Abstract
Previous research in industrialized countries finds that attitudes toward gender equality are affected by family-related transitions as young adults with egalitarian attitudes based on growing equality between the sexes in the public sphere of education and work encounter a much less equal situation in the private sphere of the family. Sweden, however, is a society known for its emphasis on gender equality in the family. This study examines the effect of family transitions on attitudes toward gender equality, asking whether egalitarian attitudes can withstand changing family transitions in Sweden. Using longitudinal data from the Young Adult Panel Study, we examine six different family transitions and three measures of attitudes toward gender equality for men and women, with only three significant findings across 18 coefficients. We conclude that most Swedish young adults possess “enduring attitudes,” likely because there is strong state support for families and gender sharing in the private sphere.
Introduction
Changing attitudes toward gender equality have been the focus of much research over the past few decades. There has been an increase in rejection of traditional gender ideology in the United States and across European countries (Scott, 2006) and even in Sweden, where there was already a low level of support for the male breadwinner model, there was a further decrease in support in the early 2000s (Lück, 2005). However, there is a major exception to this growth in egalitarian attitudes: Transitions to the family roles of partner and parent have been regularly found to reinforce gendered attitudes, as the newly married and new parents become more supportive of a provider–carer division of labor between men and women. Often called “the stalled revolution” or “incomplete revolution” (e.g., England, 2010; Esping-Andersen, 2009), it has become clear that the move toward gender equality has been uneven, much more rapid in the public sphere of politics, education, and employment than in the private sphere of the home.
We prefer to think of recent trends in gender relationships and structures in the family as the second, or familistic, half of the gender revolution (Goldscheider, Bernhardt, & Lappegård, 2015). In the first half, women joined men in the new opportunities for family and self-support in the labor market. In the second half, just now under way, men are beginning to join women in the tasks of making a home and raising children. During the first half, with growing egalitarianism in the public sphere but little change in the division of labor within the family, family transitions into marriage and parenthood were likely to cause considerable strain due to work/family conflict, which pressures people to adjust their gender attitudes in a more traditional direction. In the second half, however, as men increasingly share unpaid work, particularly increasing their time on child care, to offset women’s increased paid work (Bianchi, 2011; Hook, 2006), family transitions may be less likely to weaken egalitarian attitudes, particularly in situations where public policy supports families by providing paid parental leave and high quality, low-cost childcare. This should especially be the case in Sweden, where the second half of the gender revolution is well advanced both in terms of state support and paternal involvement (Goldscheider et al., 2015; Oláh & Bernhardt, 2008).
The current study examines the influence of family transitions, including moving in with a partner, getting married, separating or getting divorced, and having children, on changes in attitudes toward gender equality in Sweden. We use the Swedish Young Adult Panel Survey, which allows us to address these issues on a longitudinal basis. First, we have survey data from two waves, spanning 6 years during young adulthood, in which individuals are undergoing various family transitions. We are thus able to test directly whether changes in family status result in changing attitudes. Second, this study goes beyond previous research in considering multiple measures of attitudes toward gender equality. We consider attitudes toward gender equality across three dimensions: work, family, and work–family intersections. We also have detailed data on union formation and dissolution as well as childbearing. Finally, our focus on Sweden allows us to determine whether attitudes toward gender equality are stable or not in a highly egalitarian country. As Sweden is a country with policies that provide strong support for families (Oláh & Bernhardt, 2008), some of which have been in place for more than a generation, it seems probable that unlike the experience of young adults assuming family roles in countries with little if any support for families, such as the United States, the experience of family role change in Sweden should be linked with little or no change in attitudes toward gender equality.
Theoretical Background and Previous Research
A common definition of an attitude is the one formulated by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), namely a predisposition to respond to a particular object in a generally favorable or unfavorable way. Attitudes can be more or less stable over time. Schwarz (2007) discusses whether people have enduring attitudes or construct automatic and deliberate evaluative judgments on the spot. Although there is a fairly extensive literature on changes over time in many types of attitudes, mostly by psychologists (for reviews of this research area, see Eagly & Chaiken, 2005; Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997), they have not studied attitudes toward gender equality. Hence, in this article, we focus on attitudes to gender equality and to what extent individuals become more or less egalitarian in their attitudes, following different changes in family status.
