Psycho-social dimensions of poverty: When poverty becomes shameful

Shame as internally felt

While the literature on human psychology has engaged extensively with shame as a social emotion (Tangney and Fischer, 1995; Gilbert, 1998; Scheff, 2000; Miller, 2006; Tracy et al., 2007), shame has been insufficiently explored within the social sciences (Scheff, 2000). Along with embarrassment, pride and guilt, shame is defined as a ‘self-conscious’ rather than a basic emotion. Thus it characteristically requires self awareness, facilitates the attainment of complicated social goals and is cognitively complex (Cooley, 1922; Tracy et al., 2007). Cooley (1922) states that shame arises from self-monitoring, what he calls ‘self-sentiments’. That is, shame is closely associated with the self and self-image of one’s identity (Lister, 2004).

Shame is an especially powerful emotion compared to other self-conscious emotions in its potentially detrimental impact not only on psychological but also on physical health; it is described by Scheff (1994: 53) as the ‘master emotion’. Its impact can be all-encompassing, imposing feelings of denial or degradation of the entire self, and instilling a sense of failure or inferiority (Piers and Singer, 1953; Alexander, 1954; Lynd, 1958; Tangney, 1995; Reyles, 2007). In more vivid terms, Tomkins (1995: 1) depicts the essence of shame as ‘inner torment, a sickness of the soul … [and that] the humiliated one feels naked, defeated, alienated and lacking in dignity and worth’. In its extreme form, shame associated with poverty has been implicated in the emergence of pathological mental illness, such as chronic depression (Gilbert, 1998, 2000; Gray, 2005; Perese, 2007).

Moreover, shame can be pivotal to social relations as it functions within what Scheff (2000) defines as a deference-emotion system. Here, conformity to exterior norms is rewarded by esteem and feelings of pride, and nonconformity is punished by lack of admiration and an induced sense of shame, resulting in both self-alienation and social exclusion from others (Goffman, 1967; Watson, 2005). Simmel (1904) in his study of shame and fashion indicated that avoiding shame with fashion is equal to avoiding being isolated, for fashion implies membership and conformity in thought and behaviour among the fashionable group in society. According to Sen, shame and social exclusion share an intrinsic association, since the capability to stay out of shame is equal to the capability to ‘mix with others in that society’ and ‘to participate in the activities of the community’ (Sen, 1983: 162), or share in the ceremonies and traditions that bring people together (Narayan et al., 2000). Where shame impedes such participation, it works as a mechanism for social exclusion (Sen, 2000). Hence shame becomes one of a number of systemic social barriers (Barry, 2002) which impede participation and lead to social marginalization.

Shame as externally imposed

While the self-conscious attribute of shame and its damaging impact on individuals in poverty have increasingly been recognized, what has less often been explicitly addressed is the essentially social nature of shame and the fact that it emanates from the scorn or contempt of others.

The ‘others’ who are the protagonists of such shaming may be either real or imaginary (Lewis, 1971), the latter existing within one’s mind in the form of ‘the inner, critical voice that judges whatever we do as wrong, inferior, or worthless’ (Miller, 2006), often echoing previous assertions directed at us by the ‘others’. This implies that self-worth or self-esteem, which is lost or lowered when ashamed, is intrinsically dependent on whether or not one has traits and attributes valued by others (Santor and Walker, 1999). Benedict (1946) and Freud (1950) define the locus of shame as the point of separation between the self and others, the latter being the audience of the self. Thus an assessment is made of one’s compliance with social values, morals or cultural laws, or other wider social constructs, which, in turn, determines whether or not a person should be ashamed, in the eyes both of others and of oneself. Thus, the individual feeling shame actually cannot be fully responsible for the emotional baggage, since it is ‘others’ – which can be as broad as the dominant socio-cultural norms and discourses shared within the society – who observe, judge and condemn the ‘self’ and trigger the sense of shame (Lynd, 1958; Gilbert, 2000). The close relationship between self-esteem and shame, therefore, stems from this inextricable link between the self and the ‘others’ that award value and recognition upon the self (Rawls, 1973; Taylor, 1992; Chandhoke in Guru, 2009).

