Ontological Security: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Normalization With the Gulf Cooperation Council in Exit 7

Introduction

As Palestinians have been trying to write their place into history for centuries, the question of “Occupied Palestine” has been a tedious and never-ending conflict. The pathway toward displacing and dismantling Palestine began its course following World War I. Through British mandate authorities, European Jewish settlers began to settle in what was known as Palestine (Khalidi, 2020). The beginning of this Zionist colonial project could be achieved, as said by Theodore Herzl, one of the leaders of the movement, by slowly expropriating and removing the poor, denying employment, and sending them across the border. That is why in 1917, the British Cabinet issued the Balfour Declaration establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine, without mentioning the Palestinian majority living there (Khalidi, 2020).

In 1948, about 780,000 people were displaced from Palestine in what has historically been termed the Naqba (the greatest catastrophe). With the creation of the state of Israel, many Palestinians were forced out and had no opportunity to create a state. Thus, the identity of the Arab states in the region became anti-Israeli and anti-apartheid. Since then, Arabs have clung to the hope that Occupied Palestine would be free one day. “The right of return” and the act of defining a “homeland” is in direct contrast to the Zionist conception of a Jewish state built on a similar right of return (Ghabra, 1992). Nonetheless, the global media has historically followed in the footsteps of hegemonic narratives, such as the Zionist narrative of a Jewish homeland, while Arab countries have refused to acknowledge the State of Israel.

However, a shift in the Arab political discourse on the Palestine issue transpired in 2020, as nations such as Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, and Morocco normalized diplomatic ties with Israel. While Saudi Arabia, a dominant regional actor, has consistently stated that it could not forge a peace deal with Israel until the establishment of a Palestinian state, its restrained reaction to the normalization deal invites further notice (Crowley et al., 2023). As those countries publicly celebrated their deals in their state-owned media outlets, the Arab public was left perplexed by the paradigm shift. Given that the Palestinian cause is deeply entrenched in the Arab identity, governmental actions that contradict such convictions have engendered a climate of confusion regarding the appropriate response. The present study contends that this dramatic shift in the Arab world's foreign policy has created a state of ontological insecurity, disrupting the routines of Arab individuals and calling into question their national identity, which for the most part, was anti-Israeli.

Ontological security refers to the need to know one's self in order to maintain a consistent and stable identity (Giddens, 1991). Furthermore, Mitzen (2006) argues that states, in addition to seeking physical security, strive for ontological security by establishing a routinized state narrative that fulfills the ontological requirements of their members. In the event of drastic policy changes, reestablishing routine becomes an essential process for sustaining ontological security. One approach to achieving this is by orchestrating a narrative change through the media, which, based on the theoretical underpinnings of ontological security, function as objects of attachment that substitute face-to-face interactions (Silverstone, 1993). The routinized consumption of media thus creates a sense of reassurance, familiarity, and calm.

The theoretical foundations of ontological security offer a framework for comprehending the potential transformation of Saudi and Arab perceptions toward Israel through the narrative changes disseminated by state-controlled media. As the Saudi government consolidates control over its media landscape, we argue that it has the capacity to reshape the national narrative and steer public opinion.

One show, in particular, incited substantial controversy when it was broadcasted on the Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC), a Saudi-owned media organization considered the most popular and widely viewed in the MENA region (Hubbard, 2018). This occurred during the month of Ramadan when television viewership experiences a dramatic surge in the Middle East. Episode 3 of Exit 7 was devoted to the issue of normalization in the present day and challenged established views pertaining to Israel. Palestinians perceived this as an indication of abandonment, coinciding with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's push for the annexation of parts of the West Bank, Palestine (Smith & Jabari, 2020). A fellow at the Middle East and the Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University commented that the show aimed to sway public opinion and align the audience with the new direction (Smith & Jabari, 2020). Reactions from the Arab World following the airing of the episode reverberated across social media as the hashtag #boycott_mbc gained traction. One Twitter user remarked, “I can smell normalization in Exit 7” (Alchevy, 2020), while another tweeted, “We will break our fast in Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine,” accompanied by the hashtags #Kuwaitis_against_normalization and #Exit7 (Alnusif, 2020). A journalist tweeted, “Zionist soldiers have occupied Arab channels” (Alharbi, 2020), beneath which a comic strip depicted an Israeli soldier emerging from a television bearing the phrase “Occupied Arab Drama” (Alharbi, 2020).

Employing a postcolonial critique analysis of Episode 3 of Exit 7, this paper contends that through state-controlled media, Saudi Arabia can incrementally introduce new narratives that challenge long-standing animosities toward Israel and cultivate a sense of ontological security, which may, over time, further mask the apartheid occurring in Israel.

We begin this paper with a review of Saudi Arabia's relations with Israel, followed by a demonstration of how the theoretical foundations of ontological security intersect with narrative shifts disseminated by state-controlled media. We then focus on the role of MBC and other state media outlets in promoting Saudi Arabia's strategies and policies to Saudi and Arab audiences. Finally, we offer a critique of episode 3 of MBC's show Exit 7, arguing that, over time, shows such as Exit 7 may exert a profound influence in changing a deep-rooted anti-Israel sentiment that has existed in the region since the 1940s.

