How do radical right populist parties influence resurging debates over the stripping of citizenship?

Abstract

Debates over the stripping of citizenship have been rekindled in many countries in recent years. Radical right populist parties (RRPPs) are often perceived to have played a significant role in these resurging debates, even when they do not possess executive power and are often marginalised by mainstream parties. Thus, RRPPs’ real influence on policy-making remains unclear and the way RRPPs intervene in the policy-making process to influence it has not yet been satisfactorily determined. By focusing on policy-making, this study asks the question: how do RRPPs influence resurging debates over the stripping of citizenship? Using process-tracing and evidence from archives, memoirs and 67 interviews with policy-makers and party leaders, this research aims to determine if and how RRPPs intervene in the process in France and Belgium. The results indicate that RRPPs matter but that their influence is strongly curtailed. Their influence is not exercised directly and through institutional arenas, but indirectly: based on a provocative style, in a specific context, and through public opinion and the media.

Keywords

Populism populist political parties policy-making policy influence stripping of citizenship

Debates on the stripping of citizenship have been rekindled in many countries following terrorist attacks which have often been perpetrated by Islamist terrorists who hold citizenship in the state that they have attacked, particularly since January 2015. Proposals for the stripping of citizenship or denial of naturalization have come from parties of the left and the right in order to tackle the issue in this context. Yet, both parties of the left and the right are also critical of the measures: debates are not only highly sensitive over the stripping of citizenship itself but also in relation to its application or scope. While some advocate that the measure should be embraced to prevent criminality and terrorism, others argue that it is more of an identity issue than a security issue and that it would contribute to the development of a two-tier justice system (Geisser, 2015). Thereby, the measures are not only contested at the level of government but also among citizens.

At the same time, radical right populist parties (RRPPs) – whose platforms are tightly focused on issues relating to immigration and law and order (Mudde, 2007) – are on the rise in many countries (Hewison, 2017). Because these parties are the first to have proposed stripping of citizenship in their party manifestos (Jamin, 2016), they are often perceived to have played a significant role in these resurging debates, even if they do not possess executive power and are often marginalised by mainstream parties (Heinze, 2018). However, RRPPs’ real influence on policy-making could still be better understood. The way RRPPs intervene in the policy-making process to influence it – to impose its preferences (Dahl, 1976) – has not yet been satisfactorily determined. Because of their reputed role in such debates and because they are often considered to be threatening democracy (e.g. Urbinati, 2014), there is a need to better understand the influence of RRPPs, particularly when it comes to highly sensitive debates such as the stripping of citizenship.

This study seeks to explain the policy influence RRPPs have on the specific issue of stripping of citizenship. The article aims to contribute to the ‘do-parties-matter’ literature and, specifically, to the burgeoning literature on the policy influence of RRPPs. This will be done by examining two typical cases, which are the policy-making processes around the stripping of citizenship in France and in Belgium. Both countries have seriously debated the issue within the last 10 years, particularly in 2010 and 2015 in France and 2015 in Belgium. France has mostly debated the extension and the constitutionalisation of stripping of citizenship during both right-wing and left-wing legislatures, while Belgium has debated the extension of stripping of citizenship of terrorists during a centre-right legislature. Specifically, the influence of the Front National (FN) in France and that of the Vlaams Belang (VB) in Belgium on these policy-making processes are compared. The historical development of these parties has followed a similar trajectory and they have similar relationships with mainstream parties and power. Because both have, for several decades, proposed the adoption of such a measure in their electoral manifestos and because a party manifesto analysis (by the author) shows that mainstream parties have never proposed similar measures in their own electoral manifestos in France and Belgium, the FN and the VB have been described as influential in debates over the stripping of citizenship in their respective countries. This research tests this proposition empirically, by opening the black box of policy-making to know the real influence exercised by RRPPs.

This article is grounded in empirical research and based on original data collected through a set of 67 interviews, memoir research and archival research. On this basis, the article demonstrates that both the FN and the VB have influenced policy-making on debates on the stripping of citizenship in 2010 and 2015. Yet, their influence during these debates is also weak and is mostly found upstream in the policy-making process, via public opinion and the media.

This article first looks at the literature on RRPPs and their influence on policy-making. In the second section, the cases, method and data are discussed, before moving on to an examination of the influence of RRPPs in the policy-making process relating to the stripping of citizenship in the cases of France and Belgium. Finally, a comparison of the two cases allows for the drafting of a causal mechanism regarding the influence of RRPPs.

