Longitudinal Associations Between Household Labor Division Inequity and Conflict Among Newlywed Couples

Abstract

The division of household labor among couples is a frequently occurring topic of conflict. The present investigation examined longitudinal associations between inequities in household labor divisions and conflict about those divisions in 219 newly married heterosexual couples without children enrolled in the Louisiana Marriage Matters Panel Survey of Newlyweds. We used autoregressive latent trajectory models across three time points spanning approximately 3.5 years. More conflict about labor inequity was related to declines in household labor inequity by the next wave. Additionally, greater household labor inequity was related to declines in conflict by the next wave. We discuss findings in terms of the demand-response hypothesis and ideological reasons why higher labor inequities may relate to less conflict.

Keywords

Division of household labor conflict inequity newlyweds longitudinal

Across the course of romantic relationships, navigating roles and responsibilities within the household can be challenging. Upon marriage, navigating the division of household labor often emerges as a source of relationship conflict. From work dating back to the 1970s and spanning to the present, researchers have consistently found that, in heterosexual relationships, women generally perform a substantially larger proportion of household work than men because tasks are often divided along sex-typical lines (Barstad, 2014; Baxter, 2005; Benin & Agostinelli, 1988; Blair & Lichter, 1991; Greenstein, 1996; Hochschild, 1989; Newkirk et al., 2017; Yavorsky et al., 2015; Yogev & Brett, 1985).

Sociocultural developments over the past two decades have narrowed the gender gap in the division of household labor in response to the rise of women in the paid labor force (Bianchi et al., 2000; Geist & Cohen, 2011). Because more women are now pursuing careers of their own, they have less time available to devote to household tasks (Artis & Pavalko, 2003; Popescu, 2016; Silver & Goldscheider, 1994) and more relative resources for bargaining power with their male partners (Antman, 2014; Brines, 1994). As a result, the time women devote to household labor has decreased by about half since the 1960s, whereas the time men devote to household labor has nearly doubled during the same time frame (Artis & Pavalko, 2003; Bianchi et al., 2000; Gershuny & Robinson, 1988). Despite this historical shift, women still outperform men in time devoted to household labor (Bartley et al., 2005; Jansen et al., 2016). This inequity often gives rise to division of labor-specific disputes (Cubbins & Vannoy, 2004; Kluwer et al., 2000; Stohs, 1995).

Negotiating the division of household labor may be more challenging during certain relationship stages. One significant relationship stage that may be particularly vulnerable to these challenges is early marriage when couples are adapting to novel situations and expectations in their relationship roles. Using an archival, longitudinal dataset of married couples in Louisiana, we tested how inequitable household labor divisions and conflict about those divisions are related over time for newlywed heterosexual couples across three time points.

The Newlywed Period

Upon entrance into marital unions, couples often bring feelings of immeasurable adoration for each other, heightened passion, and excitement for the future that lies ahead. Like any romantic union, however, newlyweds also experience unique challenges associated with time-specific life events and the novelty of their new roles as husband and wife, and these may carry important implications for how newlyweds negotiate the division of household labor and the extent to which these divisions generate disputes. Newlyweds possess a unique set of vulnerabilities that make them an ideal demographic with which to examine the division of household labor and conflict about labor divisions.

First, newly married couples may be more susceptible to higher levels of stress due to important life events (e.g., changing jobs, relocating, completing formal education; Cohan & Bradbury, 1997), and unsatisfying household labor divisions may compound this stress. Regardless, relationship satisfaction is generally at its highest during the early years of marriage and steadily declines as years pass (Hall & Adams, 2011; Tucker & Aron, 1993). Elevated relationship satisfaction may contribute to idealized expectations about marital offerings that often end up unrealized. This may be one of many reasons why newlyweds tend to endure more dramatic shifts in relationship quality and are at greater risk of marital dissolution (Cherlin, 1992). Thus, examining how newly married couples navigate salient relationship issues like household labor inequity and conflict about labor divisions has important implications for relationship stability.

