When Fringe Hate Goes Mainstream: How White Nationalist Discourse Manifests in Online News Commenting

Abstract

After protestors clashed in Charlottesville, Virginia over the planned removal of a statue of a Confederate general, President Trump refused to condemn white nationalists. Over the following days, numerous news stories were written about the protests, allowing the public to discuss white nationalism through online comments. Using theories on ideology, discourse, and framing, this study considers how white nationalist discourse emerged in those comments. The findings show broad support for white nationalism, including complaints about threats to white culture, reinterpretation of American history to support white nationalist ideas, and rejection of the idea that marginalized people face oppression. However, the study also shows a burgeoning force of critical commenters struggling to challenge white nationalism’s emergence in public spaces.

Keywords

framing ideology discourse internet and new media race

In August 2017, white nationalists in Charlottesville, Virginia marched to challenge the planned removal of a statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee. (Stolberg & Rosenthal, 2017). In the ensuing conflict, both white nationalists and counterprotestors were accused of violence (Matray, 2017; Ruiz & McCallister, 2017) and President Donald Trump refused to condemn white nationalism (Thrush & Haberman, 2017). This moment serves as the backdrop for a study of contemporary white nationalist discourse on mainstream news sites in the form of online comments. Rather than consider the radical alt-right discourse that takes place on alternative sites, this study focuses on white nationalist discourse in mainstream news comment forums. This allows us to further understand how these views are perpetuated, legitimized, and challenged among mainstream audiences through a textual analysis of online comments on two national and two local newspapers’ websites.

White Nationalism and Its Views

While white nationalism has maintained a following throughout American history, today’s “alt-right” expresses hate directly to mass audiences (Hawley, 2017). However, the alt-right is more than one set of ideals, but a “disorganized mob that broadly shares a number of goals and beliefs” (Hawley, 2017, p. 70). The alt-right represents a subset of white nationalist ideologies that promotes white identity, criticizes multiculturalism, and critiques attempts to undermine white civilization (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2019). The alt-right shares views with right-wing populism in Europe, including espousing anti-establishmentism and authoritarianism (Norris & Inglehart, 2016), while also emphasizing perspectives like ostracism and the othering of minoritized groups (Engesser et al., 2017).

White Nationalist Discourse

Racial frames are built on dominant stereotypes, including both those negative of people of color and positive of white people. Racist frames have helped support racial oppression that has assisted white Americans (Picca & Feagin, 2007). Today’s white nationalism is focused on protecting a “distinct cultural, political, and genetic identity as white Europeans,” (Swain, 2002, pp. 16–17) privileging white perspectives. These individuals fear that their identity is under threat from immigration and multiculturalism (Swain, 2002). White nationalist discourse is represented by both overtly racist and veiled statements that perpetuate the glorification of the ideology of white culture, politics, and identity.

White grievance discourse is a form of white nationalist discourse characterized by the belief that white citizens are being left behind, that white economic loss is the fault of people of color (Loke, 2013), white victimization (Hughey & Daniels, 2013; Steinfeldt et al., 2010), and othering as a way to acknowledge race (Hughey, 2012). Some frame white victimization around white innocence by using white privilege to explain how Blacks and liberals have created and perpetuated social problems (Lacy, 2010). White victimization often leads to white identity discourse, specifically that white identity represents a superior “ideal citizen” (Hughey, 2012, p. 178). Building white nationalism around white grievance discourse helps to develop support among people who do not think of themselves as racists (Swain, 2002). Right-wing populism is often framed less around overt exclusion and more around embracing the in-group by promoting patriotism and cultural preservation (Krämer, 2017). When challenged, these individuals often respond with surprise that their statements were considered offensive, act to minimize the problem, perpetuate misinformation, or trivialize the issue (Steinfeldt et al., 2010).

The Internet as a Platform for Hate

Online spaces traditionally reflect the culture of white Americans (Picca & Feagin, 2007). White individuals can “engage in racialized performances to show people of color that they are trespassers into white spaces” (Picca & Feagin, 2007, p. 80). Recently, right-wing groups have taken their discourse to more mainstream spaces (Hawley, 2017) where they use deeply-embedded, seemingly-innocuous, stereotypes to promote their positions to susceptible white audiences (Hughey & Daniels, 2013). They defend their statements as free speech, by claiming that they are the victims of political correctness, and try to normalize their speech (Hughey & Daniels, 2013).