The fact that shame is inherently a social emotion implies that the source and level of shame are also socially defined, such as via socio-cultural norms and dominant discourses. Likewise, poverty cannot be fully interpreted outside of the specific social context in which it occurs. ² Øyen states that ‘[p]overty is at the same time culture-bound and universal’ (1996: 4), arguing that it is the socio-economic structural and cultural contexts that shape the specific experiences and understandings of poverty, a view shared by others (Gore and Figueiredo, 1997; Lister, 2004). However, owing to the prevalence of the individualized treatment of human emotions, the specific time and space of the context within which shame occurs have often been neglected in consideration. Scheff (2000) has explicitly criticized this individualized treatment of shame in some psychology and psychoanalysis literature, revealing its limitations in taking full account of the emotional experience (see also, Cooley, 1922; Mead, 1934; Santor and Walker, 1999; Scheff, 2000).

This proposition to explore the relationship between shame and poverty on a social level, challenges the notion that the individual is responsible for feeling ashamed in poverty, and sheds light on the explicit role of the wider society. Furthermore, it reveals how the poverty–shame nexus is contingent upon the socio-historical context, and thus may help us not only to better understand the nexus but also to deconstruct the social processes that create shame attached to poverty.

The contextual nature of capitalism

While the social context of poverty can vary substantially across time and place, most countries now operate within a global capitalist economic system. What is notable of the system, which unavoidably shapes the poverty and shame nexus, is its inherent dynamic of competition. Capitalist resource allocation systems create an environment in which competition becomes compulsory for everyone; not only for commercial enterprises competing as corporate companies in the market but also for those involved in the labour market.

The competitive process necessarily produces what have become known as ‘winners and losers’ in society, with different quantity and quality of material resources allocated amongst individuals according to their performance in the market. Based on the amount of attained material wealth, comparative evaluations are made often within the closest and immediate social milieu of the individual, an example of what Frank (1985) argues is a propensity we all have from birth to compare the self with others. Such evaluations, either favourable or unfavourable, then provide a basis for social rank formation (Gilbert, 2000), the shaping of social relationships and hierarchies (Barkow, 1989; Gilbert, 1989, 1997) with everyone in the capitalist society becoming ordered according to their economic status.

What is distinctive of this economic hierarchy compared to the social status given from birth, for instance within a feudalistic society, is the focus on the separateness of the individuals and the meritocratic way of seeing status as a personally acquired position through each individual’s capacity and hard work.

If the social hierarchy is seen as if it were a ranking of the human race by ability, then the outward signs of success or failure all make a difference. … Higher status almost always carries connotations of being better, superior, more successful and more able. (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010: 40)

Therefore, wealth becomes not only a visible signifier of a higher social status but also a source of self-pride acknowledged within the society. Poverty, on the flipside, becomes a direct source of shame in such a context which dictates that those who fall into poverty do so through their own inadequacies and deserve the opprobrium heaped upon them.

What further justifies and sustains the competitive process and resulting inequality and shame is the notion of social mobility, that one’s economic status is open for change provided one works hard to improve one’s situation. However, where classes have institutionalized and solidified, inequality is largely static (Lister, 2004). Winners remain winners, as do their children, and the notion of social mobility in the market, ‘widely seen as a process by which people are sorted by ability’ (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010: 43), can only intensify the shame for those living in long-term poverty.

A more fundamental attribute of the capitalist society, however, is its propensity to highlight, celebrate and exacerbate difference amongst the people throughout its competitive process, subsequently creating a physical and emotional sense of distance between individuals. The very nature of competition is in comparing differences between individuals and distinguishing who is better than the other in their performance, which is then celebrated with a prize that only winners can enjoy. The resulting difference in the following award is often very visible as ‘better jobs, higher incomes, education, housing, cars and clothes’ (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010: 40). Such conspicuous differences between individuals in terms of their exterior looks, intellectual knowledge, occupation, consumption pattern and lifestyle can all exacerbate the sense of disparity and evoke an acute sense of social distance. The emotional distance inevitably generates an uneasy tension between individuals and provides the ground for shame, for shame is more or less felt according to the degree of perceived difference or separation between the self and others (Fromm, 1956). As an illustration, in a small agricultural village, or an egalitarian social democratic society, where there is little difference in material circumstances, feelings of shame resulting from relative lack of finances may be less acute as the space for social difference is more limited. However, in a market economy where the economic achievements can differ substantially amongst individuals, there is arguably increased scope for shame to surface (see also, Gubrium and Lødemel, 2011; Chase and Walker, forthcoming). Hence, in this respect, it becomes normative for social groups of high economic status to display a frequent tendency to differentiate and distance themselves from people in poverty and to utilize a shaming language, what Lister (2004) has described as ‘Othering’.