Saudi-Israeli Relations: The Quiet Diplomacy

On September 15, 2020, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Israel, and the United States signed the Abraham Accords, documenting normal diplomatic relations between the two Gulf States and Israel. A few months later, Sudan and Morocco followed suit. In the context of international relations, normalization refers to the process of initiating or reinstating cordial diplomatic and economic ties between two or more nation-states. While the concept of normalization seems sensible, Hellyer (2020) states that the “Arab states’ declarations have overturned the historically held notion that a stable Arab world, in which Israelis fully accepted, would only occur after finding a solution to the Palestinian question” (para. 2). As the four Arabs states celebrated their new political alliances, Saudi Arabia's reaction toward such transition in foreign policy invites further notice.

Throughout the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East, which has resulted in deadly wars and violent incidents claiming hundreds of thousands of lives, Saudi Arabia's participation in Arab war efforts against Israel has been relatively limited (Abadi, 2019). The fact that both states do not share a border has played a role in this noncombative approach. However, it is their shared interests within the region that had significant consequences for their relationship. Podeh (2018) argues that “Israel-Saudi relations exemplify quiet diplomacy, which entails veiled collaboration between two states in pursuit of peaceful objectives” (p. 564). Specifically, the threat of Gamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-Arab ideology, Saddam Hussain's expansionism ambitions following the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Iran's persistent interference in Arab state affairs since the 1979 revolution have jeopardized the stability of both Israel and Saudi Arabia (Abadi, 2019; Podeh, 2018; Rynhold & Yaari, 2020).

Although classified and confidential documents reveal that both nations covertly collaborated against their shared regional adversaries, their public relationship was far from cordial. Both states employed media and rhetoric to portray themselves as adversaries, thereby consolidating support from their respective populations who harbored rooted animosities toward the opposing party (Abadi, 2019; Podeh, 2018; Rynhold & Yaari, 2020).

However, this “veiled collaboration” has recently become more transparent and, in some instances, celebrated. The Arab Spring in 2011 and its repercussions on regional governmental stability, combined with Iran's assertiveness in supporting Shia militias in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as Turkey's expanding political and economic influence in the region, have prompted both Israel and Saudi Arabia to increasingly publicize their relationship (Abadi, 2019; Podeh, 2018; Rynhold & Yaari, 2020). The 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal signed during the Obama administration and the rise of Muhammad Bin Salman as Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia in June 2017 rendered their relationship more “pronounced and open” (Podeh, 2018, p. 579). Podeh (2018) concludes, “since Israel was always eager to make public its illicit connections with Arabs, exposure of these contacts can be attributed to a change in Saudi attitude, which stems from the desire to use Israel as a public deterrent against Iran, something that would not be feasible if the Israeli-Saudi connection remained hidden” (p. 585).

Although publicizing the relationship between the two states might serve their national interests within the current political environment, garnering public support for this connection appears particularly challenging in Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam and home to the holy mosques in Mecca and Medina. As a key player in Arab and Islamic politics, Saudi Arabia's support for Palestinian statehood and its public opposition to Israeli occupation has led to a deeply ingrained animosity toward Israel as part of Saudi, Arab, and Muslim identity. Such hostility toward Israel is witnessed in the periodic public opinion surveys of Arabs conducted by the Arab Barometer and the Doha Institute Arab Opinion Index (Arab Barometer, 2023; Arab Opinion Index, 2023).

Ibn Saud, the founder of the kingdom, continuously sent scathing letters to Franklin Roosevelt demanding the end of the Zionist campaign to take over Palestinian territory. “He told Roosevelt that Palestine was a ‘sacred Moslem country’ that ‘belonged to Arabs’ and he called Jews vagrants and exploiters who had an imaginary claim to Palestine based on fraud and deceit” (Abadi, 2019, p. 2). As an increasing number of young Palestinian immigrants began working in Saudi oil fields, Ibn Saud, although disinclined to engage in direct combat during the Palestine War of 1948, felt compelled to support the Palestinian cause (Abadi, 2019). The Arab defeat in the Six-Day War in 1967 significantly weakened Egypt, providing Saudi Arabia with a prospect to elevate its status within the region. The kingdom seized this opportunity by announcing its intentions to financially support the defeated Arab states, routinely participating in Arab summit meetings, and adopting the “Three Noes” policy (no peace, no recognition, no negotiation) (Abadi, 2019; Niu & Wu, 2021). The OPEC oil embargo against the United States in retaliation for the 1973 Arab-Israeli War transformed King Faisal into a national Arab hero, further emphasizing the Saudi anti-Israeli image. “The impact of the oil embargo and the reaction of the world public opinion emboldened the Saudi regime to such an extent that it took every opportunity to appear influential in the Middle Eastern affair” (Abadi, 2019, p. 6). When Egypt was expelled from the Arab League in 1979 following the Camp David peace treaty with Israel, Saudi Arabia solidified its leading role in the Arab world. This prominent role was exemplified by Saudi Arabia's introduction of the Eight-Point Peace Plan in 1981 and the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002 (Niu & Wu, 2021).

