Effect of Company Characteristics on Human Resource Disclosure Index: Empirical Evidences from Indian Corporates

Abstract

Purpose:

The purpose of the present research article is to know the extent of Human Resource (HR) disclosure practices and effects of various independent variables on HR disclosure practices in selected Indian listed companies.

Design/methodology/approach:

Initially, Human Resource Disclosure Index (HRDI) of 91 items is constructed for 63 companies listed on the NSE-100 index. After that, the effect of various independent variables is analyzed on HRDI. Finally, independent variables are regressed with HRDI to find the important independent variables which influences the HRDI. The relationship between industry type and HR disclosure has been studied using one-way ANOVA and the comparison between public and private sector has been studied using the Mann–Whitney U test.

Findings:

The findings of the study show that net fixed assets, net sales, market capitalization, earnings per share (EPS), the debt–equity ratio and total number of pages of an annual report have a significant effect on HRDI. The remaining variables show insignificant association with HRDI. HRDI has been reported differently by different industries, while public and private companies do not differ in case of HR disclosure practices.

Originality/value:

This study provides the valuable information and contributes in existing literature. The HR disclosure index created in this study may be utilized by the companies as a benchmark to enhance their HR disclosure in future.

Keywords

Human resource disclosure index company characteristics annual report content analysis

Introduction

The classical economics defined the three factors of production: land, labour and capital. Labour is the internal asset of the organization because of the expertise and competency of the employees (Guthrie, Petty, & Ricceri, 2004). As per Brooking (1996), Human Capital (HC) is the aggregate of collective expertise, capability, managerial skills, creative and leadership ability of the employees in an organization. Due to transformation of economy from industrial economy to knowledge-based economy, there is high demand of high-tech services provided by employees of the organizations and HC is the significant resource for value generation in the organizations. So, the focus of the organizations has changed from physical resources to intellectual resources. With the onset of innovation and learning era, it is clear that HC is the only capital which influences the success of the organizations.

Due to emergence of knowledge-based economy, HR is imperative for an organization (Bhargava, 1991). The prosperity of the organizations immensely depends on intangible resources (Baruch, 2001; Edvinsson & Malone, 1997; Stewart & Ruckdeschel, 1998). Because key to success of an organization are skilled and knowledgeable employees. Hence, HR is the only resource which converts all type of resources of an organization into valuable form and expectation of the investor is high regarding future earnings of an organization which have high quality of HR. Rao (2005) argues that with the help of HC accounting disclosure, investors better judge the strength of the HC in an organization. Hence, corporate’s HC has explicitly been viewed as a profitable asset and a key factor for the success of organization (Stewart & Ruckdeschel, 1998). In spite of huge potentialities of HC towards organization existence (Möller, Gamerschlag, & Guenther, 2011), the information related to HR in developing country like India is still voluntary in nature, non-standardized and scarce. Hence, it is difficult to synthesize the data of HR from annual reports (Lajili & Zeghal, 2006).

Most of the previous literature studied the HR with intellectual capital (Abdolmohammadi, 2005; Abeysekera, 2008; Bontis, 2003; Bozzolan, Favotto, & Ricceri, 2003; Branco, Delgado, Sousa, & Sa, 2011), and only few studies measured the HR alone and focussed on the extent of information related to HR disclosed by companies (Huang, Luther, Tayles, & Haniffa, 2013; Lin, Huang, Du, & Lin, 2012; Motokawa, 2015). In accounting field, voluntary disclosure of information in the annual reports has been rapidly growing research area. It decreases the information asymmetry between the various stakeholders. Because of inadequacy of mandatory disclosure, the voluntary disclosure of information has been receiving attention in recent accounting field. The information is communicated through annual reports. Annual reports are the important medium through which the company communicates most of the information (Jindal & Kumar, 2012).

The HR disclosure in most of the country including India is voluntary in nature. So, HR disclosure of different companies is inconsistent, unstructured and incomparable. Consequently, there is a need to study the nature and level of HR disclosure practices currently adopted by different companies in India (Verma & Kirti, 2019).

The present article has been divided into eight sections. The first section introduced the article. The remaining sections are as follows: the second section discusses the review of literature followed by development of hypotheses in the third section. The fourth section contains the objectives of the study. The fifth section provides the information related to research methodology taken up for the study including data sources. The sixth section presents data analysis and results of the study. The seventh section explains managerial implications of the study. Finally, the eighth section concludes the article.

Review of Literature

Researches on accounting disclosure have been conducted since 1960. There may be two fundamental ways to deal with accounting disclosure. The principal approach is sending the questionnaire to various users of financial accounting and asking them to rank the things as per their levels of significance for decision-making process (Buzby, 1974; Chandra, 1974; Firth, 1978). The second approach is based on finding the relationship between voluntary, obligatory or total accounting disclosure with certain company attributes. This article relates to the second category of accounting disclosure studies (Kaur, Raman, & Singhania, 2016).

The concentration of most of the studies conducted in developed nations is to examine the linkage between company attributes and disclosure levels—the UK (Firth, 1979; Spero, 1979), the USA (Buzby, 1975; Lang & Lundholm, 1993), Canada (Belkaoui & Kahl, 1978), Sweden (Cooke, 1989), Switzerland (Raffournier, 1995), Japan (Cooke, 1992) and Hong Kong (Wallace & Naser, 1995). It is evident from literature that company size (Buzby, 1975; Cooke, 1992; Firth, 1979; Raffournier, 1995) and listing status (Cooke, 1989; Firth, 1979) have a significant influence on HR disclosure practices, whereas Buzby (1975) concluded that listing status does not influence the HR disclosure practices. Also, the variables like auditor type (Firth, 1979) and number of subsidiaries (Cooke, 1989) do not influence HR disclosure practices. These results are found in line with the studies conducted in developing countries—Egypt (Mahmood, 1999), Jordan (Naser, Alkhatib, & Karbhari, 2002), Nigeria (Wallace, 1987) and Bangladesh (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994). Naser et al. (2002) concluded in his study that corporate size, audit firm status, liquidity, gearing and profitability influence the disclosure level of the firm. Further, a few studies have come out with a comparative approach to assess the disclosure level of two nations (Barrett, 1977; Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Zarzeski, 1996). Zarzeski (1996) argued that global culture and market forces create pressure for adopting better reporting practices due to transparency in company’s accounts which is demanded by international investors. This helps to harmonize the financial reporting practices of companies listed on international stock exchanges.

Independent Variables and Hypotheses Development

Based on the existing literature, eleven hypotheses are developed in this section which is related to company-specific characteristics to the HR disclosure practices of Indian listed companies. Table 1 provides the category-wise list of independent variables.

Table 1.

List of Independent Variables

Category of Variable	Independent Variables
Structural	Company size, ownership concentration, leverage, company age, type of auditor
Performance	Profitability, liquidity ratio
Market	Listing abroad, industry type
Other	Total number of pages of an annual report, type of ownership

Source: Literature review.

Company Size

The size of a company is imperative to determine the level of voluntary disclosure. It is said that larger companies account the significant proportion of goods and services. Therefore, they come under the scrutiny of the government. By disclosing more voluntary information, larger companies are able to reduce agency cost than smaller companies and easily obtain the capital at lower cost (Botosan, 1997), larger company have adequate resources for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information at lower cost and the agency cost is higher in larger company because shareholders are widely scattered. Thus, by disclosing more voluntary information, firms are able to reduce agency cost. Hence, net fixed assets, net sales and market capitalization have been taken as proxies for the size of a company, and the first hypothesis can be framed as:

H₁: Size of a company has positive effect on HRDI.

Ownership Concentration

Ownership concentration means that majority of the shares of a company are acquired by few people. In widely held companies, the chances of conflicts between principals and agents are greater as compared to closely held companies. Widely held companies feel more pressure from various stakeholders to reduce the information asymmetry (Raffournier, 1995). So, they disclose more voluntary information in their annual reports. Closely held companies disclose less information because dominant investors commonly access the information when they require through private meetings. Literature gives blended outcomes in regard to the effect of benefit on disclosure. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found positive relationship between ownership concentration of a company and disclosure level. On the other hand, Hossian, Perera, and Rahman (1995) and Barako, Hancock, and Izan (2006) reported adverse results in their studies. Hence, proxy for ownership concentration is taken as promoter’s holding in equity shares of a company. The second hypothesis in this case can be framed as:

H₂: Ownership concentration of a company has positive effect on HRDI.