Associations Between Division of Labor Inequities and Conflict

Although previous studies have shed a great deal of insight into how historical shifts in women’s participation in the labor force over the past several decades have affected gendered divisions of household labor, it remains unclear how these arrangement shifts affect the extent to which couples disagree or argue about new labor arrangements, as well as how labor inequities and conflict change and relate over time. Household labor divisions are a recurring topic of contention for couples. It is unknown whether these conflict interactions about household labor divisions are useful in generating positive change (i.e., more equal labor divisions) or whether they are detrimental to couples’ goals towards greater household labor equality. If household labor divisions and conflict about these arrangements lead to changes in each other across the course of relationships, researchers may be better able to identify how couples can effectively re-distribute household tasks in ways that fulfill the needs of both partners.

One possibility in how household labor inequities and conflict about labor divisions are related longitudinally is that unequal labor divisions may produce greater conflict over time. Indeed, the division of household labor is associated with greater levels of distress in relationships (Barnett & Shen, 1997) because partners often judge labor divisions as unfair and dissatisfying, particularly women (Barstad, 2014; Hochschild, 1989; Moen, 1992). In turn, greater levels of distress are linked to a host of negative behavioral patterns, including conflict (Notarius & Markman, 1989). Though the majority of research has found stronger individual consequences for women, both men and women are negatively affected by domestic pressures (Jones & Fletcher, 1996). When either person experiences dissatisfaction in the relationship, it is likely to lead to conflict with the partner, and this is particularly the case when the female partner in a heterosexual relationship is distressed, as women tend to have more negative reactions to marital stress compared to men (Almeida & Kessler, 1998). As a result, couples may experience greater conflict as a result of unequal household labor divisions. However, it’s also important to note that women who espouse more traditional ideologies tend to experience less dissatisfaction than egalitarian women in their relationships when divisions of labor are more inequitable (Blair & Johnson, 1992; Piña & Bengtson, 1993). Thus, it is possible that some couples may not experience increased conflict in response to unequal household labor divisions.

A second possibility in how household labor inequities and conflict about labor divisions are related longitudinally is that conflict about unequal labor divisions actually changes how labor is distributed between partners over time. The demand-response hypothesis asserts that the time husbands spend on domestic tasks is, in part, a result of the demands placed on husbands by wives to fulfill household duties (Coverman, 1985). Husbands responded to behavior modification requests by increasing their participation in household activities (Coverman 1985; Deutsch et al., 1993; Presser, 1994). Mannino and Deutsch (2007) found that women who were more assertive in their attempts to increase men’s participation in childcare labor felt closer to their ideal division of childcare labor compared to less assertive women. Overall, this evidence suggests that newlyweds may respond to the dissatisfaction their partners express regarding housework allocations with true behavior change.

The Current Study

The overarching goal of the present investigation was to examine how household labor division inequities and conflict about unequal labor divisions are associated across time among heterosexual newlywed couples. We limited our investigation to heterosexual couples because of our focus on inequities in household labor, something same-sex couples tend to have less of (Chan et al., 1998; Goldberg et al., 2012; Kurdek, 1993; Solomon et al., 2005). We also limited our study to newlyweds who did not have children at the start of their marriage and did not transition to parenthood during the three waves. Household labor increases substantially when a child is born, meaning there is more housework overall to divide (or not) between partners and less time available to devote to household labor tasks (Baxter et al., 2008). Because of these substantial differences in study constructs between couples with and without children, we focused our analysis on newlyweds without children to avoid this confound.

This study provides the first test of how household labor division inequities and conflict interactions about unequal labor divisions are related over time. We examined bidirectional pathways between unequal division of household labor and conflict interactions across the first four years of marriage using an archival, prospective data set. By adding a longitudinal perspective, we were able to track changes in household labor divisions over time and test the direction of effects between labor divisions and conflict about these divisions. Although gender is closely tied to heterosexual couples’ household labor divisions, we did not run models separately by gender or test gender moderation because of our focus on couple-level constructs of inequities and conflict (i.e., events in relationships that, theoretically, couple members should report similarly) as opposed to individuals’ time or satisfaction.

In line with previous literature and the demand-response hypothesis, we hypothesized that bidirectional associations would occur. Specifically, we predicted that inequitable divisions of household labor would relate to increases in conflict about those divisions over time and that conflict about labor divisions would relate to decreases in inequitable divisions of household labor over time.