Gender-related attitudes have been the focus of substantial research for the past several decades (Cherlin & Walters, 1981; Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2011; Giele & Holst, 2004; Mason & Lu, 1988; Scott, Alwin, & Braun, 1996; Zuo & Tang, 2000). Braun (2008) points to the difficulties involved in developing good measurement instruments for “gender egalitarianism” and claims that most existing surveys focus exclusively on the role of women (in the family or in the work place), ignoring men. It is also clear that it is necessary to distinguish between gender equality in the public and private spheres. Results of studies looking at the consequences of holding egalitarian attitudes measured in terms of the public sphere are often quite different from those that measure attitudes in the private sphere (e.g., Goldscheider, Oláh, & Puur, 2010). Our study examines attitudes toward the public sphere (work), the private sphere (family), and the intersection of these two spheres (work–family).
Furthermore, many studies of attitudes toward gender equality link them to family statuses, and many use cross-sectional data. For example, married people have been found to be less supportive of gender equality (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004) and instead tend to be more supportive of traditional family roles (Gubernskaya, 2010), particularly men with higher breadwinner status (Cha & Thébaud, 2009; Zuo, 2004). Pitt and Borland (2008) find that being single is associated with more liberal attitudes. Moreover, divorced women have been shown to hold more egalitarian attitudes than married women in the United States (Forste & Heaton, 2004). Similarly, several studies find a relationship between being parents and holding more traditional attitudes (Davis, 2007; Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Fan & Marini, 2000). But the causality in each of these cases is unclear. Are women with more egalitarian attitudes more likely to get divorced, for example, or is it the experience of getting divorced that makes women more egalitarian in their attitudes? Are those who become parents, particularly those who do so at a young age, already more traditional, or does parenthood encourage more traditional attitudes?
The problem is that the analysis of cross-sectional data does not permit distinguishing selection from adaptation effects (Lesthaeghe & Moors, 2002). To study the dual process of selection and adaptation, it is necessary to have access to panel data, which is “the most appropriate design for capturing the dynamics of recursive causation over time” (Lesthaeghe & Moors, 2002, p. 2). Attitudes are predictive of later behavior, as many studies of the selection process have shown (Barber, Pearce, Chaudhury, & Gurung, 2002; Bernhardt & Goldscheider, 2006; Clarkberg, Stolzenberg, & Waite, 1995; Kaufman, 2000; Torr & Short, 2004).
Although most existing longitudinal studies examine the effect of attitudes on behavior, a growing number consider the effect of behavior on attitudes. In terms of gender-related attitudes and behavior, these studies suggest that family transitions such as entering (or leaving) a coresidential relationship, getting married, and having children are related to changes in gender-related attitudes and ideals (e.g., Barber & Axinn, 1998; Morgan & Waite, 1987). For example, two recent studies using data from the British Household Panel Survey (Berrington, Hu, Smith, & Sturgis, 2008; Schober & Scott, 2012) focus on changes in attitudes toward gender equality following the birth of a first child, also taking into account changes in women’s labor force participation. Berrington et al. (2008) find that attitudes are not fixed, and that adaptation of attitudes following important life course events is an important process. Moreover, they claim that it is not entry into parenthood as such but the change in economic activity that is associated with attitude change. Schober and Scott (2012), on the other hand, argue that the concept of dissonance is useful in explaining attitudinal change following the transition to parenthood. Attitude-practice dissonance is produced when maternal employment behavior is at odds with prenatal gender attitudes. For example, women with traditional attitudes prior to the transition to motherhood move in a more egalitarian direction if they work after becoming mothers.
It is clear then that there is a reciprocal relationship between attitudes and family transitions (Moors, 2003). For example, Lesthaeghe and Moors (2002) find that young Belgian adults who cohabit and those who have experienced the dissolution of a cohabiting or marital partnership hold less conformist orientations, while those who are married hold more conformist attitudes. Cunningham, Beutel, Barber, and Thornton (2005) also find a negative relationship between egalitarian attitudes and early marriage and parenthood, as do Corrigall and Konrad (2007). While it is not always clear what the mechanisms are behind the influence of behavior on attitudes (Olson & Zanna, 1993), and the evidence is indeed somewhat mixed, several studies do give empirical support for a significant effect of family transitions on gender-related attitudes (Clarkberg, 2002).