Leverage

Leverage means firm uses debt in their capital structure to acquire assets (Garg & Singh, 2017). Agency theory can likewise be utilized to explain the impact of leverage on voluntary disclosure of information by companies. At the same point, when firms acquire the outside debt, the agency cost arises. Agency cost creates conflicts between debt holder and equity shareholders (Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). It reduces the value of a firm and increases the monitoring cost of a firm. So, by disclosing more information, managers try to reallocate the wealth of debt holders and try to decrease the monitoring costs and increase the value of a firm (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). In this way, high leverage firms have a motivation to disclose more voluntary information for reducing their agency costs. Literature in this regard gives blended outcomes. Different studies found a positive relationship between leverage and voluntary disclosure index (Fernando & Ariovaldo, 2010; Hossain, Tan, & Adams, 1994). On the other hand, Oliveira, Rodrigues, and Craig (2006) and Ragini (2012) did not find any significant association between leverage and voluntary disclosure index of a company. The debt–equity ratio is taken as a proxy for leverage of a company. Hence, the third hypothesis can be framed in the light of above as:

H₃: Leverage of a company has negative effect on HRDI.

Company Age

For development and growth, age is considered as a proxy. There are number of reasons for disclosing the more voluntary information by the older companies like when the younger companies disclose more information in their annual reports then they suffer from competitive disadvantage, older companies bear less cost of collecting, analyzing and dissemination of information as compared to younger companies. Younger companies have no past tracks, so they have no motivation to disclose more voluntary information (Owusu, 1998). The present study takes as number of years of existence of a company as a proxy and the fourth hypothesis can be framed as:

H₄: Age of a company has positive effect on HRDI.

Type of Auditor

Auditing is a device which increases the reliability of disclosure by companies in their annual reports. The type of auditor employed by firms (Big 4 or not) affects the voluntary disclosure level of companies. Bigger audit firms disclose more voluntary information than the smaller firms. Bigger audit firms persuade the companies to disclose more voluntary information (DeAngelo, 1981; Hossian et al., 1995) as they need to increase their reputation (Oliveira et al., 2006). Other authors (Fernando & Ariovaldo, 2010; Giner, 1997; Oliveira et al., 2006; Raffournier, 1995; Wang, Sewon, & Claiborne, 2008) did not find any significant relationship between type of auditors and voluntary disclosure of information by companies. Thus, fifth hypothesis can be framed as:

H₅: Type of auditor has positive effect on HRDI.

Profitability

The agency theory recommends that managers of higher profitable companies are disclosing more voluntary information for supporting their position and legitimizing their remunerations (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Wallace, Nasser, & Mora, 1994). The less profitable companies also disclose more voluntary information to explain their bad performance and guarantee about their future development (Leventis & Weetman, 2004). Literature gives mixed outcomes in this regard. Different studies found that there is a positive relationship between profitability and voluntary disclosure level (Ashbaugh, Johnstone, & Warfield, 1999; Debreceny & Rahman, 2005). On the other hand, (Marston, 2003; Marston & Polei, 2004; Xiao, Yang, & Chow, 2004) few studies found that there is no significant relationship between profitability and voluntary disclosure level of companies. Profits after tax, EPS, return on total assets and return on equity have been taken as proxies for profitability of a firm. Hence, the sixth hypothesis is written as:

H₆: Profitability of a company has positive effect on HRDI.

Liquidity

Liquidity means the ability of a firm to meet their short-term obligations. There is no single measure to reflect all the aspects of liquidity. But, in this study current ratio and quick ratio have been chosen as proxies for liquidity. Firms with high liquidity disclose more voluntary information as compare to firms with low liquidity. But, low liquidity firms also disclose more voluntary information as to alleviate fears and inform various stakeholders regarding the internal problems of the companies (Wallace et al., 1994). Exact proof on the relationship between liquidity and disclosure level of company is puzzling. The study of Camfferman and Cooke (2002) proposed that liquidity of Dutch firms is significantly and positively related with the disclosure level of firms while the insignificant negative relationship has been found in the study with respect to UK firms. Conversely, the study of Wallace et al. (1994) exhibits a significant negative relationship between both the variables. The study of Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) also concluded that there is no significant relationship exists among liquidity and voluntary disclosure level. The present study takes quick ratio and current ratio as proxy for liquidity of a company and the seventh hypothesis can be outlined as:

H₇: Liquidity of a company has positive effect on HRDI.

Listing Abroad

Multinational companies disclose more information as compared to companies whose operations are restricted to domestic country only. The study of Gray, Kouhy, and Lavers (1995) and Webb et al. (2008) concluded that multinational companies disclose more information for reducing their cost of capital and investors uncertainty. The study of Meek and Gray (1989) found in their study that European multinational companies listed on London Stock Exchange voluntarily disclose information in addition to that required by London Stock Exchange. The present study chooses two groups: one is Europe and the other is America. Within Europe group, London and Luxemburg Stock Exchange are chosen. In America category, NYSE and NASDAQ are chosen (Kaur et al., 2016). These stock exchanges are chosen because of high quality and wider range of securities listed on these stock exchanges and most of the securities are of successful companies. The present study takes the cross-list dummy Europe and America as proxy for listing abroad and the eighth hypothesis is outlined as:

H₈: Listing Abroad of a company has positive effect on HRDI.

Industry Type

Industry type affects the voluntary disclosure level of companies. Literature shows a significant relationship between industry type and voluntary disclosure of information (Alam & Deb, 2010; Bozzolan et al., 2003; Cooke, 1989; Francis & Schipper, 1999; Kamath, 2008; Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Oliveira et al., 2006; Watson, Shrives, & Marston, 2002). Knowledge-oriented industries disclose more information as compared to manufacturing industries. Therefore, the present study examines the influence of industry type on voluntary disclosure of information by companies and outlined the ninth hypothesis as:

H₉: Disclosure of HR information differs with varied industry type.

Total Number of Pages of an Annual Report

The shareholders of an organization are enormous in number and generally dispersed all through the nation. It is not feasible for the shareholders to deal with day-to-day issues of the organizations. That is why, shareholders select the people who deal with the day-to-day affairs of the organizations. Thereby, results in separation of the management and ownership in the company. Shareholders and other interested parties need data about the daily affairs of the organizations and an annual report is the medium through which the data are imparted to them. Mandatory information is not sufficient to satisfy the various needs of stakeholders. The voluntary information disclosed by companies show the transparency of the accounts and also helps to gain the confidence of the stakeholders. Pages of an annual report show that to what extent information is disclosed by companies. As the number of pages of an annual report increases, the amount of information disclosed by companies will automatically increase. So, more pages of annual reports imply more information is disclosed by companies. The study takes pages of an annual report as proxy. Hence, the 10th hypothesis can be written as:

H₁₀: Total number of pages of an annual report of a company has positive effect on HRDI.

Type of Ownership

Public sector companies can easily gain trust of investors as compared to private sector companies. Henceforth, public sector companies do not need to disclose more information. While a trust issue is a big concern for private sector companies. Because for expansion, they require more of financial resources and investors in this regard would be a major resort. Thus, private sector companies try to gain trust by disclosing more information. In this view, the 11th hypothesis is framed as:

H₁₁: There exists significant difference between the HR disclosure practices for public and private sector companies.

The information regarding category of variables, independent as well as dependent variable (proxies) and their expected relationships (which have been extracted from intensive review of existing literature) can be summarized in Table 2.

Table 2.

Category of Variables, Independent Variables and their Proxies

Category of Variable	Independent Variable	Proxy	Expected Relationship
Structural	Company size	Net Fixed Assets (NFA) Net Sales (NS) Market Capitalization (MC)	+ + +
	Ownership concentration	Promoter’s Holding (PH)	+
	Leverage	Debt–Equity Ratio (DER)	–
	Company age	Maturity of the company since its incorporation year (Age)	+
	Type of auditor	Big4—1 Other—0 (TOA)	+
Performance	Profitability	Profit after Tax (PAT) Return on Total Assets (ROTA) Return on Equity (ROE) Earnings Per Share (EPS)	+ + + +
Performance	Liquidity	Quick Ratio (QR) Current Ratio (CR)	+ +
Market	Listing abroad	Listing Status of a Company (LS) Industry Type	+
Other	Total number of pages of an annual report	Pages of an Annual Report (PAR)	+
Other	Type of ownership	Public—1 Private—0

Source: Literature review.

Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the present study are:

to know the extent of the HR disclosure practices in selected Indian listed companies;

to examine the effect of company characteristics on HR disclosure practices in selected Indian listed companies;

to compare HRDI across selected industrial sectors; and

to compare HR disclosure practices of selected Indian listed companies of public and private sectors.

