Nationalism and the strength of secessionism in Western Europe: Static and dynamic autonomy

Abstract

Contrary to the dominant expectations of the late 20th century, secessionism surged in two West European minority national communities, Catalonia and Scotland, over the last decade. Yet, in two others enjoying similar degrees of autonomy, Flanders and South Tyrol, secessionism did not gain strength. This outcome suggests that focusing on the degree of autonomy afforded to minority national communities is misplaced. This article shows that the nature of autonomy is more important than its degree for understanding the strength of secessionism. It demonstrates that the key to autonomy regimes weakening secessionism is their capacity to adjust and expand over time. Dynamic autonomy staves off secessionism while static autonomy stimulates it. The article is based on a controlled comparison of, on the one hand, Catalonia and Scotland, where autonomy regimes have been mostly static during key periods of time, and, on the other hand, Flanders and South Tyrol, where they have been dynamic.

Keywords

Nationalism secessionism autonomy

Nationalist movements were a significant force in the politics of several Western European democracies during the 20th century. Although there were always secessionist forces within these nationalist movements, they primarily pursued an autonomist rather than a secessionist agenda. By the turn of the century, secessionism appeared to be on an irremediable decline. Not only had states enacted measures to accommodate nationalist demands, but the European Union (EU) seemed to give significant incentives for nationalist movements to seek autonomy rather than independence by undermining the state, creating networks for cooperation between regional governments, and facilitating transborder cooperation. More generally, nationalist movements in Western Europe seemed to be operating in a ‘changing international order’ (McGarry and Keating, 2001) that was producing an era where softer and more ambiguous claims for self-determination than outright independence would dominate.

By the early 2010s, it appeared that the demise of secessionist nationalism in Western Europe had been exaggerated as the push to create new states continued (Lachapelle and Qvortrup, 2020). The Scottish National Party (SNP) formed a majority government in Scotland in 2011 and announced its intention to hold an independence referendum. In Catalonia, Convergència i Unió (CiU) underwent a secessionist turn that launched an external self-determination process still on-going. Yet, in other minority national communities, secessionism either failed to gain momentum or lost steam altogether. In Flanders, support for independence remained low and the Flemish nationalist party Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) entered a federal coalition in 2014 even if it meant, at least temporarily, shelving any type of self-determination claims. In South Tyrol, the 2018 elections to the provincial parliament confirmed that the small gains made by the secessionist parties in 2014 did not represent the beginning of an upward trend for secessionism.

This article tackles the puzzle of nationalist movements in Western Europe going in different directions; while Scottish and Catalan nationalism have recently witnessed a strengthening of secessionism observed by governments taking concrete steps to achieve independence through referendums, nationalism in Flanders and South Tyrol has experienced no similar outcome. The article argues that the central explanatory factor for the different paths followed by these nationalist movements is the nature of autonomy offered by their respective states. In Belgium and in Italy (at least as pertains to South Tyrol), autonomy has been dynamic insofar as the specific conditions of autonomous government, and even the larger framework, have been evolving. By contrast, autonomy in Spain and in the UK (until a few days before the 2014 Scottish referendum) has been mostly static (more static in Spain than in the UK).

The article is divided into four sections. The first discusses the puzzle of the divergent paths taken by nationalist movements in Western Europe over the last decade and explains how the nature of autonomy is the crucial explanatory factor accounting for the distinct outcomes. The second presents the case studies, first examining a strengthening of secessionism (Scotland and Catalonia) and then looking at an absence of such strengthening and even a weakening (Flanders and South Tyrol). The conclusion highlights the contribution of the article for the scholarship on nationalism.

The divergent paths of nationalist movements in Western Europe: autonomy, static and dynamic

Strong secessionist pressures have permeated Catalan and Scottish nationalism in the last decade. Catalonia’s independence referendum, considered unconstitutional by the Spanish state, represented the latest initiative of a self-determination process (Martí and Cetrà, 2016), which was the product of a secessionist turn in Catalan nationalism (Guibernau, 2013). In Scotland, the last decade witnessed a secessionist surge as the SNP rose to power and held a referendum on independence in 2014 (Keating, 2017). The surprisingly strong result of the ‘yes’ side in the referendum galvanised the SNP and the secessionist option. The strength of secessionism within these two nationalist movements was virtually unthinkable at the turn of the century for three reasons.

First, secessionism was always a minority position within each of these nationalist movements. Catalan nationalism has its historical roots in a bourgeoisie seeking autonomy for Catalonia within Spain. In the contemporary democratic era, autonomy, not independence, remained the objective during the long period of CiU political dominance. CiU’s nationalist competitor, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), which espoused secessionist positions (albeit not consistently), was the weaker of the two nationalist parties before the 2010s. In Scotland, claims for self-determination were historically focused on home-rule or, as it became known in the late 20th century, devolution. As the SNP developed a clearer secessionist position in subsequent decades, it remained ‘extremely small in terms of membership and organization’ (Lynch, 2002: 2). By the 1980s, the party joined the movement for devolution, albeit seeing autonomy as the first step towards independence. The first several years of the Scottish Parliament featured Labour-led governments. Thus, secessionist claims found very little political support in both Scotland and Catalonia as late as the mid to late 2000s.

