The reaction time of financial markets presently constitutes one of the major challenges facing the state. Using the results of a qualitative research study, this article formulates and discusses an hypothesis concerning the short-termism of financial markets by presenting an analysis of the temporal horizons and cognitive maps of actors who “make or break” prices on emerging markets. Behind the power of the market hides a multitude of actors, analysts, strategists, economists, and portfolio managers who constitute a veritable epistemic community with its own dynamic of opportunity and constraint. The aim in this article is to unravel the various strands in the tapestry that weaves the interactions of those who “make the market.” It is not embroidered by the invisible hand of God, or the devil, but, more simply, by the unceasing anticipations and interactions of a myriad of analysts and investors who draw their breath from Wall Street.
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