The politics of climate change in a neo-developmental state: The case of South Korea

Under-reaction to the challenge of emission reductions

South Korea has clearly lagged in regard to climate mitigation and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In 2018, South Korea was the world’s 11th largest economy and the seventh largest emitter of CO₂. As South Korea grew economically, CO₂ emissions more than doubled from 276 million tons in 1992 to 589 million tons in 2016, which was the biggest increase in the OECD. Per capita emissions increased from 6.3 to 11.5 tons in the same period of time, which was the 16th highest increase in the world and far above the OECD average of 9 tons per capita (OECD, 2018). As I will show below, due to its structure, the Korean economy has low CO₂ productivity in that it needs more CO₂ emissions to produce a unit of GDP than most other OECD countries. Economic growth and national industrial growth have always been the primary objectives of developmental states such as South Korea. While growth in the sense of market expansion is a necessity for all capitalist economies, for South Korea and other developmental states, growth is not just an abstract necessity but an explicit goal of government policies. Policy considerations are not driven by the abstract expansion of markets to maintain profitability of businesses but rather by the concrete expansion of market shares by domestic businesses. In this ‘growth first’ development strategy, climate and environmental policies in general did not play an important role until 2008, when the conservative President Lee Myung-bak made ‘green growth’ his signature policy initiative (for an overview of climate policies in Korea until 2013, see Yun and Yoon, 2016). In 2009, he established the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG), which merged competencies from different ministries (Kim and Thurbon, 2015). In the same year, the National Strategy for Green Growth (2009–2050) and the First Five-Year Plan for Green Growth (2009–2013) were announced, and in 2010, the Framework Act on Low Carbon and Green Growth (2010) was passed, thus laying the legal foundation for South Korea’s climate policies.

The green growth initiative was important because for the first time environmental concerns became a focus of policymaking. Moreover, Lee used the international negotiations highlighted in the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 to formulate the first-ever Korean goals for emission reductions (for other examples of the integration of international and domestic factors in climate policies, see Tosun and Rinscheid, 2019). The government announced a goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30% below business as usual (BAU) by 2020, which would have meant an increase of 80% over 1990 levels and a reduction of 19% compared to 2010. This goal was the highest recommended target for a non-Annex 1 country under the Kyoto Protocol (Global Green Growth Institute, 2015) and showed that Korea was willing to contribute despite the lack of a legal obligation to do so.

Considering that the goal announced by President Lee was Korea’s first self-set pledge, it was seen as very meaningful and ambitious at that time (Kim and Thurbon, 2015), and in 2011, Climate Action Tracker rated South Korea’s climate goals as ‘sufficient’ (Climate Action Tracker, 2018). However, the brief period of relatively ambitious goals passed when President Lee’s tenure ended in 2013. Despite the common origin in the conservative party, the new administration under President Park Geun-hye showed little interest in climate policies and the environment in general. The Park government failed to take advantage of the Paris Agreement on climate change of 2015 to formulate more ambitious targets. On the contrary, in 2015, it amended the Framework Act by slightly increasing the emission reduction goals to 37% below BAU while also extending the deadline by 10 years to 2030. This weakened goal would mean a 78% increase of emissions compared to 1990 and a reduction of 20% below 2010 levels but 10 years later. Consequently, Climate Action Tracker downgraded Korea’s efforts to ‘inadequate’ in 2015. The same goals were also pledged under the Paris Agreement that was signed and ratified in 2016. Based on a new scale, Climate Action Tracker rated Korea’s pledges as ‘highly insufficient’ in 2017, meaning that if all governments were to follow the same path as Korea, global warming would be between 3 and 4°C, which is much higher than the 2°C goal (Climate Action Tracker, 2019). Nevertheless, the Paris Agreement was important for Korea because it was the first time that Korea agreed to binding reductions on greenhouse gas emissions. Under the Kyoto protocol of 1992, South Korea was still categorized as a developing (non-Annex 1) country without binding targets. Since then, South Korea has undergone a massive transformation and emerged as fully fledged developed country and an OECD member. Under the Paris Agreement, the country is now – like all countries – obliged to reduce emissions.