Second, both Spain and the UK responded to nationalist claims for autonomy with accommodation measures in the 1980s and 1990s. During its democratic transition, Spain established a system of Autonomous Communities (Estado de las Autonomías) that provided Catalonia (and other units) with a measure of political autonomy as specified in a Statute of Autonomy. In the UK, devolution resulted, in the case of Scotland, in the re-establishment of a parliament.

Third, the context of the late 1990s and early 2000s appeared antithetical to secessionism in Western Europe. The EU was draining powers away from the state towards its institutions while seemingly offering opportunities for agency to minority national communities.

Adding to the puzzle of secessionism becoming stronger within Catalan and Scottish nationalism is that not all nationalist movements in Western Europe experienced such a development. For example, no similar move to actively seek independence occurred amongst South Tyrol’s German-speaking population (where secessionist and irredentist claims had led to violence a few decades earlier) (Grote, 2012) or in Flanders, despite multiple political crises involving government formation. The absence of strong secessionist pressures in South Tyrol and Flanders in the context of a recent strengthening of secessionism in Catalonia and Scotland adds to the puzzle.

The contrast in outcomes eliminates potential explanations that would make sense if the cases of Catalonia and Scotland were considered on their own. For example, the fiscal and economic crisis of 2008 seemed to be an important part of both stories of secessionist growth. In Spain, the crisis was severe, and Catalonia was one of the hardest hit Autonomous Communities. In the UK, the conservative-led government of David Cameron implemented austerity measures that included major social policy cuts. Looking only at Catalonia and Scotland, one could invoke the difficulties of the EU or the rise of populism in Europe to account for the strengthening of secessionism. However, if all these forces, which were Europe-wide, had played the crucial role in stimulating secessionism in Catalonia and Scotland, there would presumably have been a similar development in other West European minority national communities such as Flanders and South Tyrol. There was not.

Therefore, the explanation for distinct outcomes in, on the one hand, Catalonia and Scotland, and, on the other hand, Flanders and South Tyrol, has to be related to the state. The Spanish and British states necessarily have something in common (at least in relation to Catalonia and Scotland respectively) that is different from something shared by the Belgian and Italian states in their relations with Flanders and South Tyrol respectively. This directs us to the centrepiece of the liberal-democratic state’s accommodation strategy: territorial political autonomy. Territorial autonomy is viewed in the literature as ‘a mechanism for accommodating nationality demands without provoking secession and countersecession’ (Keating, 2015: 141). The basic case for autonomy as a nationalist management strategy is simple: nationalist movements want it. Indeed, ‘[I]t is this promise of autonomy that has brought federalism to the forefront of conflict management around the world’ (Hueglin and Fenna, 2015: 3). Through the decentralisation of policy fields considered by a minority national community to be of vital importance to its development, autonomy can minimise conflict between that community and the majority community (or the state) (Ghai and Woodman, 2013; Lapidoth, 1996).

However, autonomy has not been sufficient to extinguish secessionist pressures in liberal-democracies. Catalonia and Scotland are examples of minority national communities where the secessionist streams of nationalist movements have thrived in the context of substantial autonomy. And, there are good reasons to believe that providing minority national communities with extensive autonomy does not reduce secessionist pressures.

Minority national communities that have experienced strong secessionist pressures enjoy a high degree of autonomy. A useful tool for assessing levels of autonomy is the Regional Authority Index (RAI) (Hooghe et al., 2016). The RAI offers a self-rule score built from an assessment of a region in relation to different criteria. The self-rule score of the four cases considered in this article shows not only extensive, but also similar degrees of, autonomy. How can we explain the strong secessionist push in Catalonia and Scotland and the weakness of secessionist claims in Flanders and South Tyrol when the degree of autonomy of these four governments is virtually the same? The only possible conclusion is that the strength of secessionism is not a function of the degree of autonomy.

If the degree of autonomy does not affect the strength of secessionism, perhaps its nature does. This article makes a distinction about autonomy rooted in temporality. It distinguishes between static autonomy, which corresponds to permanent, unchangeable autonomy arrangements, and dynamic autonomy, that is, autonomy arrangements that are, or can be, progressively enhanced and/or laterally adjusted in time to changing circumstances. An autonomy that is static (a final and definitive settlement) is more likely to stimulate secessionism than a dynamic autonomy (an arrangement that is adjusted and/or expanded in time). Indeed, if nationalist parties have good reasons to believe that autonomy can be improved in the future, they have less of an incentive to adopt strong secessionist positions than if they think the existing autonomy arrangement is a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. However, if nationalist parties have good reasons to believe that the autonomy regime is a final settlement, then change to the constitutional status of the minority national community can only come with independence, and these parties can more easily argue that the state is incapable of responding to that community. Their argument that their community is suffering becomes more plausible. In these conditions, secessionism strengthens.

