Teacher Performance Appraisal Regulation: A Policy Case Analysis

Research in Performance Appraisal

The TPA is a subject of interest because management research suggests that little is known about how performance appraisals operate, how they are implemented, and whether they are fair, effective, and transparent (as argued by Cappelli & Conyon, 2018). So far, research on the implementation of performance appraisals indicates that managers perceive that evaluating their team members or employees is both important and time consuming. Performance appraisals are perceived as important because they help management allocate rewards (e.g., distribution of wages) and motivate employees to work in the interests of their employers.

As stated earlier, the literature on performance appraisals focuses on identifying meaningful attributes of the evaluators and evaluate (Ilgen et al., 1993) and on the perceived acceptance of the appraisal process by employees (Pichler, 2012). However, little has been done so far on the actual language of the regulations of performance appraisals. Still this body of literature provides some insights about the type of labor covered by performance appraisals. Occupations associated with complex and separate tasks are more likely to be covered by performance appraisals (Brown & Heywood, 2005). In addition, research suggests that performance appraisals are characterized by two rating models: objective measures of performance (those that are at least conceptually straightforward to measure) and subjective measures (those that are conceptually difficult to measure) of performance (Cappelli & Conyion, 2018).

The literature suggests that subjective appraisals are often biased, entangled in manager-employee relations, cultural fitness, and other contingent factors (Frederiksen et al., 2017; Meier & O’Toole, 2013). Prendergast and Topel (1993) argue that subjective appraisals are systemically biased and create an enabling environment where managers’ preferences and biases lead to unfair rewards. Meier and O’Toole (2013) also argue that subjective appraisals are mostly arbitrary and open a door for managers to give preferential treatments to in-group members while underrating out-group members. For that reason, we probed the issue of subjectivity in the content of TPA and teased out, in the regulations provided by TPA, language aimed at preventing rating bias in the teacher performance evaluation.

So far, the body of literature on performance appraisals has been dominated by a psychological interpretation of traditional and transactional appraisal processes and outcomes, leading some scholars to hold a critical view of these processes (Levy & Williams, 2004; Murphy & Cleveland, 1995). Many argue that performance appraisal must also be studied from a social and institutional paradigm rather than from a cognitive paradigm only. As such, this article aligns itself with the rationale of the aforementioned scholars by addressing the issue of teacher performance evaluation from an institutional paradigm rather than from a cognitive one.

The Phasing out of Performance Appraisal

Increasingly, corporate organizations are phasing out transactional models of performance appraisal and about 70% of multinational firms are replacing their transactional appraisal model such as annual reviews with a summative appraisal model (Cappelli & Tavis, 2016). Simply said, employers are moving away from a punishment-reward culture. Evaluations are now being used by management to provide feedback and improve employees’ professional development. One reason that could explain this paradigm shift is that firms have realized that effective talent management is one of the indicators and predictors of organizational efficiency and employee retention. They have also come to terms with the fact that 95% of managers are not satisfied with their organizations’ performance management processes (Meinert, 2015). According to the Society for Human Resource Management, 66% of employees believe that the current performance appraisal process interferes with their productivity and 65% of them do not believe that the feedback provided during or after the appraisal process is relevant to their work (Meinert, 2015).

In consideration of such findings, some scholars (e.g., Cohens & Jenkins, 2010) have called for organizations to stop the practice of transactional performance appraisals on the assumption that, in most organizations, they do more harm than good. These scholars suggest that transactional and traditional performance appraisals should be replaced with alternative talent management models such as coaching and feedback (Cohens & Jenkins, 2010; Trost, 2017). This antitransactional view of performance appraisals is also shared by many corporate organizations who believe that transactional appraisals such as annual reviews are old fashioned and constitute one of the antecedents of management distrust and workplace conflicts (Cappelli & Tavis, 2016).