Despite South Korea’s role as a major emitter, climate change played only a minor role in the 2017 presidential election campaign. In his election program, President Moon promised to tackle fine dust, close old coal-fired plants and ‘faithfully carry out the implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change’ (100 Policy Tasks, 2017: task 61). Despite these commitments, the Moon government has failed to specify a roadmap to achieve these goals, which is surprising because the liberal President Moon is ideologically much closer to the environmental movement than his predecessors (see below). Instead of tackling greenhouse gas emissions, the Moon government spent a considerable amount of political capital on an ultimately failed attempt to phase out nuclear power. In July 2018, the government announced that it wanted emissions to peak in 2020 but did not revise the climate act, which had been rendered almost useless by the changes made by the Park Geun-hye administration. Consequently, Climate Action Tracker kept its rating of South Korea’s pledges at ‘highly insufficient’ in its latest report in December 2018 (Climate Action Tracker, 2018). While it seems counterintuitive that a conservative government close to business has been more active in climate policies than a more progressive government, the reason can be found in the way the conservative ‘green growth’ policies were designed and implemented, which I will describe in the following sections.

Ambitious green industrial policies

While South Korea can be regarded as an underperformer with respect to emission reductions, consecutive governments have been dedicated to making South Korea a leader in green technology and green products. Green infrastructure and green industrial policies were the most important elements of President Lee’s ‘green growth’ initiative. The primary goal of ‘green growth’ is not reconciling growth and environment but rather seeking to increase economic growth, export competitiveness and create jobs. Consequently, behavioral changes and in particular changes in consumption and production patterns play only a subordinate role, if any. As Kim and Thurbon point out:

The GG [green growth] initiative centered on the idea of protecting and improving the environment not simply, or even mainly, by placing costs on polluters. Rather GG centered on actively promoting and supporting the development, commercialization, production, and export of green technologies, products, and processes by domestic firms. (Kim and Thurbon, 2015: 219)

Altogether, the ‘green growth’ initiative had a substantial budget of US$100 billion or approximately 2% of GDP per year for the period 2009–2013 (Global Green Growth Institute, 2015). Almost half of this sum was allocated to the Green New Deal project to stimulate the economy after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008/2009, with the majority allocated to a ‘supply side oriented fiscal stimulus’ (Kalinowski, 2015) focused on infrastructure and support for green industries. Due to the dramatic crisis situation, many of the projects were front-loaded, and US$20 billion was spent in the first year (Mathews, 2012). The explicit goal of the green industrial policies was to increase research and development (R&D) expenditures in environmental technology to 25% and increase green exports to 20% by 2020 (Mathews, 2012). The support for R&D focused on 27 core technologies, including solar panels, nuclear energy, fuel cells, ‘low pollution vehicles’, LED displays, batteries and many more (Global Green Growth Institute, 2015: 154). The Green Technology Committee (GTC) under the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) was tasked with coordinating the spending of the R&D budget by line ministries. Approximately one-third of the budget went to government-funded research institutes, while approximately three-fifths were evenly divided between universities, large business conglomerates and small- and medium-sized enterprises (Global Green Growth Institute, 2015: 178). It is important to note that government-funded research institutes have a long tradition in the Korean developmental state. Until the 1980s, private businesses had little independent R&D capabilities, and most industries depended on government-funded research. The strength of state-funded research was one reason why businesses were eager to form a development partnership with the government because such a partnership provided access to advanced technology. Finally, six new ‘green growth engines’ were identified in which support for businesses was concentrated: renewable energy, next-generation nuclear plants, water treatment, LED lighting, green transport systems and green cities (Global Green Growth Institute, 2015: 254).