There are at least two scenarios that would lead citizens of a minority national community to consider autonomy dynamic as opposed to static. The first is that autonomy has evolved in the recent past or, in other words, that there exists a precedent, perhaps even over decades, of adjustments being made to the community’s autonomy. When such a precedent exists, autonomy is likely to be viewed as an on-going and open-ended process as opposed to a final, unchangeable settlement. The second is a credible commitment by the state to such an approach. Even in the absence of precedents for evolving autonomy, citizens may still consider autonomy dynamic if they have good reasons to believe it may be adjusted and expanded in the future. The credibility of such a commitment hinges on past discourses and policies from the political actors making it, and on the specification of a process for change. Moreover, for a commitment to dynamic autonomy to be credible, it needs to be strongly endorsed by at least one of the main political parties in the minority national community. In the absence of at least one of these scenarios, autonomy is seen as static. Of course, static and dynamic autonomy are best viewed as two ends of a continuum rather than discrete categories. Autonomy can be more or less static, and more or less dynamic.

In short, dynamic autonomy, in the form of a series of adjustments (political or constitutional) to autonomous powers, already begun or expected, reduces the incentives for members of a minority national community to support independence. By adapting to the evolution of the community’s identity and interests (as defined by nationalist leaders), autonomy that is dynamic maximises the chances that its members think they are better off politically, culturally and economically within the state than as an independent country.¹ On the contrary, static autonomy, that is, autonomy that neither expands nor adjusts in time, generates incentives for members of a minority national community to support independence. Evolution in the community’s identity (in its expression, conceptualisation, importance, etc.) and in the definition of its interests leaves static autonomy arrangements incongruent with the minority national community’s socio-political order. As the governments of minority national communities unsuccessfully seek enhancement or adjustment in their autonomy arrangement, a ‘collective impatience’ develops that makes the situation ripe for radical politics such as secessionism (Basta, 2020).

While there is agency to what type of autonomy states provide an internal minority community, there are also structural factors that condition the likelihood of static or dynamic autonomy being implemented. Static autonomy is likely when the internal national community is a central and significant part of the country’s population, economy and politics, or when the nationalism of the state tends towards a mononational understanding of the country. Dynamic autonomy is more likely when the internal national community is peripheral to the country from a demographic, economic and political perspective, or when state nationalism embraces a multinational view of the country.

Secessionism and autonomy in four Western European minority national communities

We now look to solve the puzzle of the divergent paths of nationalist movements in Western Europe through a controlled comparative analysis (Slater and Ziblatt, 2013) conducted using process-tracing (Beach and Pederson, 2013). That analysis features two pairs of cases treated in the most similar systems design. The two pairs (Catalonia and Scotland; Flanders and South Tyrol) share many important features: these minority national communities are within Western European states that are members of the EU, and they all enjoy a similar level of territorial autonomy. Yet the last decade has witnessed in Catalonia and Scotland a major push for secession that has been absent in Flanders and South Tyrol.² To explain the difference in outcomes, we focus on one important difference: the nature of autonomy.

Catalonia and Scotland

Catalan nationalism was always overwhelmingly autonomist (Balcells, 1995), and Catalan political parties were initially satisfied with the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. Through the 1980s and 1990s, CiU, which headed all the Catalan governments, maintained an autonomist discourse. Beginning in the 1990s, some discontent towards the Estado de las Autonomías began to emerge. At the broadest level, the complaint was that the system had failed to evolve in a way that enabled the Catalan government to exercise the powers it deemed necessary to the cultural, social and economic growth of Catalonia. Catalan nationalists argued that Catalonia’s powers were unduly curtailed by the Spanish government; that the system suffered from excessive fiscal centralisation; that Autonomous Communities were unable to interact meaningfully with the EU; and that the Spanish state was stuck in a ‘one and indivisible nation’ mindset that prevented any recognition of a Catalan nation (Requejo, 2005). In the 1992 Catalan elections, ERC took a clear stance in favour of independence. The strategy was only mildly successful as ERC increased its support but could not surpass 10% of the vote at Catalan elections. A clear secessionist position was failing to attract much support (Elias, 2015: 87).

The chances of reforming the Catalan Statute of Autonomy were virtually inexistent between 1996 and 2004 as the Spanish government was formed by the Partido Popular (PP). The PP’s Aznar government conveyed a static understanding of autonomy, although its minority position in parliament between 1996 and 2000 forced it to make punctual ‘concessions’ for increased autonomy, including to Catalonia, in exchange for parliamentary support from nationalist parties. This trade-off, which occurred only in situations of parliamentary minority, has been the lone source of dynamism for Catalan autonomy. The PP only moved on autonomy when forced to do it. Otherwise, it extolled the virtues of the 1978 Constitution and everything related to it, including the Statutes of Autonomy, seemingly viewing them as the perennial bases for the new, democratic and prosperous Spain.

