalist ideology.
Cassegård goes on to illustrate the development of critical materialism through the work of Adorno and Alfred Schmidt. Adorno develops critical materialism through the introduction of two theoretical notions: the primacy of the object and natural history. Both notions illustrate a fundamental ambiguity inherent in nature, one that serves as a core tenet for a critical theory of nature: On the one hand, nature exists beyond the world of our thoughts, and independently of it, and will never be fully known despite the progress of science. It is withdrawn from the subject––the mute object par excellence. But paradoxically, it also possesses an affluence of meaning, being one of the best examples of an almost purely social category that has been loaded with a variety of different meanings depending on historical and cultural context. (49-50).
The primacy of the object denotes a perspective on material reality that acknowledges the ‘withdrawn’ aspect of the object that cannot be bridged by the subject, while natural history discloses the dialectical relationship between nature and history by which the former acquires it’s ‘affluence of meaning’ and transforms into the latter. For Adorno, these notions help us escape the trap of identity thinking and usher in social change. However, Adorno falls short in delimiting his transhistorical critique of identity thinking to capitalism proper. This development is later achieved by Schmidt, who succeeds in reconceptualizing the bounds of a critical theory of capitalism and clarifies the destructive relationship between nature and society that arises from the haphazard imposition of capitalist forms on material reality.
In demonstrating capitalism as a negative totality (by virtue of its false appropriation of nature through conceptual forms) Schmidt contributes his view of ‘metabolism’, the idea that humanity is inextricably linked to nature through our need to utilize its resources for our own survival. Schmidt however proves incapable of separating metabolism from the destructive impulse towards nature, claiming that this impulse is inevitable and therefore complicating any hope for a non-destructive post-capitalist relationship with nature.
This sets the stage for Cassegård’s original contribution to critical materialism, a solution for Schmidt’s error that emphasizes the value-law, not metabolism, as the mechanism that fosters a destructive relationship with nature. Chapter five contains this argument alongside a skillful presentation of the core tenets of Marx’s Capital. This chapter is wonderfully written, providing a lucid description of Capital that could be easily apprehended by laymen and scholars alike. Cassegård’s argument in this chapter hinges on the idea that nature is a non-value producing entity due to its status as both a formal and material ‘outside.’ Capitalist society nevertheless seeks to appropriate nature as a source of value production, and this is what results in our destructive treatment of material reality.
This raises one problem that a critical theory of nature must contend with: if nature is conceived of as an ‘outside’ in both the formal and material sense, how are we, agents operating from within the negative totality of capitalism, supposed to interact with this outside in a meaningful way? Cassegård argues in Chapter six that Adorno’s notion of constellations as a method by which we can interact with the outside. For Adorno, constellations are a method of using concepts in such a way that do not subsume the material object completely, always allowing an innocent remainder of its non-identity with the observing subject. Essentially, constellations enable us to think of the object without subsuming it to identity thinking. Constellations encircle the object and illuminate it from various, often contradictory, viewpoints, thereby retaining the non-identity between the object and our conceptual system of understanding. By adhering to the primacy of the object, the outside is experienced in the contradiction between concepts and matter, thus allowing for a critique of the system.
At this point in the work, Carl Cassegård has successfully demonstrated the theoretical foundation for a critical theory of nature. Such a theory benefits from the wealth of theoretical notions and critical tools first put forward by the likes of Adorno and Schmidt, while Cassegård furthers their progress by arguing for the notions’ validity for an ecological critique of capitalist society. In utilizing object primacy, constellations and the concept of non-identity, Cassegård has developed a satisfactory solution to the problem of how a critique emerging from within the capitalist totality can interact with nature as it exists outside of the totality. However, he falls short on two points: concrete examples of the experience of non-identity and a sufficient answer to how a critical theory of nature contributes to theories of a post-capitalist utopia.
Since it is a central pillar of a critical theory of nature, non-identity as a concept is adequately described throughout the work. However, save for one instance, Cassegård does not provide any example of what this experience looks like in everyday life. The reader is forced to picture for themselves the experience of non-identity; a task that somewhat draws the air out of the importance placed upon the concept. It may be said that since his primary concern was to provide a theoretical framework for his theory, he avoids the responsibility of providing an idea of what the practical application of this theory may be. However, it cannot be denied that any argument benefits from the inclusion of examples, and the failure to include more of them severely diminishes the weight of the impression non-identity has on the reader.
Likewise, Cassegård also struggles to provide an adequate answer to the problem of utopia. The final chapter of Toward a Critical Theory of Nature describes the relationship between Cassegård’s theory and social praxis, highlighting that a truly critical praxis must ‘visiblize the contradictions generated by the imposition of form on matter’ (188). Presumably, utopia can be achieved through the implementation of this form of critical praxis. Yet once again we are left with no concrete example as to how such a praxis may proceed, instead receiving the theoretical guidelines this praxis must adhere to if it is to function properly. A contention may be made that since a critical theory of nature is new, social praxis that corresponds to this theory has not yet happened, and this is the reason that no examples of praxis can be given. One might concede this point and yet maintain that until the practical application of a critical theory of nature is demonstrated, it makes no headway toward achieving utopia beyond what foregoing utopian fantasies have offered. As such, at the close of this book utopia remains an enigmatic concept that one can only picture incompletely, groping our way forward by theoretical postulates and attempts at forward-looking political action.
Cassegård’s treatment of utopia is not in vain, however, as he puts forth a reconceptualization of utopia as ‘an ongoing, unevenly progressing apocalypse’ (188). In short, a critique of the reified forms imposed on matter by capitalist society must involve an interrogation of catastrophes as they happen in real time. For Cassegård, this is ‘the clearest language through which non-identity is communicated to the subject’ and reformative praxis involves our response to this experience of non-identity. Utopia in this vein becomes the hope for a reality in which objective nature is no longer chained by the forms imposed upon it, and the potential for the realization of utopia is demonstrated by our responses to catastrophic instances where the contradiction between form and matter is laid bare. This final point is, according to Cassegård, the critical impetus behind Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. Their monumental work must then be interpreted as optimistic; they do not profess despair at the lost potential for a utopian reconciliation with nature. Rather, the work itself is based on the ongoing hope for such a future.
In conclusion, Carl Cassegård in Toward a Critical Theory of Nature displays impressive academic rigor in his development of a theoretical framework for an ecological critique based in critical theory. The breadth of theory he works with is commendable, and his in-depth treatment of this material is masterful. In addition to his admirable condensation of the wealth of critical theory, Cassegård demonstrates supreme philosophical ability in providing a solution to the problem of how to develop a method of critique that can interact with elements that exist outside the system in which the former is generated. In terms of the history of philosophy, Toward a Critical Theory of Nature is suitable, if not highly recommendable, to introductory students of Marxism and post-Marx materialist philosophy due to the cogent and concise presentation of otherwise complex thinkers and theories. In terms of contemporary ecological discussions, this work would be best received by scholars familiar with the theoretical grounding of present-day attempts at ecological reform. As a whole, the work can be appreciated by most, but would certainly be best appreciated by scholars working in critical theory.
