Perceptions of Fairness and Housework Disagreement: A Comparative Analysis

Abstract

This article uses data from couples in 29 nations to investigate the associations between household divisions of labor, perceptions of housework fairness, and frequency of housework disagreement. We extend previous studies by hypothesizing that perceptions of fairness mediate the relationship between household division of labor and housework disagreement. We also hypothesize that the association between perceptions of fairness and housework disagreement will be stronger for women than men and will be influenced by both individual characteristics and macro-level context. The results support our hypotheses, showing that individuals’ relative resources and macro-level factors such as the female–male earned income ratio strengthen the relationship between perceptions of fairness and housework disagreement. We conclude that relative economic resources between genders at the micro- and macro-level shape the extent to which subjective perceptions of fairness are associated with housework disagreement.

Keywords

housework disagreement fairness distributive justice housework division

Introduction

Paradoxically, women continue to do the lion’s share of housework despite substantially increasing their participation in the labor market (Baxter & Tai, 2016; Kan, Sullivan, & Gershuny, 2011). Even more puzzlingly, women do not always see their disproportionate housework loads as unfair (Jansen, Weber, Kraaykamp, & Verbakel, 2016; Major, 1993; Thompson, 1991). At the same time, previous research shows that men and women sometimes report conflict over housework and that housework conflict is associated with separation and divorce (Ruppanner, 2012). This raises the question under what conditions do unequal housework arrangements lead to housework disagreements, and do perceptions of fairness influence the association between housework divisions and housework disagreements?

If women do not perceive their housework division as unfair, they may not openly express disagreement about their domestic arrangements. Although some studies provide theoretical and empirical insights into the connection between actual and perceived housework divisions (Greenstein, 2009; Jansen et al., 2016) or the association between perceived housework divisions and marital quality (Claffey & Mickelson, 2009; Greenstein, 2009; Voydanoff & Donnelly, 1999), it is less clear how women’s perceptions of housework unfairness are associated with housework disagreement. Some scholars have investigated the relationship between housework allocations and housework conflict (Ruppanner, 2010, 2012). However, these studies focus on household allocations and housework conflict without adequately theorizing the process linking these two factors. Furthermore, no studies have examined potential factors that may affect the connection between perceptions of housework divisions and housework disagreements.

We extend current research by developing a model that brings together these two strands of work. Specifically, we argue that perceptions of fairness mediate the relationship between household divisions of labor and housework disagreement. In other words, if couples do not define household divisions of labor as unfair, there will be little disagreement regardless of the allocation of time and tasks. Furthermore, we elaborate the individual and country-level contexts under which perceptions of fairness are associated with housework disagreement and argue that individual and societal gender power relations influence the relationship between perceptions of housework fairness and housework disagreement.

We thus extend previous literature by examining the relationship between household labor, perceived fairness of housework, and housework disagreement from a multilevel and comparative perspective. Our research questions are as follows:

Research Question 1: Do perceptions of housework fairness mediate the relationship between household labor and housework disagreement?

Research Question 2: How do individual- and country-level gender power relations affect these relationships?

Research Question 3: Are the patterns similar across gender?

Housework Disagreement and Perceptions of Housework Division

Housework disagreements are one of the major causes leading to heated arguments between spouses (Dew & Dakin, 2011; Kluwer, Heesink, & Van de Vliert, 1996). According to previous studies, women usually do a larger share of housework, are less satisfied with housework arrangements than men, and women’s discontent with housework divisions is more likely to trigger conflict than men’s discontent with housework (Kluwer et al., 1996; Kluwer & Mikula, 2003). Women’s main concerns include unequal housework divisions and partners’ not doing housework to an acceptable standard. Men, on the other hand, are more concerned about being pressured to participate in domestic chores. While women are more likely to report housework conflict and express a desire for rearrangement of housework division, men are more likely to support the status quo (Kluwer et al., 1996; Kluwer & Mikula, 2003).

Nevertheless disagreement about housework is less frequent than expected. The distributive justice perspective has suggested that women report housework allocations as fair because they place more value on family relations than domestic workloads, or perceive similar levels of housework being done by other women (Major, 1993; Thompson, 1991). It is also possible that unequal housework divisions are justified by beliefs that it is women’s job to take care of the family. In short, perceptions of housework divisions are gendered.

At the same time, the distributive justice perspective suggests that contexts and relationships influence whether distributive outcomes are considered unequal or unjust and when less powerful parties seek change (Davis, 2010). If we consider disagreement as a sign of wanting changes in domestic arrangements, the precondition for women to take action and push for change in their domestic arrangements is that they recognize injustices in the household. Following this reasoning, we may propose that whether unequal housework division leads to disagreements depends on whether women perceive their housework division as unfair (Claffey & Manning, 2010; Fincham, 2003).

In most matters of distribution and justice, power is the central concept (Davis & Greenstein, 2013; Deutsch, 1985). We argue that the power relations between men and women provide the context where distributive rules are defined, perceptions are shaped, and disagreements are encouraged or discouraged. In the next section, we theorize how gendered power relations moderate the connection between perceptions and housework disagreement.

