Abstract
Ishkanian and Szreter’s edited volume largely succeeds in its aim to provide a range of historically grounded and internationally comparative responses to the big society agenda. The book is divided into two sections: history and policy, and draws on the work of historians, social policy analysts and third sector practitioners to develop multidisciplinary analyses of the big society debate. Ishkanian and Szreter’s introduction highlights the anti-democratic nature of the big society’s zero-sum polarization of ‘big government’ and ‘civil society’; Proposing [the regeneration of communities] while ignoring local government makes little sense; proposing that it be done in place of elected and accountable local government begins to look like some form of vigilante alternative to democratic structures. (p. 6)
This suggests a development of the ‘crowding out thesis’ adopted by Thatcher in the 1980s; where previously the state was crowding out the private sector, both national and local government are now crowding out ‘civil society’ in relation to welfare (Corbett and Walker, 2012). This assumption is apparent in many big society initiatives addressed in this volume. Recurring themes are the mythologizing of an idealized voluntarist past to justify welfare state retrenchment, and the already existing and extensive civic role performed by professional charities and voluntary organizations which raises the question of whether creating a ‘big society’ is even necessary.
In the history section, Szreter argues that well-funded local government is more likely to achieve some of the localist aims of the big society, whereas the Victorian period of moral philanthropy was largely ineffective at reducing poverty. Bradley compares long-term community engagement in youth clubs with the more ‘transitory’ impact that the National Citizen Service may have for young people and local communities, suggesting that the NCS may duplicate and weaken already existing valuable organizations. Hilton discusses charities, voluntary and non-governmental organizations since 1945, and asserts that civic ties and social trust remain strong, having become more professionalized and technocratic within big charitable organizations and transformed by online methods of charitable donating. Hilton’s point is that the claim of a decline of civic association, on which the big society hinges – the ‘broken society’, is without empirical basis. Big society proponents must instead grasp the dynamic and evolving role played by NGOs, charities, and voluntary organizations, rather than regressing to a Tocquevillian ideal of community. Other chapters in this section deal with antecedent visions of the ‘great society’, the legal precedent of the Poor Law, the decline of mutual aid, and the central role of charities in providing welfare.
Albrow’s chapter neatly sets up the policy section by analysing big society rhetoric. The big society slogan can be adapted to address different audiences because of the concept’s ‘everyday quality’, and the taken for granted nature of the term ‘society’. However, Albow argues that the shift in focus to ‘society’ in political discourse runs the risk of exposing even more the gap between society and ‘the class that lives from politics’ (p. 115). So while used as an attempt to distract the public from the economic crisis, it may inadvertently open up debate on the distribution of wealth and excess corporate power. Richardson’s empirical research on ‘nudge’ theory (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) concludes that while nudging behavioural changes in individuals may work in specific circumstances, the more sustained changes required for big society initiatives are not supported by the evidence. Ketola describes how the UK already has some of the highest levels of social care and welfare volunteering, compared with other European nations. He cites Sweden as a nation with both high levels of volunteering and high levels of welfare expenditure. Ishkanian’s analysis goes to the heart of the big society debate by comparing the concept with post-Soviet neoliberal ‘shock therapy’ in Armenia. She describes as ineffective the support for victims of domestic violence in Armenia in the early 1990s, when structural adjustment programmes minimized state welfare, which sets a dangerous precedent for the effect that significant cuts in Britain will have for victims of domestic abuse. Other chapters in this section discuss the insufficient coverage provided by philanthropy, the democratic deficit in private foundations and the over-emphasis on volunteers as welfare providers, which are likely to increase inequalities in provision between advantaged and deprived communities.
Historically grounded and critical approaches to current directions in British social policy are fundamental for analysing the big society concept. This volume is an extremely timely and valuable contribution to critical social policy, which engages a number of key policy areas. Although it comes to the fore in the later chapters and the conclusion, a greater acknowledgement of the influence of more recent politics may better situate the big society debate in its overarching politico-economic context. Despite the rhetorical distancing adopted by big society proponents, closer attention to the similarities that it shares with 1980s Thatcherite rhetoric and action which drove through first-wave neoliberal social policies could enhance some of the discussion. As Ishkanian’s chapter indicates, this is especially pertinent to how big society policies are likely to introduce further neoliberal marketization, to the cost of the social. After all, the over-reliance on ‘nudge’ methods and prompts to generate more private philanthropic giving is continuing evidence of the stranglehold that a morally and empirically bankrupt neoliberal ideology maintains over British policy-makers in the fallout from the financial crisis (Hall, 2011).