The formation of a Socialist-led government in Madrid in 2004 opened a window for a reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy (Colino, 2009). An agreement on the reform of the Statute of Autonomy was reached and supported by both the Catalan and Spanish Parliaments. The reform was put to a referendum in Catalonia, where it was backed by over 73% of voters.

For a very short time, it seemed that Catalan autonomy could evolve more significantly than through forced ‘concessions’, that it had some real measure of dynamism. However, the potential effect that the reformed Statute could have had in stemming the tide of discontent over the Estado de las Autonomías in Catalonia was almost immediately negated by the PP taking the reformed Statute to the Spanish Constitutional Court, arguing that half of its content was unconstitutional. The mere fact that the reformed Statute was the subject of a legal challenge after all the proper steps had been taken elicited much anger in Catalonia (Guibernau, 2013: 381). Few people expected that the Spanish Constitutional Court would uphold the entirety of the reformed Statute so pressure on ERC and, especially, CiU to announce their position if the new Statute could not be enacted as agreed began to mount. Although both parties wavered in their discourse between 2006 and 2010, suggestions that a judgment unfavourable to the reformed Statute would represent some kind of end of the road for Catalonia within the Estado de las Autonomías began to emerge (Basta, 2018: 1256).

The Spanish Constitutional Court’s judgment rendered on 10 July 2010 annulled or interpreted narrowly many of the provisions of the Statute. The judgment firmly established the static nature of Catalonia’s autonomy. As such, it represented a transformative event in the evolution of Catalan nationalism (Basta, 2018); indeed, to protest against the notion that change was impossible, over a million Catalans took to the street to assert Catalonia’s nationhood and its ‘right to decide’. The sheer size and intensity of nationalist mobilisation unleashed by the judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court quickly made CiU’s traditional autonomist nationalism untenable. After CiU leader Artur Mas failed, in 2012, to convince Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy to endow Catalonia with greater fiscal autonomy, and in the context of massive demonstrations now focusing squarely on independence, the dominant political party of Catalonia adopted a secessionist position.

From that moment on, reversing the secessionist turn of Catalan nationalism was unlikely since the Spanish state never hinted at the possibility that Catalonia’s autonomy could evolve. In fact, as Catalan secessionist governments sought to hold a self-determination referendum, the state responded by declaring such exercise unconstitutional. The secessionist drive of the Catalan government, far from eliciting a willingness to negotiate autonomy, was met by the use of coercive powers and the suspension, albeit temporary, of Catalonia’s autonomy through article 155 of the Spanish Constitution. This reaction further narrowed the path of Catalan nationalism towards secessionism as Catalan society underwent a quick and profound dichotomisation between supporters and opponents of independence. In this context, little room was left for autonomist nationalism.

Secessionism was historically as marginal in Scotland as in Catalonia. The first century and a half of post-Union Scotland was virtually absent of any self-determination claims (Harvie and Jones, 2000: 34). In the late 20th century, Scottish nationalism was focused on the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament, an objective supported by the SNP and achieved in 1999.

From the perspective of Westminster, devolution to Scotland was understood as a new but fixed political order. It was a ‘settlement’ (Cairney, 2011: ix). Indeed, devolution did not come with a blueprint for, or a commitment towards, future adjustments or an expansion of Scottish autonomy. Nor was there any precedent in the history of Scotland within the Union suggesting that devolution was simply the first step in a series of constitutional and institutional changes related to Scottish autonomy. Of course, there were those in Scotland who felt that devolution was the beginning of a sequence of political and institutional transformations towards greater decentralisation (Cairney, 2011: ix), but this position was never validated by the UK government. At the same time, and contrary to Spain, the UK government did not insist that the devolution arrangement was set in stone. While in Spain there were forceful statements that autonomy was static, this position was never expressed as strongly in the UK, although the idea that devolution constituted a final settlement was the dominant view in Westminster.

The notion of devolution as a final settlement rapidly came up against the new political configuration generated by Scottish autonomy. One key element of this new configuration was a re-shaping of the party system in Scotland, which included the SNP acquiring notable political importance. With devolution, the SNP was able to articulate its ‘Scotland first’ discourse, including its stand on independence, in a setting where it would be impactful. Another historical difficulty for the SNP was that Scotland was dominated by Labour, with the Conservatives also representing a significant political force until the Thatcher years. Making headway in the British two-party system was difficult. In the new Scottish political system, the SNP could benefit from the unpopularity in Scotland of the Conservatives as well as from the Scots’ scepticism of the Labour party’s move towards the right.

Devolution also changed the politics of self-determination in Scotland insofar as the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament provided for the possibility of a referendum on independence. Prior to devolution, the SNP stated that it would declare Scotland an independent country when it won a majority of Scottish seats at Westminster. This scenario was always highly improbable. With a Scottish Parliament, a clearer ‘constitutional path to Scottish independence’ emerged: the SNP would commit to holding a referendum on independence during Scottish election campaigns (MacCormick, 2000: 722).

