Determinants of legislative voting loyalty under different electoral systems: Evidence from Romania

Abstract

Previous research has found mixed evidence regarding the change of parliamentary voting behaviour following electoral reforms. But scholars have not analysed whether the mechanisms by which voting loyalty is elicited matter differently in such cases. Our article fills this gap by investigating the individual variation in voting loyalty across two legislative terms, using a sample of 26 high-stakes roll-call votes. Romania constitutes an ideal setting for such a study due to its recent shift from closed-list proportional representation to single-member districts. Multivariate ordinary least squares models (including all Members of Parliament and including only incumbents) test for the effect of parliamentary experience, party membership duration, parliamentary office, party hopping and district magnitude, while also accounting for demotion and a number of socio-demographic controls. Results indicate that socialisation is less important for Members of Parliament’s voting behaviour after reform, whereas signalling through voting dissent prior to party switching becomes more relevant.

Keywords

Electoral reform Members of Parliament parliamentary party groups Romania voting loyalty

Introduction

There is a broad consensus among legislative studies scholars that the way in which Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected can influence their behaviour in office. Party-centred electoral systems (i.e. party lists) usually trigger high degrees of cohesion (Hix, 2004), whereas candidate-centred systems (i.e. voting in single-member districts (SMDs)) typically confer MPs a certain degree of leeway around the party line. However, most of these findings come from studies of different cases (Cain et al., 1987; Hix and Noury, 2008; Depauw and Martin, 2009; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) as consolidated democracies rarely undergo radical changes of their electoral rules (Birch, 2005; Lijphart, 1994). One of the few longitudinal studies that tried to understand whether MPs change their voting behaviour following a shift from a party- to a candidate-centred electoral system was conducted after the 2008 Romanian electoral system reform. In his analysis of the impact of different electoral rules on Romanian MPs’ vote defection from their party position, Coman (2012) found no relevant change in overall levels of loyalty. Nevertheless, it is important to investigate whether the electoral reform did bring a change in the mechanisms by which voting loyalty is elicited, given the significant modification in the structure of opportunities the MPs faced.

Our article aims to present conclusive evidence answering this empirical question. We seek to identify the determinants of MP loyalty towards their parliamentary party groups (PPGs) and, in this way, to observe whether loyalty-triggering mechanisms mattered differently in legislatures elected under different electoral systems. Such behaviours can be shaped by a large number of factors in a cross-country comparative study. To better isolate the effect of the electoral system, longitudinal observations within the same country – where most other factors are held constant – are particularly useful.

Voting in plenary sessions is traditionally studied using the Rice Index that accounts for the cohesion of MPs across PPGs (Rice, 1928). Although the index quantifies cohesion, it is limited to the PPG level of analysis without being able to provide insights into individual-level voting. The latter is crucial to capture essential changes in MPs’ loyalty. Institutional modifications can alter the way in which individuals follow their interests. As the PPGs are not unitary actors facing structures of incentives, such mechanisms are hard to trace through aggregate figures that could instead indicate spurious relationships (Kam, 2009). Moreover, cohesion measured at the level of PPGs masks changes of loyalty over time. As a result, individual-level data are appropriate to reveal possible changes in MPs’ voting behaviour. Our analysis focuses on a single country, avoiding in this way the risk of endogeneity present in cross-national studies. According to Przeworski (2007), comparisons across countries are difficult as unobserved heterogeneity across the units of analysis can contaminate research design; consequently, a quasi-experimental design, like the one used in this article, may provide original and valuable insights.

In light of these strictures, Romania constitutes the ideal case for investigation: it witnessed a dramatic change of its electoral system and individual-level data are available to observe this change. After 18 years of closed-list proportional representation (PR) (i.e. one of the most party-centred systems), the parliamentary elections in 2008 were organised under a new electoral formula in which SMDs (i.e. the focus on candidates) are the crucial and dominant component. We analyse the individual-level voting behaviour of Romanian MPs in the Chamber of Deputies to account for the variation of factors that influence party loyalty. In doing so, we employ loyalty scores based on the average of their votes coded dichotomously as agreement or disagreement with the party. We seek to determine the causes of voting loyalty, using an original data set with the most salient (Giannetti and Laver, 2009) 13 roll-call votes in each of the 2004–2008 (party-centred system) and 2008–2012 (candidate-centred system) legislative terms. As the unit of observation is the roll-call vote per month, the study covers 26 months of effective plenary sessions between May 2007 and June 2010.

The article starts with a general theoretical framework on legislative voting loyalty from which we derive empirically testable hypotheses. The research design section briefly describes the change of electoral system, explaining its shift of focus from parties to candidates, and presents the Chamber of Deputies and its composition (i.e. the PPGs). It also includes the conceptualisation and operationalisation of variables, details of the roll-call vote selection, and the multivariate models. The third section summarises the findings of our multivariate statistical analyses of the patterns of voting loyalty. Finally, the conclusions draw out the major implications of our study and elaborate directions for further research.

MPs’ voting behaviour under different electoral rules

This article focuses on the voting behaviour of individual legislators relative to one of their principals: the party to which they belong. We are interested in MPs’ voting decisions compared with the position of their PPGs. Earlier research has shown that this behaviour is influenced by the relationship established by the representatives with the other major principal – their constituency voters – and by electoral rules. The latter can either foster a collective reputation (party-based) that helps develop strong ties between the MPs and their parties (Ames, 1995; Carey and Shugart, 1995) or encourage a personal reputation, an approach in which legislators are more oriented towards their voters (Carey, 2009). Carey and Shugart (1995) nuanced these perspectives and used four criteria to establish the relationship between electoral rules and the development of personal or party reputations: ballot control, vote pooling, type of vote (multiple or party- or candidate-oriented) and district magnitude.

Following these arguments, one expects more party-loyal behaviour from MPs in the case of electoral systems emphasising party reputation compared with systems that favour personal reputation. However, in reality, the connection is not straightforward and the empirical results display mixed evidence (for a review, see Coman, 2012: 202). In the Romanian case, despite a general change in the logic of the electoral system, the extent to which MPs follow the party line has remained relatively stable (Coman, 2012). Under these circumstances, the task that follows logically is to investigate whether the mechanisms by which voting loyalty is elicited matter differently for MPs elected under different rules.