The policy influence of RRPPs

RRPPs are sometimes defined only through their populism. This can be explained by the fact that populism is often conflated with other notions such as the far right, nationalism or even fascism (Jamin, 2016). However, because populism is ‘a political style based on the appeal to the people and the cult and the defense of the people’ (Taguieff, 2007, p. 31), it should be grafted onto an ideology, and this ideology may be associated with either the right or the left side of the political spectrum. Therefore, RRPPs should be defined not only through their populism but also through their focus on immigration and law and order issues (Betz, 2004).

First, RRPPs defend a ‘nativist’ view of society (Mudde, 2007, p. 23). This means that, according to RRPPs, only members of the nation should inhabit the state and foreigners are considered to be a threat. Second, RRPPs focus keenly on the issue of law and order. They accuse the justice system of privileging criminals over victims and demand a societal order based on stricter penal law. Immigration and law and order are often part of a common discourse among RRPPs (Betz, 2004), which attempt to show that higher rates of immigration provoke greater insecurity. Within this framework, the ‘stripping of citizenship’ is classically proposed by many RRPPs. This issue has been hotly debated in both France and Belgium, and because the debates have resulted in a (quasi-)decision in each case, it is at the heart of this study.

The ‘do-parties-matter’ literature has analysed the influence of political parties not only on politics but also on policy (e.g. Fiva et al., 2017). In the latter case, studies mainly address the policy influence of mainstream parties (e.g. Hampshire & Bale, 2015). There are only a few studies focused on the policy influence of RRPPs, in spite of the relevance of such research because of the rise of RRPPs in Europe and because they are considered to be a threat to liberal democracy (e.g. Urbinati, 2014). These studies have shown that RRPPs matter by the fact that more restrictive immigration policies are adopted when these parties are part of a government (e.g. Afonso & Papadopoulos, 2015; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015; Fallend, 2004; Minkenberg, 2001; Zaslove, 2004). They are first able to shape coalition agreements and, later, the content of reforms. Their influence can thus be exercised both on the saliency of the issues and on the position taken.

Research also shows that a mere parliamentary presence is not sufficient to produce policy effects (Minkenberg, 2001). This is because of the fact that mainstream parties traditionally maintain a disengagement strategy towards RRPPs since they are perceived to be a threat to democracy (Heinze, 2018). These strategies can be formal – such as a cordon sanitaire, that is, an agreement between political parties to exclude a party from any coalition (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) – or less formal.

Several authors disagree with these findings and do not consider RRPPs to matter, even when they are in power (e.g. Heinisch, 2008; Howard, 2010). According to these authors, a policy shift towards more restrictive immigration policies, for instance, is not necessarily the result of the influence of RRPPs. They argue that mainstream parties (mostly from the right-wing) are initiating such changes. This is explained by the fact that RRPPs used to be junior partners in coalitions and traditionally have weak bargaining position before and during a legislature term because of their position on the left–right continuum (Akkerman & de Lange, 2012).

Despite this disagreement, researchers can agree on the fact that RRPPs exercise an indirect influence (Minkenberg, 2001; Schain, 2006). This means that RRPPs make mainstream parties more willing to realise the changes RRPPs wish to enforce. For instance, Biro-Nagy and Boros (2016) show how the Hungarian Jobbik influences policy through Fidesz by forcing it to co-opt and implement its own ideas. Such a co-optation process would result from a shift in public opinion and, in fine, in the electorate (Heinze, 2018). Mainstream parties are thus put under pressure by public opinion (Bolin et al., 2014; Howard, 2010) and, as suggested by Carvalho (2014), such a pressure from public opinion results from strategies developed by RRPPs.

The literature has also shown that the media plays a crucial role in the indirect influence exercised by RRPPs. The media are classically used by RRPPs to dramatise a particular event or provoke a scandal around a problem – real or imagined – (Wodak, 2015) that propagates a sense of crisis (Moffitt, 2015), which in turn brings core RRPP issues to the forefront of the national agenda. New sentiments can then be cultivated within public opinion, and existing anti-immigrant or punitive sentiment may be activated (Howard, 2010). Strong pressure from public opinion to address such issues may consequently be exercised on mainstream parties – who can no longer afford to ignore issues at the risk of electoral loss (Givens & Luedtke, 2004) – potentially pushing them towards similar solutions to those put forward by RRPPs.