The outcomes of green industrial policies are mixed. In particular, the so-called green infrastructure projects were overambitious and misguided. President Lee’s massive US$25 billion four-river restoration project was prone to collusion and created more environmental problems than it solved (Han, 2015). In 2018, President Lee was sentenced to 15 years in prison on corruption charges, and although these charges were not directly related to the four-river project, they added to the general impression that his administration used its strong ties with business not just to coordinate industrial policies but also for collusion. However, in addition to the disastrous infrastructure projects, there were also many positive outcomes. The most impressive improvements were made in terms of green technology development. The application of environmental patents increased almost fivefold from 2000 to 2013, and South Korea now has the highest per capita development of environmental-related technologies in the OECD (OECD, 2017). Overall, from 2005 to 2015, the share of the environmental industry in industry turnover increased sevenfold from 0.38% to 2.82% (Ministry of Environment, 2019). South Korean companies emerged as leading producers of green products such as solar cells, batteries and electric vehicles. Although green industries have established themselves as a new growth sector, their products are mostly exported or produced in offshore facilities for the global market. The domestic Korean markets for electric cars and solar panels remain small, thus reflecting a lack of behavioral changes in regard to consumption patterns. For example, South Korea is the fifth largest producer of solar panels in the world (EPI, 2014) but has the lowest share of renewable energy in the OECD at 2.8% of electricity production in 2016 compared to 23.6% in the whole OECD (OECD, 2019). The picture is similar for electric cars. Of the 21,148 electric cars sold by Korean companies in the first quarter of 2019, 16,162 (76%) were sold in foreign markets, while only 4968 were sold domestically (Kwak, 2019).

As investments in green domestic technology and industries has far outpaced the domestic demand for green products, the green industry was from the beginning an export industry. At the global level, this South Korean export-oriented strategy complemented the consumption-oriented strategy in Europe and, in particular, the USA. In these countries, governments focused on subsidizing the consumption of new and more energy efficient appliances and cars (‘cash for clunkers’). Due to its export dependency, the green growth initiative had an international component from the beginning as Korea tried to establish itself as a ‘green leader’.

International aspirations as a green leader

The international climate agreements provided an opportunity not just to create industries and jobs domestically but also to become a global leader in green technology and industries. Until President Lee’s ‘green growth’ initiative, South Korea was accustomed to the role of fast follower. As part of the ‘industrializing through learning’ approach (Amsden, 1989), governments and business teamed up to reverse-engineer the successful strategies of others. Thus, for the first time, South Korea aspired to be a leader or at least among the front-runners. President Lee started two successful international initiatives. In 2010, his administration launched the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) and managed to transform it into a recognized international institution at the Rio+20 summit in 2012. The aim of the GGGI is to promote ‘green growth’ and environmental sustainability through research and to provide expertise, particularly in developing countries. The second even more substantial achievement was for South Korea to become the host for the Green Climate Fund based on a decision of the UNFCCC in 2010. The GCF is a major international organization with 194 member states, pledged funds so far of US$10 billion and a goal to raise US$100 billion a year to help finance climate policies in developing countries. The GCF secretariat moved into its headquarters in Songdo, South Korea, in 2013, and the first projects started in 2015 (GCF, 2019). Both international organizations are the result of the same ‘green growth’ spirit of the Lee administration described above. Environmental issues and climate policies are seen as investment opportunities where the main challenge is to develop a sound business plan and raise money for investment. Similar to the green growth initiative in general, both organizations are not the result of a new way of thinking in South Korea but rather an extension of the old thinking into the environmental sector. It can be expected, however, that the presence of the two institutions will change the political debate in Korea over time by raising the priority of environmental and climate issues.

Another area where Korea can be considered very active is the trade in international certificates offsetting domestic pollution. South Korea has announced that it will meet a third of its Paris targets not by reducing emissions domestically but through international carbon credits. Thus, South Korea has been very active in the international carbon markets. Since unilateral projects of non-Annex 1 countries were allowed in 2005, South Korea has quickly emerged as the country with the fourth largest emission reductions under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) behind China, India and Brazil (Jones and Yoo, 2011: 11). Currently, South Korea has 88 projects registered under the CDM (UNFCCC, 2019). Domestically, South Korea has developed the second largest emission trading system (ETS) behind that of the EU. The Korean ETS suffers from the same problem as all ETSs because too many pollution rights are issued and thus prices are too low to reduce emissions. Both emission markets have also been vulnerable to speculation and price manipulation. Moreover, the Korean ETS has actually managed to raise the price above US$20 and was thus more successful than the EU ETS, where prices were still below US$17 in 2018 (World Bank, 2019). This moderate success can be explained by a very long effort of institution building that culminated in the establishment of the South Korea ETS in 2015. In 1998, South Korea introduced an energy target mechanism system (TMS) to reduce its dependency on energy imports amid the Asian financial crisis (Niederhafner, 2014). When the government initially failed to implement an emission trading system following the EU model due to resistance from the business sector and the connected bureaucratic circles, it instead extended the scope of the existing TMS to include emission reductions. Different from an ETS, the Korean TMS did not rely on market mechanisms but followed a classic system of state-business coordination where allowances are directly negotiated between the government and emitters. Instead of a market-based system, the TMS combines top-down command-and-control components with network-like mechanisms (Niederhafner, 2014). The (relatively) successful implementation of an emission market was thus achieved by supplementing the long legacy of top-down dirigisme with elements of established state-business coordination, which is investigated in the following sections.