Research Methodology

The present research has taken all the companies listed on NSE-100 Index. A total of 63 companies have been selected for final analysis. All the companies that belongs to banking and financial sector as well as companies following accounting year, whose annual reports as well as the data are not available on PROWESS database have been excluded from the study. Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) PROWESS database has been used for extracting the data of independent variables. The time period for the current study ranges from financial year (FY) 2012–2013 to 2017–2018.

Human Resource Disclosure Index

To measure the level of voluntary disclosure, HRDI is constructed. It consists of 91 items and these 91 items are further divided into nine components. The content analysis of 63 companies has been undertaken to review the voluntary HR disclosure practices of Indian listed companies. The items have been extracted using annual reports of said financial years of 63 Indian listed companies. Afterwards, a score has been assigned to each item. There are two methods of scoring of an item weighted and unweighted index. In current study, unweighted index has been applied as most of the earlier studies have been advocated for unweighted index. In this approach, each item is considered as important and a score is assigned (Fontana & Macagnan, 2013; Giner, 1997; Hossain, 2008; Vazakidis, Stavropoulos, & Galani, 2013; Wallace et al., 1994). Score 1 is awarded to disclosure of an item and score 0 to non-disclosure of an item. After scoring of all the items, the scores of each company are added to locate the aggregate score of all the companies. The HRDI is dependent variable in the present study, to be analyzed with the selected independent variables. The data of dependent variable is collected from annual reports for the period of 2012–2013 to 2017–2018 financial years. The detail description of HRDI index is given in Annexure 1. The formula used to calculate HRDI is given below:

H R D I = \frac{T o t a l s c o r e o f i n d i v i d u a l c o m p a n y}{M ​ a x ​ i m u m p o s s i b l e s c o r e o b t a i n a b l e} \times 100 ​

Model Development

Multiple regression models are developed for testing the hypotheses and understanding the variations in HR disclosure level of sample companies.

β₀β₁₁β₂₂β₃₃β₄₄β₅₅β₆₆β₇₇β₈₈β₉₉β₁₀₁₀β₁₁₁₁β₁₂₁₂β₁₃₁₃β₁₄₁₄β₁₅₁₅

Here, HRDI is the Human Resource Disclosure Index. And other terms used in the equation are explained as:

NFA₁ = Net Fixed Assets

NS₂ = Net Sales

MC₃ = Market Capitalization

PH₄ = Promoters’ Holding

DER₅ = Debt -Equity Ratio

Age₆ = Age

TOA₇ = Type of Auditor

PAT₈ = Profit After Tax

ROTA₉ = Return on Total Assets

ROE₁₀ = Return on Equity

EPS₁₁ = Earnings Per Share

QR₁₂ = Quick Ratio

CR₁₃ = Current Ratio

LS₁₄ = Listing Status of a Company

PAR₁₅ = Pages of an Annual Report

Β₀ to β₁₅ = Coefficient of respective Independent Variables

€ = Error term

Initially, descriptive statistics have been carried out to know the status of HR disclosure practices of Indian listed companies. After that, correlation is applied for checking the relationship between dependent and independent variables. At last, regression has been carried out to examine the effect of company characteristics on HRDI of selected Indian listed companies. Autocorrelation, multicollinearity, normality of residuals and heteroscedasticity of the data have been tested before applying regression. The relationship between industry type and HR disclosure is studied by using one-way ANOVA. Afterwards, the Mann–Whitney U test has been employed to compare HRDI of public and private sector companies despite independent sample t-test. The reason for using the Mann–Whitney U test is that t-test is a parametric test and it is used when the assumption of normality and homogeneity of the data is fulfilled. In this data, both the assumptions are not fulfilled. Hence, the Mann–Whitney U test (non-parametric test) equivalent to t-test is used.

Data Analysis and Result Discussion

This section focusses on the data analysis and result discussion which is further presented through four parts. Part 1 aimed towards the attainment of first objective of the current study which is to know the extent of HR disclosure practices in selected Indian listed companies. This information is obtained by applying descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum). Part 2 is aimed to examine the effect of company characteristics on HRDI (objective 2). Pearson correlation has been carried out to investigate the relationship between the variables taken for the study. Afterwards, regression analysis has been employed to outline the effect of company characteristics on HRDI of selected Indian listed companies. Part 3 is focussed to compare the HR disclosure practices across selected industrial sectors (objective 3). The information has been obtained by applying one-way ANOVA. Finally, part 4 is dedicated towards the comparison of HRDI across public and private sector listed companies (objective 4). The Mann–Whitney U test will be applied for this. The results are described as:

Part 1: Extent of HR disclosure practices in selected Indian listed companies.

Table 3 provides the results of the descriptive statistics of dependent variable (HRDI) and independent variables (age of company, net fixed assets, net sales, market capitalization, profit after tax, EPS, return on total assets, return on equity, current ratio, quick ratio, debt–equity ratio, promoters’ holding, total number of pages of an annual report, listing status of a company and type of auditor). The mean value falls between 27 (minimum) and 68 (maximum). It shows the high level of consistency between the variables. The mean score of HRDI is 48.28 indicating that companies moderately disclose HR information in their annual reports. Standard deviation is 7.577. It explains the variations in HR disclosure score of companies.

Table 3.

Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Std. Dev.
HRDI (DV)	378	48.28	27	68	7.577
Age (IV)	378	43.91	6	111	23.670
Net fixed assets (IV)	378	16974.99	52	200964	30704.994
Net sales (IV)	378	38769.83	78	478456	72391.538
Market capitalization (IV)	378	73010.70	2700	559160	87137.458
Profit after tax (IV)	378	3558.28	–11906	33612	5454.363
EPS (IV)	378	31.47	–357	256	45.360
Return on total assets (IV)	378	10.05	–78	38	10.285
Return on equity (IV)	378	17.96	–143	117	22.596
Current ratio (IV)	378	1.78	0	13	1.594
Quick ratio (IV)	378	1.34	0	12	1.606
Debt–equity ratio (IV)	378	0.33	0	3	0.563
Promoters holding (IV)	378	54.90	0	86	18.223
Pages of an annual report (IV)	378	239.93	63	596	84.530
Listing status of a company (IV)	378	0.27	0	1	0.443
Type of auditor (IV)	378	0.34	0	1	0.476

Source: Annual reports of sample companies from FY 2012–2013 to 2017–2018.

Note: DV = Dependent variable and IV = independent variable; N = 63 × 6 = 378.

Parameters of variables: HRDI (%), age (year), net fixed assets (crore), net sales (crore), market capitalization (crore), profit after tax (crore), EPS (₹), return on total assets (%), return on equity (%), current ratio (times), quick ratio (times), debt–equity ratio (times), promoter’s holding (%), pages of an annual report (pages), listing status of a company (0,1) and type of auditor (0,1). The units and coding scores are mentioned in the parentheses.

Table 4 further indicates the companies disclose highest and lowest amount of HR information. A score of 300 or more is considered as cut off score for high disclosure companies while a score below 200 determines the companies with low disclosure of HR information. Table 4 depicts that a total of 10 companies have come out as high disclosure companies as their scores are more than 300. A total of 4 companies exhibited as low disclosure companies as their scores are below 200. Out of 10, high disclosure companies, few are explained as: Dabur India Ltd. discloses the maximum amount of HR information (331) followed by Wipro Ltd. (327), Reliance Industries Ltd. (322) and Vedanta Ltd. (313). The low amount of information is disclosed by Oracle Financial Services Software Ltd. (174). It means Oracle Financial Services Software Company is least active regarding disclosure of HR information in their annual reports. It is also noticed that no company scored 100 per cent in relations to HR score. The detailed explanation of Table 4 is provided in Annexure 2.

Table 4.