Based on these past and emerging studies, six hypotheses (H1–6) can be made regarding the influence of the FN and the VB during debates on stripping of citizenship in France and Belgium.

H1: RRPPs cannot exercise a direct influence on policy-making.

H2: RRPPs cannot influence policy-making through the parliamentary arena.

H3: RRPPs exercise an indirect influence on policy-making.

H4: RRPPs use the media to exercise an indirect influence on policy-making.

H5: Mainstream parties perceive that public opinion is influenced by RRPPs.

H6: Mainstream parties co-opt RRPPs’ agenda and positions consequently to a perceived pressure from public opinion and RRPPs.

Together, these hypotheses can be empirically tested to help construct a causal mechanism explaining if and how RRPPs influence policy-making.

Cases, method and data

Analysing the resurgence of debates over the stripping of citizenship in both France and Belgium, as well as the respective influences of the Front National (FN) and the Vlaams Belang (VB) in policy-making, is relevant for several reasons. First, these policy-making processes share the same scope conditions, taking place in similar democratic political regimes with a free media and freedom of expression and association. Serious debates over the stripping of citizenship have been instigated in both countries within the past 10 years, with both the FN and the VB often described as having influenced policy-making in their respective countries. The FN and VB as political parties have also followed a similar trajectory: started in the 1970s, they mainly developed in the 1980s, became serious and rooted parties in the 1990s, and began to change strategy in the late 2000s to avoid demonisation and break the glass ceiling. Since 2015, both the FN and the VB have belonged to the same political group in the European Parliament (Europe of Nations and Freedom). Finally, neither the FN nor the VB is a member of any coalition, and their representation in Parliament (at the national level but also at local levels) is currently quite weak.

Despite these similarities, several differences should be noted between the two cases. First, at the national level, a majoritarian electoral system is used in France, while a proportional system is used in Belgium. This has consequences for the electoral results obtained by political parties in these countries, notably by RRPPs (Laroze, 2017). Second, strategies adopted by mainstream parties towards RRPPs in France and Belgium differ. A formal cordon sanitaire is adopted towards the Belgian VB while such a ‘disengagement strategy’ (Heinze, 2018) is much less formal in France. Finally, even though they are both members of the same party family (RRPP), the FN and the VB were founded on different bases. While the FN was founded on far-right roots, the VB was created in reaction to an agreement about Belgian institutions made in 1977 by the Flemish and nationalist party Volksunie with other parties. The Belgian basis was thus mostly nationalist (Lucardie et al., 2016). These differences will be taken into account in the analysis.

To test the hypotheses, it is essential to open the black box of policy-making. Therefore, a qualitative method already used in the ‘do-parties-matter’ literature (e.g. Hampshire & Bale, 2015) known as process-tracing is deployed. Defined as ‘an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena’ (Collier, 2011, p. 824) – this method aims to discover the mechanisms linking causes (X) with outcomes (Y) (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). While this is an important and necessary step, the goal of the method is not only to describe empirical narratives but also to find causal mechanisms by discovering a set of interrelated steps between X and Y (cf. Figure 1). By using this method it becomes possible to detect which actors (with a focus on the FN and the VB) intervene when, with which action, and which consequence in the policy-making process. In sum, the presence of influence, the type of influence (direct or indirect) and the way RRPPs exercise their influence can be verified.

Figure 1.

Causal mechanism (adapted from Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

Because of the complexity of the processes to be traced, three data-collection methods have been employed: interviews with people who participated to the processes, archival research and memoir research. First, 32 interviews were carried out in France and fully transcribed by the author (in French) and 35 in Belgium (in French, Dutch and English). All of these are aimed at discovering who intervened, when and how. The interviewees are mostly elected officials but also members of the executive board of parties that took part in the policy-making process. The interviewees were selected based on two principles: first, a set of actors was identified a priori; then other interviewees were met based on a snowball effect.

Of course, these data may be biased because of subjectivity on the part of the interviewees. Therefore, data from archives (electoral manifestos, law proposals, minutes of parliament, roll-call votes, etc.) and from memoirs written by key players (e.g. a book written by a former chief of state) have also been collected to reinforce the value of the primary data, making both valid and reliable.