Our theoretical expectations build upon the different incentives for party unity offered by party-centred as opposed to candidate-centred electoral systems. Because it is the party vote that matters most for re-election under closed-list PR (Hicken and Simmons, 2008), we expect socialisation into party rules and norms to play a more important role for voting loyalty before the electoral reform than afterwards, when MPs had to adapt to a new structure of opportunities. Conversely, efforts to cultivate a personal vote through highly publicised dissent make much more sense in an SMD-based electoral system (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Moreover, because SMD voters are better equipped to punish MPs who switch parties than their counterparts in closed-list PR systems, the potential switchers might adapt and dissent more frequently so as to signal to their constituents their policy disagreements with the parties and prepare them for the change of affiliation.

The socialisation component

The understanding of parliamentary behaviour can be informed by three distinct theoretical models: the sociological (Crowe, 1986; Kornberg, 1967), institutional (Cox, 1987) and preference-driven approaches (Krehbiel, 1993, 1999; Ozbudun, 1970). The policy preference model focuses on the preferred stances of a legislator to predict her behaviour. Institutional and cultural constraints do not apply; policy maximisation is all that matters (Krehbiel, 1993). The institutional model does not reject the importance of MPs’ preferences but stresses the transformative effects of institutions (e.g. electoral systems, internal party rules, confidence motions or agenda-setting rules) upon the pursuit of preferences (Cox, 1987). The sociological model is different in the sense that it does not espouse rational-choice assumptions. Instead, it emphasises the power of socialisation upon voting cohesion (Davidson-Schmich, 2003). Our model incorporates the intuitions of the socialisation literature, but we think their explanatory power depends on the stability of the institutional setting. Thus, we hypothesise that a longer presence in the legislature (H1) and in the party (H2) should have a positive effect on voting loyalty. However, given the radical institutional change that happened in 2008, we expect these factors to matter less in the second term, when MPs had to face a new structure of opportunities and adapt to it.

After several terms in office, MPs come to value loyalty and party solidarity, and are more prone to respond positively to peer pressure (Kam, 2009; Kornberg, 1967). Through a gradual and largely unconscious process of norm internalisation, MPs end up sharing a conformist view of what makes a behaviour appropriate, that is, ‘the greater good of party unity’ (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011). Additionally, lengthy parliamentary experience may foster loyalty due to a more instrumentalist filter. This applies when more experienced MPs have had the opportunity to see their party losing fiercely at polls because voters perceived it as divided and faction-ridden (Longley and Hazan, 1999: 5). Previous findings have confirmed a positive influence of parliamentary experience on cohesion for some Western countries but not for others (Depauw, 2003: 143; Kam, 2009: 202–203).

High rates of turnover represent a constant in the Romanian legislature, with more than 55% newcomers each term (Chiru, 2011). Accordingly, we test for an additional, less demanding, indicator of organisational socialisation, namely, the length of MPs’ party membership. Following our previous reasoning, extended membership records should increase party loyalty, even in the absence of parliamentary experience. The variable also captures the instances of affiliation shortly before elections, which may reflect opportunistic behaviours of career politicians who abandon sinking parties. They might later on show the same volatile tendencies with respect to toeing their new party’s line.¹

Parliamentary position, affiliation and competition

Next to socialisation, we expect voting loyalty to be a function of parliamentary position, change of affiliation and intensity of competition. Alongside renomination, distribution of office perks (e.g. ministerial portfolios and committee assignments) is the most important positive selective incentive party leaders have at their disposal to ensure high levels of cohesion (Bowler et al., 1999: 10). In turn, office-seeking MPs have reasons to please party leaders to enhance their chances of further career advancement (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991). The link between loyalty and advancement is especially visible in Westminster parliamentary systems. One party holds the monopoly over most offices, while policy influence and the capacity to distribute resources are achieved only through appointment to a ministerial position (Kam, 2009).

In a system marked by more power dispersion, such as the Romanian semi-presidential system, where coalition governments are the rule (Elgie and Moestrup, 2008), a parliamentary office can still be perceived as a reasonable proxy for the politician’s chances of advancement in both public and party office (Stefan, 2009: 30–31). Along these lines, the MPs holding parliamentary offices are likely to take part in the decision-making process of the PPG,² which should strengthen even more their propensity to toe the party line (H3).³ We expect a weaker effect after the electoral change because, unlike in the previous system, even prominent MPs might feel the urge to dissent on unpopular measures that affect their constituencies.

The most extreme form of parliamentary dissent is changing one’s party group. In Romania, party switching is frequent: more than 10% of MPs defected in each post-communist legislature, with a peak of 24% in the 2004–2008 term (Chiru, 2011). Party switching is generally explained by three main motivations: seeking ideological compatibility; the desire for office and/or pork for constituents; and looking for electoral advantage, that is, easier re-election (Heller and Mershon, 2009). It is not justifiable to assume that switchers are previous rebels who have systematically dissented from their party line. This would be the case only for those MPs whose policy preferences were significantly different from those of their former party, that is, ‘sincere dissenters’. The other two categories of defectors (the instrumental-oriented ones) might include, almost with the same probability, conformist, low-profile politicians or just occasional, strategic dissenters who want to signal their intentions to future party bosses. In Romania, parties have not developed strong programmatic orientations (Gherghina and Chiru, 2010; Pop-Eleches, 1999), and MPs are not known for their attachment to particular policy stances. This ideological fuzziness (Tavits, 2008; Van Biezen, 2003) makes switching for policy compatibility highly unlikely. By taking into account the strategic signalling idea, we hypothesise that MPs who do not change PPG affiliation are more loyal compared with party switchers (H4). We expect a higher impact of party switching under the candidate-centred electoral system because potential switchers might now dissent more to signal to the other principal – the constituents (far less important under PR) – that they are not happy with their party and prepare them, in this way, for a subsequent change of PPG.

The intensity of electoral competition within the two different electoral systems may also have an effect on voting loyalty. Higher district magnitude has been shown to decrease MPs’ likelihood of adopting a constituency representation role in closed-list systems (André et al., 2011). The fact that representatives tend to be party-oriented in such conditions should also have a positive impact on their voting loyalty. We test directly for this relationship for the first (2004–2008) legislative term, when each county⁴ was a constituency. Regarding the second term (2008–2012), the mechanics of the system allow for a different effect. Thus, in the seats redistribution phase, there is also competition between the candidates of the same party running in SMDs from the same county. Accordingly, this competition could lead to a decrease in voting loyalty (Carey and Shugart, 1995). However, we expect this effect to be marginal as the number of candidates winning seats in this stage was relatively limited.