Company-wise HR Disclosure Score of Indian Listed Companies

S. No.	Company Name	Cumulative Total Score	S. No.	Company Name	Cumulative Total Score
1.	Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd.	246	33.	Larsen & Toubro Ltd.	301
2.	Ashok Leyland Ltd.	204	34.	Lupin Ltd.	246
3.	Asian Paints Ltd.	280	35.	Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.	287
4.	Aurobindo Pharma Ltd.	267	36.	Marico Ltd.	266
5.	Bajaj Auto Ltd.	212	37.	Maruti Suzuki India Ltd.	240
6.	BEL	252	38.	Motherson Sumi Systems Ltd.	253
7.	BHEL	266	39.	NHPC Ltd.	287
8.	BPCL	269	40.	NMDC	274
9.	Bharti Airtel Ltd.	288	41.	NTPC	295
10.	Bharti Infratel Ltd.	284	42.	ONGC	274
11.	Britannia Industries Ltd.	239	43.	OIL	233
12.	Cadila Healthcare Ltd.	247	44.	Oracle Financial Services Software Ltd.	174
13.	Cipla Ltd.	265	45.	Petronet LNG Ltd.	240
14.	Colgate-Palmolive (India) Ltd.	220	46.	Pidilite Industries Ltd.	188
15.	CONCOR	283	47.	Piramal Enterprises Ltd.	264
16.	Cummins India Ltd.	302	48.	PGCIL	230
17.	DLF Ltd.	222	49.	Reliance Industries Ltd.	322
18.	Dabur India Ltd.	331	50.	SAIL	244
19.	Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd.	237	51.	Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.	264
20.	Emami Ltd.	255	52.	Sun TV Network Ltd.	179
21.	GAIL	265	53.	Tata Consultancy Services Ltd.	293
22.	Godrej Consumer Products Ltd.	240	54.	Tata Motors Ltd.	307
23.	Havells India Ltd.	275	55.	Tata Steel Ltd.	273
24.	Hero Motocorp Ltd.	275	56.	Tech Mahindra Ltd.	279
25.	Hindalco Industries Ltd.	183	57.	Titan Company Ltd.	307
26.	HPCL	298	58.	UPL Ltd.	255
27.	Hindustan Unilever Ltd.	304	59.	Ultratech Cement Ltd.	269
28.	Hindustan Zinc Ltd.	269	60.	United Spirits Ltd.	295
29.	ITC Ltd.	286	61.	Vedanta Ltd.	313
30.	IOCL	301	62.	Wipro Ltd.	327
31.	Infosys Ltd.	270	63.	Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd.	255
32.	JSW Steel Ltd.	232

Source: Annual reports of sample companies from FY 2012–2013 to 2017–2018.

Table 5 shows that the selected Indian listed companies disclose maximum information for the components: information about HR policy and vision with highest disclosure score (3,590 (21.93%)) followed by financial information relating to HR (2990 (18.01%)), information about HR relationship and culture (2,744 (16.53%)) and information about HR development (2,503 (15.08%)). Whereas, the companies are least active to disclose information regarding: information relating to Importance of HR to the organization as the score is only 1.29 per cent followed by information about different benefits/assistance given to employees (2.6% disclosure).

In nutshell, it is concluded from part 1 that Dabur, Wipro, Reliance and Vedanta have come out as high disclosure companies and Oracle Financial Services Software has exhibited itself as least active in terms of HR disclosure. Further, the companies disclose maximum information regarding Information about HR policy and vision component, and Information about HR relationship and culture component, and least active in disclosing the information regarding Importance of HR to the organization component and information about different benefits/assistance given to employees component.

Part 2: The information about the effect of company characteristics on HRDI.

To check the relationship between variables, correlations have been calculated. Furthermore, the effect of company characteristics on HRDI has been tested through regression model.

Table 5.

Component-wise HR Disclosure Score and Percentage

S. No.	Component of HR Disclosure	Disclosure Score	Disclosure Percentage
1.	Information about HR policy and vision	3,590	21.63
2.	General information about HR	2,041	12.29
3.	Financial information relating to HR	2,990	18.01
4.	Information relating to importance of HR to the organization	214	1.29
5.	Information about HR development	2,503	15.08
6.	Information about employees’ health and safety	1,303	7.85
7.	Information about HR relationship and culture	2,744	16.53
8.	Information about different benefits/assistance given to employees	437	2.63
9.	Information about employee’s engagement and empowerment	779	4.69

Source: Annual reports of sample companies from F.Y. 2012–2013 to 2017–2018.

Table 6 provides the results of the correlation analysis between dependent variable (HRDI) and independent variables. Age (0.164, p ≥ 0.01), net fixed assets (0.228), net sales (0.273), market capitalization (0.394), profit after tax (0.310) and total number of pages of an annual report (0.503) are found positively correlated with HRDI. Earnings per share (0.117, p ≥ 0.05) is negatively correlated with HRDI. Listing status of a company (0.126, p ≥ 0.05) is showing a positive correlation with HRDI. The current ratio (0.189) and quick ratio (0.186) are found to be negatively correlated with HR disclosure of the companies at 1 per cent level. Debt–equity ratio (0.023) and promoter’s holding (0.096) are found as negatively correlated with HR disclosure of the companies. Type of auditor (0.044) is found as positively correlated with HR disclosure of the companies. At last, it is concluded that there exists high correlation among dependent and independent variables.

Before proceeding to the regression results, it is essential to check the problem of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is the situation where the relation between two or more than two independent variables is very high. This distorts the result of the multiple regressions. The variance inflation factor (VIF) value is an indicator for the problem of multicollinearity. Table 7 shows that the problem of multicollinearity does not exist as the VIF and tolerance values are found within limit. Further, it is evident from the Table 7 that current ratio and quick ratio are on border line. Henceforth, the benefit of doubt can be given to these variables. The problem of multicollinearity exists between independent variables if the VIF value is more than 10 and tolerance value is less than 0.10 (Field, 2013; Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2011).

To check whether the residuals are normally distributed or not, the Kolmogorov–Smirnov and Shapiro–Wilk test have been conducted. Normally, 5 per cent levels of significance is considered as reliable evidence for normality of the residuals. From Table 8, it is clear that residuals are normally distributed because the significance values are more than 5 per cent levels of significance in both the tests.

The Durbin–Watson test is used to study the autocorrelation between the residuals. From the Table 9, it is clear that, autocorrelation is absent between the residuals and also there is no heteroscedasticity between the residuals, as the value of the Durbin–Watson test is close to 1. The value of adjusted R² is 0.412. It means 41.2 per cent variations in HRDI are explained by 15 independent variables. The value of the F-statistics confirms that the model is significance (as F-value (16.891) is found significant at 0.000 per cent levels of significance).

Company Size

The size of a company is measured through net fixed assets, net sales and market capitalization. As per results, net fixed assets has negative effect on HRDI and this effect is significant (as the value (p = 0.001) is less than 5 per cent level of significance). It means that if net fixed assets increases HRDI decreases. Other two variables (net sales and market capitalization) have positive effect on HRDI and this effect is also significant (as the values 0.000 and 0.000, respectively, are less than 5% level of significance). The positive effect indicates that larger companies disclose more voluntary information as compare to small companies. The reason behind this outcome is that the larger firms are watched by the various stakeholders and also these firms have ability to bear the extra cost of disclosure. The result is consistent with the findings of Shehata, Dahawy, and Ismail (2014) who measured the company size with sales and with Kaur et al. (2016) who measured the company size with market capitalization. Hence, the hypothesis (H₁) is accepted in this regard as the size of a company has positive effect on HRDI.

Table 6.

Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables

Variable	HRDI	Age	NFA	NS	MC	PAT	EPS	ROTA	RONW	CR	QR	DER	PH	PAR	LS	TOA
HRDI	1
Age	0.164^**	1
NFA	0.228^**	–0.026	1
NS	0.273^**	0.139^**	0.585^**	1
MC	0.394^**	0.072	0.437^**	0.383^**	1
PAT	0.310^**	0.022	0.596^**	0.545^**	0.837^**	1
EPS	–0.117^*	–0.068	–0.032	0.126^*	0.242^**	0.275^**	1
ROTA	–0.059	0.093	–0.237^**	–0.116^*	0.256^**	0.172^**	0.327^**	1
ROE	–0.049	0.210^**	–0.144^**	–0.035	0.158^**	0.108^*	0.237^**	0.875^**	1
CR	–0.189^**	–0.061	–0.215^**	–0.133^**	0.086	0.113^*	0.104^*	0.331^**	0.109^*	1
QR	–0.186^**	–0.130^*	–0.244^**	–0.179^**	0.093	0.114^*	0.126^*	0.323^**	0.109^*	0.937^**	1
DER	–0.023	–0.062	0.341^**	0.209^**	–0.140^**	–0.107^*	–0.285^**	–0.438^**	–0.313^**	–0.265^**	–0.308^**	1
PH	–0.096	–0.346^**	0.038	–0.052	–0.164^**	–0.058	–0.112^*	–0.025	–0.020	0.067	0.130^*	0.076	1
PAR	0.503^**	0.179^**	0.423^**	0.233^**	0.339^**	0.337^**	–0.036	–0.090	–0.083	–0.162^**	–0.184^**	0.094	–0.191^**	1
LS	0.126^*	0.318^**	0.122^*	0.095	0.209^**	0.127^*	–0.001	–0.183^**	–0.191^**	–0.092	–0.113^*	0.020	–0.550^**	0.172^**	1
TOA	0.044	0.141^**	–0.056	–0.036	0.129^*	0.029	0.093	0.034	–0.005	–0.018	–0.031	–0.096	–0.281^**	–0.007	0.104^*	1

Source: Annual reports of sample companies from F.Y. 2012–2013 to 2017–2018.