The French Case

The FN has for some time claimed to be the first and only political party advocating stripping of citizenship in France (member of the board of directors of FN, interviewed 26 September 2016). This proposal is recurrent in successive electoral manifestos (e.g. the 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017 FN electoral manifestos), and no other party puts forward such a proposal in its manifesto. Although the FN often addresses the issue in the social media or at events (such as its summer schools) – using an atypically direct and sometimes radical communication style – only one law proposal has been written by an FN MP in the last 10 years. Gilbert Collard proposed this text (law proposal no. 4011) on 31 August 2016, just after terrorist attacks in Nice, France. However, his law proposal did not provoke a reaction from other parties and has at best received publicity from social media, as indicated by an FN parliamentary assistant (interviewed 24 January 2017). This lack of reaction results from the fact that mainstream parties are afraid of being associated with RRPPs by taking their proposals seriously (Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP)/Les Républicains (LR, the new name for the right-wing UMP since 2015) parliamentary collaborator, interviewed 9 November 2016).

Although not addressed in party manifestos, the UMP has proposed the expansion of stripping of citizenship on some occasions. This was the case on 30 June 2010 in Grenoble when President Nicolas Sarkozy promised to expand stripping of citizenship to those convicted of killing police officers. The text was adopted by the National Assembly but would not have been in the Senate (whose majority was composed of UMP but also centrist MPs). As a consequence, the president himself withdrew his proposal to avoid the implosion of his majority (ex-councillor of the president, UMP/LR Member of Parliament, interviewed 18 January 2017). This attempt by Sarkozy had been inspired by an actual event (the killing of a police officer) and the fact that his 2007 electoral campaign had been based on both identity and law and order issues in a bid to attract some of FN’s voters (Buisson, 2016). The proposal had thus been completely in line with Sarkozy’s own pledges. Meanwhile, the influence of the FN can be described, at best, as passive and limited to being upstream in the policy-making process.

After Nicolas Sarkozy, a new attempt to engage in the stripping of citizenship in France was launched by President François Hollande. Again – and to an even greater extent – the context played a particularly important role in the reactivation of the debate. As explained by President Hollande himself, the question of stripping of citizenship would never have been raised if not for the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015.

It is not really in the substance of the text. You can or cannot agree with the stripping of citizenship. I myself am against that principle. But I did it because of the context and because it could have been an opportunity to bring people together. (François Hollande, in Davet and Lhomme, 2017, p. 433)

On 15 November 2015, François Hollande organised a meeting with representatives from different political parties to find consensual solutions to fight terrorism. Stripping of citizenship was invoked by LR and the FN. As the leader of the biggest opposition party, Nicolas Sarkozy agreed to support François Hollande, announcing a set of measures against terrorism, but only if François Hollande agreed to develop several specific measures proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy, amongst which was the stripping of citizenship (as notably explained by a UMP/LR member of the National Assembly, interviewed 18 January 2017, and a Parti socialiste (PS, left-wing party) member of the National Assembly, interviewed 23 February 2017). François Hollande thus proposed to constitutionalise stripping of citizenship the following day. The influence played by the FN is marginal. Even if it had intervened in the same way as LR, its lack of parliamentary representation (two senators and two members of the National Assembly) made it a non-influential actor during that period, as recognised by many interviewees from both LR and the PS.

It must be noted that public opinion was heavily in favour of President Hollande’s proposition. In a survey conducted by OpinionWay on 28–29 December 2015, 85% of French citizens supported it. At the same time, very few MPs supported the proposal. This was true for PS members and elected officials – leading to the resignation of the Minister of Justice from her position on 27 January 2016 – as well as for LR members and elected officials. Consequently, Hollande’s proposal was heavily amended in Parliament (especially in the Senate), and the president eventually withdrew his proposal on 30 March 2016. Although the issue had been at the forefront of the political agenda for more than four months, nothing came out of this period of heated debate.

In summary, as suggested by Figure 2, LR played a crucial role in that the proposal was set on the agenda by the president himself, while the role of the FN is less evident. As indicated, the FN had barely intervened in the call for stripping of citizenship. When the FN tried it, its marginal representation in the institutions reduced its weight of influence. Therefore, the FN could not exercise any direct influence and could not exercise its influence through the parliamentary arena (hypotheses 1 and 2 are thus confirmed). Yet, the influence exercised by the FN on public opinion – which was heavily in favour of the measure – through the social media by resorting to atypical forms of communication to make the issue easier for the public to understand (Wodak, 2015) cannot be dismissed.