Control variables

We control for the effect of age as previous research has shown that older MPs are more prone to dissent, since their prospects of career advancement are much diminished compared with those of their younger colleagues (Kam, 2009: 199). MPs’ professional background is another control variable. We expect those representatives who have previously held political or administrative jobs to be more prone to toe the party line than those who are newcomers to politics. The last control variable is context-specific as personal wealth plays a significant role in Romanian politics and list composition (Gherghina and Chiru, 2010). Thus, in the context of meagre levels of party subsidies and reduced rates of fee-paying members (Gherghina and Chiru, 2013; Smilov and Toplak, 2007), the parties choose to promote well-off candidates who are able to finance their campaigns both for national (Chiru, 2010; Protsyk and Matichescu, 2011; Stefan, 2004) and European (Gherghina and Chiru, 2010) elections. Once elected, these politicians might feel entitled to more autonomy vis-a-vis the party line than others.

These relationships are tested for the entire pool of MPs who voted in the two parliamentary terms surveyed. Moreover, we are interested in the behaviour of MPs with continuous presence in Parliament in 2004 and 2008. In their case, both voting loyalty and change of loyalty between the terms provide useful insights about their interactions with the PPGs. Consequently, we build two supplementary models specific to incumbent MPs. In addition to the specified variables, we also control for whether demotion (i.e. downward mobility in parliamentary rank in the second term analysed) decreases loyalty (Kam, 2009: 160) and if incumbents’ affiliation with government parties increases it.

Research design

Our analysis focuses on the Chamber of Deputies as it is the primary arena of legislative debates. Most legislation is first discussed by deputies and then acted upon by senators. The analysis includes all the deputies present in the plenary sessions when the roll-call votes were cast. Appendix 1 illustrates only small differences between our universe of cases and the entire number of MPs. In other words, absentees do not cause a distortion in the data.

A new electoral system

The electoral reform involved the introduction of SMDs for all the parliamentary seats. The system envisages three layers: the district, the constituency and the national level. The latter two are the legacy of the previous electoral system (a closed-list PR system that used the d’Hondt method for redistribution) and they appear exclusively in the seats redistribution phases. The constituencies correspond to the territorial administrative divisions of Romania (counties) and include several districts, depending on population. Candidates compete in districts and only those receiving 50% + 1 of the votes are directly elected.

For the rest, the distribution of seats happens in two stages. The first is the county redistribution and refers to the number of votes obtained by the party in each county. The second stage redistributes the remaining seats and accounts for the national vote shares of the parties (Chiru and Ciobanu, 2009; Gherghina and Jiglau, 2012). The introduction of SMDs did produce some modification in recruitment patterns – that is, by putting a premium on local roots (residence, local experience and party career), it reduced the number of ‘carpetbaggers’. Also, the parties chose to delegate many of the campaigning costs, favouring well-to-do candidates (Chiru, 2010). Given the importance of these personal resources, there are reasons for the MPs elected under this system to feel entitled to more autonomy compared with their colleagues who were anonymously elected on party lists in the previous terms. Such independent behaviour is tolerated by parties as long as it maximises the vote shares these candidates obtain (Carey, 2003: 201). Moreover, the district connection can create a basis for ‘legitimate dissent’ – that is, claiming that constituents’ interest would be hurt by toeing the party line – and generally for a discourse much more oriented towards individual accountability (Carey and Reynolds, 2007).

The Romanian PPGs

Three major parties and a smaller one had parliamentary representation in both legislative terms. The Social Democratic Party (PSD) is the largest Romanian party in the post-communist period, winning the popular vote in four out of six elections. The Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) is the other successor of the Romanian Communist Party. The party was present in all post-communist parliaments and changed its ideological orientation in 2005: following a decade-long affiliation with the Socialist International, it became a member of the European People’s Party. The National Liberal Party (PNL) is the only historical party revived in 1990 that managed to survive as a major parliamentary party for two decades. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) is an ethnic party that reunites different ideological visions. The UDMR has been present in all the post-communist parliaments.

Roll-call votes selection

The usual problem of roll-call votes is that they are not a random selection of votes – if roll-call is not the standard procedure, they might be requested by the opposition to embarrass the government or by the government to advertise their decisiveness relative to a policy issue (Carrubba et al., 2004, 2008). In either case, these roll-call votes are not representative of the overall loyalty of individual MPs. However, this is not a problem in the Romanian Parliament, where every issue is automatically voted upon and no selection bias occurs. However, the challenge consists of selecting representative sets of votes from the whole universe of issues from the yearly bulk of legislation. At the same time, some votes are more important than others. Our selection controls for their saliency to enable us to treat them equally. In this respect, we adopted three measures. First, similarly to Mainwaring and Perez Linan (1997), we eliminated all the votes that registered unanimity or a very large majority (over 90%) as they do not reflect a divisive dimension. The latter provides the ideal setting to test for MPs’ loyalty. Second, we selected votes with similar attendance rates, as this may significantly influence cohesion (Carey, 2002; Thames, 2007) or loyalty. Third, our selection is characterised by equilibrium between the votes approving and rejecting policy proposals (mostly belonging to the government). The share of these votes is proportional to all the votes on the parliamentary agenda.

The selection of roll-call votes includes the end of a legislative term and the beginning of another one. In spite of some theoretical reasons that may suggest a selection bias, the contextual factors indicate that this is not the case in Romania. For example, the size of the government coalition may be one source of bias. This is a constant as the government had similar support in Parliament in both terms. The end of the 2004–2008 term was characterised by tacit PSD support for the government, whereas the government coalition at the beginning of the 2008–2012 term relied on similar percentages of seats. At the same time, there were no external interferences or major political decisions to be reached by the PPGs.

We have also incorporated a broad spectrum of topics (see Appendix 2). We did not include organic laws (which require an absolute majority), laws under second reading or EU-derived legislation (there is a very high degree of opinion convergence for the latter). Consequently, our analysis includes 26 votes on ordinary laws (one a month), picked evenly (13 each) from the 2004 and 2008 parliamentary terms. Usually, there are no more than 30 roll-call votes a month as many votes cannot take place due to the low rate of attendance – the Romanian legislation stipulates a minimum quorum to take decisions. More than half of the roll-call votes register unanimity or very large majorities. The first vote selected is dated May 2007 and the most recent is 22 June 2010. We accounted for the last 13 months in the 2004 term, as May 2007 was the first month in which votes were recorded electronically in the Chamber of Deputies and made publicly available.