The internet has been adopted by white nationalists because of the ability to circumvent traditional gatekeepers and to use short, emotional messages that are effective for mobilizing supporters while avoiding attention (Engesser et al., 2017). Finding a space for individuals who also feel aggrieved allows participants to work together to build narratives to give “a sense of identification through a shared reality” (Duffy, 2003, p. 307) and to build a form of community. Using mainstream spaces can be effective for goading a response from critics, or to see if their posts will be left up without response or critique, which helps to legitimize their ideas (Krämer, 2017).

Social media platforms and online forums are partially defined based on their affordances for “amplifying, recording, and spreading information” (Boyd, 2011, p. 45). The choices that designers made about features can impact the replicability, scalability, searchability, and persistence of content. These choices shape how people use online spaces for engagement (Boyd, 2011). The affordances on many sites allow for increased visibility of content, and for content to be published in real-time, allowing hate speech to spread. And while many might get deplatformed, others are typically willing to fill the void (Feshami, 2020). Certain platforms, most notably Twitter, have embraced a free speech ethos, exacerbating problems with hate speech. By using tools like hashtags to find one another and create echo chambers, the affordances of the platform get coopted for hate (Ridgeway, 2020).

Legitimizing Hate or Condemning White Nationalism Online

There is concern that giving a voice to white nationalists will help support their views and advance their goals (Walgrave & De Swert, 2004). Mainstreaming is also furthered by public officials, including President Donald Trump, who embrace alt-right ideology and engage in racist discourse, giving the movement legitimacy (Hartzell, 2018). Through the process of the “mainstreaming of the fringe” (Barkun, 2017), once unaccepted viewpoints can move into the mainstream and the line between the mainstream and the fringe becomes blurred. Many argue that social media companies should remove hateful speech and ban fringe accounts to prevent the legitimization of hate. Social media has been a successful tool for spreading white nationalism, but future success is “contingent on social media remaining generally free from meaningful censorship” (Hawley, 2017, pp. 161–162).

Discourse, Ideology, and Framing

Discourse gives a form of language to a topic or issue. By constricting how a topic is discussed, society places limits on how the topic is understood and constructed (Hall, 1996). Participants can help shape shared understandings of topics and pursue goals. Framing can be utilized to understand how audiences are influenced by considering how the speaker makes certain interpretations of reality more salient (Entman, 1993). Framing is an active process for taking reality and constructing a new narrative to “promote a particular interpretation” (Entman, 2007, p. 164). Language and discourse can be used to further ideology (Hall, 1996), but ideology can also be used to classify based on their perceived status in society (Hall, 1985). Specific ideologies that are used to classify based on race can be furthered through discourse that reproduces “domination and exploitation” (Hall, 1985, p. 110). For those who belong to marginalized groups, this exploitation is a part of their lived experience (Hall, 1985).

Frames can be used to enhance the salience of perspectives (Entman, 2007) and to develop preferred meanings based on the types of frames that are most frequently used and become understood (Entman, 1993). A frame is invoked through the use of specific language, phrases, images, and other identifiers (Entman, 1993). Highlighting specific ways of describing an event can help with four tactics: “define problems,” “diagnose causes,” “make moral judgments,” and “suggest remedies” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). By making certain information more salient and avoiding alternative information, a frame can influence audience perceptions (Entman, 1993).

The white racial frame has changed over time in American society from rationalizations of slavery to justifications of Jim Crow legal segregation to colorblindness (Feagin, 2020). It perpetuates its influence through everyday discrimination. “Whites still frequently engage in racial performances and discriminatory behaviors motivated by the array of racist stereotypes, images, narratives, and emotions in the centuries-old frame” (Feagin, 2020, p. 144). But framing can also be used to create, recreate, and reproduce boundaries between groups. And as a political tool, it can be used to skew information and influence opinions (Pan & Kosicki, 2001). Actors use public deliberation as “an ideological contest and political struggle … over the right to define and shape issues” (p. 36) to gain political legitimacy. White nationalists frame their community around terms like “white nationalism” because it is more “approachable” than “white supremacy” (Speakman & Funk, 2020, p. 17). Similarly, these groups avoid framing their associations around being “pro-white” and instead build an ideology around challenging issues like political correctness to attract white individuals who feel victimized (Hartzell, 2018). This furthers their ability to go mainstream as they avoid the most detestable attributes of white nationalist ideology.