Disagreement and Power

Differential power relations between genders are one of the central ideas explaining housework divisions and marital conflict (Davis & Greenstein, 2013). Nevertheless sparse literature has been devoted to adequately theorizing or empirically testing the ways in which gendered power relations shape disagreements over housework division and perceived unfairness. The distributive justice perspective provides some theoretical insights for our research. According to this approach (Bies, 1987; Deutsch, 1985; Kabanoff, 1991), in more power-differentiated relations or organizations, less powerful parties may not take actions and initiate conflict even when they perceive the distribution of entitlements or responsibilities as unjust. This is because the stronger parties are in a position to render social accounts that justify the distributive injustices. For family work, unequal divisions may be justified by men’s higher socioeconomic status, women’s economic dependence, or traditional gender norms. Therefore, women are less likely to perceive injustice in domestic arrangements and their motivation for conflict or other actions may be difficult to develop or sustain. On the other hand, in more equal power relations, women may be more likely to express overt disagreements about unequal distribution. Since the relative resources between genders and gender ideology mainly define gender power relations (Blumberg & Coleman, 1989; Davis & Greenstein, 2013), we expect that the connection between perceived unfairness and disagreement is conditional on the relative resources between genders and gender attitudes.

Power relations are not only multidimensional but also multilevel (Blumberg & Coleman, 1989). Gender power relations are constructed in the family and in broader society. Thus, the relative resources between couples or gender attitudes may shape gender relations in the family. At the same time, societal economic structures and gender norms may also shape the macro gender structure. In other words, economic resources and ideological power are likely the two salient factors that moderate the connection between perceived unfairness and disagreements about housework division at the micro and macro level.

Micro Power Context

At the micro level, economic resources such as income, employment, and education define the power relations between couples (Coltrane, 2000). Men usually possess more economic resources (e.g., earnings) than women. Scholars thus argue that men tend to use their economic resources to “buy out” of housework responsibilities. When women have more equal economic resources relative to their spouses, their economic independence may encourage them to openly express their disagreements. In particular, we argue that the relative income between couples moderates the connection between perceived unfairness and disagreements about housework division.

The association between family work and relative resources, however, is only partially supported by empirical studies (e.g., Brines, 1993; Deutsch, Lussier, & Servis, 1993). Although women’s higher levels of earnings relative to their spouses are found to be negatively correlated with perceived fairness (Braun, Lewin-Epstein, Stier, & Baumgärtner, 2008) and positively associated with housework conflict (Ruppanner, 2010, 2012), they do not predict marital conflict in other studies (Blair, 1993; Perry-Jenkins & Folk, 1994).

Second, some scholars argue that the patriarchal culture shapes the gender structure at home and in broader society (Tichenor, 2005). Couples with traditional gender attitudes tend to have less equal housework divisions (Treas & Tai, 2012). Egalitarian gender attitudes are also correlated with marital conflict and perceived inequity (Jansen et al., 2016; Ruppanner, 2012). Since gender attitudes are a source of power, it is plausible that individual gender attitudes moderate the connection between perceived housework unfairness and housework disagreement. Thus, women who hold traditional gender views may not express overt disagreements about housework or seek changes in domestic arrangements, even if they perceive their housework as unfair. Their traditional gender attitudes may justify these unequal domestic arrangements.

Macro Power Context

Societal gender power relations may also play a significant role in shaping housework disagreement and its association with perceptions of household labor. Women are likely to acquire more bargaining power in family work in a society where the economic structure allows women to achieve economic independence or promotes women as an important income earner (Fuwa & Cohen, 2007; Ruppanner, 2010). Hence, in a society where women’s work opportunities are strong or gender income gaps are less pronounced, women may be more motivated to express their disagreements and seek changes in domestic arrangements, especially when they perceive family work as unjust.

In addition to the structure of the labor market, the state is likely to enhance women’s economic status and sense of entitlement for employment through the implementation of work-related policies that ensure women’s equal access to employment (Chang, 2000; Fuwa & Cohen, 2007; Geist & Cohen, 2011). For instance, equality of access policies such as affirmative action policy and antidiscrimination laws are two important policies that may help affirm women’s rights to participate in the labor force on the same terms as their male counterparts (Fuwa & Cohen, 2007). Importantly, the ideology of gender equality conveyed through these policies may also be internalized by individuals (Sjöberg, 2004). Thus, it is possible that women develop a stronger sense of entitlement to equal rights in the family and workplace in societies that implement equality of access laws.

Finally, patriarchal culture that promotes men’s domination over women is considered highly influential in shaping housework, perceived housework divisions, and housework disagreement. In a society featuring more traditional gender norms, women and men may be socialized to expect women to undertake the majority of housework regardless of their employment status or other factors. Thus, perceived unfairness is “discounted” and unequal housework division is less likely to be contested (Blumberg & Coleman, 1989).