Thus, with devolution, the SNP became, with Labour, one of the two major parties in Scotland, and it could use the referendum as a tool to achieve its secessionist objectives. Disappointment with its results in the first two Scottish elections led the SNP to emphasise more significantly the static nature of Scottish autonomy, or how Scotland was ‘held back’³ by Westminster, for the 2007 Scottish election. Benefitting from dissatisfaction towards Labour, the SNP then formed a minority government after the 2007 Scottish elections, only to win a majority of seats in 2011, putting the party in a position to hold a referendum on independence.

As a response to the SNP’s promotion of independence following the formation of its first government, unionist parties in Scotland formed a commission (the Commission on Scottish Devolution) whose mandate was to review the provisions of the Scotland Act 1998 in light of the first few years of devolution and to recommend appropriate changes. Facing a threat from the SNP, these parties sought to enhance Scottish autonomy. The Commission on Scottish Devolution was a Scottish initiative opposed by the SNP Scottish government, which meant that the impact of its work was uncertain, especially with British elections on the horizon. The Commission’s final report, issued in 2009, recommended, among other things, an increase in Scotland’s fiscal powers. Although the Conservative-led government formed in Westminster in 2010 committed to implementing the recommendations of the Commission, the reform of devolution was approved by Westminster only in 2012 (through the Scotland Act 2012) at a time when the SNP had already formed a majority government, thereby eliminating most its moderating effects.

Westminster fully endorsed a static view of Scottish autonomy as the SNP considered a multi-option referendum question where voters would choose between independence, the status quo and further devolution.

The SNP government’s main objective over the months following the 2011 election was to win support to include a ‘more powers’ option on the ballot paper in the referendum (. . .). In 2011, the SNP supported a third option on the ballot paper as an insurance policy. It wanted to ensure that more powers would be won even if independence was defeated. (Mitchell, 2016: 80–81)

The British government, however, was adamant it would only accept a yes/no question on independence, suspecting that any other option would get plurality support and, therefore, force change towards increased power for the Scottish Parliament. Also, ‘[P]olls suggested that a straight contest between independence and the status quo would be an opportunity to defeat, possibly humiliate, the SNP’ (Mitchell, 2016: 81).

For the British government, accepting a ‘further devolution’ option would have meant treating Scottish autonomy as strongly dynamic, that is, as an evolving process rather than a settlement. Forcing a ‘yes/no’ question suggested that the existing autonomy framework was a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.

The independence referendum was a transformative event for Scottish nationalism for many reasons (McEwen and Keating, 2017). First, it produced a level of nationalist mobilisation never seen before (Mitchell, 2016: 90). Such participation and mobilisation was particularly visible on the ‘yes’ side. Second, the referendum fully legitimised a self-determination option, independence, that had been historically marginal as it brought it to the forefront of the Scottish political debate like never before. Third, the SNP came out of the referendum strengthened by the better-than-expected result despite the defeat of the ‘yes’ side 45% to 55%. While it is impossible to know exactly how a campaign conducted on a multi-option question would have unfolded, it is safe to think that the presence of an option for increased autonomy (i.e. a clear signal by the UK government that Scottish autonomy was dynamic, that it could be augmented) would have reduced mobilisation for independence. Ironically, in the last few days of the campaign, as there seemed to be a chance that the ‘yes’ side could win, the leaders of the three main British political parties made a common ‘vow’ that, among other things, the powers of the Scottish Parliament would be expanded if Scots rejected independence (Clegg, 2014). However, the politics of self-determination had already been transformed by the referendum campaign: secessionism was strengthened, as was the SNP.

Despite many important differences in the way the Spanish and British states managed Catalan and Scottish nationalism respectively (most notably, the UK recognised as constitutional a referendum on independence whereas Spain did not), the two countries saw a similar strengthening of secessionism within these nationalist movements. This similar outcome is the product of a common conception and operationalisation of autonomy as mostly static (although autonomy was more static in Catalonia than in Scotland) in the 2000s and early 2010s. In Spain, the state considered that the changes sought by Catalan governments to the Catalan Statute of Autonomy were unconstitutional, leaving virtually no room for the Statute to be adapted and expanded. In the UK, the view in Westminster that devolution was a final settlement and the related insistence of the British government that a referendum involve a choice between independence and the status quo produced a period when secession seemed the only option for change. Constitutional changes in the aftermath of the Scottish referendum stemming from the vow have provided some dynamism to Scottish autonomy. No similar development occurred in Spain where the dominant political discourse in Madrid was either about the status quo on autonomy or a re-centralisation of the system of Autonomous Communities (Muro, 2014).⁴

Flanders and South Tyrol

The strong secessionist pushes in Catalonia and Scotland have no equivalent in Flanders where ‘the desire for independence remains marginal and pro-independence mobilizations and social movements well-nigh absent’ (Huysseune, 2017: 353). Yet the early development of Flemish nationalism shares a key feature with that of the two others insofar as the Flemish Movement was overwhelmingly autonomist. By the 1960s, the relationship between the Francophone and Flemish communities had seriously deteriorated, and a series of political crises seemed to open the way for a strengthening of secessionism within Flemish nationalism.