An ideological movement can use framing to facilitate the construction of a shared identity (Snow & McAdam, 2000). To disrupt ideology that serves to classify, exclude, and exploit, opponents engage in an “ideological struggle” to take fixed terms and introduce new meanings, associations, and understandings of status (Hall, 1985, p. 112). The alt-right in the U.S. uses discourse to frame in-group and out-group status, challenging audiences to choose whether they associate with the far right, or with the far left (Lorenzo-Dus & Nouri, 2020). Far right publications construct victimhood for the white in-group and then shift away from a more traditional conservative ideology of colorblindness by acknowledging race without being too overt. In one case, Hartzell (2020) found that posts on the white nationalism message board Stormfront, “strategically negotiate[d] white folks’ (dis)comfort to coax them out of colorblindness and into a formation of racial consciousness in which whiteness is openly privileged and praised” (p. 143).

This study is also about the use of symbols as strategic devices to re-interpret events like the U.S. Civil War. Using public symbols to engage in the contestation of memory is about the “constant negotiation between the ‘official’ memories of elites and the ‘vernacular’ memories of the citizenry” (VanderHaagen, 2019, p. 95). For this study, this means considering how online commenters on news sites re-interpret the Civil War through the glorification of memorials to advance a white identity perspective.

Given how discourse can be used to further ideology, and the growth of white nationalist discourse, there is need for research that considers where this discourse is happening and how it is responded to by others. This study seeks to understand the prevalence of white nationalist discourse in mainstream news forums, but also focuses on examining how others respond in to disrupt the discourse and how the negotiation of ideological perspectives happens in this specific discourse. This will be studied using the following research questions:

RQ1: In what ways does white nationalist discourse emerge in mainstream news commenting sections?

RQ2: How do commenters respond to white nationalism in mainstream news commenting sections?

Method

This study utilized a textual analysis of comments on four news websites to understand how white nationalism was expressed and how others responded to it. The study specifically focused on understanding alt-right discourse following the Charlottesville rally as opposed to alt-right discourse, in general. Textual analysis is uniquely fit for understanding “ideological negotiation” in texts (Fürsich, 2009, p. 238). To consider how white nationalist discourse emerged in both traditional and alternative forms, the researcher adopted both a traditional textual analysis using a priori codes and a constant comparative analysis.

In a textual analysis the researcher conducts a deep reading and seeks to understand the cultural practices of the author and any potential meaning behind the text (McKee, 2003). The researcher can be guided by previous understandings of how similar individuals also use texts to reproduce cultural meaning. The constant comparative method, though, allows the researcher more freedom to examine phenomena. The researcher engages in a close reading and codes and analyzes the text while reading, developing new theoretical categories for understanding the phenomena (Glaser & Strauss, 1968) and generating new theoretical understandings for under-studied and emerging concepts that have previously received less critical evaluation (Charmaz, 2014). For this study, this included developing codes for concepts related to how white nationalists revise history and deflect blame for white nationalist violence. It also included codes related to criticism of white nationalist sympathizing politicians, criticism of journalists who legitimize white nationalism, and how some individuals attempt to seek solutions to the issue of Confederate monuments.

The researcher looked at discourse on the websites of two national news organizations, The New York Times and USA Today, and two local organizations, The Richmond Times-Dispatch and The Daily Progress in Charlottesville, Virginia. The New York Times and USA Today were chosen because they are both in the top-20 most trafficked news websites in the U.S. (Alexa, 2018), wrote numerous stories about the protest, and had quality commenter engagement. The Daily Progress was chosen because it is the most trafficked news website for the city of Charlottesville and The Richmond Times-Dispatch because it is the most trafficked news website within a 90-mile radius. The New York Times allowed for anonymous comments, while the other three publications used Facebook commenting, which required users to have a Facebook account, but did not necessarily mean that people under their actual names. The Richmond Times-Dispatch, Daily Progress, and USA Today moderated comments only after they were posted and relied on help from Facebook and its users to flag inappropriate comments. The New York Times’ staff pre-moderated comments.

Data was collected from a five-day period, which included the original reporting, coverage of the protest, violence, and first few days of reaction. The final data included 82 articles and 20,675 comments. The New York Times had 5 articles and 12,383 comments, USA Today had 40 articles and 6,858 comments, The Richmond Times-Dispatch had 19 articles and 835 comments, and The Daily Progress had 18 articles and 599 comments.