Methods

Participants

Data were used from the Marriage Matters Panel Survey of Newlywed Couples (MMPSNC; Nock et al., 1998–2004). The MMPSNC is a large public database of newlywed couples living in Louisiana, U.S.A. The overall goal of the original study was to examine the effects of covenant marriage on rates of marital dissolution, relationship quality, and other relationship outcomes in response to the covenant marriage law enacted by the state of Louisiana in 1997 as an alternative to a conventional marriage license. Covenant marriage legally obliges couples to a more enduring union such that its legal consequences closely emulate the vow made by husbands and wives during the wedding ceremony (Rasmusen & Stake, 1997; Wolfe, 1995). Because researchers aimed to have equal numbers of standard-licensed and covenant-licensed couples in the study, standard-licensed couples were intentionally over-sampled at the start of the study in anticipation of covenants’ potentially greater commitment to the duration of the study. The final sample was comprised of roughly equal numbers of standard and covenant couples, and demographically, respondents were similar to recently married people across the United States (Nock et al., 1998–2004). Couples were recruited by randomly selecting 17 parishes from which 1,310 marriage licenses were drawn. Of these, approximately 700 couples agreed to participate. Wave one data were collected roughly three to six months after marriage. Wave two data were collected about 18 months after wave one, and wave three data were collected between 12 to 24 months after wave two.

For the present study, we analyzed data from a subsample of newlywed couples without children throughout the duration of the study. Our final sample consisted of 219 couples. Among wives, 81.7% were Caucasian, 11.9% African American, 2.7% Hispanic, 3.2% other ethnicities, and 0.5% had missing data; .5% of wives had eight years or less of formal education, 28.3% had between 9 years and 12 years, 61.1% had between 13 years and 16 years, and 10.1% had between 17 years and 20 years of education. Among husbands, 77.6% were Caucasian, 9.1% African American, 1% Hispanic, 1.8% other ethnicities, and data for the remaining 10.5% were missing; 32.1% of husbands had between 9 years and 12 years, 47.9% had between 13 years and 16 years, 9.1% had between 17 years and 20 years, and the remaining 10.9% were missing from the data.

Procedure

In the MMPSNC study, newly married couples completed three separate waves of surveys over a total of 3.5 years. Wave one was collected roughly three to six months after marriage, in which couples completed questionnaires independently from their partner in their home regarding their thoughts and feelings about their current marriage and household responsibilities. Couples answered similar questions at waves two and three, which were administered about 18 months after wave one and 12 to 24 months after wave two, respectively.

Measures

Demographics

Couples provided basic demographic information. The information collected included their age, ethnicity, each partner’s income, weekly paid labor hours, and religiosity.

Division of Household Labor

Household labor divisions were assessed using a measure designed for the MMPSNC (Nock et al., 1998–2004). Questions assessed the degree to which household tasks are the respondent’s primary responsibility, the respondent’s partner’s primary responsibility, or equally shared. We analyzed six routine household labor tasks: cleaning the house, washing dishes, washing clothes, preparing meals, paying bills/keeping financial records, and shopping for groceries and household goods. A common way to measure household labor is to create a composite of those items that are more similar in terms of frequency with which they are performed (Legerski & Cornwall, 2010, Moreno-Colom, 2017). Some tasks are more routine than others and could be viewed as a qualitatively different type of household labor than tasks that are more occasional and infrequent. For example, tasks such as washing the dishes and preparing meals are typically completed daily, whereas tasks such as car repair and maintenance are completed on an as-needed basis. Women are stereotypically responsible for routine household tasks that must be completed with frequency, are sometimes unpleasant, and allow for minimal “schedule control” (Barnett & Shen, 1997). Indeed, routine housework is both theoretically and empirically linked to historical trends of the gendered division of household labor (Bittman et al., 2003; Cunningham, 2007, Leopold & Skopek, 2015). Frequently occurring tasks may be more likely to lead to persistent frustration, and thus, conflict in relationships. Thus, routine tasks were examined in the current study because of our focus on conflict about labor arrangements among couples.