State-business links and weakened state autonomy

To a large degree, South Korea’s ambitious green industrial policies can be explained by the strong links between state and business originating in the South Korean developmental state. During the period of rapid economic catch up from the 1960s to the 1990s, the state combined economic planning and industrial policies with infant industry protection and export promotion. In many ways, the economic legacy of this developmental state could hardly be more problematic for effective climate policies. Heavy industrialization since the 1970s and an oversized construction sector left Korea with a high share of energy-intensive industries. In fact, at 12% of total value added, South Korea has the largest share of energy-intensive industries, such as construction, petrochemicals and steel, in the OECD (Jones and Yoo, 2011: 24). Another huge problem stemming from the rapid heavy industrialization since the 1970s is that 40% of electricity production depends on coal-fired plants. Many of the plants are older than 30 years, and despite coal being the dirtiest of all fossil fuels, South Korea will build 20 new coal-fired plants by 2022. Thus, it is not surprising that CO₂ productivity is much lower in Korea than the OECD average, as the amount of emissions needed to produce a unit of GDP is much higher. Per kilogram of CO₂ emissions, South Korea produces only US$3.05 of its GDP, while the OECD average is much higher at US$4.24 (OECD, 2017). Until the Moon administration, nuclear power was seen as the only viable alternative to fossil fuels. In the tradition of the developmental state, nuclear energy was seen not just as a source of electricity but also as a new export industry, although the plan to export nuclear technology largely failed (Valentine and Sovacool, 2010). As Korea’s electricity production is dominated by the state-owned KEPCO, renewable energies were suppressed because they were seen as a competitor and an obstacle to Korea’s nuclear export ambitions. Even today, the prospect of exporting nuclear power plants is used as an important argument to expand the domestic use of nuclear energy. Because traditional fuel sources will dominate KEPCO’s business for years if not decades to come, it is unlikely that the company will intrinsically develop a strong self-interest in the expansion of renewable energies.

While important industries have strong lobbying power everywhere, in developmental states, the problem is not primarily lobbying but the tight direct links that have formed over decades based on politics, bureaucracy and business. These links extend all the way from the highest political sphere to the lowest levels of bureaucracy and are dominated by personal networks and decades-long practices of corporatist coordination. Green industrial policies can be seen as an extension of these strategies, institutions and networks but within the new context of green industry promotion. Kim and Thurbon rightly argue that ‘Korean style environmentalism is best understood as an extension of the long-held philosophy of developmentalism amongst the policy-making elite’ (Kim and Thurbon, 2015). As Thurbon points out, the ‘developmental mindset’ of the Korean elite, and thus the willingness to directly intervene in the economy, remains strong (Thurbon, 2016). The current political economy in Korea, however, is not just an extension or ‘revival’ of the old developmental state but rather a path-dependent transformation to a new form of neo-developmental state. This transformation is the result of decreasing state autonomy amid the growth of business power and increasing internationalization.

The original discussion on the East Asian developmental state in the 1980s highlighted state autonomy and the role of the bureaucracy (Johnson, 1982), while in the 1990s, ‘embedded autonomy’ and the combination of state autonomy with strong links between state and business were seen as crucial for successful development (Evans, 1995). Of the East Asian developmental states, however, only China might have retained some of the original state autonomy. South Korea, on the other hand, has transformed into a neo-developmental state in which state autonomy is undermined by the rise of oligopolistic business conglomerates and international pressure for neoliberal reforms, while state-business links remain strong and civil society remains weak. In the old developmental state, business was the junior partner, while the government was the main actor; however, business is now the senior partner, while the state maintains autonomy only in certain policy niches. Green industrial policies are one of those niches where path dependency prevails because big business conglomerates are weak and international political pressure is strong (another niche is supporting overseas investment in new and challenging markets; see Kalinowski and Park, 2016).