As this context suggests that Saudi Arabia strategically used its stance against Israel to vie for public support from local Arab and Muslim populations, how can Saudi Arabia execute a paradigm shift in foreign policy while minimizing local and international opposition? Drawing from ontological security theory, we propose that altering Saudi and Arab perceptions of Israel could be achieved through narrative changes in popular culture disseminated by state-controlled media.

Ontological Security: A Theoretical Framework

Ontological security offers a framework for understanding our attachment to popular culture and mass media. Giddens (1991) defines ontological security as:

The confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding and material environments of action. A sense of reliability of persons and things, so central to the notion of trust, is fundamental to feelings of ontological security. (p. 92)

Central to ontological security is the concept of self and the maintenance of a consistent and stable identity. According to Giddens (1991), this recognition of self emerges from birth as trust develops through social interactions between an infant and its caregiver. This relationship provides a secure environment in which potential threats can be identified (Giddens, 1991). Eventually, the infant must separate from its caregiver and, in doing so, seeks ontological security by attaching to an external object, as described by object relations theory (Winnicott, 1974; as cited in Silverstone, 1993). For infants, this attachment may take the form of a toy or blanket. In a similar manner, adults replace these early attachments with other objects. Silverstone (1993) stresses that television serves this purpose for adults. As such, ontological security operates as a form of consciousness, delivering emotional and cognitive security across various human activities and cultures.

As individuals cultivate a sense of ontological security, the establishment of routines becomes another factor contributing to the prolongation of security. Routines guide individuals through various life stages, and the feeling of security emerges from these routines being integrated into daily behaviors (Giddens, 1991). When routines are disrupted, such as during a traumatic event, uncertainty leads to a state of ontological insecurity. Reestablishing routines is crucial for returning to a sense of normalcy and reinforcing one's sense of self.

Mitzen (2006) builds upon Giddens (1991) conceptualization by proposing that states, like individuals, seek ontological security in addition to physical security. One rationale for this idea relates the state's pursuit of ontological security to the ontological security needs of its members. Mitzen (2006) argues that “society must be cognitively stable in order to secure the identities of individuals, and as such, individuals will become attached to these stable group identities” (p. 352). For Mitzen (2006), having a distinct state identity is crucial for ontological security. “Because losing a sense of state distinctiveness would threaten the ontological security of its members, states can be seen as motivated to preserve that national group identity, not solely the national body” (p. 352). This argument can be further supported by examining the concept of nationalism.

Nationalism centers on constructing collective imaginaries that revolve around a shared state narrative (Yiftachel, 2002), ultimately creating and preserving national identity. These state narratives become routine for its members, establishing reassurance that maintains a sense of security at both the individual and state level. States and individuals are emotionally connected because the state agent creates an emotional connection that promotes its authority and the “national interest,” which means that the citizen's existential experience can only be completed through the state itself (Pan & Korolev, 2021). Delving even further, nationalism relies on the nation and the people as one, and this is linked directly to our sense of security and an imagined national space (Kinnvall, 2004). Therefore, if we are against the national narrative, then it will disrupt our sense of security. It is for this reason that many individuals, especially in states that do not enjoy high levels of political and media freedom, go along with the state narrative. It will not disrupt their routine as opposed to if they were seen as resisting the state narrative.

Considering the Saudi and Israeli context, the persistent and pronounced anti-Israeli Saudi narrative has played a significant role in shaping the national identities of Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies. Mitzen (2006) contends that a routinized conflict between states generates ontological security as states become attached to their conflict in order to sustain their national identity. The 2020 Abraham Accords undoubtedly created a sense of ontological insecurity, as the national identity of Arabs consistently being in conflict with Israel was challenged. Mitzen (2006) asserts that when such an anomaly occurs, returning to routine is “a crucial step toward recovery” (p. 348).

One method of recovery, as proposed by Subotić (2016), is through state narrative change. As narratives evolve, national consciousness—linked to identity construction—can be shaped and reshaped. Subotić (2016) states, “political actors always manipulate stories to persuade their followers of a specific policy. They seize on collectively remembered history to make specific political points in the present” (p. 612). Such narrative change, she adds, will preserve “state ontological security through providing autobiographical continuity, a sense of routine, familiarity, and calm” (p. 611).

This narrative change can, most definitely, be implemented through the media. According to Silverstone (1993), the media, particularly television, serve as objects of attachment that substitute face-to-face interactions. Through their routinized consumption, they provide ontological security, especially during times of crisis. Television, according to Silverstone (1993), colonizes space and connection as the sole caretaker. This art of colonization is a cultural system that provides reassurance, which is much needed when routines are transformed. Through the control of television, not only does the state manage transnational anxieties but it also resolves and systemizes our temporalities (Georgiou, 2012). However, it is important to note here that not all audiences will follow this new routine, as there are undoubtedly active and critical audiences who will refuse certain paradigm shifts. What is certain, though, is that when a new routine is introduced, the state, through its controlled media, will reassure its members of this routine.