In 1970, Flemish and Francophone politicians agreed to a reform of the state, which represents a turning point in the evolution of nationalism in Flanders (Deschouwer, 2006: 900). The crucial importance of this autonomist reform for Flemish nationalism stemmed primarily from the fact that it did not represent a comprehensive, definitive constitutional and institutional settlement. As such, politicians were not only leaving room for, but indeed rendering likely, further reforms at a later time. The political elite of the country ‘did not in the first place defend far-reaching devolution or the implementation of a fully-fledged federalism. They rather tried to contain the ethno-linguistic conflict, and removing some contentious competencies from the centre seemed a good way to do this’ (Deschouwer, 2006: 901). The 1970 reform of the state also featured the adoption of consociational governing practices involving the two main language communities. These practices would ensure the occurrence of regular state reforms as sought by many Flemish parties since Francophone parties, which tended to favour the status quo, would often need to agree to change on autonomy for governments to be formed. Thus, the first reform of the state, which featured an agreement to create in Belgium three Communities and three Regions, contained the seeds of further reforms, thereby setting in motion Flemish autonomy.

The second reform of the state in 1980 was no more a definitive settlement than the first one. Although Flemish and Francophone parties agreed to strengthen the powers of Communities and to establish Flanders and Wallonia as Regions while providing them with policy-making powers, on the status and borders of Brussels within a decentralising Belgian state they ‘agreed to disagree’ (Covell, 1982) and to tackle that issue at a later time. The third reform of the state, prompted by a political crisis around Voeren/Fourons, transformed Brussels into a Belgian Region, provided protection for its Flemish minority, and permanently established its borders. It also foreshadowed another reform since ‘[I]n the ambitious agreement of May 1988, a separate chapter described a series of reforms on which the coalition parties agreed, but for which the details had to be worked out later’ (Falter, 1998: 189). In other words, a fourth reform of the state was expected to follow the third. Once again, a developing political crisis precipitated the next constitutional change. This time, Flemish left-wing parties were blocking an arms sales deal to Saudi Arabia, from which Walloon factories would have profited. As tension built and Flemish public opinion on the future of Flanders hardened, seven parties (including the Flemish nationalist party Volksunie) agreed to a fourth reform of the state, which involved the proclamation of Belgium as a federal state.

The formal transformation of Belgium into a federation did not render Flemish autonomy static. Less than a decade later, a fifth reform of the state (in 2001) provided Regions with increased fiscal autonomy while decentralising agriculture and international trade as per the wishes of the Flemish parties.

At the turn of the century, a change in the Flemish party system threatened to strengthen secessionism in Flanders: the disintegration of Volksunie. A victim of its own success as it achieved its original programme of federalism, Volksunie was dissolved in 2001 with many of its members forming a new, more ideologically coherent right-of-centre party, N-VA. The rise of the N-VA contributed to the beginning of a crisis of governability in Belgium (Swenden, 2015) that opened a window for secessionism to make headway. It took nearly one year for a new government to be formed after the 2007 federal elections, while the 2011 federal election did not produce a government for 18 months. Linguistic tensions were re-surfacing in the form of the Flemish demand to split the bilingual electoral riding of Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde (BHV). Once again, a reform of the state, the sixth, which included the decentralisation of family allowances, relieved the pressure and kept secessionism marginal.

Despite multiple political crises in the last several decades, no secessionist turn comparable to what unfolded in Scotland and Catalonia has happened in Flanders. In fact, no significant Flemish political party has a concrete and immediate plan to achieve independence,⁵ and there has been no mobilisation in favour of secession. Belgium’s on-going and open-ended process of decentralisation provides massive disincentives for Flemish political parties to actively seek secession. State reforms are constitutive of Belgian politics; they are high-profile events, discussed in federal election campaigns, and negotiated between Francophone and Flemish parties during processes of government formation. They occur at regular intervals, and every reform sets up a next one. In this context where it is all but assured that Flemish autonomy will keep developing, Flemings who want change do not have to support secessionism.

In South Tyrol, secessionism, often of an irredentist variety, used to be strong, an unsurprising fact considering the primarily German-speaking territory was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until it was transferred to Italy in the 1919 peace treaty of St Germain. In the mid 1950s, nationalism within South Tyrol’s German-speaking population

comprised all the traditional elements of national Risorgimento, both in its political aim (separation from Italy and self-determination from South Tyrol) and in its choice of political instruments (rejection of the political parties, fermenting of frustrations and the beginning of paramilitary action). (Grote, 2012: 91)

In the 1960s, there was further strengthening of secessionism and irredentism, including violent actions. Yet, a few decades later, secessionist and irredentist claims were all but gone, and the Alpine territory was continuing its ‘path from external to internal self-determination’ (Alber, 2015: 274).

