United Nations electoral assistance: More than a fig leaf?

Introduction

In April 2010, Sudan held its first multiparty elections after 21 years of military dictatorship. Aiming to push Africa’s then largest country towards democracy, international actors placed high hopes and enormous resources into the electoral exercise. Funded by the United Kingdom, Sweden and other donors, the United Nations (UN) advised Sudanese elections officials, airlifted ballot boxes to remote villages and helped with the registration of voters. In short, the UN provided the Sudanese government with the necessary resources to conduct free and fair elections. Nevertheless, elections turned out deeply flawed. According to election observers, results were ‘untraceable’ and campaign activities ‘restrained’ (EU EOM Sudan, 2010: 5f). Instead of enhancing democratization, electoral assistance may have helped to legitimize the incumbent Omar al-Bashir, who is wanted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court.

Two years later, in neighbouring Libya, the first elections after the fall of the Gadhafi regime took place. Again, the UN provided large-scale assistance in order to compensate for the lack of electoral experience after decades of dictatorship. In this case, elections were at least ‘somewhat’ free and fair according to experts from the Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al., 2016). Likewise, the UN-supported elections in Nigeria in 2011 were largely considered a success (Lewis, 2011). What explains these divergent outcomes of UN electoral assistance (UNEA)?

I argue that different strategic interests of regime elites largely account for this variation. In Libya, after the fall of Gadhafi, the interim government made credible elections a top priority (Vandewalle, 2012). Conversely, the Sudanese president al-Bashir, who had come to power through a military coup in 1989, only reluctantly agreed to hold elections in 2010 and restricted credible electoral competition in order to securely stay in power (Musso, 2012: 61). In Nigeria, President Jonathan assumed office directly following the death of his predecessor and only one year before the 2011 election. After mass demonstrations against the election commission, President Jonathan decided to improve electoral governance in order to gain popular legitimacy for the consolidation of his rule (Akhaine, 2011: 650).

Against this background, I argue that the Libyan interim authorities and the Nigerian regime elites were inclined to cooperate with UNEA, while the Sudanese authorities were rather reluctant. Thus, regime compliance seems to have enabled UNEA to play a positive role for the elections in Libya and Nigeria while the lack of compliance undermined the UN’s contribution to elections in Sudan.

This notion builds on prior studies pointing to the importance of a conducive political context for the effectiveness of democracy aid. For instance, Carothers (1999, 304) argues that democracy aid is only able to ‘speed up a moving train.’ Bush (2015) warns that democracy aid does not necessarily challenge authoritarian regimes. Tolstrup (2014) identifies regime elites as gatekeepers to international influences on regime trajectories.

However, to date the role of regime elites in the effectiveness of electoral assistance has not been systematically examined. Several studies target related topics. For example, Ludwig (2004a, 2004b) specifically assesses the UN’s role in electoral assistance but without much critical analysis of its longer-term impact. Borzyskowski (2016) analyses the allocation but not the effectiveness of technical election assistance. Kelley (2012a: 215) rightly points out that ‘[e]vidence is insufficient to settle the debate about the merits of international involvement in elections.’ It is highly relevant to address this research gap since electoral assistance is the backbone of international democracy promotion activities. Between August 2007 and December 2014, the UN assisted 37% of all elections worldwide and half of all elections outside of established democracies. ¹

Electoral assistance is distinct from election observation. Electoral assistance aims at improving elections whereas election observation missions assess elections and provide recommendations for the future. Electoral assistance includes active logistical, technical and financial support to electoral processes, such as procuring ballot boxes, training polling station staff and educating voters. UN entities – namely the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Department of Political Affairs (UN DPA) – are the central players in electoral assistance as they set policy standards and often coordinate international engagement.

In this study, I move beyond assessing the direct output of UNEA and focus on its outcome and long-term impact. Outputs refer to goods and services that UNEA provides, for example ballot boxes or trainings of election officials. Outputs are designed to contribute towards outcomes such as free and fair elections. In particular, I scrutinize how regime elites ² mediate the effectiveness of UNEA and its long-term impact on democratization.

Based on this framework, I first outline practice and allocation of UNEA and develop the argument. The subsequent section sheds light on the contribution of UNEA to elections in Sudan (2010), Nigeria (2011) and Libya (2012). I draw on 23 expert interviews with UN officials and electoral stakeholders and participant observations in Libya. ³

Output: The practice of UN electoral assistance

Given its size and legitimacy, the UN is the key player in electoral assistance. Most international donors – with the notable exception of the United States – channel their contributions through the UN. ⁴ UNEA is provided before, during and after elections and comprises three tracks: Mediation/Electoral Framework; Election Management; and Capacity Development for Non-State Actors (see Table 1). ⁵

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Table 1.