We argue that by exercising control over the media, television in particular, Saudi Arabia could alter its narrative and reconfigure its state of ontological insecurity in relation to its relationship with Israel.

Saudi Media Consolidation and MBC

When Mohammed bin Salman’s 2017 anti-corruption crackdown targeted Saudi royals, politicians, and businessmen, including prominent media moguls in the region, it could be argued that this action was intended to grant the Saudi government complete control over the media industry. Three media tycoons—Waleed Alibrahim of the MBC group, Prince Al-Waleed Bin Talal of Rotana, and Saleh Kamel of Arab Radio and Television—were all arrested in the Ritz-Carlton and forced to relinquish their assets before being released. Kristin Diwan of the Arab Gulf States Institute of Washington stated to the Financial Times, that bringing the giants of Saudi and Arab media under complete government control means that “Mohammed bin Salman is clearly intent on controlling the message as he conducts a dramatic restructuring of the Saudi state and economy” (Al Omran, 2017).

Boasting 18 mostly free TV channels offering global entertainment programming in multiple languages, sports, and news, along with the Shahid app—a Netflix equivalent—the MBC group is the largest media company in the MENA region, reaching millions of Arab viewers. Founded in 1991 by Waleed Alibrahim, whose sister was married to the king, MBC initially started in London before relocating its headquarters to Dubai in 2002. In 2022, the giant media corporation named Riyadh its new home (Alhamawi, 2022). The media organization steered clear of politics, focusing on entertaining the Arab world while “advancing a relatively liberal social agenda” (Alkhereiji, 2020; Hubbard, 2018).

Mohammed bin Salman sought further media control to consolidate power, undermine rivals, and effectively communicate his vision of a new Saudi identity on the world stage. He aimed to transform Saudi Arabia from an ultraconservative state with fewer freedoms and stricter rules than most Islamic states into a diverse and vibrant society open to foreign investments, tourism, and global influence (Hincks, 2020; Saudi Arabia Vision 2030, 2020). Furthermore, as Saudi foreign policy shifted to a more aggressive stance—waging war in Yemen, severing ties with Qatar, and engaging in public disputes with Iran and Turkey—MBC and other Saudi-owned media organizations were weaponized to serve as government mouthpieces. McAlister (2005) asserted that “foreign policy statements and government actions become part of a larger discourse through their relation to other kinds of representations, including news and television accounts of current events, but also novels, films, museum exhibits, and advertising” (p. 5).

This manipulation of narratives was clearly evident during the 2017 blockade on Qatar. MBC's Al Arabiya news channel took the lead in providing a counter-narrative to Qatar's Al Jazeera network. When Turkey publicly denounced the blockade, MBC ceased broadcasting Turkish dramas (Saeed, 2018). MBC also presented a scathing depiction of Qatar and its leaders in the 2017 Ramadan comedy hit Selfie, starring Nasser Al Qasabi, one of the most popular Saudi actors who also stars in Exit 7. Additionally, the song Teach Qatar, performed by prominent Saudi singers, went viral. This narrative change toward Qatar, using news and entertainment media outlets, aimed to reshape the Saudi public's perception of Qatar, transforming it from friend to foe. When relations were restored, however, such negative portrayals of Qatar became nonexistent.

In the case of Israel, the public's perceptions in the Arab world needed to be reshaped. This narrative change first materialized when Ola Al-Fares, a prominent news presenter on MBC, was fired following a tweet critical of Trump's recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and his decision to move the US embassy there (Middle East Monitor, 2017). When the normalization deal took place, Saudi-backed media outlets applauded and defended it. A study from the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change noted a shift in tone toward Israel in Saudi opinion articles: 66% of the analyzed sample from 2019 were critical of Israel, compared to 40% in 2020 (Rock & Dajani, 2020). MBC and other Saudi media outlets broadcasted and emphasized the September 2020 Friday sermon by Abdul Rahman al-Sudais, the imam of the Grand Mosque of Mecca, which suggested the religious relevance of normalization as he cited several stories of the Prophet Muhammad maintaining good relations with non-Muslims, particularly Jews (Uddin, 2020).

Finally, during the month of Ramadan, when TV viewership increases dramatically in the Middle East, MBC showcased Israel and Jews in its entertainment programming. Um Haroun, or the Mother of Aaron, was one of the most popular shows of the 2020 season, depicting the story of Jewish families living in the Gulf before migrating to Israel. While Um Haroun portrayed relationships between Jews and Muslims in the Gulf region from a historical perspective, episode 3 of Exit 7 was devoted to the issue of normalization in the present day.

The theoretical foundations of ontological security provide a framework for understanding the potential transformation of Saudi and Arab perceptions toward Israel through the narrative changes of popular culture in state-controlled media. As the Saudi government consolidates control over its media landscape, it has the ability to reshape the national narrative and guide public opinion. We argue that through shows like Exit 7, Saudi Arabia can gradually introduce new narratives that challenge long-held animosities toward Israel, foster a sense of ontological security, and ultimately facilitate a paradigm shift in foreign policy.