Three distinct types of codes were used: types of white nationalist discourse; how others respond to white nationalist discourse; and how white individuals respond to criticism of their expression. For white nationalist discourse, the researcher looked for instances of worrying about demographic changes leading to rising crime and immigration, believing that whites are being oppressed, resenting affirmative action policies (Swain, 2002), blaming marginalized people for white economic loss (Loke, 2013), engaging in fear mongering over ‘reverse racism’ (Hughey & Daniels, 2013), and criticizing political correctness (Hughey, 2012). Through the analysis, new codes were developed through the constant comparative process that further exemplified white nationalist discourse. These five codes reflected the realities of the discussion about the Charlottesville protest, violence, and response. They included: re-interpreting history, arguing that not all white Americans are racists, blaming violence on both sides of the issue, attacking liberal groups as hate groups, and denouncing journalists as biased in favor of liberals.

The second type of codes reflected how others in the forum responded to white nationalist discourse. Because the research on how people respond to white nationalism is less developed, these eight codes were also developed by the researcher through the constant comparative analysis: seeking legitimate solutions to race issues, advocating the removal of the monuments as symbols of racism and hate, challenging false equivalence, exposing the difference between liberal groups and hate groups, identifying white nationalists by calling them out, calling white nationalists names, criticizing Trump for not calling out white nationalists, and criticizing journalists and others for giving legitimacy to fringe views.

Lastly, a set of a priori codes was utilized to study how white individuals who used white nationalist discourse responded to criticisms of their expression: using othering as a tool for acknowledging race and reinforcing inferior status for marginalized groups (Hughey, 2012), ignoring the oppressive history of marginalized groups (Picca & Feagin, 2007), and trivializing the concerns of minoritized people through minimizing their problems and perpetuating misinformation (Steinfeldt et al., 2010).

The researcher conducted an initial reading of the texts, coding based on the a priori codes while developing new codes through constant comparative analysis. Then the researcher conducted an in-depth reading of the coded texts. This allowed the researcher to identify distinct and consistent actions within the data. Once broad themes were developed based on the actions from the coded data, the researcher merged similar themes into larger overarching themes of behaviors and practices from the commenting sections. This is in accordance with the constant comparative method (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1968).

Findings

The discourse is broken down into two categories: threats to white identity and responses to white identity discourse. But within these categories a number of themes emerged that showed how white nationalist discourse follows specific strategies and how the response reflects distinct choices by counterprotestors.

Threats to White Identity

Defenders of white nationalism used their perceived aggrieved status to argue for how white identity is under threat. The often involved expressing pride in their white identity, but most commenters expressed this in a diluted form. Many focused on Southern and Confederate heritage, political correctness, and shifting the blame.

Clinging to White Identity and Heritage

Commenters celebrated white identity and superiority by claiming to be “smarter” and more “civilized” (Tito, August 11, 2017, Daily Progress) and also claiming that white Americans have made more “substantiative social contributions” through paying more taxes and fighting in more wars (Charles, August 15, 2017, Daily Progress). Some argued that white identity should be celebrated much like gay pride parades and Black Lives Matter marches. “White people are tired of being told they have no culture and heritage” (Kurisutofa, August 12, 2017, USA Today). Many made similar broad statements that their white culture was being targeted. Others targeted African Americans for inviting violence. “Remember, black is still a minority in this country. It would be a shame to incite and invite wrath upon yourselves with your sharp tongues” (Michael, August 15, 2017, Richmond Times Dispatch). These individuals saw the removal of Confederate statues as an attempt to “[wipe] out evidence of history” (Jaqcky, August 15, 2017, Daily Progress) or to use political correctness to rewrite Civil War history (Paul, August 13, 2017, The New York Times). These commenters often used racist language to defend white culture from a perceived loss of status, frequently by suggesting that whiteness was under attack.

Some reinterpreted history to downplay the oppression of African Americans. They highlighted how “there were blacks that fought in and assisted the Confederate army” (Anthony A., August 15, 2017, Daily Progress) or blamed the ancestors of African Americans for selling their people into slavery (C. Jack, August 14, 2017, Richmond Times Dispatch). But the most common argument was that liberals were reinterpreting the history of the Civil War. As one commenter put it, “In 150 years NO ONE has been unduly upset or offended by the statues of great Confederate Americans” (Catherine, August 16, 2017, Richmond Times Dispatch). Beyond simply defending their “whiteness”, these commenters tied their heritage to a passionate defense of the “lost cause” interpretation of the Civil War.