Household labor response anchors were originally scaled from 2 to 4 (2 = shared equally, 3 = mainly partner’s responsibility, and 4 = mainly my responsibility). We recoded the anchors for ease of interpretation, such that 0 = shared equally, -1 = mainly partner’s responsibility, and 1 = mainly my responsibility. With this new coding system, a negative score would be interpreted as I do less than my partner, a positive score would be interpreted as I do more than my partner, and a zero as we share this task equally.

We reverse-coded women’s household labor scores so that men’s and women’s scores could be interpreted in similar ways. Next, we examined the extent of agreement between men’s and women’s scores at the task level. Similar scores would support combining husbands’ and wives’ reports into one composite. This approach is consistent with past work, as reports from each partner measure a single concept of interest (Katz-Wise et al., 2010). Indeed, men and women responded in similar ways to each other about household task divisions. Correlations between husbands’ and wives’ reports ranging from .47 to .85 (all ps < .001). Paired sample t-tests examining differences between husbands’ and wives’ reports showed that scores were either not significantly different (24% of comparisons; t’s = 1.34–1.65, p’s = .101—.180) or were significant (t’s = 1.99—5.87, p’s = .000—.047) but with mostly small effect sizes. For example, among the tests that were significant, only 2 out of 13 effect sizes were moderate in size (d’s = .311 and .425). The other 11 out of 13 effect sizes were small in size (d’s = .14 - .26). Because the task division reports were averaged across these routine tasks that were either not significantly different between husbands and wives or were largely minimally different, the impact of any reporting difference was considered small and husbands’ and wives’ reports of household task divisions were combined.

Finally, we took the absolute value of the routine task composite score to allow for interpretation that is consistent with our research goals of examining more or less inequity in labor divisions. Taking the absolute value for routine tasks produced a continuous measure with scores ranging from 0 to 1. All analyses in this study used the absolute value scores. Values closer to one were indicative of greater inequity, and values closer to zero were indicative of less inequity. The mean scores for this new measure were M = .43 (SD = .34) at wave one, M = .45 (SD = .35) at wave two, and M = .48 (SD = .38) at wave three.

Conflict about household labor

Conflict about household labor was measured using two items from the MMPSNC (Nock et al., 1998–2004). The two items asked respondents to indicate the extent of agreement or disagreement between them and their partner about who does what around the house, and handling family finances—the only two conflict items asked that directly relate to routine labor tasks. Response options were (1 = always agree, 2 = almost always agree, 3 = sometimes disagree, 4 = frequently disagree, 5 = almost always disagree, and 6 = always disagree).

Conflict scores were handled similarly to the division of household labor scores. Zero-order correlations and paired sample t-tests were conducted to determine whether men’s and women’s reports of conflict were similar and could reasonably be combined. At waves one, two, and three, the correlations between husbands’ and wives’ reports of conflict regarding who does what around the house were r = .53, r = .57, and r = .53, respectively (all ps < .001), and paired sample t-tests showing nonsignificant differences between husbands’ and wives’ reports were t = -.85, p = .40, t = -1.55, p = .12, and t = -.433, p = .67, respectively. For husbands’ and wives’ reports of conflict regarding handling family finances, correlations were r = .32 at wave one and r = .37 at waves two and three (all ps < .001), and paired sample t-tests showing nonsignificant differences between partners were t = .77, p = .45, t = -.16, p = .87, and t = -.75, p = .46, respectively. Because the substantive pattern suggested that men and women tended to agree on the frequency in which each type of conflict occurred in their relationship, averages were created to represent overall conflict over handling family finances and overall conflict over who does what around the house. In addition, because conflict over who does what around the home and conflict over handling family finances both represent conflict about routine household labor, we aggregated these conflict items. Correlations between the two conflict topics ranged from .45 to .51 across the three waves (all ps < .01), supporting a composite of one overall measure to represent conflict about household labor inequities.