Variable operationalisation and method

The dependent variable of this analysis is MPs’ voting loyalty. Each vote is dichotomously coded as loyalty (1) whenever the MP votes in the same way as the majority of her colleagues in the PPG or dissent (0) in all other instances. The average loyalty score is multiplied by 100 (in order to make the interpretation of the regression coefficients easier) and used as such for two statistical models, whereas a third employs the difference in individual loyalty scores across the two legislatures (see later). Similarly to the Rice Index, the issue of abstentions (Hix et al., 2005) pops up. Aware that abstentions are mild defections, we code them as loyalty if the MP abstains and most of the PPG abstains and as dissent if the MP abstains when the PPG has an opinion, respectively. Wrapping up, each MP has a sequence of 0’s and 1’s depending on the votes she casts. We calculate the average of these votes and multiply it by 100 to obtain a scale where 0 means total dissent and 100 is perfect loyalty.⁵ The change of loyalty is calculated solely for incumbents and represents the difference between the levels of loyalty in the 2004 and the 2008 terms.

The parliamentary experience variable (H1) measures the total number of years spent in the legislature from the beginning of the post-communist period. The length of party membership (H2) is measured in a similar manner, the reference point being the enrolment in the political party. For the parliamentary office variable (H3), we look at the position MPs hold in Parliament. In doing so, we use an ordinal Likert scale with five values that run from simple member to leader or vice-leader of the PPG. All MPs are considered party switchers (H4) who change their partisan affiliation (Desposato, 2006) either by becoming independents or by joining a different PPG group. The analytical nuances Kreuzer and Pettai (2003) introduced are useful in explaining what other cases are considered as party switches. If MPs change their political affiliations as a result of splits, mergers or following the emergence of a new PPG, then they are considered switchers. This variable is a dummy in which all party switchers are coded as 1. MPs’ loyalty is always calculated relative to the PPG they are members of; for MPs becoming independents, we account only for the months in which they belonged to a PPG. In the comparisons between PPGs, party hoppers are assigned to the PPG from which they defected.

The district magnitude variable (H5) stands in both terms for the number of MPs elected in a county. Although at the 2008 elections all MPs were elected in SMDs, the number of seats allocated to a county remained roughly the same as in 2004, varying between 4 and 12 – with Bucharest as an exception, with 28 representatives.

The control variables are age (in years), professional background and wealth. For the professional background, we use a series of seven dummies: politician, public officer, trade union leader, liberal professional, businessman, media and showbiz person, and other. Last but not least, wealth is measured on an ordinal Likert scale with six values ranging from modest (1) to extremely rich (6). The primary data for this scale comes from MPs’ own written declarations uploaded on the official website of Parliament at the beginning of each term.

We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with robust standard errors to compensate for assumption violation (i.e. normal distribution). The model – run separately for each legislative term – can be summarised as follows, with β6–β12 as controls:

\begin{matrix} V o t t i n g L o y a l t y = c o n s t a n t + β 1 P a r l i a m e n t a r y E x p e r i e n c e \\ + β 2 L e n g t h o f P a r t y M e m b e r s h i p + β 3 P a r l i a m e n t a r y O f f i c e \\ + β 4 P a r t y h o p p i n g + β 5 D i s t r i c t M a g n i t u d e \\ + β 6 A g e β 7 W e a l t h β 8 \dots + β 12 P r o f e s s i o n d u m m i e s^{6} + μ \end{matrix}

(1)

A supplementary model is used for incumbent MPs in an attempt to explain their loyalty. One main effect (demotion) is tested and one more control (government party) is added. Demotion is calculated as the difference between the positions occupied in 2004 and in 2008; whereas belonging to a government party is coded as a dummy, with opposition MPs being coded as (0):

\begin{matrix} V o t t i n g L o y a l t y = c o n s t a n t + β 1 P a r l i a m e n t a r y E x p e r i e n c e \\ + β 2 L e n g t h o f P a r t y M e m b e r s h i p + β 3 P a r l i a m e n t a r y O f f i c e \\ + β 4 P a r t y h o p p i n g + β 5 D i s t r i c t M a g n i t u d e \\ + β 6 D e m o t i o n + β 7 G o v e r n m e n t P a r t y + β 8 A g e + β 9 W e a l t h \\ + β 10 \dots + β 16 P r o f e s s i o n d u m m i e s + μ \end{matrix}

(2)

The multivariate analyses⁷

Table 1 includes the multivariate statistical analyses seeking to explain Romanian MPs’ voting behaviour in 2004 and 2008.⁸ Both models account for approximately 7–8% of the variation in MPs’ voting loyalty.⁹ The model for the term preceding the electoral change finds empirical support for some of the hypothesised relationships. The hypothesis according to which veteran MPs are likely to be more loyal is weakly corroborated: one full term as an MP increases the representative’s loyalty by 2.7 percentage points. The length of party membership variable points in the right direction but fails to reach statistical significance.

Table 1.

The effects of individual features on voting loyalty in the two legislatures.

	2004	2008
Experience in Parliament	.687* (.394)	−.117 (.171)
Length of party membership	.282 (.209)	−.067 (.124)
Parliamentary office	−1.262** (.596)	.205 (.319)
Party hopping	−4.666 (2.961)	−8.556* (4.434)
District magnitude	.170 (.1113)	.106 (.067)
Age	−.135 (.099)	−.064 (.071)
Wealth	−1.264 (1.022)	.288 (.561)
Public servant	7.783* (3.971)	−.005 (2.445)
Trade union leader	10.026** (4.409)	5.998** (2.434)
Liberal profession	5.807* 3.320	−.617 (1.800)
Businessman	4.869 (4.192)	−3.389 (4.086)
Media and showbiz	9.476*** (3.503)	3.459* (2.019)
Other profession	6.599* (3.712)	−.175 (1.940)
Constant	86.577*** (6.905)	98.319*** (3.484)
R²	0.083	0.069
N	277	311

Notes: Reported coefficients are non-standardised (robust standard errors in parentheses). *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < 0.1.

The effect of higher parliamentary office runs counter to our hypotheses as MPs occupying lower positions within the legislature appear more loyal to their PPGs than their more senior colleagues: one category switch in the parliamentary rank, for example, from being secretary of a committee to chairing the committee, brings a 1.26% decrease in loyalty. This behaviour could be explained through the presence of a large mass of backbenchers (58% that do not hold any office), many of whom would show loyalty in the hope of promotion. In this case, the logic of advancement that prevents dissent functions with high parliamentary office as reference points, that is, MPs already holding important office do not look for further promotion to the executive.

MPs who abandon the PPG on the lists of which they were elected seem to dissent on average more than the rest, but the effect is not significantly different from 0. What is certain (precisely because of the small size of this effect) is that most switchers did not dissent constantly from their party line, as one would have expected if their subsequent switching was motivated by ideological distance from the initial party.