Shifting the Blame for Violence and Anger

Many commenters shifted the blame to groups like Black Lives Matter and Antifa. “I believe that the protest march would have been peaceful if not for the arrival of leftists who launched physical attacks” (Bambi, August 14, 2017, Daily Progress). Others argued that counterprotestors should have known better than to provoke white nationalists. “If you taunt Neo Nazis, the KKK, or other hate groups, they just might strike back, and I APPLAUD them for striking back” (Yankeefan, August 14, 2017, The New York Times). By focusing on free speech and ignoring the content, commenters were able to position white nationalists as the aggrieved party and counterprotestors as the instigators. This language was not overtly white nationalist but supported white nationalist pursuits.

Many mimicked the language of President Trump, who refused to denounce the white nationalists and placed blame on both sides. They referred to “hooligans on both sides” (S. Jack, August 12, 2017, Daily Progress). “We are not all racists as the media and their hateful trolls attempt to label us” (Art, August 12, 2017, USA Today). This shifting of the blame reflects a strategic approach to deflect responsibility while still expressing hate, allowing them to maintain their ideology. These codes were added to represent how individuals rationalize the actions of white nationalists and their consequences.

Another tactic used to shift blame was to position anyone who was not white as an outsider unworthy of equal status. This included the most overt forms of hate including statements that African Americans should have been happy with their treatment during slavery (Kevin, August 12, 2017, USA Today) and referring to black culture as a “cancer upon America” (George, August 14, 2017, USA Today). These statements went beyond mere hateful ideology by advocating conspicuous white superiority. While these comments were relatively infrequent, their overt use of hate attracted attention in the comments and made their statements all the more prominent.

Criticizing Political Correctness

Commenters argued that white identity was under threat by criticizing political correctness. “You have a right to free speech only if you agree with left-wingers” (Thomas, August 14, 2017, USA Today). White victimization wasn’t just about demographic change, but also about liberals challenging their rights, including a belief that the media had a liberal bias. “Of course the media is going to side with the BLM and coordinated groups and will never remind us that both groups are just a sliver of American society” (Edward, August 13, 2017, USA Today). These commenters avoided any critical reflection of the protests but were driven to comment by a perception that they were being silenced.

Commenters frequently trivialized the concerns of critics by arguing that taking down the statue would erase history. “Perhaps the Washington Monument may one day be toppled as well since it celebrates a former slave owner” (Chris, August 16, 2017, The New York Times). Some blamed liberals for reigniting old debates and encouraging racial division. “[T]he identity politics of the left refuses to let sleeping dogs lie, insists on tearing off bandages, and dividing people against each other” (Jason, August 13, 2017, Richmond Times Dispatch).

Rather than try to see how the statue is perceived by African Americans, these commenters saw the protests as an affront to their identity. However, many of these comments framed the problem by complaining about the concerns of marginalized people and avoided overt statements glorifying white identity. By dismissing the concerns of marginalized people, these commenters didn’t have to align themselves with the most racist factions of white nationalism.

When criticized, white nationalist sympathizers followed a consistent pattern: reject the premise of the argument and question the legitimacy of the other speaker. They assumed that marginalized groups were seeking preferential treatment, and rebuffed arguments that the removal of the statue was supported by a diverse group of citizens. The white grievance discourse represented an unapologetic defense of white heritage and the belief that liberals and the media were seeking to destroy that heritage. What this discourse doesn’t reflect is reflexivity about using white identity to advance identity politics for white Americans.

Responses to White Identity Discourse

Commenters who challenged white identity discourse struggled with finding an effective strategy – possibly because there were too many moving targets: Confederate statues, overt white nationalism, and the emergence of false equivalency around race. This led to a number of different approaches.

Advocating the Removal of Racism and Symbols of Hate

The most common response to white nationalists was to argue more vociferously for the removal of the statue. “Does denoting this statue as historically relevant necessarily ‘trump’ the concept of a park being a place where all should feel welcome?” (AM, August 13, 2017, The New York Times). Commenters believed that the statues should be displayed with their historical context. “They are not only art pieces but they are a part of a dark period of our history. That should be the story, not glorifying people who were trying to tear the nation apart” (Bob, August 16, 2017, Richmond Times Dispatch). This response appeared numerous times as critics of white nationalism attempted to find a cautious way to engage with hateful comments.