A rich body of literature has documented the considerable influence of societal contextual effects on housework divisions (Baxter & Tai, 2016; Geist & Cohen, 2011). For instance, more equal housework divisions are associated with higher levels of gender equity, more egalitarian gender ideology, or social policies that promote women’s equal access to employment (Fuwa, 2004; Fuwa & Cohen, 2007; Geist & Cohen, 2011). Only a few studies have examined how these contextual effects affect conflict over housework. For example, some cross-national studies found that the divorce rate, women’s full-time employment levels, and more egalitarian gender regimes are positively related to housework conflict (Nordenmark, 2013; Ruppanner, 2010, 2012). However, these studies do not consider the potential effect of perceptions of domestic arrangements on conflict over housework. Thus, it is not clear when perceived inequity in household labor is associated with disagreement across countries or how the connection between perceptions and housework disagreements varies across differential power relations. A few studies have examined perceived equity of the division of housework cross-nationally (Braun et al., 2008; Davis, 2010; Greenstein, 2009; Jansen et al., 2016). All things being equal, women are more likely to perceive their housework division as unfair in societies with high levels of support for gender equity (Braun et al., 2008; Greenstein, 2009; Jansen et al., 2016). But these studies do not examine whether perceived inequities in household labor are associated with housework disagreements.

This study examines the relationships between housework divisions, perceived housework divisions, and disagreements. We also investigate how micro- and macro-level gender power relations shape the connection between perceived inequity in housework division and disagreements about housework.

Hypotheses

Building on theories of relative resources and distributive justice, we argue that women’s perceptions of fairness are the key mechanism that links housework divisions and disagreements about housework.

Hypothesis 1: For women, the association between housework divisions and housework disagreement is mediated by perceptions of housework divisions. When perceptions of housework divisions are taken into account, the association between the division of household labor and frequency of disagreement levels will be negligible.

Second, since women are more likely than men to report unfairness and express their dissatisfaction with domestic arrangements (Kluwer & Mikula, 2003), we assume a stronger relationship between perceptions of household labor and housework disagreement for women.

Hypothesis 2: The effect of perceived housework unfairness on frequency of disagreement will be more pronounced among women than men.

Next, we expect that the connection between perceived unfairness and disagreement varies according to gender power relations. Gender power relations shape perceptions and housework conflict in the household and in broader society. Specifically, we focus on relative economic resources between genders and gender ideology.

Hypothesis 3: At the micro level, the effect of perceived housework unfairness on housework disagreement is conditional on gender attitudes and income relative to the spouse.

Similarly, at the macro level, we hypothesize that societal gender ideology and economic resources moderate the association between perceived unfairness and housework disagreement. We evaluate the macro-level relative economic resources between genders using the following measures: the female–male earned income ratio, the percentage of females in the professional and technical positions, and equality of access policies (i.e., affirmative action policy and the absence of discriminatory policy). In addition, we expect that societal gender ideology and overall gender equity moderate the association between perceived unfairness and housework disagreement.

Hypothesis 4a: At the macro level, the effect of perceived housework unfairness on housework disagreement is strengthened in societies where gender income ratios are more equal, higher percentages of women work in professional and technical positions, affirmative action policy is implemented and discriminatory laws are not present.

Hypothesis 4b: The effect of perceived housework unfairness on housework disagreement is strengthened in societies with more egalitarian gender ideology and overall gender equity.

Data and Measures

To investigate these hypotheses, we use data from the 2002 Family and Changing Gender Roles module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP; GESIS, 2002). Although ISSP has released a more recent wave from 2012, measures of housework disagreement were not included in this wave. Although more recent data would be preferable, we have no reason to expect that the associations we are investigating will have changed markedly since 2002. Twenty-nine countries/regions with consistent and available data were selected. The 29 countries are listed in the appendix (Table A). The original sample size of 29 countries consists of 13,134 coupled women and 11,222 coupled men (i.e., 24,356 married or cohabiting respondents). Our analyses are limited to 21,010 coupled respondents aged between 18 and 65 years (11,717 women and 9,293 men). Among these coupled respondents, 3,833 did not provide information on household income, 1,325 did not reveal the frequency of housework disagreement, and 844 did not provide their or their spouse’s work status. In addition, 1,822 and 809 did not report their actual housework hours and perceptions of housework division, respectively. With these missing data deleted (e.g., don’t know, refuse, not applicable, not available), the final analytic sample consists of 7,144 women and 5,822 men (unweighted). Since the deletion of missing data may affect the representativeness of the sample, we conducted multiple imputation and undertook supplementary analyses based on the imputed data. The findings from these analyses are generally similar to those reported in the text below (results available on request).

The outcome variable is housework disagreement based on the question: “How often do you and your spouse/partner disagree about the sharing of household work?” The response was reversed to range from 1 (never) to 5 (several times a week). The two key explanatory variables are the division of household labor and perceived unfairness of housework division. Perceptions of housework unfairness were originally measured on a 5-point scale through the following question: “Which of the following best applies to the sharing of household work between you and your spouse/partner?” Responses were dichotomized as unfair to women, the woman does much more or a bit more than her fair share (1) or not (0).