However, while corporate organizations in Canada and other industrialized countries are shifting their appraisal culture from accountability to personnel development, it appears that governments in those countries are doing the contrary when it comes to issues of school staffing. But compared with Canada, the overemphasis on accountability is more pronounced in the educational reforms proposed by governments in certain industrialized countries such as the United States (e.g., teacher merit pay, based on student test scores). Still, provincial governments across Canada want school districts to implement a traditional and transactional teacher performance evaluation model centered on accountability while also acknowledging the necessity of such an appraisal model to improve teachers’ professional development. Arguably, in introducing the TPA, the government of Ontario shares the same personnel development view with today’s corporate approach while at the same time maintaining the old-fashioned accountability appraisal culture in local school districts.

TPA Policy: Implementation Flaws

The TPA policy was adopted by provincial school districts in 2002 after the Ontario government passed the Quality in the Classroom Act and amended the Education Act in 2001. The Education Act is the main statute governing Ontario public education jurisdiction. It has been amended a few times to address the changing educational priorities of the province and sets the powers and responsibilities of all stakeholders (school boards, educators, parents, students, ministry of education). The enactment of TPA was part of Harris government’s public sector reform legislation, namely the Common-Sense Revolution. This reform movement was an outcome of the Ontario government’s efforts to implement the methods (e.g., performance standards, output controls, accountability, cost reduction) of New Public Management (NPM) in the public sector.

The NPM is a neoliberal managerial model that involves monitoring the public sector with corporate-like rules (Lorenz, 2012; Williams et al., 2012). Since being espoused by the federal governments of Clark, Trudeau, and Mulroney in the 1980s, the NPM has been adopted at the provincial level to make education and health care systems more businesslike (Glor, 2001).

In Canada and the United States, the introduction of NPM methods in the managerial culture of schools has been underscored by corporate practices such as teacher performance evaluations. In the past years, school boards in Ontario have sought to evaluate teachers to ensure that students receive the benefit of a public school system staffed by teachers who are carrying their instructional tasks satisfactorily (Larsen, 2009). Yet, since enacting the TPA, controversies have emerged around the implementation of this evaluation policy in provincial schools. A survey study by Larsen (2009) on the intended and unintended effects of the implementation of the TPA, for example, reveals that only 20% of teachers felt that the evaluation process was fair. Most of those surveyed felt that the implementation of the TPA has not enhanced their professional development. Teachers complained that it was too time consuming to prepare for an evaluation and that the appraisal process was frustrating. Concerns were raised about the accuracy of the professional judgment of principals in rating teachers’ work quality during classroom observations. As a result, Larsen (2009) concluded her study by arguing that some significant limitations exist in the implementation of the TPA.

In the same vein, research conducted by Maharaj (2014) shows that the TPA is not implemented fairly and is entangled by some challenges. A consideration of the above rationale suggests that our case study is relevant and could potentially inform policy makers (teacher unions, school boards, government, and other stakeholders) about flaws in the TPA manual, thus, proving an argument for the need to increment this evaluation regulation. Taking into account the above literature review, this case study aims to address the question of whether the language of TPA presents significant limitations.

A Clear Definition of the Role of Stakeholders

Our analysis of the content of the TPA manual reveals that the roles and responsibilities of evaluation stakeholders are clearly defined. These stakeholders are the school boards, supervisory officers, principals, vice-principals, and teachers. Yet the roles and responsibilities of principals and teachers are defined in more depth than those of other stakeholders. One reason that can explain this differential is that supervisory officers and vice-principals are ascribed a secondary role in the evaluation process. Their participation in the evaluation process is contingent on the unavailability of principals as pointed out in section 277.17 and 277.18 of the Education Act. Teachers’ responsibilities involve engaging in professional learning activities, participating in the school leadership and community building, and commitment to students. This definition is consistent with how the role of teachers has evolved in the 21st century, from a teacher-centered role to a student-centered role.

Principals’ responsibilities involve assessing the performance of teachers assigned to their school. They are provided with guidelines on how to prepare and conduct a performance evaluation. Of these guidelines, the principal is advised to follow three chronological procedures: pre-observation, classroom observation, and post-observation. The pre-observation phase consists of meeting with the teacher to prepare for the classroom observation and to discuss the competencies that will be the focus of that evaluation. The classroom observation involves rating the instructional practice and leadership of teachers at work through principals’ professional personal judgment. The post-observation phase consists of meeting with the teacher to provide feedback and discuss the outcomes of the evaluation. Following these three aforementioned steps, the principal is required to write and send a summative report of the evaluation result to the school board.