Others used ideological arguments, with many questioning whether any civilization should put up monuments to “traitors” (Ken, August 12, 2017, Daily Progress) or losers (Reb, August 13, 2017, The New York Times). “The statues being removed celebrate leaders of an unsuccessful rebellion against the United States of America that was fought for the purpose of continuing slavery in the rebelling states. Why should these people be celebrated?” (Sally, August 13, 2017, The New York Times). Others called for people to recognize how these statues impact African Americans. “The existence of these statues and memorials ARE the real sharp sticks in the eyes of anyone whose ancestors were considered property and those of us who are appalled at the history of slavery in the United States” (Holmes, August 12, 2017, The New York Times). These commenters attempted to rationalize a response. By referencing the Civil War in stark terms, the commenters hoped to remind others of the motivations of the Confederacy and how that history can still have impact on African Americans.

Others argued that white nationalist views should be exposed in order to shame supporters. By exposing supporters, commenters believed they could cause those individuals to lose their jobs or suffer embarrassment. “Ignoring them has allowed this rot to fester and now it’s surfacing. It’s ideological cancer. We need to actively ferret them out and crush this behavior” (Seth, August 14, 2017, The New York Times). This response assumed that society would respond negatively and act quickly to ostracize these individuals. These comments were less frequent than ones that attempted to justify replacing the statues, but also attracted criticism from those who felt like increased attention would only help embolden white nationalism.

Much of the criticism of white nationalism came back to whether or not to remove the statues. This contemporary form of criticism went beyond challenging overt racism, but also attempted to take back symbolic public spaces. In this way, these codes were created to both reflect traditional critiques of hate, but also newer forms of commentary about the importance of community sensemaking and historical reckoning.

Challenging Attempts to Legitimize Fringe Views

Other commenters were concerned that responding would only help legitimize white nationalism. “I wonder how eagerly they’d be planning their next event if people had just ignored the last one” (Dave, August 15, 2017, The New York Times). These commenters were also concerned about consistent media coverage. “The far right will only become a regular part of the US national conversation if the media give them regular national exposure. Bullies love attention. Don’t give them any” (Scott, August 14, 2017, The New York Times). These comments exemplify the division among opponents to white nationalism: those who sought to excise racists and those who sought to ignore them in order to avoid giving white nationalists more attention.

Many were frustrated by attempts to legitimize white nationalism by equating it with other protest movements. “So, those proposing the genocide of an entire race of people are just as wrong as those who oppose it?” (Terrence, August 13, 2017, Daily Progress). These commenters challenged attempts to equate the two groups. “One side condones and preaches violence, bigotry, and racial cleansing. The other does not. Let me make it simpler for you: There are Nazis and there are not Nazis” (Snickers, August 16, 2017, The New York Times). Many of these critiques were framed around the president’s claim that there was violence on “many sides” (Thrush & Haberman, 2017), but these commenters argued that the counterprotestors were standing up for American values (Pete, August 14, 2017, USA Today) and were not violent.

The division between those who sought to extricate white nationalists from society and those who were concerned that giving white nationalists any oxygen could exacerbate the problem became contentious. These codes were developed to capture this unique problem and better understand how commenters navigated this divisive fissure.

Seeking Solutions and Avoiding Division

Finally, there was a small group of commenters who tried to avoid the divisive conversation. Instead, these commenters made passionate calls for Americans to deal with the country’s “history of oppression and genocide” (Che, August 16, 2017, Daily Progress) and to “get informed, speak out, and reach out to those who have chosen” to support white nationalism (Joe, August 15, 2017, The New York Times). These commenters seemed concerned that having an angry response would only add fuel to the fire. These comments were quite infrequent compared to statements about bringing down statues or ostracizing white nationalists, but these individuals saw themselves as rising above the contentious and confrontational norms that were established in the discourse.

Commenters who respond to, and challenge, white nationalist comments on mainstream news websites tend to focus on three key ideas: advocating for the removal of Confederate symbols, challenging the legitimacy of white nationalism, and pushing for a more nuanced discussion of race that recognizes that advocating for racial equality is not a fringe view akin to white nationalism. However, the absence of a common message means that critics of white nationalism struggle for status and authority.

Discussion

This study depicts broad sympathies in online news forums for white nationalist ideas. While most did not advocate for the most overt forms of white nationalist ideas, many believed white identity is under threat, that others are to blame, and that history is being wrongly re-interpreted. White nationalists used discourse to further shape cultural understandings through “ideological struggle” (Hall, 1985, p. 112). Further, the study exposes a lack of consistent strategies for combating white nationalist discourse.