Figure 2.

The policy-making process of deprivation of nationality in France.

As underlined by an ex-councillor of President Nicolas Sarkozy’s party, one of the main goals of his party’s electoral campaign in 2007 was to attract FN voters. Therefore, the FN’s indirect influence can be detected. This influence only took place at the beginning of the policy-making process. In addition, the media (and opinion pollsters) crucially contributed to this indirect influence by relating FN positions, as well as public reaction to these positions. Hypotheses 3, 4, 5 and 6 are thus also confirmed. Yet, the analysis allows the argument to be taken further by underlying the crucial role played by a ‘period of stress’ (Almond & Verba, 1963), beyond the role of the media. As explained by President Hollande himself, but also as a result of fine-grained analysis, the stripping of citizenship was only set on the agenda after a traumatic event, in this case a major terrorist attack.

The Belgian Case

Stripping of citizenship has been proposed by the VB in each of its electoral manifestos (e.g. manifesto 2007, p. 31; manifesto 2010, p. 12; manifesto 2014, p. 25). The VB has also tried to put forward legislation on the issue. It has proposed more legislation on this issue than any other party, although only one such proposal has been made in the last 10 years (law proposal 54K0781). Because of the cordon sanitaire, this proposal never provoked a reaction from other parties, nor any institutional debate. The only aim of the proposal – which was publicised through social media – was to highlight a perceived problem to which the party had proposed a specific solution, and thereby to shape public opinion. The role of the proposal was thus mainly communicative.

We were provocative. And it is true we were. But our aim was not to make free provocation. Our ultimate goal was to implement our electoral manifesto. (Member of the board of directors of the VB, interviewed 12 July 2017)

At the same time, other parties also proposed such measures in Parliament. This was mainly the case for the Nieuwe Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA, right-wing and nationalist party), which has asked three times for a stripping of citizenship law in the last 10 years (law proposals 53K3571; 54K1968; 53K2257). This can be justified by the fact that the N-VA wanted to address an important issue for its electorate – even without a specific context – but also by the fact the N-VA wanted to attract VB voters (as recognised by an ex-N-VA Member of Parliament, interviewed 11 September 2017).

As is the case in France, stripping of citizenship has existed in Belgian law for several decades (Closset & Renauld, 2015). First included in Belgian law in 1922 and directed at citizens who had perpetrated indignity during the First World War, stripping of citizenship became an organic law in 1934 (instead of a transitional provision, as in 1922) and was maintained in the Nationality Code of 1984 (still prevailing). Since then, several amendments have been made to it: the Law of 13 June 1991, the Law of 27 December 2006, the Law of 4 December 2012, and the Law of 20 July 2015. These have mainly aimed to expand stripping of citizenship, for instance in the case of fraud in acquiring nationality (Law of 27 December 2006). A general tendency towards greater restriction can thus be identified over the decades. Because of the temporal framework of this study, attention can be paid to the latest law. The Law of 20 July 2015 was passed urgently by Parliament at the request of the centre-right coalition government led by Charles Michel. The aim was to extend the possibility of stripping of citizenship in cases of terrorism. If terrorism was already taken into account in the Law of 4 December 2012 (with a new article 23/1 in the Nationality Code), the Law of 20 July 2015 went further by specifying that any terrorist act included in the penal code (and not only ‘the most serious offences’ as in 2012) could be punished with the stripping of citizenship. This includes, for instance, training for a terrorist attack or going abroad to commit a terrorist attack. In addition, the article placing a bar of 10 years after acquiring Belgian nationality – beyond which someone could not be stripped of citizenship – was abrogated in 2015.

Although stripping of citizenship had been part of the coalition agreement of 9 October 2014, the 7 January 2015 terrorist attacks in France, but also the dismantling of a terrorist cell in Verviers, Belgium, on 15 January 2015, clearly helped to bring the issue to the forefront of the political agenda. The Belgian prime minister (Mouvement réformateur (MR)) convened a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 16 January 2015 and adopted a set of 12 measures to fight terrorism. Figuring among these measures was the expansion of stripping of citizenship for terrorism. From the interviews conducted, it appears that both N-VA and MR played a particularly important role in the adoption of this measure. Nevertheless, all the interviewees also recognised that the context is key to understanding support for the measure. The context served as a window of opportunity (Kingdon, 2011) facilitating widespread agreement on the proposal.