However, nearly all such studies have focused on the United States and other countries where state support for working families is extremely weak. Even in the United States, there is evidence that the effect on gender-related attitudes of experiencing entry into marriage and marital parenthood may be weakening, at least among women. Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) find that American women with children in the late 1990s held more liberal attitudes than childless women. They suggest that this finding supports interest-based explanations in that women with children would benefit from a more equal division of labor. Cunningham et al. (2005) used data from a 31-year panel study; their results did not support a hypothesis that entry into marriage influences individuals’ attitudes toward gender equality. This is contrary to the findings of Barber and Axinn (1998) and Moors (2003), also based on longitudinal data, that women become more traditional when they get married.
It also seems likely that this relationship would be weaker in a country that provides substantial support for families, like Sweden. Even among Western countries, Sweden is notable in its emphasis on gender equality. Hence, Sweden provides an important context for studying links between family transitions and attitudes toward gender equality, given specific government efforts to promote gender equality (Oláh & Bernhardt, 2008). Specific family policies related to childcare and parental leave encourage women’s greater participation in employment and men’s greater participation in childrearing, goals that promote gender equality (Earles, 2011). Swedish mothers have particularly high rates of labor force participation (Mandel & Semyonov, 2006) and spend a lower proportion of time on care work (Thévenon & Luci, 2012), while Swedish men take on a relatively high proportion of unpaid work (Boye & Evertsson, 2014) and parental leave (Viklund & Duvander, 2014). In fact, gender equality may encourage Swedish couples to continue childbearing (Duvander & Andersson, 2006). Perhaps as a result, Swedes hold more positive attitudes toward mothers’ employment than British or Norwegians (Knudsen & Waerness, 2001), and Swedish mothers experience a smaller wage gap than mothers in other countries (Thévenon & Luci, 2012). In addition, Swedish men and women hold generally positive attitudes toward gender equality at home (Bernhardt, Noack, & Lyngstad, 2008).
Of course, all is not (yet) equal. Parenthood still contributes to women’s lower wages (Magnusson, 2010). Furthermore, a relatively high percentage of Swedish women are engaged in female-dominated occupations and in part-time work (although quite intensively, averaging 30+ hours; Mandel & Semyonov, 2005, 2006). Nevertheless, Sweden comes far closer than most other countries in providing the supports, both at work and in the family, for women with egalitarian attitudes to realize an egalitarian work–family balance.
The evidence regarding the effect of parenthood on the actual division of labor by sex in Sweden, however, is still mixed. For example, Evertsson (2013) finds that Swedish women who gave birth in the period between survey rounds in 1999 and 2003 became less work committed. The lower work commitment among recent mothers is interpreted as a way of temporarily adjusting to difficulties of combining work and family during the early preschool years. Relatedly, Boye (2008) finds that parenthood increases women’s time on housework without a corresponding increase in men’s housework, resulting in a more traditional division of labor among parents. In contrast, Dribe and Stanfors (2009) show that the effect of parenthood on the household division of labor has weakened considerably in Sweden. They had no information on the gender-related attitudes of these individuals, but these results give no support to a claim that parenthood would lead to a significant strengthening of traditional attitudes in Sweden. Hence, it is not clear from these studies what the effect of family transitions will be on attitudes toward gender equality in Sweden. Based on earlier research findings, we propose the following hypotheses:
While the weight of previous research suggests the above hypotheses, we recognize the possibility that such effects might be weaker in early 21st century Sweden.
Data and Method
Data for this study come from the Young Adult Panel Study (www.suda.su.se/yaps). This study concentrates on young adults in the prime ages for cohabitation, marriage, and childbearing. Data were collected by Statistics Sweden via both mail and web surveys conducted in 1999, 2003, and 2009. The first survey was conducted in spring 1999 with a sampling frame based on three birth cohorts, at the time aged 22, 26, and 30 years old. The response rate was 65% for a total of 2,820 respondents. In spring 2003, a second survey was sent to the original participants as well as to a new cohort of 22-year-olds, which resulted in a total of four birth cohorts (born in 1968, 1972, 1976, and 1980). With the additional birth cohort and a response rate of 72%, the total number of respondents in 2003 was 2,816. In spring 2009, a third survey was sent to all those who had participated in one or both of the previous surveys. The response rate, calculated based on number of persons who returned the survey in 2009 of the total number of persons who had participated in at least one of the prior waves (3,528), was 56%, resulting in 1,986 respondents. Sample attrition was lower among women and respondents with higher levels of education (Wanders, 2012). The sample for the current study consists of all those who participated in both the second and third waves, as all attitudes toward gender equality included in this study were measured in these two waves. The sample size is 1,794 participants, with 1,042 females and 752 males. Particularly relevant to this study, in 2003, there were 688 single individuals, 736 cohabiting individuals, and 370 married individuals; 1,137 had no children.