Defining the Problem

White nationalist sympathizers used commenting forums to define the controversy around the belief that white Americans are the victims of a new focus on America’s history of racism and oppression and that by acknowledging our past we are threatening a way of life.

Threats to a White Way of Life

This study found gradations of white nationalism support, aligning with Hawley’s (2017) argument that there is not just one form of white nationalism. The commenters argued that white identity is under threat because of demographic change (Swain, 2002), engaged in white grievance discourse (Loke, 2103) and utilized white victimization (Steinfeldt et al., 2010). This shows how white nationalists define the problem of societal change, create an ideological lens, and perceive the change as impacting their lives. What varied was the extent to which individuals embraced white nationalism. Most used their aggrieved status to deflect blame without referencing racist language. However, the most problematic commenters doubled down on racist rhetoric in order to redistribute blame. What needs further consideration, though, is how to structure public discourse so as to allow discussions about social change while deescalating aggressive tendencies and hate like white nationalism.

Rejecting America’s History of Oppression

Some commenters interpreted history through their ideological lens, neglecting the history of marginalized groups (Picca & Feagin, 2007). They used “historically dominant and well-entrenched racial stereotypes” (Hughey & Daniels, 2013, p. 338) to promote their cause. This represents an attempt to use identity to further a shared ideology (Hall, 1996) among those who might seek to delegitimize members of marginalized groups by assigning them to a lower status (Hall, 1985). These commenters also engaged in white nationalist discourse as described by Steinfeldt et al. (2010): minimizing the problem, perpetuating misinformation, and trivializing the issue. Further, the commenters “othered” by pointing out race and reinforcing the inferior status of minoritized groups (Hughey, 2012). Individuals who express this type of commentary look at problems of racial division in society and, rather than see centuries of oppression, perceive marginalized populations as being unwilling to improve their status. This reinterpretation also allows them to strategically negotiate the public memory of the Civil War by reasserting their interest in having monuments to Confederate soldiers. By refusing to give up ground, they are keeping the argument over the meaning of the war alive, perpetuating the broader argument over the interpretation of history (VanderHaagen, 2019). This myopic approach is built upon the historical use of the white racial frame (Feagin, 2020) and furthers the use of discriminatory stereotypes and narratives for political gain. More research is needed, though, on how these frames might change over time under increasing pressure to update, revise, or remove historical symbols and narratives.

Diagnosing Causes: Finding a Scapegoat

One common tactic was to engage in less overt white nationalism and blame others. These commenters fit with the research on white grievance by complaining about reverse racism (Hughey & Daniels, 2013) and affirmative action (Swain, 2002), and blaming marginalized groups for their economic losses (Loke, 2013). These individuals used white grievance to position themselves in an “ideological struggle” (Hall, 1985) over who should bear responsibility for societal change and racial division. Rather than acknowledging the problem, these commenters chose to blame contemporary individuals and institutions. One tactic was to frame the problem around losses and gains, by arguing that minoritized people are the unfair beneficiaries of gains like affirmative action. This allowed critics to further their attempts to use discourse for exploitation and domination (Hall, 1985). White nationalists frame the cause of the problem on both marginalized people who benefit from programs, but also the system enacting these policies. This positions their argument around their perceived loss of status as a product of liberals and the news media championing diversity and moves the framing process from merely defining the problem of white grievance into a narrative about how elite institutions use race relations to sow division and to promote diversity as a societal goal, similar to what Lacy (2010) found. This allows white nationalists to reach a larger audience of those who feel similarly aggrieved, therefore taking the narrative and marrying it with white nationalist ideology so that it can be used to influence others (Pan & Kosicki, 2001). This process of assigning blame for racial division to minoritized people becomes a strategic discursive tool for not only further dividing groups, but to recruit followers.

Making Moral Judgments: Refusing to Accept Responsibility

More than assigning blame, white nationalists actively avoided responsibility. By framing the debate around white grievance, these commenters framed themselves as the victims of a society that cares more about diversity than merit.

The less overt type of white nationalist discourse is used to recruit those with white nationalism sympathies who might reject an overtly racist movement. This allows white nationalist sympathizers to frame their status as less of a product of their own skills and, instead, as a product of advantages given to marginalized people. By advancing both overt and veiled forms of white nationalism, supporters can frame the problem in more than one way and build political legitimacy (Pan & Kosicki, 2001). This raises questions about how to distinguish the degrees of white nationalist discourses and how to recognize characteristics of problematic white grievance discourse that might encourage more overt forms to emerge.