Three tracks of United Nations (UN) electoral assistance.

Track 1 Mediation and Electoral Framework: Mediation between electoral stakeholders and technical advice about international standards for the legal framework of elections; and in rare cases UN missions verify the credibility of the electoral process

Track 2 Election Management: Support to the Electoral Management Body in all aspects of election management, for example, planning and procurement, voter and candidate registration, out of country voting, Election Day management, results counting and tabulation; and election-related training to the judiciary and security sector actors

Track 3 Capacity Development for Non-State Actors: Education of voters about electoral rules and procedures; activities targeting political parties, media and civil society; and funds and technical assistance for domestic election observers

United Nations officials routinely mediate between electoral stakeholders in order to promote agreement on the electoral framework and facilitate acceptance of election results. Related to this, UN experts often provide technical advice about international standards for legal frameworks (Track 1). Track 2 includes UNEA activities to support election management such as logistical, financial and technical assistance to the Election Management Body (EMB) and other support to state actors such as security forces. Track 3 encompasses capacity development and support to non-state actors such as political parties, media and civil society as well as voter education.

The size and priorities of electoral assistance programmes vary greatly. Most UNEA projects have a small number of technical advisors and a minimal budget. ⁶ Some larger projects include substantial amounts of financial assistance. For example, in the period 2004–2011, UNDP reportedly implemented three projects with budgets of over US$100m and at least seven projects over US$20m. ⁷ In rare cases, the UN directly organizes entire elections, for example, in Cambodia (1992/1993) or East Timor (2001/2002) (Bjornlund, 2004: 42).

Allocation of UN electoral assistance

The allocation of UNEA typically proceeds in three steps. ⁸ First, a government submits a formal request. Second, the UN – normally through a needs assessment mission – analyses the country’s electoral capacities and political context. Third, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs makes the final decision.

Both the recipient and the UN have a say in the allocation of UNEA. In a quantitative study, Borzyskowski (2016) finds that countries with weak electoral capacities and hybrid regimes are more likely to request UNEA. The UN seems to be less likely to approve requests from countries with high electoral capacities and which come only months ahead of election day (Borzyskowski, 2016: 271). Conversely, for the UN’s approval, political factors – such as restriction of opposition – do not seem to matter much (Borzyskowski, 2016: 271). The UN itself mainly cites ‘insufficient lead time’ as a reason for denying electoral assistance and only rarely ‘the absence of an enabling environment’ (Ludwig, 2004b: 133–161). Both Ludwig’s (2004b) and Borzyskowski’s (2016) findings are based on the same data source for the period 1990 to 2003. More recent data are not publicly available. ⁹ However, in expert interviews, UN officials confirmed that still most requests are approved. ¹⁰ Additionally, the UN Security Council sometimes directly mandates electoral assistance mainly in the context of peace operations. In such cases, broader political aims such as peace may dominate the allocation process.

Nevertheless, even though the UN typically assesses the political context before granting electoral assistance, several regimes with a consistent track record of manipulated elections received UNEA. For instance, the UN supported the last election of Tunisia’s former president Ben Ali in 2009 and three consecutive elections in Turkmenistan (2008, 2012, 2013), which V-Dem experts assess as ‘not at all’ free and fair. ¹¹

Outcome and impact

To what extent democratization is an aim of UNEA is disputed. Some argue that democratization is a key long-term goal of UNEA and an end in itself (White, 2000). Also, the periodic, election-related reports of the UN Secretary General (SG) refer to the ‘promotion of democratization’ in their title and former UN SG Ban-Ki Moon argued that ‘[d]emocratic principles are woven throughout the normative fabric of the United Nations.’ ¹² Other scholars and practitioners emphasize the instrumental role of democratization and UNEA for the UN’s main purpose – peace and security (Newman and Rich, 2004: 5f).