The N-VA laid a heavy claim on that measure. We were not the last ones to support it […]. But I have to admit this was not so complicated inside the government. We did not need to exchange it with something else, to tell it simply. (Member of the board of directors of MR, interviewed 30 May 2017)

The starting point here is the terrorist attacks: Paris, then Belgium. If Belgium was not affected, the expansion of stripping of citizenship would have never been passed. (Member of the board of directors of MR, interviewed 30 May 2017)

Of course, we all have our manifesto, but it is clear we have felt a strong pressure because of terrorist attacks. For sure. (CD&V Member of Parliament, interviewed 20 July 2017)

Beyond the support of majority parties, other parties, such as the Centre démocrate humaniste (cdH, Christian democratic party), have also supported reform of the nationality code. Support for the cdH also comes from the period of stress that is terrorism. Because of radicalism in Belgium, the party president established a working group within the cdH, which proposed an expansion of the stripping of citizenship (cdH Member of Parliament, interviewed 29 June 2017). Support from the cdH for the measure is thus not surprising. The Parti socialiste (PS, left-wing party) did not support the measure but admits it was tough because of the pressure from public opinion.

The pressure outside and inside was very, very strong over stripping of citizenship. Sometimes we even voted against a text but some of us abstained to show that we understood their will. So, yes. We have been greatly influenced. (Member of the board of directors of PS, interviewed 22 June 2017)

Very quickly, the centre-right coalition government proposed the measure. It was adopted into law by Parliament on 16 July 2015. What is striking is that the proposal was developed by VB, but it is difficult to empirically locate VB’s fingerprint within the policy-making process – only upstream, in communications with the public about parliamentary interventions. Also, VB itself was not happy with the measure, believing that it should encompass a much wider set of crimes. Therefore, its influence in the process was very much limited.

Of course we want to go further. The Belgian citizenship should be removed from everybody who has committed a serious crime. When someone is accepted into our community there should be some conditions to that. These people should be irreproachable. (Member of the board of directors of VB, interviewed 13 July 2017)

To sum up, as suggested by Figure 3, the influence of the VB is limited in the policy-making process. Nevertheless, its influence cannot be said to be non-existent, notably because of the recognised influence of the N-VA. The N-VA is the party that fought hardest in favour of such a measure and, in addition, other parties recognise that the N-VA heavily supported the measure inside the majority. This results, at least in part, from the fact that the N-VA tries – and manages – to attract a significant segment of VB’s voters (Pauwels, 2011). The influence exercised by VB at the early stages of policy-making – by dramatising problems and proposing solutions via an atypical communication style – affects public opinion. This effect is reinforced when a ‘period of stress’ occurs (Almond & Verba, 1963). The real effect on public opinion is sparse. What is important for mainstream parties is the perceived effect on public opinion, which causes these parties to formally react to such proposals during periods of stress since, as indicated by Givens and Luedtke (2004) and by Howard (2010), not responding to such a problem could be electorally risky. To appreciate the influence exercised by VB, one should thus take into account three important factors: its indirect influence and its passive role (in this case, it is not VB which actively influences the N-VA but the N-VA which tries to attract its voters), the important role of the social media, and the essential role of a period of stress. The six hypotheses are thus also confirmed for the Belgian case.

Figure 3.

The policy-making process of deprivation of nationality in Belgium.

Discussion

The analysis confirms the six hypotheses for both cases. A model explaining if and how RRPPs try to influence policy-making regarding one of their central pledges – stripping of citizenship – can thus be drafted (cf. Figure 4) and enrich the literature on the policy influence of RRPPs.

Figure 4.

The influence of RRPPs on policy-making: causal mechanism.

In each case the RRPPs under investigation have proposed legislation on the stripping of citizenship for several decades. It is part of their manifestos – contrary to other parties in both countries – and they have also put forward law proposals to the same effect. Yet, the number of law proposals which have come forward is low in both cases and the law proposals never take effect, being rejected by other parties directly, without even being put forward for debate. This result corroborates the findings of Minkenberg (2001), who concluded that the parliamentary presence of RRPPs does not suffice to lead to any policy effect. Beyond the explanation of the tactics adopted by mainstream parties towards both the FN and the VB, the low number of law proposals results from the fact that both parties have weak parliamentary representation (in spite of the different political systems in France and Belgium). RRPPs thus cannot put the issue on the agenda through institutional arenas. However, these interventions can be exploited in two ways. First, and as suggested in the literature (e.g. Jacobs & Spierings, 2018) and verified notably through interviews, RRPPs use social networks to communicate with citizens – mostly their supporters – that they are concerned with the defence of the nation.