The division of household labor is measured by men’s percentage of total weekly housework hours. Total weekly housework hours is the sum of the respondent’s and his or her spouse’s time spent on housework every week (each top-coded at 60). The measurement of housework hours is based on the questions: “On average, how many hours a week do you (or your spouse) personally spend on household work, not including childcare and leisure time activities?”

Gender attitudes are measured by the average of Likert items on agreement/disagreement with two statements: (a) Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person and (b) Both the man and woman should contribute to the household income. Higher scores represent more egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles.

Relative resources are measured with an item that asked whether the respondent’s income is higher, the partner has the same income, or the spouse’s income is higher. This is recoded as men’s income higher (the omitted category), same income, and women’s income higher. The respondent’s education is measured by a 6-point scale, ranging from 0 (no formal qualifications) to 5 (university degree completed). The measure indicating relative educational attainment between couples was not included in analyses because of missing data on spouses’ education for some countries. The work status of the respondent and partner was dummy-coded as working full time (1) and others. The data on family income were harmonized into six categories (1-6). Finally, the number of children was included to control for variations in the demand for housework across couples.

Following previous studies, we employ the commonly used Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) indicator to measure societal gender power relations (United Nations, 2002). GEM is a composite indicator that consists of four components to evaluate economic and political dimensions of gender empowerment. In this study, we focus on the economic and ideological dimensions of gender power relations. In addition to including GEM to measure the overall gender structure, we also utilize the two components that measure the societal gender economic relations: the percentage of females in professional and technical positions and earned income ratios. To further evaluate the institutional structure that shapes economic power between genders, we employ affirmative action policy and antidiscrimination laws that prescribe gender equity in work to measure economic resources. Based on the measures constructed by Fuwa and Cohen (2007), affirmative action policy is a dichotomized indicator showing the presence (1) or absence (0) of programs that provide women with preferential treatment in employment. The absence of discriminatory policy measures whether there are discriminatory laws prohibiting women’s participation in certain work conditions (e.g., night shifts). This measure ranges from 0 (the presence of all discriminatory treaties) to 3 (the absence of discriminatory treaties). Finally, we constructed an indicator of societal gender ideology by aggregating each country’s factor scores for the five gender roles items.

Analytic Approach

Given the skewed distribution of housework disagreement, its ordinal responses, and the autocorrelation of error terms within countries, all of which violate ordinary least squares assumptions, we estimated random-intercept and random-coefficient ordered logistic models to assess the association of housework disagreement with individual-level and country-level variables across 29 countries. A random-intercept and random-coefficient ordered logit model will allow the overall intercept of housework disagreement and the coefficient of perceived housework unfairness to vary over countries (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).We also weight the data (Level 1 sampling weight) to correct sampling biases.

Although multilevel modeling has been commonly used for nested data, there are some concerns in multilevel analyses, in particular, in cross-national analyses with limited numbers of countries. Bryan and Jenkins (2016) have pointed out that in analyses with large case numbers within each country but a small pool of countries, the estimates of country-level effects are likely to be less reliable as the country random variances will be biased downward. Their Monte Carlo simulations suggest that the minimum number of countries for a multilevel logit model is 30. Given that we can have only 29 countries with consistent individual- and country-level variables, we are aware of our data limitations.

Results

Perceived Unfairness and Disagreement Over Housework

Table 1 shows the cross-tabulation of perceived unfairness and frequency of housework disagreement by gender. The results show that 55% of female respondents consider their housework loads as unfair. Among women perceiving their domestic arrangements as unfair, 27% express disagreements about housework divisions with their spouses from several times a month to several times a week (17.28% + 9.38%). On the other hand, only 11% of women who perceive their housework division as fair report disagreements several times per week or per month (7.80% + 3.27%). Approximately 44% of men perceive their domestic arrangements as unjust to their spouses. Furthermore, 19% of men who consider that housework divisions are unfair to their spouses report disagreements at least several times a month (13.02% + 5.88%). Only 15% of men who perceive their housework divisions as fair report disagreements at least several times a month (10.69% + 4.92%). In sum, both women and men who perceive their housework divisions as unfair are more likely to report frequent disagreement over housework. It is also of note that 56% of women perceiving inequities in their domestic work never or rarely disagree over housework divisions with their spouses.

Table 1.

Housework Disagreement by Perceptions of Housework Divisions (Weighted Results).

Disagreement/unfairness	Women				Men
	Fair to woman^a		Unfair to woman^b		Fair to woman		Unfair to woman
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Never	1,393	43.65	1,013	25.62	1,152	35.44	751	29.20
Rarely	1,024	32.09	1,192	30.16	1,102	33.90	911	35.45
Several times a year	421	13.19	694	17.56	489	15.04	423	16.45
Several times a month	249	7.80	683	17.28	348	10.69	335	13.02
Several times a week	104	3.27	371	9.38	160	4.92	151	5.88
Total	3,191	44.67	3,953	55.33	3,251	55.85	2,571	44.15

Note. df = degrees of freedom. Chi-squared tests: Women: 403.88 (df = 4), p < .001; Men: 31.54 (df = 4), p < .001.