Note: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) and ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).

Table 7.

Multicollinearity Test

Independent Variable	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	—	—
Age	0.666	1.502
Net fixed assets	0.347	2.879
Net sales	0.518	1.931
Market capitalization	0.247	4.056
Profit after tax	0.179	5.573
EPS	0.758	1.320
Return on total assets	0.132	7.578
Return on equity	0.162	6.192
Current ratio	0.106	9.419
Quick ratio	0.104	9.657
Debt to equity ratio	0.640	1.562
Promoters holding	0.562	1.779
Pages of an annual report	0.706	1.417
Listing status of a company	0.577	1.734
Type of auditor	0.867	1.153

Source: Annual reports of sample companies from FY 2012–2013 to 2017–2018.

Note: VIF—Variance inflation factor.

Table 8.

Tests for Normality of Residuals

Models	Kolmogorov–Smirnov			Shapiro–Wilk
Models	Statistics	df	Sig.	Statistics	df	Sig.
Standardized residual	0.033	378	0.200	0.995	378	0.200
Studentized residual	0.032	378	0.200	0.995	378	0.232

Source: Annual reports of sample companies from FY 2012–2013 to 2017–2018.

Ownership Concentration

Ownership concentration is measured through promoter’s holding in equity share capital of a company. It is clear from Table 9 that promoter’s holding has positive effect on HRDI but this effect is not significant (as p-value (0.211) is more than 5% level of significance). Hence, the hypothesis (H₂) is rejected in this regard as ownership concentration has a positive effect on HRDI. The result is consistent with the findings of Kaur et al. (2016). The positive effect indicates that HR disclosure will increase with increased concentration in ownership. Because, the chances of conflicts between principals and agents are greater as compared to that of the companies with less concentrated ownership. These companies feel more pressure from various stakeholders to reduce the information asymmetry (Raffournier, 1995). So, they disclose more voluntary information in their annual reports. Leverage: Leverage is measured through debt–equity ratio of a company. Analysis clearly indicates that debt–equity ratio has negative effect on HRDI and this effect is significant (as p-value (0.023) is less than 5% level of significance). Hence, the hypothesis (H₃) is accepted in this regard. The result is contradicted with the study of Shehata et al. (2014) and Kaur et al. (2016). It is evident from the study conducted by Agyei-Mensah (2012) leverage is significantly and positively related with HR disclosure. According to agency theory too, firms disclose more voluntary information for reducing the conflict between debt holders and equity shareholders, try to increase the value of a firm and reallocate the wealth of the debt holders.

Company Age

Age of a company is measured through maturity of the company since its incorporation year. Table 9 shows that age of a company has positive effect on HRDI but this effect is not significant (as p-value (0.482) is more than 5% level of significance). Hypothesis (H₄) is rejected in this regard as age of a company has positive effect on HRDI. The results are consistent with the findings of Garg (1992), Alsaeed (2006), Kaur et al. (2016) and Garg and Kumar (2018). There is list of reasons for this positive effect but the effect is not statistically proven such as when the younger companies disclose more information in their annual reports then they suffer from competitive disadvantage, older companies bear less cost of collecting, analyzing and disseminating information as compare to younger companies. Also, younger companies have no past tracks, so they have no motivation to disclose more voluntary information (Owusu, 1998).

Type of Auditor

Type of auditor is measured through whether the company is audited by Big 4 or not. Analysis depicts that type of auditor has positive effect on HRDI but this effect is not significant (as p-value (0.747) is more than 5% level of significance). The hypothesis (H₅) is rejected as the effect is not statistically proven. The result is consistent with the findings of Alsaeed (2006), Jindal and Kumar (2012) and Kaur et al., (2016). The reason behind this outcome may be that the job of auditor is restricted to the limits of obligatory data. Generally, an auditor does not compel the clients to disclose the information in excess of accounting standards. But, the result contradicts the study concluded by Shehata et al. (2014). The conclusion of the study was that the companies audited by Big 4 disclose more voluntary information than the companies audited by local firms.

Table 9.

Results of OLS Regression Model

Independent Variable
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	β	Std. Error	β	t	Sig.
(Constant)	38.628	2.096	—	18.429	0.000
Age	0.011	0.016	0.035	0.704	0.482
Net fixed assets	–0.000	0.000	–0.220	–3.215	0.001
Net sales	0.000	0.000	0.214	3.824	0.000
Market capitalization	0.000	0.000	0.408	5.027	0.000
Profit after tax	0.000	0.000	–0.081	–0.847	0.398
EPS	–0.033	0.008	–0.196	–4.243	0.000
Return on total assets	–0.034	0.082	–0.047	–0.421	0.674
Return on equity	–0.012	0.034	–0.035	–0.347	0.729
Current ratio	–0.760	0.588	–0.160	–1.292	0.197
Quick ratio	–0.007	0.591	–0.001	–0.011	0.991
Debt–equity ratio	–1.546	0.679	–0.115	–2.278	0.023
Promoters holding	0.028	0.022	0.067	1.253	0.211
Pages of an annual report	0.037	0.004	0.416	8.660	0.000
Listing status of a company	–0.297	0.908	–0.017	–0.327	0.744
Type of auditor	0.223	0.690	0.014	0.323	0.747
Dependent Variable: HRDI
Explanation of the Model			Significance of the Model
R ²	0.642		F	16.891
Adjusted R²	0.412		Sig.	0.000
Durbin–Watson = 0.720

Source: Annual reports of sample companies from FY 2012–2013 to 2017–2018.

Profitability

Profitability of a firm is measured through profit after tax, EPS, return on total assets and return on equity. It is evident from Table 9 that EPS has negative effect on HRDI and this effect is significant also (as p-value (0.000) is less than 5% level of significance). Profit after tax has positive effect on HRDI but this effect is not significant (as p-value (0.398) is more than 5% level of significance). Other two proxies (return on total assets and return on equity) have negative effect on HRDI but this effect is not significant (as p-values (0.674 and 0.729 respectively) are less than 5% level of significance). The results are found in line with the results concluded by Kaur et al. (2016), who measured the profitability of firm with profit after tax. Thus, hypothesis (H₆) is partly accepted.

Liquidity

Liquidity position of a company is measured through quick ratio and current ratio. It is stated in Table 9 that both ratios have negative effect on HRDI but the effect is not significant (as p-values are (0.991 and 0.197 respectively) more than 5% level of significance). Thus, the hypothesis (H₇) is rejected in this regard as liquidity has positive effect on HRDI. The result is in line with the study of Verma and Kirti (2019) who measured the liquidity position of a company with current ratio. The result is contracted with (Shehata et al., 2014) who measured the liquidity position of a company with current ratio.

Listing Abroad

Listing abroad defines the listing status of a company. Table 9 depicts that listing abroad has negative effect on HRDI but this effect is not significant (as p-value is (0.744) more than 5% level of significance). The negative effect shows that companies listed on international stock exchanges disclosed lesser amount of HR information as compared to those which are listed on domestic stock exchanges. The hypothesis (H₀₈) is rejected in this regard as listing abroad has positive effect on HRDI. The result is contradicted with the study of Kaur et al. (2016).

Total Number of Pages of an Annual Report

It is evident from the analysis that total number of pages of an annual report has positive effect on HRDI and this effect is significant also (as p-value is (0.000) less than 5% level of significance). The voluntary information disclosed by companies show the transparency of the accounts and also gain the confidence of stakeholders of a company. Pages of an annual report shows that to what extent information is disclosed by the companies. As the number of pages of annual report increases, the amount of information disclosed by companies will automatically increase. So, more pages of annual reports imply more information is disclosed by the companies. The hypothesis (H₁₀) is accepted in this regard as number of pages of an annual report has positive effect on HRDI. The result is in line with the study of Verma and Kirti (2019).

In nutshell, it can be concluded that net sales, market capitalization and pages of an annual report have positive effect on HRDI and also this relationship is significantly proven. Net fixed assets, EPS and debt–equity ratio have negative effect on HRDI and this relationship is also proven significant. Conversely, remaining variables (age, profit after tax, return on total assets, return on equity, current ratio, quick ratio, promoter’s holding, listing status of a company and type of auditor) do not exhibit any effect on HRDI. If companies do not disclose the information of their key resource (HR) then the companies are not able to receive the benefits which are available in lieu of disclosing HR information. Benefits may be in terms of managing the employees in an organization, proper use of HR, attracting foreign capital and maintaining the confidence of the stakeholders.