Methodology: Postcolonial Critique

In order to display how hegemonic narratives easily take over popular culture narratives, it is important to use postcolonial critique as a methodology that reminds us that globalization is about flows that will always be unequal in nature (Shome & Hegde, 2002). We follow in the steps of Calafell (2015), arguing for a methodology in which there is a need to interrogate hegemonic discourses that produce Othering. As we engage in decolonial/postcolonial methodologies, we follow a framework that involves taking apart narratives that intersect with colonialism and imperialism (Smith, 1999). A postcolonial critique helps us understand that narratives have intersectional dimensions, whether it be race, class, gender, religion, sexuality, and nationality (Shome & Hegde, 2002). Like Ghabra and Calafell (2019), we provide our positionalities as decolonial subjects and deconstruct hegemonic rhetorics in the name of resistance.

When it comes to popular culture, rhetorical critique as a methodology can be a site where the struggle for and against culture is involved (Hall, 2011). For this reason, paying attention to narratives that recreate new signs of identity, contestation, and collaboration is vital (Bhabha, 1994). Ghabra and Calafell (2019) defines hegemonic rhetoric as “dominant narratives that circulate in the media and popular culture and favors the privileged point of view” (p. 6).

What is of the essence here is that a postcolonial critique of media ethics will entail searching for ethics from the margins and not from positions of dominance itself (Rao & Wasserman, 2007). As truth is already within these centers of power, a postcolonial critique can help us understand and expose these forms of knowledge. Therefore, the act of being critical means interrogating current political conditions and deconstructing them (Parameswaran, 2008). Thus, postcolonial implies going beyond anti-colonial nationalist theory and beyond specific historical contingencies to a world of third-world nationalist struggles (Shohat, 1992).

Additionally, as the field of communication studies expands, many Middle Eastern scholars have also demonstrated the need to critique hegemonic rhetoric within their own communities and beyond (Abdi, 2014; Chrifi Alaoui, 2020; Ghabra, 2018; Ghabra & Hasian, 2018; Hasian, 2013; Khamis & Fowler, 2020; Kraidy & Mourad, 2014). That being said, we must not forget the Palestinian scholar Edward Said's notes on analyzing texts that are produced in uneven discourse, termed Orientalism (Said, 1979). When Said discussed the concept of Orientalism as a field of study, he asserted that the author's position vis-à-vis the text must be described in regard to both power and culture. For Said, television, film, and the media's resources have standardized cultural stereotypes. For this reason, a postcolonial critique assists the researcher in bringing narratives of power to the fore. It exposes the power of rhetoric to sway public opinion.

While critiquing these narratives of power, it is vital that rhetoricians and communication scholars be sensitive in studying national rhetoric. Critics need to take power and politics into account without essentializing them. In other words, we must note the difference between when our rhetoric is emancipatory or reifying hegemonic structures. Furthermore, critics need to attend to how nationalism intersects with power, knowledge, and discursivity. Even further, if communication scholars accept the notion that rhetoric is constructed, then it is existential to use postcolonial methods to assist the critic in turning away from Eurocentric world events and rhetoric and toward the rhetoric of those at the margins (Hasian & Flores, 1997).

As we conduct our critique, we note our positionalities as Kuwaiti scholars. Kuwait is one of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states that has refused to normalize with the State of Israel. Additionally, compared to other GCC states, Kuwait enjoys higher political, media, and speech freedom.

We note that this informs and guides our analysis. In addition, as (one of the authors) is originally Palestinian, it provides us with the ability to perform a cultural critique from the ‘margins.’ What follows is a postcolonial critique of episode 3 of Exit 7. We conduct a scene-by-scene analysis arguing that Exit 7 brings to light a deep-seated invisible shift in MENA politics.