Fair to woman = woman does much less, a bit less than her fair share, or roughly her fair share of the housework. ^bUnfair to woman = woman does much more or a bit more than her fair share of the housework.

Individual Characteristics by Gender

Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of individual-level variables. On average, female and male respondents report seldom disagreeing with their partners about housework (2.27 and 2.22). Men usually share 26% to 31% of total housework hours. In this sample, only 15% of males and 16% of females have similar levels of income as their partners and another 12% of men and 17% of women report that women earn more than men in the household.

Table 2.

Individual and Household Characteristics by Gender (Weighted Results).

Variable	Women				Men
Variable	M	SD	Minimum	Maximum	M	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Housework disagreement	2.27	1.23	1	5	2.22	1.17	1	5
Perceived unfairness to women	0.55	0.50	0	1	0.44	0.50	0	1
Men’s percentage of housework hours	26.25	18.18	0	100	31.44	19.13	0	100
Total housework hours	28.00	18.94	1	120	28.86	18.37	1	120
Egalitarian gender attitudes	3.78	0.90	1	5	3.67	0.85	1	5
Men’s income higher	0.67	0.47	0	1	0.73	0.44	0	1
Same income	0.16	0.36	0	1	0.15	0.35	0	1
Women’s income higher	0.17	0.38	0	1	0.12	0.33	0	1
Women working full time	0.45	0.50	0	1	0.46	0.50	0	1
Men working full time	0.77	0.42	0	1	0.79	0.40	0	1
Family income	3.68	1.37	1	6	3.84	1.36	1	6
Number of children	1.00	1.14	0	9	1.01	1.17	0	12
R’s education	2.89	1.37	0	5	2.97	1.40	0	5
R’s age	42.41	11.46	18	65	44.71	11.14	18	65

Multilevel Ordered Logistic Analyses

Multilevel ordered logistic analyses are employed to test the effects of the reported division of housework and perceived unfairness on frequency of housework disagreement for men and women, respectively. Table 3 focuses on the associations between individual and household characteristics and housework disagreement. Based on women’s reports, Model 1 shows that men’s larger share of housework time is associated with lower rates of disagreement when perceived housework divisions are not taken into consideration (p < .001). Women’s full-time employment and higher levels of education are associated with higher rates of disagreement (p < .001). The number of children in the household and more total housework time are associated with higher frequency of disagreement about housework (p < .05 and p < .01, respectively), while age is negatively related to disagreement about housework (p < .001). Egalitarian gender attitudes are positively correlated with disagreements (p < .001). In addition, the rates of housework disagreement are higher when women’s income is equal to or higher than the income of their spouses (p < .1).

Table 3.

Multilevel Ordered Logistic Models for Individual-Level Effects on Housework Disagreement (Odds Ratios).

Variable	Women			Men
Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Men’s percentage of housework hours	0.991***	1.003	1.003	0.998	1.002	1.002
Total housework hours	1.004**	1.003*	1.003*	1.003*	1.003*	1.003*
Women working full time	1.306***	1.218***	1.219***	1.085	1.085	1.082
Men working full time	0.949	0.946	0.946	0.987	0.996	0.998
Relative income (men’s income higher = ref)
Same income	1.139^†	1.133^†	1.078	1.082	1.091	1.051
Women’s income higher	1.116^†	1.078	0.978	0.917	0.916	0.799^†
Liberal gender attitudes	1.166***	1.129***	1.091*	1.067^†	1.065^†	1.058
Number of children	1.062*	1.055*	1.056*	1.077**	1.080**	1.081**
R’s age	0.974***	0.974***	0.974***	0.979***	0.979***	0.979***
R’s education	1.127***	1.117***	1.117***	1.038	1.037	1.038
Family income	0.984	0.998	0.998	1.012	1.004	1.005
Perceived unfairness to women	—	2.800***	2.119**	—	1.473***	1.316
Intercept	0.050***	0.027***	0.031***	0.047***	0.038***	0.040***
Individual-level interactions
Unfairness × gender attitudes	—	—	1.066	—	—	1.017
Unfairness × same income	—	—	1.091	—	—	1.092
Unfairness × women’s income higher	—	—	1.186^†	—	—	1.451^†
Between-country intercept variance	0.242***	0.229***	0.233***	0.231***	0.259***	0.260***
Between-country unfairness variance	—	0.070***	0.070***	—	0.003	0.003
N	7,144			5,822

Note. The thresholds of multilevel ordinal logistic models not shown in the table.

†

p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Model 2 investigates whether the relationship between the division of housework and frequency of disagreement over housework is mediated by perceived unfairness. We employed random-coefficient model to estimate the effect of perceptions on housework disagreement with housework division and other micro-level variables controlled because we expect variation across societies in the relationship between perceptions of housework fairness and housework disagreement. The analysis shows that perceived unfairness is significantly different across countries. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, perceived unfairness has a strong positive effect on frequency of housework disagreement levels (p < .001). With perceived unfairness included in the model, the effect of men’s percentage of housework time on disagreement becomes nonsignificant. The finding suggests that the key mechanism associated with housework disagreement is perceived inequity in housework divisions rather than time spent on housework.