Autonomy was one of the tools chosen by the Italian state to manage South Tyrol after World War II. After an agreement on the parameters of South Tyrol’s treatment by the Italian state was signed by Italy and Austria in 1946 (the Gruber–DeGasperi Agreement), the 1948 Italian Constitution created 20 regions, including five with a special autonomous status. One of these regions was Trentino-Alto Adige, which included the mainly Italian-speaking province of Trentino and primarily German-speaking South Tyrol. This First Autonomy Statute for South Tyrol (1948) did not succeed in moderating nationalism. Not only were Italian-speakers a majority (71%) in the new region, but the Statute was presented as a final settlement. ‘[W]ith these provisions, Italy considered the Gruber–Degasperi Agreement as being fulfilled’ (Lantschner, 2008: 15). The autonomy offered to South Tyrol by the First Autonomy Statute was static.

The failure of the First Autonomy Statute to quell secessionism and irredentism led to the formulation of a Second Statute of Autonomy (1972), which was approved by the main political party in German-speaking South Tyrol, the Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP). This Second Autonomy Statute conferred autonomy primarily to the provinces of Trentino and Bolzano/Bozen (South Tyrol). It also created a model of dynamic autonomy:

The most significant difference to 1946 (. . .) was a guaranteed scheme of implementation of these provisions in a follow-up catalogue, the so-called ‘Durchführungsbestimmungen.’ This meant that the full autonomy would not be immediately effective. It came in gradually over the following years and depended heavily on the political relationship between Rome and Bozen/Bolzano, as this determined the speed of the implementation. (Grote, 2012: 11)

Initially, the timetable for the full implementation of the Second Autonomy Statute was two years. In reality, the process was much slower; only in 1992 did all the relevant actors (including Austria) consider the Statute fully implemented. The Second Autonomy Statute featured institutions that would keep generating dynamism into South Tyrolean autonomy going forward: the Commission of Twelve and the Commission of Six.

The Commission of Twelve was tasked with implementing autonomy measures related to the region of Trentino-Alto Adige while the Commission of Six deals strictly with the autonomy of South Tyrol, which means it has had a more crucial role in mitigating secessionism. The Commission of Six’s membership follows two rules of parity: between South Tyrol and the Italian state (each nominate three members) and between German and Italian speakers.⁶ It de facto works by consensus, which guarantees that its decisions on the implementation of autonomy measures in South Tyrol have the support of its two main language groups as well as of the Italian state. The consensual nature of the Commission of Six helped it develop as a trusted institution for guiding the development of South Tyrol’s autonomy (Palermo, 2008: 145). Through the 1970s and 1980s, the work of this commission in implementing the content of the Second Autonomy Statute gave South Tyrol’s autonomy a dynamic character.

The SVP became closely wedded to this incremental process for implementing the new autonomous measures. Already recognised as the main political voice for the German-speaking population of South Tyrol when the implementation of the Second Autonomy Statute began, the SVP reaped the political rewards stemming from the benefits the new autonomous measures brought German speakers (Pallaver, 2017: 117). There was, therefore, very little political space or incentive to articulate secessionist claims as the Second Autonomy Statute was gradually implemented.

A crucial feature of the post-1992 relationship between South Tyrol and the Italian state is a shared understanding that all parties considering the Second Autonomy Statute fully implemented did not mean the end of the development of autonomy. Autonomy was conceived as dynamic. As a result, adjustments in South Tyrol’s autonomy remained on-going, as room was left to adapt policies in various realms to changing circumstances. At the centre of the workings of this dynamic autonomy is the Commission of Six, whose enactment decrees are, in the Italian legal order, superior to the ordinary legislations of the Italian Parliament and only subordinate to the Constitution (Palermo, 2008: 147). The enactment decrees of the two commissions have been used to ‘substantially change the provisions of the ASt or to overrule judicial rulings’ (Palermo, 2008: 149).

Dynamic autonomy is not just a legal and intergovernmental reality in South Tyrol. It has become engrained in partisan politics through the SVP, which adopted it as a slogan. The SVP developed a reputation for being the ‘mother and guardian of autonomy’ (Pallaver, 2017: 117). In this process, the party eschewed support for secession and re-integration with Austria. In turn, the concept of dynamic autonomy gained considerable legitimacy by being endorsed by the hegemonic party of German speakers. The SVP promoting the notion of dynamic autonomy meant it was widely diffused in this population. In these circumstances where German speakers could expect South Tyrol’s autonomy to keep adjusting and expanding, there was little incentive to support secessionist or irredentist positions.

Dynamic autonomy was helped by Austria’s integration into the EU in 1995. From 1995 on, part of the evolution of South Tyrol’s autonomy could conceivably come in the form of a Euroregion encompassing, among others, South and North Tyrol. In 1998, Tyrol-Alto-Adige/South Tyrol-Trentino was proclaimed a Euroregion, and, in 2011, the Euroregion was formally established as a European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) by the EU, providing it with its own legal personality and headquarters in Bolzano-Bozen. For the SVP, the process of constructing a Euroregion that included Austrian Tyrol could aid in undermining the Italian state by generating new space for political action (Crepaz, 2014: 82). The European dimension, therefore, represented another way in which South Tyrol’s autonomy could evolve.