Our focus is on change in attitudes toward gender equality among young adults experiencing union and parental transitions. As such, our dependent variable is attitudes toward gender equality in 2009, controlling for attitudes toward gender equality in 2003. We use three measures of attitudes based on factor analysis, which supported our theoretical orientation that attitudes toward gender equality in the public sphere might differ from those in the private sphere. These measures focus on work, family, and work–family related dimensions. First, we consider attitudes about gender and work life. We measure job equality with an additive two-item scale: “Men can do as well as women in caring jobs” and “Women can do as well as men in technical jobs.” Cronbach’s alpha is .858. The scale ranges from 2 to 10, with higher values indicating more egalitarian attitudes. Second, we consider attitudes about gender and family roles. These become a division of labor scale with two items: “The woman should take the main responsibility for housework” (reverse coded) and “The man should be the main supporter of the family” (reverse coded). Cronbach’s alpha is .835. Again, the scale ranges from 2 to 10, with higher values indicating more egalitarian attitudes. Third, we consider attitudes related to gender and work–family issues. We measure this with a single-item scale called family leave, based on the statement “Parents should share parental leave equally.” Responses range from 1 “don’t agree at all” to 5 “agree completely.” 1
It is important to note that young adults in Sweden tend to have highly egalitarian attitudes, although there tends to be more support for gender equality in the separate realms of work and family than regarding shared parental leave. For example, 82.4% of young adults agree completely with both job equality statements, and 70.3% agree completely with both division of labor statements. However, only 35.7% agree completely with the family leave statement.
This study seeks to understand the influence of union and family transitions on changes in attitudes toward gender equality. As such, our main independent variables are measured as transitions between 2003 and 2009. Union formation and dissolution are measured with five dummy variables (see Table 1, which describes the variables used in the analysis). The first transition consists of those who were single in 2003 and cohabiting or married in 2009 (transition from single to partnered). The second includes those who were cohabiting or married in 2003 and single in 2009 (transition from partnered to single). The third consists of those who were cohabiting or married in 2003 and cohabiting or married to a different partner in 2009 (transition from partnered to partnered). The fourth includes all those who experienced other multiple transitions. The most common multiple transition was for a single person to enter and leave a cohabiting union by 2009. Multiple transitions also included those who were cohabiting or married in 2003 who separated from their partner, entered another relationship, and exited that relationship by 2009. The fifth group, which acts as the reference category, consists of those who did not change their union status, who remained either unpartnered or partnered to their same partner throughout the time period (no union transition). 2
Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables.
Note. All numbers are percentages except income.
The transition to parenthood was measured using information on the timing of the birth of children. Those respondents who were childless in 2003 and had at least one child between 2003 and 2009 were coded as having a first child. A dummy variable was also created for those who had a child before 2003. Therefore, the reference category consists of those respondents who did not experience a transition to parenthood at any time before 2009.
To model change in attitudes toward gender equality, we use the regressor variable method in which attitudes at Time 2 are regressed on both attitudes at Time 1 and our independent variables of interest. In other words, we model attitudes toward gender equality in 2009, controlling for attitudes toward gender equality in 2003. This type of modeling is commonly used with two-wave, two-variable panel designs and is often used to rule out reverse causality and reduce the chance of spuriousness (Allison, 1990), and it has been used recently to examine change in attitudes toward work commitment using the same data set (Evertsson, 2013). We control for gender, birth cohort (1972, 1976, and 1980, with 1968 as the reference category), college degree, income (logged), and parental division of housework during childhood (coded 0 for “mother did more” and 1 for “equal division” or “father did more”), all measured in 2009. Based on the measurement of the dependent variables, we used both ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression. However, the results are the same across our models, and therefore, we present findings from the OLS models.