Analytical Plan

Our analytic plan started with an examination of descriptive statistics and potential demographic control variables. Next, we ran a structural equation model (see Figure 1) with household labor divisions and conflict about labor divisions among newly married couples assessed over three time points. In order to disaggregate the between- and within-person effects, we used an adaptation of the traditional cross-lagged path model outlined in Berry and Willoughby (2017) known as an autoregressive latent trajectory (ALT) model. The ALT model is a blend of the cross-lagged path model and the latent-growth curve model in that it allows researchers to track individual trajectories of growth and account for prior values of the repeated measure (Curran & Bauer, 2011). We added equality constraints to paths in the ALT model in a stepwise fashion. Constraints were tested on the autoregressive paths within-variable over time, the cross-lagged paths between variables within each segment of time, and the cross-lagged paths over time. We used chi-square difference tests to determine whether the constrained model fit significantly different than the freely estimated model. In cases where the constraints did not significantly worsen the model fit, we retained them for parsimony.

Figure 1.

Conceptual model linking household labor division inequity and conflict over time.

Results

Table 1 provides descriptive information for each study variable and correlations between the measures for household labor inequities and conflict at each wave. Scores for division of labor at each time point were all strongly correlated with one another. The composite scores for couples’ reports of conflict were all moderately-to-highly correlated as well. Conflict at wave two demonstrated small correlations with household labor inequities at waves two and three, while wave three conflict had small to moderate correlations with labor inequities at all waves.

Table 1.

Descriptive Information and Correlations Among Study Variables.

	M	SD	Range	Wave 1 DOL	Wave 2 DOL	Wave 3 DOL	Wave 1 Conflict	Wave 2 Conflict	Wave 3 Conflict
Wave 1 DOL	.43	.27	.00-1.00	–
Wave 2 DOL	.45	.27	.00-1.00	.64**	–
Wave 3 DOL	.48	.29	.00-1.00	.51**	.68**	–
Wave 1 Conflict	2.44	.40	.75-3.50	−.13	−.12	−.02	–
Wave 2 Conflict	2.48	.43	1.00-3.50	−.12	−.15*	−.16*	.37**	–
Wave 3 Conflict	2.47	.40	1.25-3.50	−.17*	−.16*	−.22**	.37**	.57**	–

Note. DOL=division of household labor inequity.

p < .05. **p < .01.

Because wives’ annual income is an important determinant of couples’ division of household labor arrangements (Bianchi et al., 2000; Brines, 1994), we included this variable from wave one as a control in the primary model (M = $21,021, SD = $15,420). We also conducted correlations among labor inequities and conflict with other relevant demographic variables (religiosity, race/ethnicity, and work hours). Those related to both routine labor inequity and conflict were examined as potential controls to prevent the risk of confounding variables. No additional covariates of interest were related to both household labor inequity and conflict.

To examine our hypotheses, ALT cross-lagged models were conducted to test the extent to which inequities in the division of household labor and conflict over these inequities were related over time. We add equality constraints to the model for parsimony. First, autoregressive paths were set to be equal within-variable across time (e.g., the association between wave one conflict and wave two conflict set equal to the association between wave two conflict and wave three conflict). The household labor inequity autoregressive equality constraints fit no different than the freely-estimated model, χ²_D (1) = .66, p = .417, and thus were retained. However, the conflict autoregressive equality constraints significantly lessened model fit, χ²_D (1) = 9.24, p = .002, and thus were removed, leaving freely-estimated paths. Second, cross-lagged paths were set to be equal within the same timeframe (e.g., the association between wave one household labor inequity and wave two conflict set equal to the association between wave one conflict and wave two household labor inequity). These cross-lagged constraints fit no different than the freely-estimated model, χ²_D (2) = 1.00, p = .607, and thus were retained. Third, the constrained cross-lagged paths were set to be equal across time (i.e., the wave one to wave two cross-lagged path set to be equal to the wave two to wave three cross-lagged path). This constraint also did not fit significantly different than the previous model (χ²_D (1) = .36, p = .549); thus, the over-time cross-lagged constraints were retained. The final constrained model fit the data well (χ²(14) = 12.50, p = .57, RMSEA = .00 (.00-.06), CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.01). The latent growth trajectories modeled in the ALT analysis revealed a significant average growth rate within-couple across time in household labor division inequities (b = .02, p = .008). Household labor divisions tended to become more inequitable over time. The average growth rate in conflict about labor divisions was not significant (b = .02, p = .292), suggesting that couples’ conflict did not change over time. As shown in Figure 2, greater inequity in household labor division at one wave was related to greater labor inequity at the next wave. Greater conflict at wave two was related to greater conflict at wave three, but conflict reports at waves one and two were unrelated. More conflict about labor inequity was related to declines in household labor inequity by the next wave. However, greater household labor inequity was related to declines in conflict by the next wave.