Part 3: HR disclosure practices across type of industrial sectors.

Industry-wise distribution of companies and the voluntary disclosure index for HR are reported in Table 10. The maximum number of companies belong to automotive sector (11) and minimum representation is from cement/construction, manufacturing, miscellaneous, retail/real estate, services, technology and tobacco (1 each).

Table 10 further shows the descriptive statistics of voluntary disclosure level across industries. The miscellaneous sector has mean score of 56.17 which is highest in all the sectors followed by technology sector (53.67), telecom sector (52.42) and tobacco sector (52.33).

Table 10.

Industry-wise Voluntary HR Disclosure Index

S. No.	Industry Name	N	Percentage	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Std. Dev.	CV
1.	Automotive	11	17.5	47.09	27	64	8.980	0.19
2.	Cement/construction	1	1.6	49.17	42	55	4.875	0.10
3.	Chemicals	3	4.8	44.11	30	60	8.373	0.19
4.	Cons non-durable	6	9.5	49.39	33	68	8.493	0.17
5.	Engineering	5	7.9	50.97	40	59	4.958	0.10
6.	Food and beverage	2	3.2	48.92	42	59	6.097	0.12
7.	Manufacturing	1	1.6	46.00	43	48	1.897	0.04
8.	Media	2	3.2	39.67	29	48	7.536	0.19
9.	Metals and mining	7	11.1	46.83	27	62	7.948	0.17
10.	Oil and Gas	8	12.7	50.44	37	64	6.882	0.14
11.	Pharmaceuticals	7	11.1	46.83	34	64	5.583	0.12
12.	Retail/real estate	1	1.6	40.67	33	44	4.590	0.11
13.	Services	1	1.6	51.83	44	58	6.242	0.12
14.	Technology	1	1.6	53.67	48	59	3.777	0.07
15.	Telecom	2	3.2	52.42	48	58	3.204	0.06
16.	Tobacco	1	1.6	52.33	45	56	4.676	0.09
17.	Utilities	3	4.8	49.61	40	58	6.409	0.13
18.	Miscellaneous	1	1.6	56.17	48	62	4.750	0.08

Source: Annual reports of sample companies from FY 2012–2013 to 2017–2018.

Note: CV—Coefficient of variation. N—number of selected sample companies.

Automotive sector has highest standard deviation (8.980) and lowest in case of manufacturing sector (1.897). Minimum score of mean (27) has been shown by two sectors automotive and metals and mining. Cons non-durable sector has reported maximum score of mean (68). The values of coefficient of variation (CV) show the existence of variations in voluntary disclosure scores across industries. Table 11 depicts the results of One-way ANOVA for HRDI across Industrial Sectors.

Table 11.

One-way ANOVA for HRDI Across Industrial Sectors

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between groups	3303.875	17	194.346	3.815	0.000
Within groups	18339.511	360	50.943	–	–
Total	21643.386	377	–	–	–

Source: Annual reports of sample companies from FY 2012–2013 to 2017–2018.

To test the association between voluntary disclosure level and industry type of companies, one-way ANOVA is used. The result shows that there is significant association exist between voluntary disclosure level and industry type of companies (as the F-value (3.815) is found significant at 0.01 level). Hence, the hypothesis (H₉) is accepted that the disclosure of information varies with varied industry type. The result is consistent with the findings of Garg and Verma (2010).

Part 4: The comparison of HRDI across public and private sector selected Indian listed companies.

The Mann–Whitney U test is used to compare the level of HRDI across public and private sector companies. The result shows that public as well as private sector companies do not affect the level of HRDI as the value of Z (0.0866 at 0.387 significance level) is more than accepted range (0.05%) of significant level. Thus, hypothesis (H₁₁) is rejected as there exists significant difference between the HR disclosure practices for public and private sector companies.

Table 13 shows that the mean value for private sector is high in case of information about HR policy and vision (9.66) followed by general information about HR (5.54), information about HR development (6.80), information about HR relationship and culture (7.30), and information about employee’s engagement and empowerment (2.35) as compare to public sector. The mean value for public sector is high in case of financial information relating to HR (8.02) followed by information relating to importance of HR to the organization (0.97), information about employees’ health and safety (3.64) and information about different benefits/assistance given to employees (1.54). The minimum value is high for public sector with regard to financial information relating to HR (5), for private sector the maximum value is high in case of information about HR development (3) and, information about HR relationship and culture (4), and all other sections have same minimum values in both the sectors. The maximum value is equal for both the sectors with regard to information about HR policy and vision (12), financial information relating to HR (11), information about HR relationship and culture (10), information about different benefits/assistance given to employees (4) and information about employee’s engagement and empowerment (4). Table 14 summarizes the results of the hypotheses framed for the current study. Table 12 depicts the results of Mann–Whitney U Test for HRDI across public and private sector listed companies.

Table 12.

Mann–Whitney U Test for HRDI Across Public and Private Sector Listed Companies

Model	Sector		Mann–Whitney U Test	Test Statistics
Model	Public	Private	Mann–Whitney U Test	Z	Sig. (2-tailed)
HRDI	182.87 (24,138.50)	193.06 (47,492.50)	15,360.50	-0.866	0.387

Source: Annual reports of sample companies from FY 2012–2013 to 2017–2018.

Note: Sum of ranks presented in parentheses.

Table 13.

Descriptive Statistics of Components of HR Disclosure

		Sector
Components of HR Disclosure	Statistic	Public	Private
Information about HR policy and vision	Mean	9.19	9.66




	Median	9.00	10.00
	Variance	2.231	1.914
	Std. deviation	1.494	1.384
	Minimum	5	5
	Maximum	12	12
	Range	7	7
	Interquartile range	1	2
	Skewness	–0.888	–0.635
	Kurtosis	0.544	0.545
General information about HR	Mean	5.14	5.54
	Median	5.00	5.50
	Variance	2.033	2.658
	Std. deviation	1.426	1.630
	Minimum	2	2
	Maximum	8	9
	Range	6	7
	Interquartile range	2	2
	Skewness	–0.097	–0.034
	Kurtosis	–0.252	–0.449
Financial information relating to HR	Mean	8.02	7.85
	Median	8.00	8.00
	Variance	1.671	2.577
	Std. deviation	1.293	1.605
	Minimum	5	2
	Maximum	11	11
	Range	6	9
	Interquartile range	2	2
	Skewness	0.280	–0.290
	Kurtosis	0.109	0.328
Information relating to importance of HR to the organization	Mean	0.97	0.35
	Median	1.00	0.00
	Variance	3.907	0.228
	Std. deviation	1.977	0.478
	Minimum	0	0
	Maximum	10	1
	Range	10	1
	Interquartile range	1	1
	Skewness	3.776	0.635
	Kurtosis	14.343	–1.610
Information about HR development	Mean	6.28	6.80
	Median	6.00	7.00
	Variance	2.478	1.692
	Std. deviation	1.574	1.301
	Minimum	2	3
	Maximum	9	10
	Range	7	7
	Interquartile range	3	2
	Skewness	–0.189	–0.418
	Kurtosis	–0.322	–0.323
Information about employees’ health and safety	Mean	3.64	3.34
	Median	4.00	3.00
	Variance	1.254	1.311
	Std. deviation	1.120	1.145
	Minimum	1	1
	Maximum	5	6
	Range	4	5
	Interquartile range	2	1
	Skewness	–0.450	0.321
	Kurtosis	–0.581	0.081
Information about HR relationship and culture	Mean	7.19	7.30
	Median	7.00	7.00
	Variance	2.078	1.916
	Std. deviation	1.442	1.384
	Minimum	3	4
	Maximum	10	10
	Range	7	6
	Interquartile range	2	2
	Skewness	–0.524	0.228
	Kurtosis	0.237	–0.376
Information about different benefits/assistance given to employees	Mean	1.54	0.95
	Median	2.00	1.00
	Variance	1.273	0.781
	Std. deviation	1.128	0.884
	Minimum	0	0
	Maximum	4	4
	Range	4	4
	Interquartile range	1	1
	Skewness	0.115	0.668
	Kurtosis	–0.810	–0.110
Information about employee’s engagement and empowerment	Mean	1.52	2.35
Information about employee’s engagement and empowerment	Median	1.00	2.00
	Variance	0.923	1.193
	Std. deviation	0.961	1.092
	Minimum	0	0
	Maximum	4	4
	Range	4	4
	Interquartile range	1	1
	Skewness	0.428	–0.322
	Kurtosis	–0.061	–0.414
HRDI	Mean	47.79	48.54
	Median	48.00	49.00
	Variance	56.092	58.152
	Std. deviation	7.489	7.626
	Minimum	27	27
	Maximum	63	68
	Range	36	41
	Interquartile range	9	10
	Skewness	–0.398	–0.245
	Kurtosis	0.086	–0.034

Source: Annual reports of sample companies from FY 2012–2013 to 2017–2018.