A consideration of these procedural tasks suggests that the evaluation roles of principals reflect Weber’s bureaucratic rationalism. Simply put, their roles are tied to the ideal type of legal-rational authority that characterizes the leadership habitus of modern organizations. According to Weber, legal-rational authority is a form of authority whose legitimacy is bounded to established organizational and formal rules. Yet, judging by the language of the TPA, it appears that this bureaucratization of evaluation provides principals with much say over the outcome of the evaluation. The rating procedure is chiefly based on principals’ subjective interpretation of the quality of teacher work. As mentioned in the manual, “The principal uses his or her professional judgment in weighing the evidence and deciding on the rating of overall performance” (Ontario Ministry of Education, 2010, p. 35).

The use of principals’ professional judgment may not represent a major problem but the lack of rules in the TPA to monitor this subjective procedure may lead to the occurrence of arbitrary ratings. Some policy makers may argue that arbitrary evaluations are less likely to occur because principals undergo rigorous training before being assigned to manage a school. But this does not mean that such training absolutely immunes them from making wrong and biased decisions. This thesis could be true given that it has been credited by Larsen’s (2009) findings on the implementation of TPA. Her findings suggest that teachers have doubts about the accuracy of the professional judgment of principals during classroom observations.

However, there are also some studies (Grissom & Loeb, 2017; Jacob & Lefgren, 2008; Taylor & Tyler, 2012) that suggest that using personal judgement when rating teachers is not always a predictor of unfair outcomes. The result of Jacob and Lefgren’s (2008) research on teacher evaluation at a midsize U.S. school district, for example, shows that principals generally identified teachers who produced the largest and smallest standardized achievement gains despite using their professional judgment. Findings of Taylor and Tyler’s (2012) study of mid-career math teachers in the Cincinnati Public Schools reveal that subjective evaluation by principals can spur teachers’ professional growth. Grissom and Loeb’s (2017) study findings suggest that principals’ subjective evaluation of teacher effectiveness in low- and high-stakes environments is quite positive. However, considering that these studies on principalship are mostly U.S. based, we cannot speculate at this stage that principals’ professional judgment is a predictor of accurate evaluation in Ontario.

A Professional Growth-Oriented Expectation

The language of TPA regarding performance expectations focuses on ensuring that the outcome of evaluations will enhance teachers’ professional growth. What this means is that the teacher evaluation is conceived as a summative measure. This summative practice involves providing teachers with opportunities to complete professional development programs regardless of their rating results. For example, when teacher receive an unsatisfactory rating or is put on review status, they are required to complete an Enrichment Plan or an Improvement Plan depending on their teaching seniority. These professional development programs are designed by the principal with the input of the teacher. The plans outline the different actions or steps that a teacher should take to improve their performance level (see Ontario Ministry of Education, 2010). Simply put, the TPA supports a participatory and democratic evaluation mechanism. It conceives teachers both as evaluation subjects and contributors to the management of the evaluation process.

However, despite this policy emphasis on teacher professional development, the research conducted by Maharaj (2014) on this matter suggests that Ontarian teachers believe that evaluations do not enhance their professional growth. This is not for the first time that researchers have questioned the effectiveness of an evaluation system on teacher professional growth. Some researchers in the developed world (Darling-Hammond, 2017); Jensen, 2010; Taylor & Tyler, 2012) have also raised the same question by arguing that the ubiquity of teacher performance evaluation in schools does not always improve professional practices.

Darling-Hammond (2015) ascribes this shortcoming to the lack of resources to sustain the appraisal system. School jurisdictions in the United States have often focused on designing instruments for rating teachers without developing the structural elements needed to support an effective appraisal system. A survey study conducted by Jensen (2010) on Australian teachers indicates that 61% of respondents stated that teacher evaluations do not improve their practice. About 63% of respondents stated that the evaluations were largely completed to fulfill administrative requirements and that they were not provided with the necessary resources to improve their professionalism.