Figure 2.

Autoregressive latent trajectory model with household labor inequity and conflict.

Discussion

The purpose of the current study was to examine inequities in couples’ divisions of household labor and the conflict that emerges from these divisions among heterosexual newlywed couples without children. It has been established that perceived inequality in household labor allocations is often a recurring source of tension in relationships (Newkirk et al., 2017), but no work to date has investigated how associations between household labor inequities and conflict unfold over time. Therefore, we examined the degree to which household labor inequities and conflict change and relate to each other across three time points.

Although household labor inequities for routine tasks and conflict about those arrangements are inherently a gendered issue for heterosexual couples, our study focused on couple-level events in the relationship as opposed to men’s and women’s individual time use or satisfaction with the household labor divisions. Our measurement of couple-level constructs using both couple members’ reports relied on the assumption that men and women would similarly perceive whether inequities and conflict occur in their relationship. Preliminary analyses supported that assumption with this sample. Men’s and women’s reports of household labor inequity and conflict about household tasks were highly correlated, and men’s and women’s reports of conflict about handling family finances were moderately correlated. Furthermore, there were no significant differences between men’s and women’s reports of conflict, and the differences that were found between partners’ reports of household labor divisions were minimal. Thus, we did not find convincing evidence of gender differences in reports of our study constructs, but future research testing how men and women feel about household labor inequities and how those perceptions interact would warrant such investigation.

Our longitudinal investigation of how labor inequities and conflict are related over time among newlyweds provided a process-oriented perspective of household labor divisions and conflicts about those divisions. Notably, latent growth trajectories with the ALT model showed that newlyweds demonstrated significant change in household labor division inequities, with couples becoming more inequitable over the 3.5-year study period. We focused on routine tasks that disproportionately fall to women. This is consistent with previous research that suggests that the time wives spend doing housework increases and the time husbands spend doing housework decreases in early marriage (Gupta, 1999). Newlyweds are at increased risk for relationship problems compared to other points in marriage (Cherlin, 1992); thus, to the extent that inequitable household labor divisions cause dissatisfaction among couples, understanding the risk inequitable household labor may continue to add to newlyweds’ relationship stability year after year is paramount.

Interestingly, we did not find significant change overall in the amount of conflict about household labor divisions couples reported as evidenced by a nonsignificant trajectory; although, greater conflict at wave two was related to greater conflict at wave three in the autoregressive paths. Despite increasing household labor inequities over time, conflict about these divisions appears to be more variable, particularly in the early years of marriage. Newly married couples tend to dismiss or minimize tension as a strategy for maintaining marital happiness (Huston et al., 2001). Thus, conflicts may not build and increase risk for future disagreements as much in the first year of marriage as in subsequent years for newlyweds.

In our autoregressive latent trajectory models, which accounted for within-couple change when testing cross-lagged associations between household labor inequity and conflict, we found evidence to support the demand-resource hypothesis. Greater conflict about labor inequities was related to declines in later household labor inequity. This finding suggests that when newlyweds disagree or argue about the way household tasks are allocated, inequities in these divisions decrease over time. In accordance with the demand-resource hypothesis, newlyweds may rely on conflict to exact change in their relationships. In support of this argument, the transition to marriage is marked by heightened passion, and thus, heightened conflict when the needs of one or both partners are not being met (McNulty et al., 2016). In response to conflict interactions, newlyweds may make behavior changes because they are eager to please the other partner and wish to avoid relationship distress (Huston et al., 2001). This presents a valuable opportunity for intervention, particularly if couples are encouraged by therapists to navigate and resolve conflicts in a constructive manner.