As we hypothesised, MPs elected on longer lists (i.e. higher district magnitudes) seem to engage in dissent less frequently, but the effect is extremely small. Among the control variables, only some of the profession dummies proved statistically insignificant. The further away MPs are from classical politicians, the more likely they are to be loyal to their PPGs. Thus, MPs that come from showbiz or from professions such as journalism or union leadership have approximately 10% higher loyalty scores. One explanation could be that career politicians enjoy more connections with MPs from other parties due to their similar pre- and post-communist trajectories. Thus, they could engage more in logrolling in final roll-call votes.

The second model in Table 1 analyses the variation in individual loyalty following the electoral reform. With the exception of the change of PPG affiliation, all the other important variables in the first model lose their explanatory potential and most of them change their direction. Experience in Parliament, the office held by the MP in the legislature, and party membership length have almost no effect on voting loyalty. In a context of extensive change of the party affiliation of elected MPs (especially after the dissolution of the grand coalition, PDL–PSD), it is not surprising that party hopping has a very strong impact on voting behaviour. At the same time, its value almost doubles compared with the previous term: switchers’ loyalty scores are on average 8.5% smaller than those of representatives who stay put.

The variation of the main effects can be linked to the introduction of a candidate-centred approach by the 2008 electoral law. Under the PR system, MPs with an established parliamentary career or occupying high positions in the legislature attached loyalty to the party that ensured their election. This behaviour came both as a sign of gratitude for the confidence the party vested in them and as a safety measure for MPs pursuing re-election. With respect to the latter, legislators with this profile are quite likely to be among the most scrutinised by the party in the central office. The electoral change appeared to alter the importance of experience and parliamentary position by bringing in legislators’ popularity with their SMD voters as a potentially relevant factor. For example, one MP of the ruling party organised a meeting with his constituents and asked them whether he should vote in favour or against the austerity measures of his government. He then claimed that he was mandated to dissent (Realitatea, 2010).

However, although the party was no longer perceived as the exclusive source of re-election, it remained the triggering force behind it, particularly since, in most parties, the central leadership can veto the renomination of rebel MPs (as did happen with the representative in the above story).¹⁰ Accordingly, highly positioned MPs are aware that loyalty to the party should also be matched by efforts to mobilise at least some electoral support, whereas backbenchers perceive that high support without party loyalty can be irrelevant.

The partial equivalent of district magnitude in the 2004 model, namely, the number of MPs elected in the same county, has a small positive impact on overall loyalty in the 2008 model, but this effect does not reach statistical significance. Of the control variables, only two of the professional background dummies – the ones that were also the strongest predictors in the previous model (union leadership and media and showbiz background) – make a difference for voting loyalty.

The differences between the two parliamentary terms are visible also within the PPGs. Table 2 includes the statistical analyses for each PPG in the two parliamentary terms. Two general observations can be made. On the one hand, for all the parties, the 2004 models explain voting loyalty better than the 2008 models. On the other hand, these within-party analyses reveal the triggering mechanism behind one key variable in the general models in Table 1. The general impact of party hopping is generally triggered by the records of the PNL’s deputies and, to a lesser extent, the PSD MPs in 2004. This is strengthened by the absence of out-switching from the PDL for 2004 and the UDMR in both terms. The PNL suffered losses of MPs in both parliamentary terms. In 2007, the separation from the PDL resulted in significant migrations of MPs. The number of deputies in our sample correctly points to this process: the initial algorithm for the distribution of seats within the Truth and Justice Alliance (Alianta DA) was 1.3 (PNL) to 1 (PDL). Our sample contains 68 MPs belonging to the PNL and 59 to the PDL; it is representative of the entire population of the 2004 legislature (see Appendix 1). This process is complemented by a few MPs who enrolled in the PNL in 2004 and, in 2008, were mostly elected under the PSD+PC label.

Table 2.

The explanatory models for cross-party comparisons.

	PSD+PC		PDL		PNL		UDMR
	2004	2008	2004	2008	2004	2008	2004	2008
Experience in parliament	.844 (.554)	.085 (.285)	2.942 (2.174)	−.216 (.251)	.274 (.561)	.640 (.507)	−1.802** (.708)	−.741 (.520)
Length of party membership	.209 (.361)	.063 (.344)	−.346 (.637)	.061 (.084)	.209 (.401)	−.038 (.248)	.284 (.567)	.338 (.483)
Parliamentary office	−1.632* (.865)	.222 (.543)	−1.053 (1.526)	.400* (.216)	−.326 (.763)	−.265 (.820)	4.141* (2.088)	−.607 (1.554)
Party hopping	−3.702*** (1.350)	3.536 (4.506)	−	3.404 (2.610)	−12.023 (7.883)	−10.161* (5772)	−	−
District magnitude	.085 (.185)	.337* (.179)	.368 (.376)	.006 (.030)	.118 (.221)	.054 (.178)	−1.175 (.702)	−1.335 (.827)
Age	−.157 (.143)	−.125 (.135)	.040 (.334)	−.117* (.060)	−.018 (.204)	−.086 (.144)	−.224 (.242)	−.027 (.181)
Wealth	−1.388 (1.547)	−.268 (1.152)	−2.560 (2.525)	.049 (.419)	−.272 (2.091)	1.219 (1.525)	−.897 (2.199)	.522 (2.958)
Public servant	11.251*** (4.144)	6.173* (3.704)	17.005 (19.378)	1.589 (1.874)	1.118 (4.507)	−.8.115 (7.845)	−	−
Trade union leader	5.978 (4.112)	6.489 (4.595)	−	1.252 (1.505)	2.019 (3.414)	−	−	−
Liberal profession	5.841 (3.569)	−2.804 (3.872)	15.683 (18.508)	−.222 (1.957)	4.069 (3.825)	1.237 (4.505)	−10.295 (6.752)	.560 (5.702)
Businessman	.759 (6.821)	−14.059 (16.739)	21.668 (16.225)	.498 (2.055)	−.982 (3.310)	−8.727 (5.774)	−	−
Media and showbiz	9.130** (4.340)	10.671*** (3.702)	−	−	1.393 (3.554)	6.005 (4.169)	−	−
Other profession	7.950* (4.109)	4.012 (3.238)	21.990 (17.344)	−.627 (1.864)	−4.717 (5.024)	−.253 (3.876)	−3.378 (7.287)	3.692 (4.634)
Constant	86.706*** (7.456)	94.726*** (7.008)	70.244** (31.225)	105.540*** (2.171)	95.213*** (10.883)	92.055*** (6.897)	148.905*** (13.873)	98.531***(10.917)
R²	.137	.119	.195	.164	.216	.200	.597	.404
N	128	110	59	111	68	66	21	22

Notes: Reported coefficients are non-standardised (robust standard errors in parentheses). *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < 0.1.