Results
Table 2 shows attitudes toward gender equality in 2003 and 2009. Not surprisingly, Swedish young adults hold very egalitarian views. On all dimensions of attitudes, egalitarianism is favored on average. Comparing the means of attitudes in 2003 and 2009, we find that attitude change varies depending on the measure. Attitudes concerning job equality changed little over these 6 years, hovering toward the top end of the scale. Regarding the division of family labor, young Swedish adults’ attitudes became even more egalitarian in this time period, with an average of 9.1 in 2009 compared to 8.9 in 2003. However, belief in sharing parental leave equally became less egalitarian during this period, moving from 3.77 to 3.65, though the dominant attitude is still one of equality, remaining closer to 4 than 3 on the 5-point scale. 3
Means of Attitudes Toward Gender Equality in 2003 and 2009.
Significant at .01 level according to a paired samples t test.
In 2003, 38% of our sample was single, 41% was cohabiting, and 21% was married (data not presented). While there was a good deal of stability in status, there were also transitions, and sometimes multiple transitions, which is not surprising given the movement of these young adults from their 20s and early 30s into their 30s and early 40s. The most common union transition was for those who were single in 2003 to enter a cohabiting or marital union (and remain in this union), with 15% of our sample making this transition (see Table 1). Only 3% of our sample transitioned from a cohabiting or marital relationship to being single (without any other transitions), and another 3% transitioned from one cohabiting or marital relationship to another cohabiting or marital relationship. A further 6.5% experienced multiple union transitions. The remaining 72% made no union transition, either remaining single or with their same partner throughout the time period. 4 Finally, 26% of respondents had their first child between 2003 and 2009. Another 31% already had a child by 2003, and the remaining 43% had not made the transition to parenthood by 2009, although likely many more would do so after 2009, as most of the sample were in their late 20s to early/mid-30s.
To analyze the effect of family transitions on attitudes toward gender equality, we estimate OLS regression models of attitudes toward gender equality in 2009, controlling for attitudes toward gender equality in 2003, union and parenthood transitions between 2003 and 2009, gender, birth cohort, education, and income. By controlling for attitudes in 2003, we are able to model change in attitudes toward gender equality (Evertsson, 2013). Table 3 shows results from regression models of attitudes in 2009, controlling for attitudes in 2003. Separate models were run for each of the three measures of attitudes toward gender equality—job equality, division of labor, and parental leave. 5
Coefficients From Regression Models of Change in Attitudes Toward Gender Equality Among Swedish Young Adults.
Each model includes the same measure of gender-related attitudes in 2003 to account for change in gender-related attitudes in 2009.
p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
The main finding is that there are surprisingly few significant results regarding family transitions and changes in attitudes toward gender equality. Looking at the three regression models in Table 3, of the 18 coefficients measuring the effects of union and parenthood transitions on change in attitudes toward gender equality, only three coefficients were significant. First, young Swedish adults who transition from one relationship to another relationship become significantly more egalitarian concerning job equality than those who experienced no union transition. This lends some support to Hypothesis 2, that exiting a union increases support for gender equality (although the result was not significant for those who did not repartner). Second, young Swedish adults who made the transition to parenthood between 2003 and 2009 became significantly less egalitarian regarding parental leave than those who remained childless. This supports Hypothesis 3. Third, and similar to the transition to parenthood, young Swedish adults who had already become parents before 2003 became significantly less egalitarian during the study time period. 6 This also lends support to Hypothesis 3.
On the other hand, there is no support for Hypothesis 1, that the transition from single to partnered reduces support of egalitarian attitudes. Young adults who were single in 2003 and cohabiting or married in 2009 experienced no significant changes in any of the three measured attitudes toward gender equality. Similarly, there were no significant changes in attitudes among young adults who made the transition from cohabiting or married in 2003 to single in 2009 or among young adults who experienced multiple transitions. Furthermore, young adults who transitioned from one relationship to another relationship experienced little change in their attitudes toward division of labor and shared parental leave. Taken together, there seems to be less support for Hypothesis 2 than against it. Finally, the transition to parenthood, regardless of timing, had no significant effects on changes in young adults’ attitudes toward job equality or division of labor. Even regarding Hypothesis 3, there is mixed support.