According to official documentation, UNEA aims at achieving the following central outcomes: enabling countries to hold elections in line with international standards; and to build national election management capacity (UNDP, 2007: 4). Furthermore, electoral credibility and the acceptance of results are important objectives of UNEA. ¹³ International standards for electoral integrity are for instance codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which calls for ‘periodic and genuine’ elections with ‘free voting procedures’ reflecting the ‘will of the people’ (§ 21; see Norris, 2015). In order to reflect the will of the people, elections not only have to be free but also fair according to leading democratic theorists (e.g. Dahl, 1971). The influential declaration of ‘Principles for International Election Observation’ – endorsed by 21 organizations including the UN – echoes this notion and refers to ‘genuine democratic elections’ and ‘the opportunity to vote freely and be elected fairly.’ ¹⁴ Nevertheless, practitioners often avoid explicit statements about the freeness and fairness of the electoral process (Bjornlund, 2004: 120).

In this study I am mainly interested in the impact of UNEA on democratization – understood as the gradual process for making governments increasingly based on the preferences of the people (Dahl, 1971; Lindberg, 2009). Therefore, I focus on UNEA’s contribution to the freedom and fairness of electoral processes.

In the literature, we find divergent assessments of UNEA’s contribution to democratization. Newman and Rich (2004: 28f) conclude that UNEA had a positive impact on democratization in small societies such as Kosovo, Namibia or East Timor, but not in larger, more challenging countries such as Afghanistan, Congo and Iraq. Similarly, Peou (2007) attributes the challenges of UNEA in Cambodia to unfavourable structural conditions such as state weakness and cultural norms. Reilly (2004: 132) emphasizes that UNEA may contribute to the success of electoral events, but that longer-term democratization largely depends on domestic actors. In a similar vein, case-oriented studies on democracy aid writ-large emphasize that local political conditions need to be conducive in order to achieve a substantial impact (Burnell and Oliver, 2010; Whitehead, 2004; Zeeuw and Kumar, 2006). Consequently, Kelley (2012a: 110) sees international actors in a ‘reinforcement role’ of on-going democratization processes. Similarly, Tolstrup (2014) emphasizes that local gatekeepers determine the extent to which international actors have the power to influence regime trajectories.

Such arguments about the political context, and in particular the role of regime elites, are key for understanding the effectiveness of UNEA. In favourable local political conditions, the impact of UNEA on democratization is straightforward: a free and fair election requires extensive capacities such as knowledge about electoral standards and resources for election management. If national governments lack this capacity, international assistance – such as UNEA outputs described earlier in this article – seem crucial for the professional conduct of elections. In particular, UNEA can help regime elites and EMBs to avoid electoral malpractice – the non-intentional violation of international norms for elections. ¹⁵ However, many regime elites intentionally manipulate electoral events (electoral fraud) or tilt the political playing field (systemic manipulation), which is difficult for international actors to prevent (Elklit, 1999). UNEA often provides several outputs aimed at a legal framework in-line with international standards (Track 1), safeguards against electoral fraud (Track 2) and the inclusion and fair treatment of all electoral stakeholders (Track 3) (see Table 1). However, their implementation and long-term impact depends on the compliance of the regime elites.

Regime elites as gatekeepers

I argue that regime elites are gatekeepers to both the outcomes and impact of electoral assistance. Without their sustained compliance, electoral assistance efforts remain futile. Consequently, understanding incumbent regimes’ strategic interests in election quality and compliance with UNEA is crucial for studying the impact of electoral assistance.

Incumbents face a dilemma between electoral credibility and the risk of losing elections (Birch, 2007: 1535). To address it, regime elites have two main strategic options: they may either comply with UNEA and gain full electoral credibility or secure victory by undermining the UN’s contribution and manipulating elections. They can also choose to comply partially, which may allow them to gain some electoral credibility while limiting the risk of electoral defeat.

The first option grants electoral credibility, but comes at the higher risk of losing elections. Countries appearing more democratic can expect more international aid and foreign direct investments from democratic countries and organizations (Hyde, 2011: 114 f). Credible elections yield domestic legitimacy benefits as well. Electoral credibility can reduce the potential for post-electoral violence and protests (Hyde, 2011: 116). Opinion surveys have shown that national audiences seem to care about international election observer verdicts (Hyde, 2011: 87). However, incumbents have a better chance of staying in office if elections are less competitive – at least if norms precluding electoral manipulation are weak.

The second strategic option – non-compliance – can reduce the short-term threat of electoral defeat, but is associated with ‘legitimacy costs’ (Schedler, 2013: 274). Electoral manipulation may erode public support for governments and trigger protests. This can be a problem especially for constrained regimes – facing a strong opposition, new in office or with limited resources for co-optation and repression. Likewise, regimes dependent on Western aid or facing an electorate demanding free and fair elections are less likely to risk electoral credibility. However, access to resources from non-Western donors (e.g. Russia and China) or natural resources might reduce the perceived need for electoral credibility.