Model 3 examines whether the connection between perceptions of housework divisions and disagreement is moderated by individuals’ gender attitudes and relative income between couples. The results show that Hypothesis 3 is partially supported as the connection between perceived unfairness and disagreement is more pronounced for women with more income relative to their spouses (p < .1). There is no significant interaction between gender attitudes and unfairness.

Turning to men’s reports, according to Model 1, men’s age and gender attitudes, the number of children, and total housework hours are correlated with housework disagreement. Men who report more total housework hours and more children in the household claim higher levels of housework disagreement, while age is negatively correlated with disagreement. In Model 2, men’s perceived unfairness to their spouses is positively associated with housework disagreement (p < .001), while other effects remain similar. Note that the results show that the random effect of men’s unfairness is not significantly different across countries (p > .05), but for consistency of analytic methods for both male and female respondents, we employed random-intercept and random-coefficient models to estimate the following analyses. Wald tests (results not shown) were conducted to assess whether there are gender differences in the effect of perceived unfairness on housework disagreement. As expected (Hypothesis 2), perceptions of housework unfairness have a stronger effect on levels of disagreement for women (p < .001). Similarly, men’s lower income relative to their spouses marginally moderates the connection between unfairness and housework disagreements (p < .1).

Table 4 shows multilevel estimates that relate housework disagreement to both individual-level and country-level factors. Specifically, we tested whether GEM, relative economic resources between men and women at the macro level, societal gender ideology, affirmative action policies, and discriminatory laws explain differences in disagreement levels and the association between perceived unfairness and housework disagreement across countries in separate models. According to women’s reports, the female–male income ratio and women’s share of professional and technical positions yield positive effects on the association between perceived unfairness and housework disagreement (p < .01 and p < .01, respectively). That is, in societies where women’s income is more equal relative to men’s and more women work in professional and technical positions, the positive association between women’s perceived housework unfairness and rates of disagreement is more substantial. Social policy matters as well. The connection between perceived unfairness and housework disagreement is strengthened in societies without discriminatory work regulations that limit women’s participation in certain job categories (p < .1). GEM and gender ideology, on the other hand, do not affect the frequency of disagreement or moderate the effect of perceived unfairness on disagreement about housework.

Table 4.

Ordered Logistic Models for Country-Level Effects on Housework Disagreement (Odds Ratios).

Variable	Women						Men
Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	0.031***	0.031***	0.032***	0.031***	0.031***	0.032***	0.041***	0.041***	0.041***	0.040***	0.041***	0.043***
Perceived unfairness to women	2.100**	2.090**	2.028**	2.188**	2.106**	1.998**	1.236	1.243	1.294	1.328	1.252	1.143
GEM	0.375						0.444
Societal gender ideology		0.774						0.900
Female–male income ratio			2.623						4.197
Percentage of females in professional and technical positions				1.010						1.015
Affirmative action					0.803						0.856
Absence of discriminatory laws						0.978						1.043
Unfairness × GEM	1.285						2.491*
Unfairness × Societal gender ideology		1.127						1.345**
Unfairness × Female–male income ratio			4.692**						1.420
Unfairness × professional and technical				1.028**						1.004
Unfairness × Affirmative action					1.049						1.200^†
Unfairness × Absence of discriminatory laws						1.126^†						1.160**
Between-country intercept variance	0.221***	0.224***	0.226***	0.231***	0.221***	0.231	0.254***	0.261***	0.240***	0.252***	0.254***	0.257***
Between-country unfairness variance	0.068***	0.065**	0.043**	0.040**	0.068***	0.058	0.003	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.002	0.006
N	7,144						5,822

Note. GEM = Gender Empowerment Measure. Net of individual-level effects and thresholds of ordinal logistic analyses not shown in the table.

†

p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

The results suggest that for women, the moderating effect of economic resources on the association between perceived unfairness and disagreement is more substantial. In other words, when economic structures provide women with alternative opportunities, women who perceive housework arrangements as unfair are more likely to express disagreement.

Our results suggest that although women do the majority of housework, they do not necessarily openly disagree on housework division and seek changes if they do not perceive their housework loads as unfair. Furthermore, despite a positive association between women’s perceived inequity in domestic work and housework disagreement, the association between them is likely to be reinforced or discounted by micro and macro gender power relations. Thus, women who perceive inequality may be discouraged to seek changes if women are largely considered as economic dependents in their societies.

For men, despite the limited between-country variation of the effect of perceived unfairness on housework disagreement, GEM, societal gender ideology, affirmative action policy, and the absence of discriminatory laws yield positive moderating effects on the association between unfairness and housework disagreements. Other country-level variables are not statistically significant. Given the limited variation in the effect of unfairness on housework disagreement, the cross-level interaction effects are also relatively limited.