Previously, businesses were weak in the sense that they lacked environmental technology and hesitated to invest in green industries without government backing. Green industries were seen as cutting edge but lacked a clearly successful model that could be followed. Thus, it was necessary for the government to take the lead and push the private sector into investing in a new industry as it had previously done with the expansion into heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s as well as electronics and cars in the 1980s. It is important to point out that while big business has been emancipated from state patronage, South Korea is not necessarily becoming a liberal market economy. On the contrary, in terms of government spending and micro-interventions in the economy, the role of the state is actually increasing (Kalinowski, 2015). The difference is that the neo-developmental state has lost autonomy in the sense that it fails to implement industrial policies against the short-term interest of big business groups, at least those outside the described niches.

As an export-oriented country, South Korea is very sensitive to its international competitiveness, including the price of energy. Indeed, its export orientation is not just a critical component of the Korean development strategy but a requirement for development from the beginning due to the need to finance energy imports. An important and underestimated characteristic of the East Asian development model is the weakness (or, in Korea’s case, complete lack) of resource extraction industries. South Korea imports 97% of all its energy sources and most of its other natural resources. This lack of a resource extraction industry could be good news for successful climate policies. In fact, the reduction and import substitution of fuel imports has long been a goal in Korea even before climate policies became an issue. It is not a coincidence that the ‘green growth’ strategy was announced in the context of oil prices, which increased from US$25 per barrel in 2000 to approximately US$140 in June 2008 (Yun and Yoon, 2016). Moreover, this successful import-substitution strategy has created a large petrochemical industry that has made South Korea a major producer and exporter of fuel and other petrochemical products. It is thus understandable that the government has a limited desire to provide incentives for behavioral changes by increasing prices for fossil fuels and letting the market do the rest. Instead, it prefers to directly subsidize renewable technology through industrial policies. As Sonnenschein and Mundaca (2016) point out in their analysis of South Korea’s ‘green growth’ initiative, green industrial policies were ‘not supported by complementary pricing reforms (transport and electricity) that are also needed to drive a green economy.’ (Sonnenschein and Mundaca 2016: 190)

President Lee, who initiated the ‘green growth’ initiative, is in many ways the personification of the neo-developmental state. He not only moved from his position as CEO of Hyundai Engineering and Construction into politics but also extended the strong ties with large business to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and went as far as officially sharing his mobile phone number with selected CEOs of SMEs. Moreover, living up to his nickname ‘the bulldozer’, he was not responsive to civil society demands. His administration was known for the authoritarian implementation of policies that neglected environmental (and other) concerns raised by the civil society community (see below). While President Lee was decisive in making climate change and ‘green growth’ a priority for the first time, the external influences of international agreements also played an important enabling role. South Korean governments have used international climate agreements to legitimize policies that would be difficult to finance and implement without this external pressure. Because traditional industrial policies and support for domestic business came under pressure from international partners demanding liberalization while domestic civil society groups criticized the observed collusion, international climate agreements became a strategy for legitimizing the increasing support for domestic businesses. Path dependency shifted as institutions of state-business links were redirected towards new goals and underwent a process of conversion (Thelen, 2004).

Strong but weak civil society

The remaining question is why strong green industrial policies are not accompanied by policies that focus on changes in production and consumption patterns? A country that is strong in battery technology and electric car exports should also support the use of these technologies at home. Indeed, Korea has provided consumers with incentives to buy electric cars and install solar panels on their roofs. The incentives, however, have not been effective because they were not accompanied by measures to disincentivize fossil fuels and energy consumption. While this problem is observed in many countries (Tosun, 2018), the South Korean government has been particularly reluctant to increase the price of energy consumption. For example, retail gasoline prices in July 2019 were among the lowest in the OECD at US$1.27 per liter (Global Petrol Prices, 2019). There are even fewer incentives to reduce electricity consumption, as electricity prices in Korea are the second lowest in the International Energy Agency (IEA), just ahead of Turkey (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2019). This reluctance to increase the price of energy is partly associated with the above-described strength of energy-intensive industries as well as the lack of support for radical changes in consumption patterns by civil society and a failure to convince the public of the necessity of such changes. These failures are not primarily because the civil society in South Korea is weak per se. Indeed, Korean civil society groups have shown their power when their protests against President Park Geun-hye in 2016/2017 ultimately led to her impeachment by the parliament. Environmental groups opposing the construction of new nuclear power plants have managed to push for an (ultimately failed) attempt to phase out nuclear power. Large civil society groups have huge memberships, and the largest environmental group, KFEM, has approximately 85,000 members alone (Kern, 2010). Nevertheless, environmental groups are weak in three crucial aspects. First, they have thus far not been able to challenge the agenda-setting ability of the government. While environmental groups play a role in political discussions, the agenda of what is discussed in the Korean public is still dominated by the government. For example, until 2006, the media hardly ever reported on issues of climate change. In 2006, only 21 newspaper editorials mentioned climate change, although with the election of President Lee and his emphasis on ‘green growth’ the number dramatically increased to 98 in 2007 and 138 in 2009. However, reporting on climate change declined to 61 in 2012, the year President Park was elected. It further dropped to 29 in 2013 when President Lee stepped down, and the emphasis on ‘green growth’ faded with him (Yun and Yoon, 2016: 99).