Analysis of Exit 7

Episode 3 at large centers around the main character, Dookhy, who finds out that his son has been playing PlayStation with a new Israeli friend. In the first scene, Dookhy goes to find his wife Mariam to tell her what happens. Dookhy explains how he demands that the son cut ties with this online friend instantaneously. The son refuses. Dookhy tells Mariam that he tried to explain to their son that Israel is an enemy, but the son laughed and said the Israeli friend is a coward and is in school. Dookhy insists that the son should be careful and not give “them” too much information; “we can’t trust them,” he says. Dookhy is furious and is adamant about cutting ties with the Israeli friend, but the son refuses and says it took him forever to get to this level of playing. In this context, the son's dismissiveness of the father creates a subtle transition from anti-normalization to normalization. Mariam responds to Dookhy that their son should just cut ties with him. However, as the conversation goes on, Mariam tells Dookhy that he is exaggerating and picks up her phone to call her friends (Alsharqi, 2020). What is important to note here is that Dookhy appears naïve and ignorant because he represents the Palestinian plight for freedom. Defending the Palestinian cause has been a narrative that has been carried down from generation to generation, and Dookhy represents this plight; however, at the price of appearing ignorant. His son and wife represent a new era of capitalization and class privilege but also a counter-narrative. This counter-narrative is a subtle way of not only sustaining the hegemonic narrative to normalize with Israel, but also, this counter-narrative becomes clearer throughout the episode that Dookhy's narrative is nonsense. The media, in a nutshell, is not saying that we must normalize with Israel but are certainly suggesting so throughout the episode, demonstrating the ontological security r discussed previously. Their message goes as follows: We do not want to normalize, but it is ok to normalize with Israel. This is the rhetoric that we hear all over the media and popular culture. As our ontological securities shift from the Palestinian cause to normalization, it is one we, as media audiences, are not aware of. Furthermore, if Dookhy provides a narrative of antinormalization while creating insecurity for the viewer, then the viewer will not sympathize with Dookhy. As mentioned earlier, the caretaker and our objects of attachment, in addition to our routines, need to be stable and secure. If Dookhy's character is presented as unstable, this could lead the viewer to change their perceptions as well as to a character that is stronger and more secure.

In the next scene, Dookhy goes to tell his daughter Hadeel the same story. His daughter is shocked and angry. Dookhy is worried that Saudi intelligence will find out that his son is playing with an Israeli partner and tells Hadeel that he managed to cut off the phone lines. Hadeel tries to explain to her father the logic of the Internet and how this has nothing to do with the phone lines and that they have usernames on PlayStation and that they can still chat with each other. The father responds,“This Zionist, the son of a gun, how is he speaking to Zeyad, is it through the house phone?” Hadeel responds, “No, it's through the Internet.” Suddenly, Mariam walks in, ready to go out with her friends. Dookhy raises his voice and says, “this is a crisis and you just want to go out and have fun? I am telling you Israel, and you tell me Madawi and Sara (Alsharqi, 2020)?” The wife represents the intersections of class privilege and capitalism on the way to normalization. Societies are developing, and economies are thriving because normalization has entered the region. Therefore, financial prosperity is linked to normalization.

This scene demonstrates not only a shift in normalization but also a generational shift in the adoption of technology. Dookhy, who appears “old-school,” cannot catch up with today's modernization and development. Not only does this leave him looking ignorant but also less developed. However, we argue that it is no coincidence that Dookhy appears angry, ignorant, and dopey. For centuries, media narratives have constantly portrayed oppressed identities as “backward” or “stupid.” This is similar to the narrative of the Muslim terrorist who is always labeled as a terrorist due to his religion (Ghabra, 2020a). Only in this case, any narrative that threatens Israel's (and its allies’) ontological security will be labeled as “barbaric” or “ignorant.” This is no coincidence, as these labels have been used in American political rhetoric for centuries. For instance, former President George W. Bush frequently used the word “barbaric” in his speeches when referring to the Middle East. The term was previously used in Disney's movie Aladdin, revealing that US national policy and officials are carrying over stereotypical narratives from film, TV, and Hollywood into national speeches (Ghabra, 2018).

Dookhy, desperate to find someone to sympathize with him, goes to find his brother Ghareeb and Jabr, his father-in-law. Asking them what to do, Ghareeb says, “report him to national security, your son is a traitor.” Ghareeb looks ignorant, naïve, and goofy. Jabr jumps into the conversation, “how could you report him? Let things just fizzle out and let it go. Israelis are humans like us.” Jabr adds, “Israel is here to stay whether you like it or not.” Dookhy appears flabbergasted and says this is new news. Jabr says, “this has been my opinion for a while but I could never voice it.” This is important because this scene now confirms to the public that even though they could not speak of normalization with Israel previously in fear of being punished, now it might be ok to start speaking of normalization. This scene is also vital in introducing a narrative that humanizes dealing with the State of Israel.