Akin to the point raised by Darling-Hammond (2015) and other education researchers, our analysis of the content of TPA reveals that aside from mentioning the post-evaluation professional development programs that teachers should undertake to improve their practice (i.e., Annual Learning Plan, Improvement Plan, Enrichment Plan), this regulation has fallen short of outlining the resources that Ontarian teachers require to enhance their teaching quality. With that in mind, there is some dissonance between the policy objectives and the means to achieve those objectives.

Furthermore, the TPA does not explicitly define the notion of professionalism in detailed and measurable meanings. As a result, it may be confusing for teachers in Ontario to monitor their professional growth. It may also be confusing for principals to know what can be counted as effective professional knowledge. This lack of clarity in meanings represents a limitation considering that some researchers such as Bates et al. (2011) have argued that professionalism is a vague concept on which there is little consensus. It is contingently constructed, not always evidence-based, and not very explicit. Cohen and Goldhaber (2016) note that even when the meaning of professionalism is explicitly stated, classroom observations will always be susceptible to subjectivity. This contingency is also pointed out by Tschannen-Moran (2009) who noted in her work that there are elements of professionalization that go beyond the school workplace. Where certainty about practice does not exist, educators will continually seek to discover the most responsible course of action.

Moreover, the emphasis of TPA on professional development suggests that the goal of the government and teacher unions is about building communities of learning. Other employment policies such as the New Teacher Induction Program, Teacher Learning and Leadership Program, and the Ontario Leadership Framework make the same emphasis. The Teacher Learning and Leadership Program, for instance, was developed by the Ministry of Education and the Ontario Leadership Framework to support teachers undertaking self-directed professional development and to help them share their instructional leadership practices with their peers. The emphasis put on professional development is not only peculiar to the TPA, evaluation policies in other provinces have also adopted the same tone (e.g. The Teacher Growth, Supervision and Evaluation Policy of Alberta). But compared with Ontario, not all provinces have harmonized their teacher evaluation system. All in all, the principle of clarifying performance expectations is not fully encapsulated in the language of TPA.

A Limited Discourse on Credible Reporting

The language of TPA appears to make no textual reference on the need to address the risks of potential principals’ unconscious bias from affecting teacher ratings. This lack of antibias guidelines needs to be addressed considering that teachers’ employment termination is tied to principals’ personal professional judgment. Critical studies on staffing diversity in Ontarian public schools show that the workplace environment of those organizations is not inclusive enough (e.g., Guppy & Lyon, 2012). This is not a negligible matter considering that minority teachers represent 10% of the province’s 70,520 secondary school teachers and 9% of the 117,905 elementary school teachers. But in raising the above concern, we are not suggesting that minority teachers are unfairly evaluated by principals since no study has been conducted on the intersectionality of teacher performance evaluation in Ontario, and that the Education Act requires that school boards provide an inclusive and accepting working environment for everyone regardless of sex, social positioning, and race. In addition, school districts operate under a collective bargaining system that values diversity, fairness, and multiculturalism.

School districts in other provinces also operate under a collective bargaining system that promotes diversity staffing and prohibits discrimination at work as per the Employment Equity, Canadian Human Rights, and Canadian Multiculturalism Acts. However, judging by the rationale developed by evaluation scholars, the silence of TPA on evaluation bias represents a concern considering that the rating of teachers is tied to principals’ personal professional judgment (see Frederiksen et al., 2017; Meier & O’Toole, 2013; Prendergast & Topel, 1993). For that reason, we suggest that research should be conducted on the effect of principals’ professional judgment on minority teachers’ experience with the evaluation process in Ontario.

The same research could also be extended to investigating the intersectionality of credible evaluation reporting in other Canadian school jurisdictions. Doing so could help policy makers and researchers to develop a better understanding of the implication of systemic discrimination on teacher retention in the Canadian education workforce because a U.S.-based study from researchers Drake et al (2019) shows that the ratings of teachers are influenced by principals’ implicit biases. As a result, minority teachers were 50% more likely than their White colleagues in the same school to receive a poor evaluation rating. In the same vein, research by Grissom and Loeb (2017) on unfair evaluation outcomes shows that higher lower-rating frequencies among teachers of color were tied to the subjective nature of classroom observations and principals’ unconscious bias.