Table 14.

Results of Hypotheses

Hypotheses	Expected Relationship	Results
H₁: Company size→HRDI	+	Accepted
H₂: Ownership concentration→HRDI	+	Rejected
H₃: Leverage→HRDI	–	Accepted
H₄: Company age→HRDI	+	Rejected
H₅: Type of auditor→HRDI	+	Rejected
H₆: Profitability→HRDI	+	Partly accepted
H₇: Liquidity→HRDI	+	Rejected
H₈: Listing abroad→HRDI	+	Rejected
H₉: Disclosure of HR information differs with varied industry type		Accepted
H₁₀: Total number of pages of an annual report→HRDI	+	Accepted
H₁₁: There exists significant difference between the HR disclosure practices for public and private sector companies		Rejected

Source: Annual reports of sample companies from FY 2012–2013 to 2017–2018.

Managerial Implications

In a decade ago, various scandals have been reported in the corporate world. So, to improve the trust of stakeholders in accounting, there is a need of better disclosure practice. Regulatory bodies are also aware regarding this fact and importance of issuing the guidelines related to the disclosure. However, more work is still required related to HR disclosure. In context to this, present study has been conducted with a view to study the extent of disclosed information about their HR in books of account. This study provides the valuable information and contributes in existing literature. The HR disclosure index created in this study would be utilized by the companies as a benchmark to enhance their HR disclosure in future. It is also recommended that The Accounting Institute of India and other administrative bodies should also set proper rules or guidelines for better disclosure of HR information. They should come up with HR disclosure sheet for better disclosing the HR information.

Conclusion

The current study has come up with the conclusion that the companies disclose HR related information at moderate level. Further, it is extracted from the analysis that net sales, market capitalization and pages of an annual report have positive effect on HRDI. Whereas, net fixed assets, EPS and debt–equity ratio have negative effect on HRDI. Age of a company, profit after tax, return on total assets, return on equity, current ratio, quick ratio, promoter’s holding, listing status of a company and type of auditor do not exhibit any effect on HRDI. HRDI has been reported differently by different industries while public and private sector companies do not differ in case of HR disclosure practices.

Miscellaneous sector along with technological, telecom and tobacco come out as sectors with most HR disclosure. While, media and retail/real Estate come out as least HR information disclosed sector. The voluntary disclosure of information by companies is reported low as companies pay little attention on voluntary disclosure of information (Jindal & Kumar, 2012; Kansal & Joshi, 2015; Kaur et al., 2016; Paki & Azar, 2015). The other reasons for low disclosure of information may be, lack of time and resources, no clear guidelines for reporting of HR information as well as lack of support from senior management as concluded by Foong, Yorston, and Gratton (2003). Also, there is uncertainty regarding the type of HR information which is to be reported (Verma & Dewe, 2008).

If the companies do not disclose the information of their key resource, that is, HR, then the companies are unable to enjoy the benefits which are being offered in lieu of disclosure. Hence, the need of more comprehensive work in this regard is needed which offers ample opportunities to practitioners as well as academicians to dig out more on HR disclosure practices. The companies have to pay more attention to uplift the image as well as worth of the company.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Appendix

Annexure 2.

