Abstract
Outsourcing Control offers a rich, powerful, and unique analysis of the international migration regime. This book advances the study of migration cooperation by conducting a nuanced analysis of extraterritorial interdiction agreements and how the negotiating strategies varied between the origin and destination state. Extraterritorial interdiction agreements are bilateral agreements on migration that require the origin state to make efforts to limit undocumented migration from their borders in exchange for economic and political aid from the destination state. Tennis's writing is clear and captivating, walking the reader through various realist, liberalist, and constructivist theories, along with complex game theory and occasionally tedious negotiations between “partner” (i.e., origin) and destination states.
The book's central argument is clear: partner state negotiating practices vary based on regime type, strength, and relationship with the destination state. Authoritarian states enjoy more flexibility in negotiations and can selectively demand concessions. Meanwhile, democratic states are constrained by democratic public institutions and often must negotiate within the confines of public support, thus limiting their negotiating power. Tennis analyzes partner states with autocratic regimes such as Haiti, Mexico, Tunisia, and Libya, as well as democratic states like Senegal, Tunisia after Ben Ali, and Mexico beginning in the 1990s and under Vincent Fox. The book's best aspect is her temporal analysis of the same states and how their negotiating strategies vary with new administrations.
The book consists of six chapters including a conclusion. Tennis outlines her typological model in which regime type and strength influence how states approach negotiations on extraterritorial interdiction agreements. The typology describes how weak democratic states often had limited cooperation on interdiction, in part because of domestic resistance (Tunisia and Libya after the Arab Spring), while strong democratic states were more likely to take a pragmatic stance of robust cooperation on interdiction with limited domestic resistance (Mexico under Vincent Fox and Senegal under Abdoulaye Wade). However, both weak and strong authoritarian states tended to cooperate on interdiction in an opportunistic way because the authoritarian leaders were able to rapidly change negotiating strategies without citizens’ voices being heard.
Tennis uses four case studies to elaborate her model. The Haitian case shows how negotiating strategies can vary across different regime types as the autocrat Francois Duvalier enjoyed opportunistic cooperation with the US, but when democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide led the country, he was heavily constrained by domestic democratic processes. Tunisia's transition from authoritarian leadership to its fragile democracy illustrates how regime strength impacts negotiating strategies: Ben Ali played hardball with Italy due to his strong grip on Tunisia and its civil society. Yet, the provisional government that assumed power after Ben Ali's ousting was desperate for European aid and legitimacy, and thus demanded smaller Italian concessions. Lastly, Tunisia and Libya took advantage of European colonial history in their countries to negotiate better terms. Both Ben Ali and Gaddafi characterized Italy as a neo-colonizer and used this label to bend the negotiations in their favor.
Outsourcing Control has two main takeaways that will keep the reader pondering. First, state domestic political, economic, and social institutions influence an administration's ability to negotiate. Traditional understandings of regime strength would suggest that democratic states are stronger than autocratic ones; however, in the case of migration cooperation, an autocratic ruler enjoys the ability to negotiate an agreement at his will and for his desires, whereas a democratic leader is inhibited by the will of the people. Strong democratic institutions are accountable to the public and move the negotiations out of the leader's control, limiting their ability to negotiate.
Second, international dynamics and histories play an important role during the inception, processing, and outcomes of an agreement's negotiation. Current events, like the Arab Spring or a presidential coup and economic crisis in Haiti, impact when and how agreements are negotiated. Colonial histories between European powers and states like Tunisia and Libya impacted how Italy negotiated with the two. Specifically, under Ben Ali and Gaddafi in Tunisia and Libya, respectively, each state leveraged their colonial past to obtain more lucrative concessions. Both Tunisia and Libya depicted Italy's negotiations for an agreement as neocolonialism and demanding more concessions to show their citizens that they are bossing the “colonizers” around.
The only critiques of Outsourcing Control come from what was omitted from the analysis. In particular, the negotiating strategies of refugee warehousing states, like Kenya and its Dadaab camp would add an additional layer to the research presented in the book. Destination states see refugee warehousing as a similar problem to that presented in Tennis’ case studies, but warehousing states are often not the origin state for refugees. The different negotiating strategies that are employed in these scenarios would be interesting to compare to the strategies of the destination-origin state relationship. Also, a more in-depth discussion of the Libyan case study could elicit valuable information on international relations with origin states that are amid conflict.
The book provides a complex, yet practical, framework with which to assess the future of extraterritorial interdiction agreements and international cooperation on migration, more generally. Tennis opens a new fruitful research agenda within international migration and security with a more nuanced understanding of what makes states strong negotiators. Outsourcing Control is a must-read for scholars and students of international relations and migration.