Employment Programmes for the Poor and Female Empowerment: The Effect of NREGS on Gender-based Violence in India

Abstract

The introduction of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in India increased employment opportunities for the poor and even more so for poor women. In this article, we analyze the relationship between female labour participation and violence against women. Using district–time variation in the implementation of this anti-poverty programme, we estimate the effect of improved participation and access to the employment of women on gender-based violence. We find evidence that increased female labour participation following the NREGS has increased total gender-based violence. There have been increases in kidnappings, sexual harassments and domestic violence, while dowry deaths have decreased.

JEL: J12, J24, J71

Keywords

Gender-based violence NREGS employment female employment

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