Suggesting Remedies

In response to white nationalist discourse, critics applied two strategies: actively pursue these individuals to unmask them and ostracize them from society; or cautiously avoid engaging with them, but instead challenge their ideas with the hope that avoiding confrontation would deprive the groups of attention.

Unmasking Racism in Discourse

Those critics who unmasked racism attempted to challenge white nationalists as individuals, beyond just challenging their ideas. The critics were responding to the “racialized performance” (Picca & Feagin, 2007, p. 80) of white nationalists with counterprotests aimed at taking back public spaces online. Allowing racist discourse to go unchallenged could help legitimize it in society. Acknowledging that these statements are not welcome helps to establish that people of color are welcome. These actions represent another form of “ideological struggle” (Hall, 1985, p. 112) over the seemingly fixed meanings that dictate power in disputes over race. These critics are attempting to suggest remedies by exposing those who support white nationalism. Whether the news organizations were hesitant to get involved because of the racial politics, or whether they didn’t believe the comments were hateful enough to be removed, there is a broader issue of how a news organization can be more transparent about moderation.

Extracting White Nationalism From Contemporary Society

Other critics of white nationalism responded with caution. They saw their response as a tightrope walk – engage with the ideas and the ideology, but not with the individuals. Some research supports the belief that exposing the public to white nationalism could cause those ideas to gain support (Walgrave & De Swert, 2004). Further discussion and media coverage of white nationalist ideas could help in the destigmatizing process that Barkun (2017) refers to as the “mainstreaming of the fringe.” Before commenting forums become the focus of increased attention, news organizations could enact policies about how to cover white nationalists only when their views become newsworthy and to avoid sensationalist coverage.

In the case of arguments over symbols of hate, the discourse on mainstream news sites reflected two approaches in the contestation over ideology (Hall, 1985): white nationalists were united in a strategy of deflecting responsibility, shifting blame, relying on stereotypes, and, in limited cases, arguing for white superiority. The opposition, however, was split between publicly shaming white nationalists or avoiding direct conflict in order to deny white nationalists the space to recruit new members. The divided approach of those opposed to white nationalism could potentially lead to difficulties in overcoming white nationalist discourse in mainstream forums. White nationalists seem particularly capable of rallying supporters and using mainstream spaces to spread their message following incidents like Charlottesville, but the opposition appears to be less capable of responding in kind in order to limit the spread of hate.

Conclusion

This study sought to understand the forms of white grievance and white identity discourse that emerged and showed how white identity discourse is tied to a loss of cultural identity, and how that cultural identity relies on ideological interpretations of history and status. Further, this study brings to light the tense divide between counterprotestors who choose to confront white nationalists and those who attempt to challenge their ideas without giving them more legitimacy.

Commenters who supported or sympathized with white nationalism defended white identity and strategically used their version of history to reject identity politics for others, while accepting it for themselves. While most avoided overt racism, the tone taken with much of the white grievance discourse suggested sympathy for extreme views. Critics, however, suffered from a division over their tactics, which led to an inconsistent approach to responding to white nationalist sympathizers. The sympathy for white nationalist views, while not always wholehearted, seems to show white grievance moving from its most general form – discourse related to economic loss – to a broader statement about the loss of a cultural identity tied to race.

Because this project was exploratory, it only considered one issue and forums from just a few news organizations. There is the potential to broaden this examination to multiple places online and more story topics. There is still more research that can be done on identifying types of white nationalist discourse in mainstream commenting forums, but also to better identify where this discourse will emerge and how best to respond to it – either as a moderator or a fellow commenter.

Given recent incidents, notably an insurrection on the United States Capitol on January 6th, 2021, we can see that violent events like the protests in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017 are not isolated events. The expansion of white nationalist discourse into more public spaces has led to an increase in confrontation between competing groups and has also potentially led to more conflict in online forums. Unchallenged, this trend could prompt more sympathizers to speak out and could further legitimize white nationalism in mainstream society.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

J. David Wolfgang

Author Biography

J. David Wolfgang is an Assistant Professor of Journalism and Media Communication at Colorado State University. His research focuses on public discourse and media sociology. In particular he studies the relationship between journalists and online audience members. Wolfgang is a former journalist and holds a law degree and PhD from the University of Missouri.

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