Jabr continues, “nothing hurt the Arabs except the Palestinian conflict. If you think that you can stop your son and that it will solve anything than you are wrong. If you think Israel is going to disappear it's not.” “Israel is gone!” says Dookhy. Jabr responds, “we always hear this narrative; the Arab countries are going to disappear one after the other and Israel will stay as it is.” Ghareeb jumps in, “just do what I say.” Dookhy responds, “I’m not going listen to any of you and will find my own solution (Alsharqi, 2020).” Dookhy is worried and asks everyone not to say anything. Historically, any sympathy with Israel would open up investigations in many countries, especially the GCC. Here we witness one narrative, Ghareeb's, who thinks that Dookhy's son would get in trouble, and another arguing for a new narrative, “normalization with Israel.” Jabr represents a risky narrative and a shift in our security object: “freeing Palestine” to “normalizing with Israel.” Jabr's narrative is vital in understanding the shift in the region as a whole and in the media and television landscape. Jabr, on the other hand, appears to want to continue normalization and throughout the episode, it becomes clearer that he would do anything to normalize. For example, in one scene, he is talking to Zeyad about normalization with Israel and asserts that he would be the first one to do business with Israel. He then asks Zeyad to speak to his PlayStation partner and say positive things about him as an influential businessman who has lived in the US most of his life. He tells Zeyad he is not a “typical Arab.” When Dookhy learns this, he confronts Jabr and says, “how could you tell Zeyad you want to do business with the Israelis?” Jabr replies in English, “so what,” reasserting the US component here through his use of the English language. Dookhy says, “we have to show Zeyad that they are enemies.” Jabr responds, “The enemy is the one that doesn’t value your stance with him and curses you day and night more than the Israelis. We sacrificed for Palestine, we went into wars for Palestine, we stopped oil and lost money for Palestine. We paid for their government and at any opportunity they get, they attack Saudi Arabia.” Dookhy responds, “look at the Naqba, for example, that happened in 1948 when people were thrown out of their lands there were also Palestinians that sold their lands, so we can’t generalize. There were Palestinians during the intifada facing tankers and armies and there were also Palestinians that are building the separation wall. All nationalities have bad and good. Israel is separating between the Palestinians and the Arabs and they have affected you.” Jabr responds, “why should we stand with them when they hurt us?” Dookhy says, “it's not about taking a stance; we stand with what's right and what's just. I think you have a conscious and you know what that is” (Alsharqi, 2020). Dookhy represents the Palestinian narrative that has been carried down for centuries by Arabs all over the region, people, societies, and governments: “the right of return” (Ghabra, 1992). However, Jabr represents the newfound narrative: an attempt by Israel and other states to normalize. He also represents the need for financial security through the “act of normalization.” However, it is important to note that for the media to sustain the narrative of normalization and continue its routine, it must hide Israel's oppressive practices. This is almost impossible to know if Jabr appears “rational” and Dookhy appears “ignorant.” As audiences object to security shifts from Dookhy to Jabr, we argue that this will assist in integrating Israel into the region.

This very same tension that is seen between Dookhy and Jabr is also seen at both the Ministry of Commerce and between the characters, Hadeel (Dookhy's daughter) and Lulwa (the manager at the ministry). The scene starts out with Abdel Fatah, a worker at the Ministry of Commerce consumer protection unit, who is receiving a complaint from a consumer that a triangle shape printed on a T-shirt looks like the Star of David on the Israeli flag. Saud, the customer is angry and says this is not ok and that the T-shirt should be boycotted (conflating Judaism with Zionism). Saud insists that they remove the T-shirt from the market or that he will attack them on social media platforms. Abdel Fatah asks him to leave and says, “it doesn’t look like the Star of David.” As Abdel Fatah holds the T-shirt up, it looks like a normal star, making Saud look foolish. Dookhy walks in, and Abdel Fatah tells him to look at the T-shirt. Dookhy responds, “let's pull the product from the market now.” Saud responds, “this is the meaning of a true Arab!” When Abdel Fatah holds the T-shirt up, the pattern looks nothing like the Star of David. First, the dissimilarity of the pattern on the T-shirt and the actual Star of David makes Saud and Dookhy appear stupid and ignorant. This indicates that anyone who is anti-Israeli will be made fun of. While we agree that conflating Judaism (symbolized by the Star of David) and Zionism is also wrong, this scene demonstrates a deep-rooted shift in the way that audiences could possibly start to shy away from defending Occupied Palestine in fear of being ridiculed in society. Later on in another scene, their manager Lulwa comes in and says, “there is a social media trend about boycotting a T-shirt.” Lulwa is furious and asks Dookhy if it has the Israeli symbol. Dookhy admits that he did not see it but that one needs to be careful. Lulwa tells him that people are laughing at them and says, “this issue is bigger than me and you and from today Abdel Fatah will be the head of the unit and you will listen to what he says. If you don’t like it, you can switch units.” Thus, Dookhy gets demoted because he is refusing to normalize (Alsharqi, 2020). It is important to note here that if the characters supporting boycotting in the show seem ignorant, this could possibly undermine the Palestinian Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions Movement, which in reality aims at ensuring that Israel complies with international law and aims for freedom, justice, and equality for the Palestinians (Ghabra & Hasian, 2018). It could also be an attempt to undermine and ridicule other boycotting campaigns initiated in response to specific actions and policies deemed anti-Arab and anti-Islam. The boycotting French products campaign, for example, following President Macron's statement characterizing Islam as a religion in crisis (Alsaafin, 2020) and the 2006 Danish products campaign in response to divisive cartoon depictions of Prophet Muhammad (Fattah, 2006).

Additionally, Lulwa appears more rational than Dookhy; this is certainly odd, considering women usually are the ones that appear incompetent in film and popular culture. We argue here that this is because she represents normalization with Israel and, therefore, appears as a good Muslim woman. This is similar to the good and bad Muslim narratives in which Muslim women who adopt the secularist view become defined as good Muslims as opposed to bad Muslims who do not adopt this view (Cooke et al., 2008). Lulwa also has a brother, Khatem, who exists in this dichotomy. Khatem is another character that represents the Palestinian plight—his character throughout the show is angry and abusive. He tells Lulwa that from the day he was born, whenever anyone brings up Israel, he has the urge to hit them. The episode portrays him this way because he represents the Palestinian plight.