Figure 1 summarizes this notion. In some elections, no regime elites are competing. Interim authorities managing such transitional elections tend to have limited personal stakes in the election. They are likely to prioritize electoral credibility over a particular election result and comply with UNEA’s recommendations. Normally, however, regime elites compete in elections. Constrained regimes are likely to view electoral credibility as important for their survival. Consequently, they are more likely to comply with UNEA. Less constrained incumbent regimes are more likely to feel strong enough to risk electoral credibility by not complying with UNEA.

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Figure 1.

Strategic interests and behaviour of incumbent regime regarding United Nations electoral assistance.

Democratization or autocratic legitimation?

UN-supported elections can be crucial for democratization as discussed above, but such positive impact is not guaranteed. In the literature, we find both optimistic and pessimistic approaches to the impact of elections on democratization. Scholars such as Lindberg (2009) argue that repeated, multi-party elections push regimes in a more democratic direction. Such ‘democratization by elections’ takes place if elections make it more difficult for the regime to oppress the opposition (Lindberg, 2009: 328f). Schedler (2009) and Donno (2013) qualify this notion to apply only in competitive but not in hegemonic or closed autocracies. According to Lust-Okar (2006) flawed elections may stabilize autocracies, for instance by legitimizing dictators. Correspondingly, several authors warn that visible democracy aid makes autocratic practices appear more democratic and hence legitimate (de Zeeuw, 2005: 501; Schlumberger, 2006). According to this logic, UNEA has the potential to both contribute to democratization and to legitimize autocrats.

Outcome of UN electoral assistance in Sudan, Nigeria and Libya

In the following, I analyse three elections, which differ in the main explanatory variable – the election-related role of the regime elites. Comparing so-called ‘diverse’ cases helps to explore how such variation affects the outcome of interest (Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 301f). I start with two cases with incumbent regimes competing in elections (Table 2). The longstanding Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, was not constrained by the need for electoral credibility in 2010, because he relied on a strong internal power base and support from non-democracies (China and Russia). The Nigerian incumbent in 2011, President Jonathan, was in a much weaker position. He only recently assumed office and was under pressure both within his own party and from a pro-democratic opposition. In the third case, the 2012 Libyan election, interim authorities were in power, whose members did not compete themselves.

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Table 2.

Context of United Nations electoral assistance (UNEA) in Sudan (2010), Nigeria (2011) and Libya (2012).

	Sudan 2010	Nigeria 2011	Libya 2012
Regime competing	Yes	Yes	No
Regime constrained	No	Yes	−
Prior election capacities	Low	Low	Low
UNEA	Substantial	Substantial	Substantial

All three cases are recent African elections and share other important characteristics – such as limited prior election management capacities and substantial UNEA. These similar surrounding conditions allow me to focus on how regime elites enabled or undermined the UN’s contribution to election quality.

For the subsequent empirical analysis, it is important to bear in mind how electoral assistance works. The UN’s role is to advise the government on how to run the election and to provide financial and logistical support. The decision to follow the advice and accept the assistance offered, ultimately rests with the national authorities. ¹⁶ Regime elites do their best to cover up electoral manipulation (Schedler, 2013). Consequently, recipients do not announce publicly if and why they follow the UN’s advice. Therefore, I am unlikely to find evidence of governments explicitly rejecting UN advice and support. However, I might find evidence of public authorities’ behaviour contradicting international advice or undermining the appropriate use of provided hardware. Conversely, if governments allow UNEA to work unhindered, the electoral processes should be better than they would have been in the absence of electoral support. Plausible counterfactual reasoning will help to support such notions.

I build the empirical analysis on expert interviews, participant observation in Libya, scholarly sources, news reports and reports of election observer missions considered credible, because they have a reputation of abiding by the principles of the ‘Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation’. These include the European Union (EU) Election Observation Missions (EU EOM) and the Carter Center or the National Democratic Institute (NDI) (Hyde, 2011: 170; Kelley, 2012b: 52).