Second, environmental groups are politically weak because they lack a successful political party. The Green Party of South Korea received only 0.8% of the vote in the 2016 parliamentary election and is not represented in the parliament. Moreover, similar to other civil society organizations (CSOs), environmental groups are easily coopted by governments, particularly by those on the liberal side (Kalinowski, 2008). For example, in President Moon’s first cabinet, six out of 25 minister-level personnel were former leaders of civic groups (Kim and Jeong, 2017: 10). Consequently, civil society groups lose their ability to criticize the government, as it demands loyalty from ‘its’ CSOs. The combination of the Confucian tradition favoring a ‘benign king’ and a history of authoritarianism creates an atmosphere in which it is difficult for CSOs to criticize a government that is in the same political camp. Consequently, civil society has failed to seriously challenge the deep links between the state and business and form its own network with government organizations (Yun et al., 2014). For example, in the deliberation on emission reductions, the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE) formed strong networks with business organizations to oppose carbon taxes and cap and trade while supporting nuclear energy. Moreover, the Ministry of the Environment, which supported more ambitious reduction targets, failed to form meaningful networks with CSOs as potential allies and thus remained neutral regarding policies strongly supported (carbon tax) or opposed (nuclear energy) by environmental groups (Yun et al., 2014: 290–295).

Third, civil society groups in South Korea remain very closely associated with the fight for democracy and social welfare and against authoritarian rule (Fiori and Kim, 2011; Kim and Jeong, 2017). While environmental topics, such a climate change, have become increasingly important, broader political and social questions remain dominant as civil society needs to fill the gap left by ‘ineffectual political parties’ (Kim, 2012). Consequently, whenever a conflict between social and environmental goals arises, civil society, and even environmental groups themselves, are internally divided and fail to exercise full pressure on the government to discourage energy consumption. This lack of pressure explains why it is very difficult for the government to increase energy and fuel prices, as such increases primarily hit the poor. On the contrary, during a heat wave in the summer of 2018, president Moon, a former human rights lawyer, called air conditioning ‘basic welfare’ and suspended progressive electricity pricing for consumers. In December 2018, the government announced plans to completely abolish progressive electricity pricing that favors those conserving energy and makes those consuming more energy pay a higher price. Another example is the reaction of the government to the relatively brief increase of world market prices of oil in the autumn of 2018: in November 2018, the Korean government announced a reduction of the fuel tax by 15%, although fuel prices were already falling again at that point.

There are, however, also signs that environmental issues beyond global warming are emerging as major topics in public discourse. This shift can be observed in the case of fine-dust pollution, which in early 2019 became the first environmental topic dominating public discussion for a sustained period of time. Even in this case, government action remains hesitant, and President Moon only announced a temporary shutdown of four old coal-fired power plants during the period from March to June, when energy consumption is the lowest. Nevertheless, it seems to be plausible that amid the growing economic importance of green industries and the rising awareness of the problem of pollution, the environmental movement will grow in influence as well. Ultimately, the question remains as to whether the liberal camp can develop a composite of environmental protection and welfare that can compete with the ‘green growth’ agenda of the political right. Only if climate protection is connected to a systematic expansion of the welfare state will the public be willing to alter its consumption behavior and embrace the higher energy and fuel prices required for effective climate policies.