In addition to the above limitations, the TPA does not cover contractual teachers and continuing education teachers (see Ontario Ministry of Education, 2010). Thus, it could be argued that the teacher evaluation system in Ontario is not fully harmonized. Permanent teachers may be the only teaching workforce who have access to standardized evaluation procedures. For the sake of organizational justice, appraisal guidelines dealing with contingent teachers should also be included in the TPA. Doing so will ensure that the staffing system related to performance appraisals is equal to everyone. Some policy makers may disagree with our argument for incremental TPA changes and argue that the Ontario Regulation 274/12 provides some guidelines to evaluate contractual teachers. The Ontario Regulation 274/12 was enacted by the provincial government in September 2012 under the Education Act to promote a consistent, transparent, and fair hiring process for contractual teachers. But compared with the TPA, the procedures of that employment legislation on teacher performance evaluation are underdeveloped. All things being equal, the above review result infers that the language of TPA on the principle of credible reporting is limited.

Implications for Evaluation Policy Incremental

The findings of this case study infer that employment policies regulating teacher performance evaluations in Ontario are underdeveloped. The limitations of TPA underscore some of the flaws addressed in past teacher perspective-based studies on the quality of the provincial teacher evaluation system and the general literature on the component of principals’ professional judgment (Larsen, 2009; Maharaj, 2014). It is important for education policy makers to address those procedural flaws. However, in arguing for the need for incremental policy change, this article does not suggest that the current teacher evaluation system is completely inadequate and flawed.

Addressing issues of procedural evaluations is not a task that only policy makers in Ontario or other provinces need to undertake. Policy makers in the United States need also to increment their teaching evaluation system considering that studies (Cohen & Goldhaber, 2016; Darling-Hammond, 2015; Pogodzinski et al., 2015) suggest that the teacher evaluations have been a source of collective bargaining controversies in the United States. Cohen and Goldhaber (2016) and Darling-Hammond (2015) argue for the need for education policy makers to improve the systems of teacher performance evaluations for more accuracy, transparency and fairness. Yet none of the above researchers or we have come closer to designing and proposing the one best way of accurately evaluating teachers. Accordingly, more research is needed on developing the best managerial practices and procedures to evaluate teacher performance.

Moreover, a consideration of TPA flaws and the findings of existing studies on teacher performance evaluation in Ontario provides a bargaining rationale for teacher unions to consider renegotiating the terms and conditions of teacher evaluations with respective school boards and the government (Larsen, 2009; Maharaj, 2014). Renegotiating the terms and conditions of teacher performance evaluation is essential to improve the transparency of all evaluation procedures. As argued by Stodolsky (1984), there are many challenges in evaluating teacher performance, and classroom observations alone may not provide enough information to the principals to fully understand the context of teachers’ practice.

Therefore, evaluation ratings based on classroom observations may not completely represent teachers’ performance. Should then teacher unions pressure school boards and the government to develop an alternative appraisal system that is more quantitative based? Not necessarily, given that research suggests that quantitative-based ratings such as considering student test scores or value-added modeling do not always accurately identify more and less effective teachers (Baker et al., 2010; Darling-Hammond, 2017).

Perhaps, the best course of actions for teacher unions is to bargain for the adoption of evaluation practices that lead to strengthening trust between principals and teachers. Unions could also bargain for the overhaul of the current rigid bureaucratic orientation that overemphasizes the authority of principals (Tschannen-Moran, 2009). Simply put, there is a need to question the implementation of some of the managerial methods of NPM in today’s school administration.

But in calling for teacher unions to bargain for the incremental of TPA, we do not suggest that these organizations have or are doing nothing to address the issue of teacher performance evaluation in Ontario, considering that the existing literature (e.g., Rose, 2002, 2015) on labor relations in education suggests that in Canada teacher unions have and are opposing the government’s accountability evaluation measures. These bargaining organizations share the same perspective with the scholars (Cohens & Jenkins, 2010; Trost, 2017) who have called for the overhaul and abolishment of traditional and transactional performance appraisal systems in contemporary organizations.