The control variables had some significant effects on changes in attitudes toward gender equality. Women were significantly more likely than men to become more egalitarian in terms of job equality and the division of labor. Education had the most consistent effect, showing a significant positive effect on changes in young adults’ attitudes concerning all three measures of job equality, division of labor, and shared parental leave. There is also an interaction between gender and education, which indicates that education has a stronger positive effect on women’s attitudes toward shared parental leave (results not shown). Cohort effects were limited to the job equality model. Adults from younger birth cohorts became more supportive of job equality over the time period than those from the oldest birth cohort, though the difference is only significant for the 1972 birth cohort. Income logged had no significant effects on changing attitudes toward gender equality in any model. The parental division of labor had a significant effect on changes in attitudes toward division of labor. Those adults whose parents divided housework evenly or whose fathers performed more housework became more supportive of an equal division of labor. As one would expect, the comparable gender-related attitude scale in 2003 was positively associated with attitudes in 2009.
Discussion
In this study of how family transitions affect attitudes toward gender equality in gender-equal Sweden, we find little evidence that important life course transitions, such as cohabitation, marriage, separations, and childbirth, cause attitudinal change or adaptation. While there already exists ample evidence of the prevalence of egalitarian attitudes in Sweden (Bernhardt et al., 2008; Motiejunaite & Kravchenko, 2008), our study provides evidence that these egalitarian attitudes are also fairly stable. This provides support for the finding of Schober and Scott (2012) for Great Britain that gender-related attitudes remained relatively stable, at least for the majority of parents whose work and care arrangements did not conflict with their prenatal attitudes.
Moreover, this is also consistent with Gubernskaya’s (2010) finding that family change has a smaller effect on the attitudes of those living in countries with more liberal welfare regimes, such as Sweden, than more conservative gender regimes. It may be that the “new European pattern” of adult transitions (Billari & Liefbroer, 2010) has taken root in Sweden to such an extent that these transitions no longer greatly affect broader ideals of gender equality. Indeed, Sweden may have reached what Giele and Holst (2004) refer to as “value generalization” in which cultural priorities value gender equality in caregiving as well as employment. The fact that gender equality is not only the dominant ideology but also practiced “on the ground” (Hausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi, 2008) also helps explain why attitudes toward gender equality are so persistently egalitarian. At this late stage in the gender revolution, then, it would seem that attitudes are less influenced by changes in family status, given supportive structures such as subsidized daycare and paid family leave.
There are, however, a few exceptions to the generally small and insignificant effects of family transitions on changes in attitudes toward gender equality. In particular, we find limited and mixed support for our third hypothesis—that the transition to parenthood tends to change attitudes in a more traditional direction vis-à-vis sharing parental leave. Young adults who had their first child between waves, as well as those who already were parents before the study began, became less in favor of sharing parental leave equally, which may be indicative of the fact that Swedish mothers still take longer parental leaves than Swedish fathers (Sundström & Duvander, 2002). This finding is consistent with several previous studies that find a negative relationship between having children and egalitarian attitudes (Cunningham et al., 2005; Davis, 2007; Fan & Marini, 2000). On the other hand, we find no relationship between the transition to parenthood and changes in attitudes toward job equality or the division of labor. In other words, Swedish young adults who transition to parenthood maintain their relatively high support of an equal division of work and family tasks, even if they may be more likely to accept an unequal division of parental leave. This is consistent with Bolzendahl and Myers’ (2004) suggestion that mothers may have more liberal attitudes because they would benefit from the enactment of such equality at home. In addition, there is some recent evidence that parenthood affects Swedish men’s behavior in a similar way as Swedish women, including increasing time on housework (Dribe & Stanfors, 2009) and also that more egalitarian couples in Sweden are more likely than more traditional couples to have a second child (Oláh, 2003). Given this move toward greater equality between mothers and fathers, it seems reasonable that the transition to parenthood among Swedish young adults would have little effect on changes in attitudes toward gender equality.