By 2013, some chinks were showing in the SVP’s armour. That year, the party failed, for the first time since World War II, to garner an absolute majority of the 35 seats in the provincial legislature (it came one shy). Two other German-speaking parties then on the rise, Die Freiheitlichen (a far-right populist party) and Süd-Tiroler Freiheit (a traditional nationalist party), showed inclination towards secessionism.

To keep South Tyrol’s autonomy on the move, the Provincial Council of South Tyrol initiated, in 2016, an Autonomy Convention designed to collect ideas about a formal revision of the Second Autonomy Statute. The Autonomy Convention was presented as a participatory process whereby South Tyroleans could discuss the future of their autonomy (Larin and Röggla, 2019). The Convention’s main report made several recommendations (for example, on Tyrol’s relationship with the Italian state and the EU), which were expected to form the basis of the further development of South Tyrol’s autonomy. Although the Convention was used to express many different points of view, including secessionist and irredentist ones, these types of claims have remained marginal, thanks to an expandable and adjustable autonomy.⁷

Conclusion

This article makes at least five contributions to the literature on nationalism. The first is to highlight the importance of the interplay between nationalist movements and the state for understanding the strength of secessionism. Understanding nationalism requires an appreciation of the ‘ongoing interaction between a national order and those who seek to overturn or alter that order’ (Beissinger, 2002: 19). The literature on nationalism has effectively emphasised the importance of the state (Breuilly, 1994; Hechter, 2001; Keating, 2002) but many case studies tilt analytically towards the nationalist movements, or the larger internal national communities, as they explore their claims. This article offers an approach to studying nationalist movements, and more specifically to explaining how and why they become more or less secessionist, that places analytical primacy on the state, more particularly on its autonomy arrangements.

The second is to emphasise temporality in the accommodation of nationalist movement as the key dimension for explaining why nationalism sometimes becomes strongly secessionist while at other times it does not. Temporality has been central to the scholarship on nationalism but not so much to the study of autonomy arrangements and how they impact secessionism. Yet the relative strength of secessionism within a nationalist movement is not the product of specific socio-economic conditions or levels of autonomy. ‘Variable-centred’ approaches to secessionism typically rely on many different factors difficult to integrate into a coherent explanation (Ayres and Saideman, 2000; Sorens, 2005). This article offers an approach that focuses on the evolution (or not) of autonomy arrangements in time and allows for the formulation of an elegant and powerful explanation.

The third is to highlight the divided nature of nationalist movements. Internal national communities are divided since some political actors present themselves as ‘nationalists’ and look to achieve self-determination objectives while others do not. In addition, nationalist movements themselves are divided into streams. This article shows the division between autonomist and secessionist nationalists, as it looks for why and how the relative importance of these two streams varies in time and across space. In so doing, the article speaks to the flawed ontological view of considering internal national communities, and even nationalist movements, as monolithic and, therefore, to the theoretical and analytical dangers of methodological nationalism.

The fourth contribution is a conceptual innovation about autonomy. Autonomy is multidimensional, and it requires some unpacking. For understanding the strength of secessionism of nationalist movements, the nature of autonomy is more important than its degree or particular design. For this reason, this article makes a distinction rooted in temporality. It distinguishes between static autonomy, which corresponds to permanent, unchangeable autonomy arrangements, and dynamic autonomy, that is, autonomy arrangements that are, or can be, progressively enhanced and/or adjusted in time. This conceptual distinction represents the building blocks for offering a proposition about secessionism in liberal-democracies that could be used for theory-building.

Such proposition is the fifth contribution of this article. In a nutshell, this proposition is that static autonomy stimulates secessionism while dynamic autonomy, whether it comes from the constitutional avenue (as is the case for Flanders) or political-administrative sources (as in South Tyrol), staves it off. Static autonomy places members of an internal national community before only two self-determination options: independence and the status quo. As such, it generates incentives for supporting secessionism. Dynamic autonomy involves self-determination options other than independence and the status quo, in the form of increased or adjusted autonomy. As a result, dynamic autonomy reduces incentives for supporting secession. Hence, from a policy perspective, autonomy that is subject to either lateral adjustments to changing circumstances or progressive enhancement is a better nationalist management strategy than autonomy that comes in the form of a definitive settlement.

Footnotes

Funding

The author thanks the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its funding of this research.

ORCID iD

André Lecours

Notes

Author biography

André Lecours is Professor in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa. His main research interests are nationalism and federalism. He is the editor of New Institutionalism. Theory and Analysis published by the University of Toronto Press in 2005, the author of Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State (University of Nevada Press, 2007) and the co-author (with Daniel Béland) of Nationalism and Social Policy. The Politics of Territorial Solidarity (Oxford University Press, 2008).

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