The long-term impact of UN electoral assistance on democratization

In Nigeria, the positive trend of electoral reform continued in the subsequent elections in 2015, which were highly competitive. ⁴⁴ The opposition candidate won the contest. After repeatedly committing to credible elections, it would have been difficult for the incumbent, President Jonathan, to dismiss the electoral outcome. He accepted his defeat. In the tense political context in Nigeria, mistakes in election management could have jeopardized the gradual democratization process spanning from the 2011 election to the 2015 election. Hence, it is plausible that the UNDP’s contribution in 2011 played a positive role for mid-term democratization in Nigeria. Furthermore, the UNDP contributed to Nigeria’s first-ever democratic turnover of government power through facilitating an agreement between all major competitors, in which they pledged to fully abide by electoral rules and accept the electoral outcome. ⁴⁵

On the contrary, in Sudan, UNEA seems to have contributed to the legitimacy of a non-democratic ruler. ⁴⁶ The support of the UN for elections in Sudan was clearly visible to the public. UN and donor logos were used in connection to the elections and the UN overall was highly visible in Sudan. ⁴⁷ Therefore, an opposition activist indicated that the Sudanese think ‘the UN’ had organized the elections and approved its result. ⁴⁸ Likewise, opposition activist Issac called on the international community to ‘not facilitate the legitimatization of NCP’s expanded power through [the 2010] elections.’ ⁴⁹ The Sudanese regime used the 2010 elections for legitimization purposes. ⁵⁰ For example, the British Broadcasting Corporation quoted an NCP official as saying after the elections: ‘This is a message to the whole world: the president is legal and the representative of the whole people’ and ‘any accusation now [against the president] is an accusation against all the people.’ ⁵¹ Consequently, Young argues that the ‘failed elections’ gave the Sudanese ruling parties ‘a veneer of undeserved democratic legitimacy.’ ⁵²

In Libya, the 2012 elections did not set the country on a path to democratization because the elected institutions failed to fill the power vacuum left by Gadhafi. Gadhafi’s legacy seriously impeded the start of the new institutions. Libyans had no experience in organizing political interests at the national level and were sceptical about political parties and other vital instruments of democratic rule (Vandewalle, 2012). Most MPs did not have any prior political experience and were overwhelmed by their tasks. ⁵³ They represented minor groups or clans instead of larger societal groups or political interests – partly due to the electoral law and constituency boundaries. In light of this fragmentation, it took more than four months of chaotic negotiations before the parliament elected Ali Zeidan as head of government. ⁵⁴ According to a Libyan civil society activist this time felt ‘like the country is on hold.’ ⁵⁵ Many powerful actors, such as militia leaders, were not part of the formal institutions such as parliament. ⁵⁶ They continued to use force for their political and economic ends. As a result, elections fell short of conveying unambiguous legitimacy on a political group or leader.

In the words of a senior UN official, ‘an election as such does not bring peace and development.’ ⁵⁷ A simple postponement of elections would not have been enough to spark a sustainable democratization process. On the contrary, waiting could have aggravated the security and economic problems whereas the enormous structural challenges – the legacy of the lack of political institutions from the Gadhafi era, rival militias, unfavourable regional context, oil – would have remained. Furthermore, international actors did not have the power to substantially postpone or even cancel the electoral process, because the Libyan interim authorities were determined to call elections as rapidly as possible.

Conclusion

Overall, the case studies support the initial idea that UNEA can improve elections if incumbents have a strategic interest in electoral credibility. The UN contributed to the quality of the 2012 Libyan and the 2011 Nigerian election. In both countries, the interim government (Libya) or the newly appointed incumbent (Nigeria) appeared to prioritize electoral credibility and allowed electoral assistance providers to do their job.

In Nigeria, democratization has progressed since 2011. In this context, UNEA became a building block in the road to the first democratic turn-over of government in 2015. It is possible to compensate for a lack of electoral experience with international electoral assistance, as the case study of the first post-Gadhafi elections in Libya in 2012 shows. If an incumbent regime permits, large-scale UNEA has the potential to help even countries without prior election management capacities to hold relatively free and fair elections. In contrast, the case of Sudan illustrates that dictators may invite UNEA due to national or international pressure, but continue to substantially manipulate the electoral process. In such contexts, the UN risks becoming a fig leaf for a deeply flawed voting exercise. The conditions and contexts of such a potential adverse impact should be investigated more in detail in future research.

Such risk could be avoided by making political advisability a firmer prerequisite to allocate UNEA. Potential red flags are repression against opposition parties, media censorship or a consistent track record of electoral manipulation. Nevertheless, the UN might see the need to support some elections with a high-risk of electoral manipulation due to other considerations such as supporting peace agreements. In such cases, to mitigate the risk of providing legitimacy to a flawed exercise, the UN could limit its public visibility and prioritize activities aimed at reducing electoral fraud and manipulation.