While there is limited and sometimes mixed support for the effects of the transition to parenthood, there is no support for a relationship between union formation and attitudes toward gender equality, our first hypothesis. While Lesthaeghe and Moors (2002) suggest that marriage encourages more conformist attitudes, our study strongly supports the lack of evidence for an effect of entry into marriage found by Cunningham et al. (2005) in their longitudinal study using U.S. data. It is also consistent with a previous study that found that work–family attitudes and cohabitation are unrelated among Swedish young adults (Thomson & Bernhardt, 2010). In addition, there is little support for our second hypothesis, that union dissolution will strengthen support for egalitarian attitudes. Young adults who transitioned from one relationship to another relationship have greater support for job equality. However, none of the other dissolution variables have a significant effect on young adults’ attitudes. On the whole, those who separated from their partners by 2009, whether they were cohabiting or married in 2003, rarely experience much of a shift in attitudes over this time period. This is inconsistent with Lesthaeghe and Moors’ (2002) finding that those who have experienced the dissolution of a cohabiting union hold less conformist orientations, and Forste and Heaton’s (2004) finding that divorced women are more egalitarian in their outlook than married women.
With only 3 of 18 significant coefficients, it is clear that the effects of family transitions on attitudes toward gender equality are relatively weak in Sweden, likely because of strong government policies supportive of gender equality, not just in the market place but in the home (Earles, 2011), indicating that Sweden promotes “gender equity” in family-oriented institutions as well as individual institutions (McDonald, 2000). Past research suggests that gender equality is not only promoted by the government but also highly prized by the public (Bernhardt et al., 2008). Indeed, while Swedish couples may engage in different household strategies to manage work and family, they tend to conform to a “norm of involved parenthood” (Forsberg, 2009). The interest-based explanation that Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) apply to mothers and their support of a more equitable division of labor may apply more generally to young Swedish adults who are looking to live the equality they believe in. While Sweden still has some work to do, particularly with regard to occupational segregation (Mandel & Semyonov, 2005), we suggest our findings provide some signal of Sweden’s advancement in the second half of the gender revolution (Goldscheider et al., 2015). Given the strong emphasis placed on gender equality in families as well as in the workplace, family transitions do not have the impact on young Swedish adults’ attitudes that they have on adults in other countries.
The data had several other advantages. The longitudinal nature of the data allowed us to examine the effect of transitions (rather than statuses) on changes in attitudes, though our analyses would benefit from more waves over longer periods of time. The data also contain a rich set of questions that measure multiple dimensions of attitudes toward gender equality. While there were a few significant findings regarding transitions and individual measures of attitudes, no transition had a consistent significant effect on even two dimensions of attitudes, which strengthens our conclusion that these transitions generally have little effect on changes in attitudes toward gender equality.
Nevertheless, there are some limitations to the current study. Perhaps the most important limitation in the data is the lack of variation in attitudes toward gender equality. While this is very likely representative of Swedish young adults, it also makes analysis of change in these already highly egalitarian attitudes more difficult. In addition, while we are able to capture many union transitions, some transitions were rarer. The young age of this sample paired with the norm of cohabitation meant that few single individuals married in this time frame. Divorce rates are also rather low, leading to an even smaller number of dissolved marriages during this period. Nevertheless, over half of those who were single or cohabiting in 2003 made some union transition by 2009, and a large number of individuals made the transition to parenthood during this time.
While there has been broad consensus in the literature that transitions in family status have profound effects on attitudes toward gender equality, the fact that we found surprisingly few such effects in Sweden is important in showing the stability of attitudes in a highly egalitarian society. It seems that the gender-related attitudes of Swedish young adults are fairly immune to union and parenthood transitions. These findings suggest two possibilities. First, Swedish coresidential partnerships (whether married or not) are more equal, and mothers and fathers share childcare more equally (Dribe & Stanfors, 2009). Second, even in the face of life course transitions that may introduce a more traditional division of labor, Swedish young adults have “enduring attitudes” (Schwarz, 2007) and remain believers in gender equality.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Maria Brandén, Ann-Zofie Duvander, Marie Evertsson, Michael Gähler, Calvin Goldscheider, Ursula Henz, Trude Lappegård, Livia Oláh, and Maria Stanfors for helpful comments on earlier versions of our article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The Young Adult Panel Study was funded by several grants, including the Swedish Council for Social Research (F0138/1998), the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research (2001-1075, 2001-4022, 2002-0117, and 2007-0154), the Committee for Longitudinal Research at the Swedish Research Council (2002-3727), and the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation (J2000-0063). This research was further supported by a Dean Rusk grant and a Davidson College Faculty and Study Research grant.