We spread our messages on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat in order to bypass the media filter and to be closer to the people. And also because we are a poor party we have to be innovative in spreading our messages. (Member of the board of directors of the FN, interviewed 11 October 2016)

Second, because they choose an atypical and provocative communication style – as suggested by the literature (e.g. Wodak, 2015) – the media communicate RRPPs’ attempts to reach their audience. Even if no systematic media analysis has been conducted for this research, this assertion relies on the interviews conducted. The interviewees from RRPPs all admit that they are satisfied with the way the issues they want to emphasise are made more salient when using such a style.

When I organise a safari in Molenbeek with Geert Wilders, there are many journalists. When I simply organise a press conference in the Parliament on a given topic, there is nobody. (Member of Parliament and member of the board of directors of the VB, interviewed 19 October 2017)

The public at large thus becomes aware of their proposals. This corroborates the existing literature on the link between RRPPs and the media stating that, because of their style, RRPPs are ‘media darlings’ (e.g. Mazzoleni, 2014, p. 9). Later, a period of stress (Almond & Verba, 1963) – that is to say a specific event, such as a police officer’s murder or a terrorist attack – suddenly increases the saliency of the issue. RRPPs ‘seize the opportunity’ to remind citizens that they have long proposed a solution to this problem (stripping of citizenship) but have not been taken seriously. Empirical fingerprints show that social networks are used by RRPPs to do so. Public opinion may be affected by the context and become receptive to the RRPPs’ solution. Whether public opinion really is receptive does not truly matter in the process. What is important is that in both cases mainstream parties believe public opinion was shifting (as seen through interviews); therefore, under this pressure, they also proposed to expand stripping of citizenship. The empirical evidence corroborates the hypothesis that mainstream parties respond to (perceived) public opinion during periods of stress, as to not do so would be particularly risky for them (Givens & Luedtke, 2004; Howard, 2010).

Some parties from the right side of the political spectrum also defend such proposals in specific contexts. In Belgium, for instance, the extension of the stripping of citizenship was proposed by many N-VA leaders or elected officials on several occasions but was not a part of the N-VA electoral manifesto. This can be explained by electoral factors. Yet, they do not find support from other parties, and the issue cannot be set on the political agenda. A period of stress thus creates a window of opportunity (Kingdon, 2011) wherein these issues are more likely to be addressed by policy-makers. In the Belgian case, the N-VA has played a central role in seizing the opportunity and mobilising its colleagues from other parties regarding that issue.

While all the hypotheses are confirmed, some further contextual discussion is required. If RRPPs can exercise an influence on policy-making, their influence is strongly limited. This is the case in France, where the FN does not suffer from a formal cordon sanitaire, but its institutional representation is marginal. Meanwhile, in Belgium, the VB does suffer from a formal cordon sanitaire but the party may be heavily represented within the institutions. This results from the fact that mainstream parties reject every RRPP law proposal, specifically because it comes from a RRPP, a party with a populist style and a radical stance on specific issues. Also, once the issue is set on the agenda, RRPPs’ influence can also be described as very limited in the sense that no empirical evidence can be found to link RRPPs to the policy-making process. Yet, their influence exists (cf. Figure 4), being mostly exercised at the beginning of the process, through the media, and on public opinion. Indirectly (as suggested by Schain, 2006), RRPPs can thus influence policy-making. In addition, when other parties address these issues themselves, it is because of electoral concerns. Their influence is thus also passive. More importantly, RRPPs cannot exercise any influence on policy-making without a period of stress. This is explained by the crucial role exercised by public opinion and by the fact that a period of stress becomes a window of opportunity for some right-wing mainstream parties. This is why the period of stress – which was not mentioned in the existing literature on the policy influence of RRPPs – is a fundamental stage of the mechanism. Finally, the influence is an influence a maxima. This means RRPPs intervene in the process and contribute to its development, but that other factors (such as other political actors, for instance) can also explain the different sequences of the process.