A working mechanism of the poverty–shame nexus: Dominant discourses

An important mechanism shaping the poverty–shame nexus and its social meaning is social discourse; the ways in which words, phrases, concepts and ideas are used in relation to a specific phenomenon. Discourses are shaped by political, social, cultural, economic and other influences surrounding those who instigate or participate in such discourses, ultimately rendering the discourses to become prevailing or even regulative truths (Foucault, 1975, 2001; Bernstein, 1990; Butler, 1990). Dominant discourse in relation to poverty is the result of an ongoing process, animated often by the people who themselves are not facing poverty (Lister, 2004: 101), which takes place in a variety of social forums. The generated discourse then becomes a source of shame for people in poverty within ‘everyday social relations through interaction with welfare officials and professionals to research, the media, the legal system and policy-making’ (Schram, 1995, in Lister, 2004: 101).

Consequently, shame can be triggered and sustained at an institutional level and can account for cultural marginalization and loss of social recognition (Chandhoke, in Guru, 2009). In this respect, the close association of shame with poverty emerges, not intrinsically from the individuals in poverty or from the state of poverty itself, but rather from the dominant discourse reflecting the society which shames those who are subjected to it. Acknowledging this distinction moves us from an individualistic understanding of poverty that identifies a proneness to shame as an intrinsic quality of those who are impoverished, a sort of moral deficit, to one that recognizes its social nature and the potential to alleviate or counter the emotion through the generation of alternative or counter-regulative discourses.

A further characteristic of dominant discourses is that they tend to be formulated and perpetuated by those with power. This social status and kudos in turn affords political and public credence to the articulated beliefs surrounding poverty, irrespective of whether they bear any resemblance to the reality of those experiencing it. Thus, the identities of those in poverty are more often conceptualized and manufactured by others enjoying relative wealth and status (Lister, 2004). Munt goes as far as claiming that ‘shame is only brought into being because of the cultural, because of what dominant ideas dictate, through the idealization of norms’ (2007: 2). In other words, depending on which idea becomes the dominant discourse, the source and the extent of the association between shame and poverty can also change. Thus, what paints shame on to the image of poverty is, largely speaking, dominant discourse collectively assembled by multiple institutions which are governed by those with power and influence.

The role of cultural institutions

Within what we might call the cultural institution of popular social beliefs, there can be several ways through which representations of people living in poverty are skewed and distorted to feed media and publicly held stereotypes. One example is through language that seeks to create a social distance between ‘them’ and ‘us’ by attaching stigmatizing social labels to people in poverty which serve to differentiate them from the general public. This process of ‘othering’ shapes the image of poverty to represent a ‘spectre – a socially constituted object of wholesome horror’ (Dean and Melrose, 1999: 48). This verbal act of taking social distance is illustrated, as Lister (2004) observes, in the fact that the word ‘poverty’ itself is rarely used by those facing economic hardship, but is rather applied as a tag by those unfamiliar with such hardship. Moreover, such labelling fundamentally frames how those living in relative wealth respond to those more disadvantaged, at an interpersonal and institutional level (Lister, 2004).

Moreover, popular explanations of poverty contribute to shaping the social image of poverty, which varies widely between countries and can also change over time (Oorschot and Halman, 2000; Oorschot with Lepianka and Gelissen, 2009, 2010), influencing the treatment of people in poverty in varying ways and resulting in different levels of shame attached to poverty (Gallie and Paugam, 2002; Walker, 2008). Such socially constructed images can equally determine the level of social exclusion experienced by people facing poverty. Miller’s (1998) typology of poverty, for example, shows how different social cultures vary in their interpretations of poverty and social exclusion, and demonstrates different degrees of social inclusion of people on or eligible for welfare benefits depending on the hegemonic value judgements surrounding poverty. This shows that dominant poverty discourses held within cultural institutions in distinct jurisdictions are critical not only in shaping relevant policies but also in impacting the outcomes of those experiencing poverty.

This dynamic can be captured and exploited by those with power to propose what are considered to be ‘culturally’ appropriate remedies such as instilling the work ethic or, as in Britain, to justify cuts in welfare provision through reference to a need to tackle the existence of a ‘something for nothing society’, ‘spongers’ and ‘scroungers’. The state is of course a key player in framing this debate. Class-based hierarchies underpinned by access to and control over resources, in the British context for example, clearly intersect with those based on status to create the processes of deference, contempt and even class hatred, a phenomenon that has, for example, been explored and illustrated in British popular literature over significant periods of time (Chase and Walker, forthcoming).