For the UDMR, one also observes a relatively strong negative effect of parliamentary experience, generated by the fact that, at times, the core group of veteran MPs dissent, as compared with the others’ perfect loyalty. The ethnic party also represents an exception with respect to the impact of the district magnitude: unlike other parliamentarians, UDMR representatives elected in counties with more representatives are less loyal than those coming from less populous counties.

A comparison of the 2004 and 2008 models for each party indicates a few variables maintaining their sign and strength. However, there are some cases in which variables significantly change their strength and direction. For example, the parliamentary office reverses direction in all PPGs but the PNL. In the case of the PSD+PC and the PDL, the variable has a negative impact in 2004 that is dramatically altered in 2008 to a positive relationship, which is statistically significant for the PDL. The opposite happens with the UDMR, where the initial positive impact does not find a parallel in 2008. Of the control variables, age and wealth display the most interesting results. Thus, in six of the eight regressions, wealthy MPs seem to dissent more than their colleagues. The negative effect of age that appeared in the pooled model reappears for the PDL MPs.

Summing up, the multivariate analyses lead to a conclusion obscured by the similarity of the aggregate cohesion levels described earlier. The determinants of MPs’ voting loyalty change following the change in electoral system. The main explanation of this process is that the candidate-centred rules used in 2008 dramatically altered the structure of incentives faced by MPs, and individual features led to different behaviour. Consequently, MPs’ voting loyalty is not triggered by the same factors as in 2004. Two of our hypotheses find empirical support in 2004, whereas only one does in 2008: party hopping, a practice that increased significantly following elections held in SMDs.

In order to better understand the puzzle created by the heterogeneity of explanations for 2004 and 2008, we investigate the behaviour of the MPs who were present in both parliamentary terms. Compared with Model 2 presented in the research design section, we introduce two new independent variables: demotion (i.e. losing one’s position in parliamentary rank) and affiliation to a government party. While it makes sense to speak about demotion only for incumbent MPs, the ruling status of the PPG is also expected to produce significant results as all the incumbent MPs had the chance to experience at least one alternation of government and opposition.¹¹

Incumbent MPs’ loyalty

The analysis in this subsection focuses on the 87 MPs who took part in the plenary sessions of both Parliaments. In reality, their number is slightly higher, but absolute absentees are excluded. The distribution of incumbents across PPGs is quite proportional to the number of their total MPs in 2008: 44 for the PSD+PC, 18 for the PDL, 16 for the PNL and 9 for the UDMR.¹² Overall, the determinants of incumbents’ voting loyalty follow the trend identified for the entire legislature in the model for 2004. When comparing this analysis with its corresponding 2008 model in Table 1, the analysis of incumbents clarifies the picture much better.

The statistical model (Table 3) does a better job of explaining their loyalty compared with the broader pool of deputies. However, none of the independent variables present in the previous models reach statistical significance. Moreover, parliamentary office and the variable measuring experience in Parliament point in reverse directions than initially. Overall, control variables have a similar effect to that illustrated in Table 1: younger MPs and less wealthy deputies are more loyal than the rest. Professional background dummies appear irrelevant – a sign that incumbency and the corresponding continuous socialisation cancel initial differences.

Table 3.

The OLS models for incumbents in 2008.

	MP loyalty
Experience in parliament	−.053 (.387)
Length of party membership	.274 (.301)
Parliamentary office	.703 (1.303)
Party hopping	4.332 (5.477)
District magnitude	.179 (.166)
Demotion	.030 (1.214)
Belonging to the government	9.235*** (3.417)
Age	−.119 (.169)
Wealth	−1.605 (1.450)
Public servant	−1.258 (6.593)
Liberal profession	−.073 (4.075)
Businessman	−11.488 (8.683)
Media and showbiz	−5.372 (4.268)
Other profession	5.075 (4.540)
Constant	99.507*** (7.310)
R²	.200
N	87

Notes: Reported coefficients are non-standardised (robust standard errors in parentheses). *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < 0.1.

Another variable that considerably diverges from the previous observations refers to MPs who switch PPGs. Such incumbents appear as loyal as the rest. The demotion variable has a very weak effect on loyalty and in the opposite direction to that specified by our hypothesis. However, it does not reach statistical significance. Unsurprisingly, MPs who belong to the ruling coalition have on average up to 9% higher loyalty scores.

Conclusion

This article has shown that the shift from party- to candidate-centred electoral rules alters the mechanisms triggering loyalty and makes behaviour less predictable. Socialisation (both in Parliament and in the political party), holding a parliamentary office and party hopping affect the 2004 MPs’ levels of loyalty. Relevant to the key point of this article is that only the explanation of party switching predicts some variation in loyalty for 2008 and does so with a greater impact than in the previous term. Even the control variables do not explain much in 2008, although they performed reasonably in the 2004 analysis. These results become more relevant if we consider that more than 20% of MPs elected in 2008 were elected in legislatures prior to 2004. Overall, the explanatory model loses strength both at the general and at the PPG level from 2004 to 2008, indicating a different structure of determinants for voting loyalty. This conclusion is strengthened by our analysis focusing on incumbents, where demotion explains only the change of loyalty.

Our findings bear two major implications. First, we revealed a behavioural pattern that is much less predictable after the institutional redesign. Moreover, there is an enhanced correspondence between decisions to cross the floor and voting loyalty. When in-switching occurs, MPs are much less willing and able to toe the party line. Our results could be valuable for other countries experiencing changes of their electoral systems. A prime candidate for retesting the findings would be Honduras, where, after 15 years of closed-list PR, an electoral reform in 2004 introduced the open-list ballot. Second, the individual-level analyses provided a much more complex picture than the one depicted by aggregate numbers. Accordingly, further studies dealing with changes in MPs’ voting behaviour may want to consider individual roll-call votes as appropriate measures instead of cohesion indices. A related idea would be to assess loyalty not on averages, but on each vote, and to account in this way for the different features of individual votes.

Further studies could also incorporate qualitative data, that is, surveys with parliamentary elites, to identify whether veteran MPs and, more importantly, party whips did perceive a change or not in individual loyalty following the electoral system modification. Moreover, as public opinion seems to appreciate independence by MPs (one of the reasons PR was abandoned in Romania), it would also be relevant to examine whether and how dissent contributes to more individual accountability.