Three main obstacles to RRPPs’ influence have been identified. The cordon sanitaire (formal or not) is a first explanation. As explained above, it reduces the possibilities for RRPPs to directly influence policy-making and even to set an issue on the agenda in the institutional arena. Then – and it might seem to be a paradox – while the media play an important role in the model, they can also be an obstacle. As underlined by Esser et al. (2017), media coverage is generally negative and critical towards RRPPs. Criticism is much more the case in Belgium than in France, but in both cases a populist and provocative style is perceived by the parties themselves as a good tool to cross such an obstacle. Finally, the fear of being associated with RRPPs is very pronounced among mainstream parties. This can be explained by the fact that their voters perceive RRPPs to be extreme, undemocratic, or racist parties. Therefore, it becomes difficult for them to defend similar proposals. When this is the case, intense debates are provoked within the party or the coalition.

Finally, the drafted causal mechanism leads to a rethink of the influence of RRPPs. As suggested by Lebourg (2010), RRPPs share important characteristics with lobbies, such as the will to influence RRPPs from the outside without necessarily taking part in power (e.g. member of the board of directors of VB, interviewed 29 August 2017), or their focus on specific issues such as immigration or law and order. Therefore, the label ‘party-lobby’ (Lebourg, 2010) can help to apprehend the influence exercised by RRPPs in policy-making.

Conclusion

The research indicates that RRPPs matter but that their influence is strongly curtailed. Their influence is not exercised directly and through institutional arenas, but indirectly: based on a provocative style, in a specific context, and through public opinion and the media. In addition, the article also identifies three main obstacles to RRPPs’ influence.

The literature on the policy influence of RRPPs is still in its infancy. This article has analysed the influence of the FN and VB in debates over the stripping of citizenship by testing hypotheses based on a state-of-the-art review. All six hypotheses have been confirmed, but the research also allows the argument to go a step further by drafting a causal mechanism and by identifying additional sequences in the process. Hence, the role of a period of stress has been depicted as crucial in the mechanism. Also, a short-term should be distinguished from a mid-term or long-term period when assessing influence. Previous studies have never taken the temporal issue into account. Beyond the distinction between a direct and indirect influence, the influence can also be active or passive. Finally, the communication style used by RRPPs is also a crucial factor explaining their indirect policy influence.

The findings are useful for researchers to apprehend better how democracy works when facing the presence of parties often said to be a threat to the quality of democracy (RRPPs). But the findings are also of interest to policy-makers to better know to what extent their own actions (e.g. deciding a cordon sanitaire) can impact the policy-making process and, in fine, to assess the scope of their strategies towards RRPPs.

Two concluding remarks and suggestions for further research can be made. First, the results have shown that the role of public opinion is particularly important in the mechanism, yet it is not easily measurable. This does not weaken the results since it has been argued based on empirical data that the perception of public opinion is what matters most, but considering such data could still enrich this research agenda. For example, measuring public opinion on the issue of stripping of citizenship at different times could help to draft a graph of its evolution, which can be correlated to the influence of RRPPs and the resurgence of the debate. In addition, asking why public opinion has changed could improve understanding of that part of the mechanism. Second, if the ontological and epistemological foundations of the process-tracing method allow for generalisation, this only holds for cases sharing the same scope conditions. Researchers should thus avoid any generalisation with incompatible cases (e.g. because the policy-making process under investigation takes place in a non-democratic political regime). At the same time, these results pave the way for further research towards a more global overview of the influence exercised by populist parties on policy-making (whether they are right-wing or extreme right populist parties, and among a wide range of political regimes) by replicating this study and comparing the findings to the present case.

Supplemental Material

IPS803733_French_Spanish – Supplemental material for How do radical right populist parties influence resurging debates over the stripping of citizenship?

Supplemental material, IPS803733_French_Spanish for How do radical right populist parties influence resurging debates over the stripping of citizenship? by Benjamin Biard in International Political Science Review

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Nathalie Schiffino, Min Reuchamps, Christoph Niessen, François Randour, Vincent Jacquet and three anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback at various stages leading to the conclusion of this article.

Funding

The author received financial support from the Institute of Political Science Louvain-Europe (ISPOLE) for the research.

Author Biography

Benjamin Biard is a FRS–FNRS research fellow in political science at the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium). He was a visiting scholar at the University of Lausanne in 2015-2016 and in Sciences Po Paris in 2016-2017. His research focuses on populism, public policy, and democracy. He has written several papers and articles on the influence of radical right populist parties on the policy-making in Europe and he has co-edited two books.

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