We conducted additional analyses to test the effect of unfairness to men on housework disagreement (results not shown). Possibly because of few males (426 cases) reporting unfairness to them, the macro-level factors and cross-level interaction terms are not statistically significant.

Finally, because about 38% of cases were excluded from the final analyses due to missing data on the individual and family characteristics, to examine whether the deletion of these cases may lead to systematically different samples and estimates, we conducted multiple imputation and estimated additional analyses based on imputed data. The findings are generally similar to those presented in Tables 3 and 4 (results available on request). One notable difference is that spouses’ relative income does not significantly moderate the association between perceptions of housework unfairness and disagreement.

Discussion and Conclusion

Our article investigates whether perceptions of housework fairness mediate the relationship between divisions of labor and housework disagreement and whether this relationship varies across familial and societal gender power relations. Understanding these processes potentially provides important insight into the mechanisms that translate unequal housework divisions into more egalitarian arrangements. Few studies have investigated these associations. Previous research has either examined the factors associated with perceptions of fairness or with housework conflict. But to our knowledge there is no research examining the links between housework divisions, perceptions of housework fairness and housework disagreement from a cross-national and multilevel perspective.

Our results show strong support for our first hypothesis that housework divisions and housework disagreement are mediated by perceptions of housework divisions. When women’s perceptions of housework divisions are taken into account, the association between the division of household labor and frequency of disagreement becomes statistically nonsignificant. This suggests that perceptions of fairness play a strong role in the association between unequal housework arrangements and housework disagreement. The findings have important implications for gender relations and family change. It suggests one reason why women continue to undertake a large share of household labor. If women perceive arrangements as fair even when women are doing a large bulk of the work, disagreements over arrangements are unlikely, and there may be little motivation to change these arrangements. But if women perceive arrangements as unfair, it is likely that there will be disagreement potentially leading to new arrangements.

In support of our second hypothesis, we also find a much stronger association between perceptions of fairness and frequency of disagreement for women compared with men. Since women typically bear the burden of a much greater share of domestic work, it is not surprising that women’s perceptions of fairness will be a much stronger intermediary factor in whether these arrangements are related to disagreements.

We also hypothesize that individual- and societal-level gender power contexts influence these associations. Some countries provide the social and political context to enable men and women to act on their perceptions, while others constrain them to accept the status quo, even if arrangements are blatantly unfair. Specifically, according to our findings in the household, the connection between women’s perceived unfairness and housework disagreement is moderated by relative income. At the macro level, women who perceive their housework divisions as unfair may not disagree with their current domestic arrangements if the economic opportunity structures do not provide women with equal employment opportunities. This suggests that social contexts provide important information in understanding interpersonal power dynamics and relationships within households and indicates the importance of cross-national comparisons and replication of studies across countries rather than assuming that findings in one context always apply in others.

Our article has some limitations. Our data were collected in 2002. Although more recent international data on family work, perceptions of fairness of family work (i.e., ISSP, 2012), and conflict over housework (i.e., European Social Survey) have been released, the 2002 ISSP Family and Changing Gender Roles module is the only data file that simultaneously includes cross-national data on housework, perceptions of housework fairness, and disagreements about housework. Given that the data were released more than one decade ago, we are concerned that housework arrangements may have changed in some of the countries in our sample, including the possibility that domestic divisions of labor may have become more egalitarian over time, and women’s resources outside the relationship may have improved. While this may change the average levels of some variables, such as housework time, we have no reason to expect that the relationships between these variables will have changed over time. We are thus confident that our theoretical arguments and the patterning of the results would be similar if investigated using more recent data.

A second limitation is our measure of housework disagreement which examines frequency of disagreement over housework sharing. While disagreement about sharing housework is an important measure, it provides no insight into other possible sources of disagreement about housework, such as disagreements about housework standards. It also sheds no light on the intensity of the disagreement or who initiates the disagreement.

A third limitation concerns the causal relationships between housework, perceptions of housework fairness and housework disagreements. Given that our analyses are based on cross-sectional data, we cannot test the causal directions among housework divisions, perceptions and disagreements. We are aware that the causal ordering might be bidirectional or in the opposite direction. Thus, more equal divisions may result from continuing negotiations and conflict between couples, the reverse of our theoretical argument. To examine this, we also conduct additional analyses (results available on request) that predict men’s share of housework hours with the frequency of housework disagreement and other variables controlled. The results show that with other variables controlled, housework disagreement does not predict housework divisions.

Furthermore, we are not able to examine changes in the allocation of household chores between couples over time, changes in individual’s perceptions of housework division or changes in disagreement patterns over the course of a partnership due to the cross-sectional design of the ISSP data (Grunow, Schulz, & Blossfeld, 2012). Finally, we do not have couple (dyadic) data, and thus are unable to assess the consistency (or inconsistency) of reports of housework disagreement or housework allocations between couples.