Footnotes

Appendix 1

Table A1.

Percentage of MPs in the analysis and in the Romanian Parliament.

	Analysis		Parliament
	2004	2008	2004	2008
PSD+PC	44.3	34.9	41.91	35.9
PDL	21.6	35.6	15.1^a	36.6
PNL	24.3	21.5	20.6	20.5
UDMR	7.1	7.1	7.1	6.9

Notes: The percentage of MPs for the legislature is calculated without the seats for national minorities. ^a This is the percentage from the beginning of the term in office. Following migrations from PNL, the percentage got somewhere around 22%.

Appendix 2

Table A2.

Selected roll-call votes.

Legislature	Proposal no.	Topic	Initiated	Voted
	355/2007	Status of heroes of the 1989 Revolution	7 May 2007	29 May 2007
	73/2007	Money for pensioners’ train tickets	19 Feb 2007	26 Jun 2007
	971/2006	Increase transport tariffs	18 Dec 2006	11 Sep 2007
	535/2007	Financial regulations	9 Sep 2007	9 Oct 2007
	508/2007	Remuneration for artists	27 Jun 2007	6 Nov 2007
	415/2007	Churches for the Romanian diaspora	28 May 2007	11 Dec 2007
2004	14/2008	Legislation on blood donation	4 Feb 2008	26 Feb 2008
	855/207	Public institutions’ financial assets	10 Dec 2007	11 Mar 2008
	58/2008	Public officers’ salaries (in ministers)	25 Feb 2008	15 Apr 2008
	34/2008	Measures against contract delays	13 Feb 2008	6 May 2008
	842/2007	Salaries for personnel in education	3 Dec 2007	18 Jun 2008
	903/2007	Justice reforms and property rights	12 Dec 2007	30 Sep 2008
	130/2008	Financial facilities to pensioners	12 Mar 2008	15 Oct 2008
	84/2008	Physical education and sport	3 Mar 2008	29 Feb 2009
	466/2008	Change of the Education Law	3 Sep 2008	3 Mar 2009
	601/2008	Capital of state-owned companies	8 Oct 2008	15 Apr 2009
	213/2009	Budget reforms	30 Mar 2009	12 May 2009
	257/2009	Medical assistance in permanent centres	6 May 2009	10 Jun 2009
2008	179/2009	Health system reform	9 Mar 2009	8 Sep 2009
	432/2009	Accumulation of pensions and salaries	21 Sep 2009	27 Oct 2009
	582/2009	Sponsoring young skilled sportsmen	4 Nov 2009	15 Dec 2009
	595/2009	Professional formation in MAI	16 Nov 2009	9 Feb 2010
	383/2009	The rights of service providers	7 Sep 2009	23 Mar 2010
	462/2009	Modification of one article in the public pension system	28 Sep 2009	13 Apr 2010
	483/2009	Modification of Law 244/2002	10 Oct 2009	12 May 2010
	370/2010	The government ability to issue decrees	2 Jun 2010	22 Jun 2010

Note: MAI – Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Source: Chamber of Deputies (no date).

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Zsolt Enyedi, Shane Martin, Ulrich Sieberer, Yael Shomer, Eszter Timar, Henry Thomson, Radoslaw Zubek, Francesco Zucchini and the seven anonymous reviewers of this journal for their useful comments on earlier versions of this article.

Funding

Mihail Chiru’s work was supported by a grant of the Romanian Ministry of National Education, CNCS-UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-2012-4-0644: “Re-thinking Individual Representation: Campaign Personalization and Legislative Behavior” (2013–2015).

Notes

Author biographies

Sergiu Gherghina is Postdoctoral Research Fellow and Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Goethe University Frankfurt. His research interests lie in party politics in post-communist Europe, legislative and voting behavior, and democratisation (with an emphasis on direct democracy).

Mihail Chiru is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, and a Research Fellow at the Median Research Centre, Bucharest. He is mainly interested in legislative behavior, electoral campaigns and party politics. He published several articles in journals such as: European Union Politics, The Journal of Legislative Studies and East European Politics and Societies.

References

Ames

Barry

(1995) Electoral strategy under open-list proportional representation. American Journal of Political Science 39(2): 406–433.

Andeweg

Rudy B.

Thomassen

Jacques

(2011) Pathways to party unity: Sanctions, loyalty, homogeneity and division of labour in the Dutch parliament. Party Politics 17(5): 655–672.

André

Audrey

Depauw

Sam

Deschouwer

Kris

(2011) Institutional constraints and conceptions of political representation. American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Seattle, 1–4 September.

Birch

Sarah

(2005) Single-member district electoral systems and democratic transition. Electoral Studies 24(2): 281–301.

Bowler

Shaun

Farrell

David M.

Katz

Richard S.

(1999) Party cohesion, party discipline, and parliaments. In: Bowler

Farrell

D.M.

Katz

R.S.

(eds) Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, pp. 3–22.

Cain

Bruce

Ferejohn

John

Fiorina

Morris

(1987) The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Carey

John M.

(2002) Parties, coalitions, and the Chilean Congress in the 1990s. In: Morgenstern

Nacif

(eds) Legislative Politics in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 222–253.

Carey

John M.

(2003) Discipline, accountability, and legislative voting in Latin America. Comparative Politics 35(2): 191–211.

Carey

John M.

(2009) Legislative Voting and Accountability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

10.

Carey

John

Shugart

Matthew S.

(1995) Incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Electoral Studies 14(4): 417–439.

11.

Carey

John

Reynolds

Andrew

(2007) Parties and Accountable Government in New Democracies. Party Politics 13(2): 255–274.

12.

Carrubba

Clifford

Clough

Ryan

Montgomery

Elizabeth

. (2004) Selection bias in the use of roll call votes to study legislative behaviour. EPGR Working paper, No. 11.

13.

Carrubba

Clifford

Gabel

Matthew

Hug

Simon

(2008) Legislative voting behavior, seen and unseen: A theory of roll-call votes selection. Legislative Studies Quarterly 33(4): 543–572.

14.

Chamber of Deputies (no date) Homepage. Available at: www.cdep.ro (accessed 21 January 2011).

15.

Chiru

Mihail

(2010) Legislative recruitment and electoral system change: The case of Romania. Master of Arts dissertation, Central European University, Budapest.

16.

Chiru

Mihail

(2011) The institutionalization of the Romanian Parliament: An unfinished process? CEU ADC Conference, Budapest, April.

17.