It seems clear that anyone that is antinormalization or anti-Israel will appear either backward, goofy, or abusive like Khatem. This represents another dichotomy, the terrorist Muslim versus the liberal good Muslim. Here we argue that the good Muslim today in popular culture will adopt the normalization view as opposed to the bad Muslim who will not and will most likely be labeled irrational. As Lulwa represents the good Muslim, Hadeel represents the irrational, angry women of color. This is no new phenomenon, as Jack Shaheen reveals how Arab and Palestinian Others have appeared as villains in over 1,000 feature films (Shaheen, 2001). Even further, Arab and Muslim Others were underrepresented in film; for example, 87% of 200 series did not feature one single Muslim character. When they are portrayed, they are often extremist (Al-Baab et al., 2022). Elsultany asserts that “what makes a Mulsim ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in this paradigm is not their relationship to Islam but rather to the United States” (Alsultany, 2012).

Hadeel, on the other hand, represents the bad Muslim woman who will indeed rock the boat of normalization. First, she is wearing the kaffiyeh, a scarf that symbolizes Arab nationalism (Ghabra, 2020b). Second, she organizes a protest in the kitchen of the family's house, making her domesticated but also senseless. When Dookhy asks her what she is doing, she says, “I’m separating my things from Zeyad's thing because he is normalizing with Israel and the Zionist regime and I’m boycotting him.” Dookhy responds, “you can't cut your brother off.” Hadeel replies, “I’ll cut anyone off that normalizes with Israel.” Dookhy says, “you just want to be a hero and protest in the kitchen, put the things back.” Hadeel refuses and starts to chant, “no to Zionism, no to normalization, and shame on the traitors,” as she points at her father. Hadeel's extremism is excessive and aggressive, reinforcing the Muslim extremist stereotype and the angry women of color stereotype. In another scene, she gets angry with Turki, a delivery man, for having no opinion on politics and normalization with Israel. Hadeel angrily responds, “how could you not have on opinion on Arab nationalism?” He says, “my life is about making money and my job; I have enough on my plate instead of talking about Arab nationalism.” Hadeel responds, “it's my fault that I’m warning you about Zionist danger.” He responds, “are you serious?” (Alsultany, 2012). Again, Hadeel appears as an angry woman of color, who is irrational and not able to understand things. However, Turki represents Saudi youth and the struggle to sustain a living. To them, Israel is not important anymore, and politics is not important. Thus, the concept of nationalistic identity encourages citizens to focus on work and not politics. Furthermore, this new generation in the Arab region seems desensitized from politics due to financial hardship. Perhaps if normalization promises financial security and youth are struggling to sustain an adequate living in Saudi Arabia, normalization would be ok. In this context, we witness the intersection of class with the narrative of normalization.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the theoretical foundations of ontological security provide a framework for understanding how Saudi and Arab perceptions of Israel could be transformed through narrative changes witnessed in television that is disseminated by state-controlled media. While diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia are fast changing and unpredictable, we believe that if the relations continue to follow a normalization path, they will most definitely be reiterated in the state-controlled media. We sought to demonstrate that shows like Exit-7 can help Saudi Arabia gradually introduce narratives that challenge long-held animosities toward Israel, foster ontological security, and ultimately facilitate a paradigm shift in foreign policy.

Our analysis has demonstrated that characters representing the anti-normalization stance are portrayed as uncivilized, uneducated, backward, barbaric, or unemployed. As we have mentioned before, this is not a new phenomenon, as Arabs/Muslims have been stereotyped in this manner for centuries. In contrast, characters supporting normalization are presented as civilized, educated, and holding managerial positions. Those who are portrayed as civil are also most closely related to what Patton Owen terms hegemonic civility or “an organized process which results in suppressing or silencing any opposition in favor of the status quo” (Patton, 2004, p. 65). The status quo in this situation refers to civility. Through hegemony and civility, bodies are disciplined into performing in a civil manner. However, the episode presents a departure from the typical narrative where the white man is considered civilized, and the Arab or Muslim is portrayed as uncivilized. Instead, this divide now exists within the same homogenous group.

What makes these sites of ontological security and narrative building so treacherous is that the new generation has no knowledge of the history of the Naqba for a number of reasons. First, history is being erased. For instance, every 30 years, the Israeli archives dispose of secret materials for political reasons, and every 50 years, they throw away documents related to military matters (Pappe, 2007). Furthermore, the new generation did not live through the first (1987–1993) or/and second intifada (2000). However, historical documents are also not accessible in the Arab region as well, and, as we have aimed to demonstrate through our analysis of Exit 7, Arab governments are controlling information and fostering one narrative after the other.

Nonetheless, there is an urgent need for us to call out the hidden nature of state and media building through ontological security. As we enter a deep-rooted shift for the first time ever, we must make sure that this first step toward normalization does not become the only step we hear of in the media and popular culture.