Interestingly, this negative cross-lagged association between labor inequity and conflict was present in a bidirectional fashion. Greater household labor inequity was related to declines in conflict by the next wave. This may seem contradictory at first glance, but it is in line with concurrent bivariate associations showing that labor inequity and conflict were negatively related, which suggests that couples who report less inequity tend to argue about those inequities more. Thus, for couples who have more household labor inequity, they may experience declines in conflict about that arrangement as partners become more accustomed to their separate roles. With more traditional ideologies, men and women may see it fit to have an unequal household labor division, despite the predominant view in the literature that inequality is bad for relationships. For example, Piña and Bengtson (1993) found that among traditional wives, there was no association between unequal household labor division and wives’ perceptions that their husbands required too much from them or with their satisfaction with their husbands’ labor contributions. Women in more traditional couples may not find any reason for dissatisfaction, and therefore, are less likely to engage in conflict regarding labor divisions.

Limitations

This study utilized a longitudinal design that allowed us to examine change over the first four years of marriage and, in turn, better understand how the relations between inequitable household labor divisions and conflict evolve over years. Despite the study strengths, it is important to note the limitations. First, all data were collected via self-report methods that are vulnerable to reporter bias. Some retrospective bias may also have been introduced into the data, as participants needed to reflect on their overall impressions of household labor allocations and conflict in their relationship, and this type of reflection is usually accomplished by considering both past and present experiences. One well-documented limitation of retrospective reporting is a high rate of problems with memory recall (Dalton et al., 2006; Hardt & Rutter, 2004, Schwarz & Sudman, 2012); poor accuracy in estimating overall labor allocations and the conflict interactions surrounding them warrants caution in interpreting the results of this study.

Second, the MMPSNC data were collected between the years of 1998 and 2004, so it is possible that dynamics between married men and women have shifted over the past decade and a half. To the extent that this is true, findings may reflect data that are a bit outdated. Additionally, in a world with more advanced technology and services, it could be that tasks such as ordering groceries online and picking up food are more relevant today than they would have been during the period data were collected.

Another limitation is that the sample may not be generalizable in a few key ways. First, this study only included heterosexual couples and couples without children. Many studies have found that, compared to heterosexual couples, same-sex couples employ more equal household labor distributions, particularly lesbian couples (Chan et al., 1998; Goldberg et al., 2012; Kurdek, 1993; Solomon et al., 2005). Because our primary interest for this study was to better understand inequitable household labor and the dissatisfaction it produces, heterosexual couples were an appropriate place to start. Similarly, household labor is quite different among couples once they transition to parenthood, which complicates comparisons across parents and non-parents. Future research should examine labor division inequities over time among couples with more dynamic household labor arrangements. Finally, most of the couples were low-to-middle-income earners and Caucasian, which also renders our findings potentially less generalizable to other income levels and racial/ethnic groups.

Conclusion

The way in which household labor is divided among couples is an important indicator of relationship quality (Stanley et al., 2002). For newer yet committed relationships, expressions of dissatisfaction with household labor divisions in the form of conflict seems to play a role in equalizing these labor divisions over time. At the same time, couples with greater household labor inequities tend to fight less about these divisions as they become more accustomed to their separate labor roles. This pattern of interaction is inconsistent with previous research emphasizing the conflict and dissatisfaction associated with inequality in household tasks. These findings have implications for the ways in which couples negotiate labor divisions in the household. Couples, particularly wives, who are experiencing marital dissatisfaction as a result of inequitable divisions of household labor may find engaging in constructive conflict discussions with their spouses to be productive. But are these processes that unfold over years, or do they occur at a more micro level? Future research may consider employing designs that examine relations between household labor inequities and conflict at the daily level and test other variables that may provide a more complete picture of the many ways that household labor inequities may affect the relationship beyond conflict. Nevertheless, by testing associations between household labor inequities and conflict across time, it is possible to pinpoint strategies that will and will not serve individuals throughout the course of their most treasured relationship.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

We thank Drs. Nock, Sanchez, and Wright for archiving their original study, and the University of Michigan’s Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research for making it available to researchers.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The Marriage Matters Panel Survey of Newlywed Couples was supported by the National Science Foundation (SBR-9803736, SES-9819156).

ORCID iD

Jackie A. Nelson

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