Chiru

Mihail

Ciobanu

Ionut

(2009) Legislative recruitment and electoral system change: The case of Romania. CEU Political Science Journal 4(2): 192–231.

18.

Coman

Emanuel Emil

(2012) Legislative behavior in Romania: The effect of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform. Legislative Studies Quarterly 37(2): 199–224.

19.

Cox

Gary W.

(1987) The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

20.

Cox

Gary W.

McCubbins

Matthew

(1993) Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

21.

Crowe

Edward

(1986) The web of authority: Party loyalty and social control in the British House of Commons. Legislative Studies Quarterly 11(20): 161–185.

22.

Davidson-Schmich

Louise K.

(2003) The development of party discipline in new parliaments: Eastern German State Legislatures 1990–2000. The Journal of Legislative Studies 9(4): 88–101.

23.

Depauw

Sam

(2003) Part 2: Discipline. The Journal of Legislative Studies 9(4): 130–146.

24.

Depauw

Sam

Martin

Shane

(2009) Legislative party discipline and cohesion in comparative perspective. In: Gianetti

Daniela

Benoit

Kenneth

(eds) Intra-party Politics and Coalition Governments. London: Routledge, pp. 103–120.

25.

Desposato

Scott W.

(2006) Parties for rent? Ambition, ideology, and party switching in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies. American Journal of Political Science 50(1): 62–80.

26.

Elgie

Robert

Moestrup

Sophie

(2008) Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

27.

Gherghina

Sergiu

Chiru

Mihail

(2010) Practice and payment: Determinants of candidate list position in European Parliament elections. European Union Politics 17(4): 533–552.

28.

Gherghina

Sergiu

Jiglau

George

(2012) Where does the mechanism collapse? Representation 48(4): 445–459.

29.

Gherghina

Sergiu

Chiru

Mihail

(2013) Taking the short route: political parties, funding regulations and state resources in Romania. East European Politics and Societies 27(1): 108–128.

30.

Giannetti

Daniela

Laver

Michael

(2009) Party cohesion, party discipline, and party factions in Italy. In: Gianetti

Daniela

Benoit

Kenneth

(eds) Intra-party Politics and Coalition Governments. London: Routledge, pp. 146–168.

31.

Heller

William B.

Mershon

Carroll

(2009) Integrating theoretical and empirical models of party switching: Party switching and representation. In: Heller

W.B.

Mershon

(eds) Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 29–54.

32.

Hicken

Allen

Simmons

Joel W.

(2008) The personal vote and the efficacy of education spending. American Journal of Political Science 52(1): 109–124.

33.

Hix

Simon

(2004) Electoral institutions and legislative behavior: Explaining voting defection in the European Parliament. World Politics 56(1): 194–223.

34.

Hix

Simon

Noury

Abdul

(2008) Government–opposition or Left–Right? The institutional determinants of voting in fourteen parliaments. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois.

35.

Hix

Simon

Noury

Abdul

Roland

Gerard

(2005) Power to the parties: Cohesion and competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001. British Journal of Political Science 35(2): 209–234.

36.

Kam

Cristopher J.

(2009) Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

37.

Kiewiet

D. Roderick

McCubbins

Mathew

(1991) The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

38.

Kornberg

Allan

(1967) Canadian Legislative Behavior: A Study of the 25th Parliament. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

39.

Krehbiel

Keith

(1993) Where’s the party? British Journal of Political Science 23(2): 235–266.

40.

Krehbiel

Keith

(1999) Paradoxes of parties in Congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly 14(1): 31–64.

41.

Kreuzer

Marcus

Pettai

Vello

(2003) Patterns of political instability: Affiliation patterns of politicians and voters in post-communist Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Studies in Comparative International Development 38(2): 76–98.

42.

Lijphart

Arend

(1994) Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945–1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

43.

Longley

Lawrence D.

Hazan

Reuven Y.

(1999) On the uneasy, delicate, yet necessary relationships between parliamentary members and leaders. The Journal of Legislative Studies 5(3): 1–22.

44.

Mainwaring

Scott

Linan

Anibal Perez

(1997) Party discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly 22(4): 453–483.

45.

Ozbudun

Ergun

(1970) Party Cohesion in Western Democracies: A Causal Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

46.

Poole

Keith T.

Rosenthal

Howard

(1997) Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

47.

Pop-Eleches

Grigore

(1999) Separated at birth or separated by birth? Communist successor parties in Romania and Hungary. East European Politics and Societies 13(1): 117–147.

48.

Protsyk

Oleh

Matichescu

Marius Lupsa

(2011) Clientelism and political recruitment in democratic transition: Evidence from Romania. Comparative Politics 43(2): 207–224.

49.

Przeworski

Adam

(2007) Is the science of comparative politics possible? In: Boix

Stokes

S.C.

(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 147–171.

50.

Realitatea (2010) Available at: http://www.realitatea.net/poporul-a-decis-daniel-oajdea-va-vota-impotriva-propriului-guvern_718246.html

51.

Rice

Stuart A.

(1928) Quantitative Methods in Politics. New York, NY: Knopf.

52.

Smilov

Daniel

Toplak

Jurij

(eds) (2007) Political Finance and Corruption in Eastern Europe. The Transition Period. Aldershot: Ashgate.

53.

Stefan

Laurentiu

(2004) Patterns of Political Elite Recruitment in Post-Communist Romania. Bucharest: Ziua Publishing House.

54.

Stefan

Laurentiu

(2009) Pathways to cabinet: Selecting ministers in post-communist Romania. Jena University: Sonderforschungsbereich 580.

55.

Tavits

Margit

(2008) On the linkage between electoral volatility and party system instability in Central and Eastern Europe. European Journal of Political Research 47(5): 537–555.

56.

Thames

Franck C.

(2007) Discipline and party institutionalization in Post-Soviet legislatures. Party Politics 13(4): 456–477.

57.

Van Biezen

Ingrid

(2003) Political Parties in New Democracies. Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Supplementary Material

Please find the following supplemental material available below.

For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.

For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.

0.00 MB

0.07 MB

0.01 MB

Determinants of legislative voting loyalty under different electoral systems: Evidence from Romania

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

MPs’ voting behaviour under different electoral rules

The socialisation component

Parliamentary position, affiliation and competition

Control variables

Research design

A new electoral system

The Romanian PPGs

Roll-call votes selection

Variable operationalisation and method

The multivariate analyses 7

Incumbent MPs’ loyalty

Conclusion

Footnotes

Appendix 1

Appendix 2

Acknowledgements

Funding

Notes

Author biographies

References

Supplementary Material

The multivariate analyses⁷