Despite these limitations, our article is the first to examine the links between housework divisions, perceptions of fairness, and housework disagreement cross-nationally. Gender inequality within households continues to be a major impediment to achieving full social equality for women across many countries. Understanding the conditions under which perceptions of unfairness are converted into disagreement offers insight into possible ways to change unequal household arrangements and, more broadly gender relations. Future research may shed additional light on these relationships, including under what conditions housework disagreement leads to more equitable housework arrangements.

Footnotes

Appendix

Table A.

Housework Disagreement, Man’s Percentage of Housework Hours, Perceived Unfairness, and Country-Level Factors by Country (Weighted Results).

Country	Women			Men			GEM	Gender ideology	Gender income ratio	Females in professional and technical positions	Affirmative action	Absence of discriminatory
Country	Housework disagreement	Men’s percentage of housework hours	Unfairness	Housework disagreement	Men’s percentage of housework hours	Unfairness	GEM	Gender ideology	Gender income ratio	Females in professional and technical positions	Affirmative action	Absence of discriminatory
Australia	2.05	32.42	0.63	1.97	38.28	0.42	0.76	0.14	0.69	48.00	1.00	3
West Germany	2.05	26.65	0.56	2.05	28.11	0.53	0.77	0.21	0.50	50.00	1.00	2
East Germany	1.79	30.51	0.57	1.98	30.02	0.49	0.77	0.72	0.50	50.00	1.00	2
Great Britain	2.21	26.28	0.66	2.12	34.62	0.46	0.68	0.26	0.61	45.00	0.00	3
USA	2.23	29.88	0.61	2.30	36.67	0.33	0.76	0.24	0.62	54.00	1.00	3
Austria	1.62	22.11	0.66	1.58	29.45	0.50	0.75	−0.13	0.50	49.00	0.00	1
Hungary	2.19	24.96	0.40	2.04	27.56	0.40	0.50	−0.59	0.58	61.00	0.00	1
Ireland	2.16	22.45	0.65	2.27	28.50	0.40	0.68	0.30	0.40	50.00	1.00	3
Netherlands	2.09	25.35	0.67	2.13	28.55	0.46	0.78	0.25	0.52	46.00	1.00	3
Norway	2.27	26.62	0.48	2.25	32.17	0.53	0.84	0.65	0.64	49.00	1.00	3
Sweden	2.26	34.08	0.57	2.18	37.31	0.48	0.82	0.65	0.68	49.00	1.00	3
Czech Republic	2.31	26.35	0.62	2.16	31.42	0.46	0.56	−0.26	0.58	53.00	0.00	1
Slovenia	2.19	26.36	0.47	2.22	26.91	0.47	0.59	−0.13	0.62	51.00	0.00	1
Poland	2.47	32.51	0.56	2.59	37.27	0.31	0.59	−0.25	0.61	61.00	0.00	1
Russia	2.70	30.32	0.53	2.48	38.10	0.42	0.45	−0.53	0.64	64.00	0.00	2
New Zealand	2.05	26.74	0.67	2.02	33.45	0.44	0.77	0.18	0.67	54.00	0.00	3
Israel	2.31	25.49	0.43	2.08	30.98	0.32	0.60	0.11	0.52	55.00	1.00	3
Japan	1.82	9.44	0.47	2.09	10.48	0.54	0.53	0.07	0.44	45.00	0.00	2
Spain	2.26	21.02	0.55	2.27	29.57	0.44	0.70	0.11	0.43	45.00	0.00	1
Latvia	2.62	33.93	0.45	2.62	39.47	0.36	0.54	−0.32	0.72	67.00	0.00	3
Slovakia	3.05	30.91	0.55	2.90	34.64	0.33	0.55	−0.47	0.65	62.00	0.00	1
Cyprus	2.24	18.01	0.41	2.26	22.36	0.42	0.53	0.28	0.49	42.00	0.00	1
Portugal	2.01	17.15	0.39	2.04	23.78	0.52	0.64	−0.30	0.53	50.00	0.00	1
Chile	1.89	17.90	0.54	1.96	23.42	0.57	0.47	−0.65	0.37	52.00	0.00	2
Denmark	2.55	31.73	0.43	2.54	38.12	0.34	0.82	0.75	0.70	50.00	0.00	3
Switzerland	1.95	26.46	0.49	1.91	29.10	0.43	0.72	−0.05	0.50	42.00	0.00	1
Flanders	2.28	23.85	0.77	2.15	29.23	0.44	0.71	0.03	0.44	50.00	1.00	2
Finland	2.55	31.40	0.50	2.37	35.07	0.45	0.80	0.28	0.70	56.00	0.00	3
Mexico	2.52	28.10	0.67	2.45	34.15	0.46	0.52	−0.62	0.38	41.00	0.00	2
Total	2.23	26.23	0.55	2.21	31.46	0.44	0.66	0.03	0.56	51.41	0.34	2.07

Note. GEM = Gender Empowerment Measure.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Grant number: MOST 105-2410-H-305-002-MY2 and CE140100027.

ORCID iD

Tsui-o Tai

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