Component and Year-wise HR Disclosure Score of Indian Listed Companies

Company Name	Information about Human Resource Policy and Vision						General Information about Human Resource						Financial Information relating to Human Resource						Information relating to Importance of Human Resource to the Organization						Information about Human Resource Development						Information about Employees’ Health and Safety						Information about Human Resource Relationship & Culture						Information about Different Benefits/Assistance given to Employees						Information about Employee’s Engagement and Empowerment
Company Name	2012–13	2013–14	2014–15	2015–16	2016–17	2017–18	2012–13	2013–14	2014–15	2015–16	2016–17	2017–18	2012–13	2013–14	2014–15	2015–16	2016–17	2017–18	2012–13	2013–14	2014–15	2015–16	2016–17	2017–18	2012–13	2013–14	2014–15	2015–16	2016–17	2017–18	2012–13	2013–14	2014–15	2015–16	2016–17	2017–18	2012–13	2013–14	2014–15	2015–16	2016–17	2017–18	2012–13	2013–14	2014–15	2015–16	2016–17	2017–18	2012–13	2013–14	2014–15	2015–16	2016–17	2017–18
Adani Ports & Special Economic Zone Ltd.	9	9	10	10	11	11	4	4	4	5	5	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	7	7	7	7	2	3	3	3	3	3	8	8	8	8	8	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	4
Ashok Leyland Ltd.	6	7	8	8	9	11	2	3	3	3	7	7	8	9	9	9	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	4	4	4	5	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	4	4	4	5	8	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	1	1	1	2	2
Asian Paints Ltd.	9	9	9	10	10	11	5	5	6	6	6	6	10	10	10	11	11	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	6	6	6	8	9	2	2	2	2	4	6	7	8	8	8	9	10	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	1
Aurobindo Pharma Ltd.	9	9	10	11	11	11	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7	8	8	8	8	2	3	3	3	3	3	8	8	8	8	8	9	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	3	3	3	3	3
Bajaj Auto Ltd.	7	7	8	8	9	9	3	3	3	3	3	4	7	8	8	8	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	4	4	5	3	3	3	3	3	5	7	7	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	1
BEL	9	9	10	10	10	10	5	6	7	7	5	5	7	7	8	8	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	6	6	6	7	2	3	3	3	3	3	7	7	7	7	7	6	2	2	2	2	2	3	1	1	1	1	1	0
BHEL	9	9	9	10	10	10	5	5	5	5	5	5	7	7	7	7	8	8	1	1	1	1	0	0	8	8	8	8	8	8	3	3	4	4	4	4	8	8	8	8	8	8	1	1	1	1	2	2	0	1	1	1	1	1
BPCL	8	8	9	9	10	10	2	2	2	2	4	4	7	8	8	8	9	9	2	2	2	2	1	1	5	5	5	6	8	8	5	5	5	5	5	5	8	8	8	8	8	9	0	0	0	0	1	1	4	4	4	4	3	3
Bharti Airtel Ltd.	10	10	11	11	11	11	5	6	6	6	7	8	6	6	7	7	8	10	1	1	1	1	1	0	7	7	7	8	8	8	3	3	3	3	3	3	6	6	6	6	7	8	2	2	2	2	2	1	4	4	4	4	4	4
Bharti Infratel Ltd.	11	11	11	11	11	11	8	8	8	8	8	9	4	5	6	6	7	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	8	8	8	8	3	3	3	3	3	2	7	8	8	8	8	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	3
Britannia Industries Ltd.	10	10	11	11	10	9	3	3	3	3	3	3	7	8	8	8	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	5	5	6	6	3	3	3	3	4	4	7	7	7	7	6	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	3
Cadila Healthcare Ltd.	8	8	9	9	9	10	5	6	6	6	6	4	7	7	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	6	6	6	7	3	3	3	4	4	5	7	7	7	7	7	6	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	3
Cipla Ltd.	8	9	10	10	10	11	3	4	5	5	7	9	6	7	8	8	9	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	7	7	8	8	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	6	7	7	8	9	0	0	0	0	2	3	2	2	2	2	4	4
Colgate-Palmolive (India) Ltd.	6	7	9	10	10	10	3	4	4	4	4	4	7	7	8	8	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	5	6	6	7	2	2	3	3	3	3	7	7	7	7	7	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
CONCOR	8	8	9	10	10	9	6	6	7	8	8	8	7	7	8	8	10	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7	8	9	9	9	2	3	3	3	3	3	7	7	8	9	9	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	3
Cummins India Ltd.	8	9	11	11	11	11	6	7	7	8	7	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	6	7	7	8	5	5	5	5	4	4	10	10	10	10	10	10	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	3	3	3	1
D L F Ltd.	8	10	11	11	11	11	2	2	3	3	3	3	4	5	6	6	6	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	4	5	5	5	5	2	3	3	3	3	3	5	5	6	6	7	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3
Dabur India Ltd.	9	11	12	12	12	12	5	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	8	8	9	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	8	8	9	9	10	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	8	9	10	10	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	4	4	4	4
Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories Ltd.	9	9	10	11	11	12	5	5	5	6	6	7	5	6	8	8	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	5	6	6	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	6	7	7	7	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	4	4
Emami Ltd.	7	8	9	10	10	11	4	4	5	5	5	6	5	5	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	7	7	7	7	7	3	3	4	4	4	4	7	6	7	8	9	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3
GAIL	9	9	9	10	10	10	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	7	7	8	8	1	1	1	2	2	1	5	5	6	6	7	8	4	4	4	4	4	4	7	8	8	9	8	9	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2
Godrej Consumer Products Ltd.	8	9	10	10	11	11	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	7	7	7	7	8	1	2	2	2	2	3	5	5	5	5	5	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	3	4	4
Havells India Ltd.	9	9	10	10	11	12	4	5	5	5	5	5	8	9	9	9	9	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	6	6	7	7	7	3	3	3	3	3	4	6	7	8	8	8	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	3	3	3	3
Hero Motocorp Ltd.	8	9	10	10	11	11	5	5	5	5	5	6	7	9	9	9	9	10	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	8	8	8	8	8	3	3	3	3	3	3	7	7	7	7	7	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
Hindalco Industries Ltd.	7	7	8	9	9	9	4	4	5	5	5	5	2	4	4	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	5	5	5	5	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	5	5	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
HPCL	5	6	7	8	9	10	5	5	6	6	7	7	5	6	6	8	8	8	8	9	10	10	10	10	6	6	6	6	9	9	3	4	4	4	4	4	6	6	7	7	8	8	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	1
Hindustan Unilever Ltd.	9	9	11	11	11	11	5	6	7	7	7	7	9	9	10	11	11	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	7	8	8	8	9	2	3	3	3	4	4	8	9	9	9	9	9	2	2	2	2	2	3	1	2	2	2	2	2
Hindustan Zinc Ltd.	9	9	10	11	11	12	5	5	6	6	6	7	6	7	8	9	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	7	7	7	7	3	3	3	4	4	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
I T C Ltd.	9	9	10	10	10	10	4	5	5	5	6	6	8	8	8	9	9	9	0	0	1	1	1	1	6	7	8	8	8	8	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	6	6	6	6	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	3
IOCL	7	7	8	9	10	10	5	6	7	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	9	9	1	1	2	2	2	2	7	8	9	9	9	9	3	4	4	4	4	4	6	6	7	7	8	8	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	2	2
Infosys Ltd.	9	9	10	11	11	11	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	8	8	8	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	7	7	7	7	7	2	2	2	3	3	3	7	8	9	9	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	3
J S W Steel Ltd.	8	9	10	10	11	11	4	4	4	4	4	5	7	7	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	7	7	7	7	7	2	2	3	3	3	4	6	6	6	6	6	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Larsen & Toubro Ltd.	9	9	10	10	11	11	4	4	4	4	4	5	8	9	9	9	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	8	8	9	9	4	5	5	5	5	5	10	10	10	10	10	10	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3
Lupin Ltd.	8	9	10	10	11	11	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	8	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	5	5	5	5	6	2	2	2	2	2	3	7	7	7	8	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.	9	9	9	10	11	11	6	6	7	7	7	7	9	10	10	10	10	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	7	7	7	7	4	4	4	4	4	4	6	7	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	4	4	4
Marico Ltd.	9	9	10	11	11	12	4	5	5	5	5	5	7	7	8	8	8	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	7	8	8	8	8	2	2	2	2	2	2	6	7	7	7	7	7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Maruti Suzuki India Ltd.	5	5	5	6	7	8	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	7	8	8	8	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	2
Motherson Sumi Systems Ltd.	8	8	9	9	10	10	4	5	5	5	5	6	8	8	9	9	9	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	6	6	6	6	6	4	4	4	4	4	4	6	6	6	7	7	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2
NHPC Ltd.	10	10	11	12	11	11	5	6	6	6	7	7	9	9	10	10	11	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7	8	9	8	8	3	3	3	3	3	3	6	6	7	7	8	8	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
NMDC	9	9	10	11	11	11	5	5	6	6	6	5	7	8	8	8	8	8	1	1	1	1	0	0	6	6	7	7	7	7	4	5	5	5	4	4	7	7	7	7	7	7	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2
NTPC	9	9	10	11	11	11	5	6	6	6	6	5	9	9	10	10	10	11	0	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	6	7	7	7	3	4	4	4	4	4	7	7	8	8	8	8	3	4	4	4	4	4	1	1	1	1	1	2
ONGC	9	10	10	11	11	11	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	7	7	7	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	6	6	6	6	4	5	5	5	5	5	7	8	8	8	8	8	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	2	2
OIL	8	9	9	10	9	9	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	7	7	7	8	8	1	1	1	1	0	0	6	6	6	7	7	7	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oracle Financial Services Software Ltd.	7	7	7	8	9	9	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	4	4	4	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	3
Petronet L N G Ltd.	9	9	10	10	10	11	4	4	4	5	5	5	7	7	8	8	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	6	6	6	6	6	2	2	3	3	3	3	8	8	8	8	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2
Pidilite Industries Ltd.	5	5	5	6	7	8	2	3	3	3	3	3	7	7	8	8	8	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	7	7	7	7	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	5	5	5	5	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Piramal Enterprises Ltd.	7	8	8	9	10	10	5	5	5	6	6	7	6	6	7	7	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	7	7	7	7	7	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3
PGCIL	9	10	10	11	10	9	2	3	3	3	4	5	9	9	9	10	9	8	1	1	1	1	0	0	4	5	5	5	5	5	3	3	3	3	2	2	5	5	5	6	6	6	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Reliance Industries Ltd.	8	9	10	10	11	11	7	7	8	8	8	9	7	8	8	8	8	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	7	8	8	8	8	6	6	6	6	6	6	9	9	10	10	10	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	4	4	4	4
SAIL	7	7	8	9	10	10	4	4	5	5	4	4	7	8	8	8	8	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	5	5	5	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	4	6	6	6	7	8	8	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sun Pharmaceutical Inds. Ltd.	6	7	8	8	8	9	5	5	6	6	6	6	8	8	9	9	9	9	0	1	1	1	1	1	6	6	6	7	7	7	2	3	3	3	3	3	7	7	8	8	8	8	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
Sun T V Network Ltd.	7	8	9	9	9	10	2	2	2	2	3	3	4	4	5	5	5	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	5	5	5	5	5	1	1	1	1	2	2	7	7	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tata Consultancy Services Ltd.	9	9	9	10	10	11	7	7	8	8	8	9	6	7	8	8	8	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7	8	8	8	8	4	4	4	4	4	4	7	8	8	8	8	8	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	3	3	3	3	3
Tata Motors Ltd.	8	9	10	10	11	11	6	6	7	7	7	8	9	10	10	10	10	10	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	8	9	9	9	9	4	4	4	4	4	4	8	9	9	9	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	3
Tata Steel Ltd.	8	8	9	9	10	10	5	6	6	6	6	7	10	10	10	10	10	10	0	0	1	1	1	1	7	8	8	8	8	8	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tech Mahindra Ltd.	9	9	10	10	11	12	6	7	7	7	7	7	10	10	11	11	11	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	8	8	8	8	8	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	6	6	6	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	3
Titan Company Ltd.	8	8	9	10	10	11	6	6	7	7	7	8	10	11	11	11	11	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	6	6	6	6	4	4	4	4	4	4	7	9	9	9	9	10	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	4	4	4	4	4
U P L Ltd.	8	9	10	10	11	11	4	5	5	5	5	6	7	7	8	8	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7	7	7	7	8	2	2	3	3	3	3	7	8	8	8	8	8	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ultratech Cement Ltd.	9	9	10	10	11	12	3	4	4	4	4	4	7	7	8	8	9	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	8	9	9	9	9	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	6	6	6	8	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2
United Spirits Ltd.	9	9	10	11	11	11	6	6	7	7	7	8	7	8	8	8	8	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	7	8	8	8	9	2	3	3	3	3	3	6	6	7	7	7	7	2	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3
Vedanta Ltd.	10	10	11	11	12	12	7	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	8	8	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	7	8	8	8	8	4	4	4	4	5	5	8	9	10	10	10	10	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3
Wipro Ltd.	10	10	11	11	12	12	7	8	9	9	9	9	6	7	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7	8	8	8	8	4	4	4	4	4	5	8	9	10	10	10	10	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4
Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd.	7	8	9	9	9	9	5	5	6	6	6	7	8	9	9	9	9	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	6	7	7	7	6	2	2	2	2	2	2	7	7	7	7	7	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2

Source: Annual reports of sample companies from FY 2012–2013 to 2017–2018.

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