Furthermore, where economic hardship and other socially stigmatized attributes coincide, such as being unemployed, a lone mother or a migrant, the social distance generated between those conforming to the structured social norms, and those who appear not to, becomes greater, the shaming more evident and potential for feeling shame more acute. Also, the more vulnerable and marginalized groups within the society such as women and racial minorities, are more likely to be exposed to shame in general, as both causes and effects of poverty are deeply gendered and differentiated according to certain groups (Lister, 2004: 55).

The role of social policy institutions

In many cases, social policy and its administration also become discursive and symbolic practices, constructing the nature of the problem of poverty in various ways (Schram, 1995; Saraceno, 2002). The idealization of certain norms (Munt, 2007) elaborated above goes beyond the public domain and is taken up and perpetuated by politicians and policy makers, becoming embedded in social policy forged on the back of these assumptions. Enacted at both national and local levels, such policy ultimately may dictate access to the resources and entitlements to which those in poverty are or are not eligible. Hence, over time, the generated and pervasive discourse becomes a political tool which can be used to shame people in poverty in their daily interactions with a myriad of welfare, social, legal and political institutions (Schram, 1995).

These dominant political ideologies also dictate the extent to which shame is experienced by those in hardship. For instance, in a case study of the United States, many Americans were found to attribute a person’s status of wealth or poverty to individual responsibility. Hence relative wealth was associated with living and realizing the American Dream through self-help and determination, and poverty with failing to make the most of opportunities open to all (Smith and Stone, 1989; Lister, 2004). Thus, asking for social assistance becomes emotionally difficult; the receipt of welfare is equated with a shameful admittance of failure according to Western notions of independence and individuality (Rank, 1994). In such a context, the popular image of people in poverty conjures up ideas of them either as being responsible for their fate or as passive objects of concern, lacking in agency and becoming targets of sympathy. A degree of polarization in this response is also likely to derive from popularized notions of the deserving and the undeserving (Morris, 2009). Essentially, those in poverty are considered to have lost the entitlement to equal social status and instead variably evoke contempt, punishment, hostility, indifference and pity (Katz, 1989).

In particular, stigma and shame have widely been attached to the receipt of means-tested welfare, and the degrading and humiliating ways in which it is administered have been continuously reported (Golding and Middleton, 1982; Handler and Hasenfeld, 1997; Jones and Novak, 1999; Gilliom, 2001). These have tended to reaffirm notions of inadequacy associated with those living in poverty (Handler and Hollingsworth, 1971; Wright, 2003; Herd et al., 2005; Wright and Haux, 2011) rather than offer reprieve from the struggle to make ends meet. Means-testing arguably further constitutes a violation of the fundamental right to privacy, the applicant’s life becoming an ‘open book from which a caseworker can read to determine their eligibility to welfare’ (Gray, 2005: 340).

There is also evidence that people in poverty receiving welfare experience shame through caseworkers who are unsympathetic or disbelieving of their circumstances (Hendrickson and Axelson, 1985; Drew et al., 2010; Irvine et al., 2010) or consider it their role to determine the veracity of their client’s claim to welfare eligibility (Gerdes and Brown-Standridge, 1997). The welfare beneficiaries have revealed experiences of having their credibility and honesty questioned; being subjected to invasive scrutiny; being punished instead of congratulated for attempting to find alternatives to welfare benefits; and being publicly humiliated and shamed through measures such as the allocation of food stamps rather than cash for use in grocery stores (Gray, 2005). Many spoke of how they responded by hiding the fact that they were recipients of benefits which is a common reaction to handling shame.

Poorly constructed social policies aimed at alleviating poverty which in fact accentuate shame, have been shown to significantly aggravate poverty and hinder both people’s access to welfare benefits and their move to more sustainable livelihoods (Oorschot, 2002; Griggs and Bennett, 2009; Evans and Griggs, 2010). Conversely, according to studies on the relationship between social workers and social welfare recipients in some countries, including many of the European countries and the US, there is evidence to suggest that welfare provision that strives to nurture more sustained and respectful relationships between providers of social welfare and clients can help people escape poverty and exit welfare (Gerdes and Brown-Standridge, 1997; Cheek and Piercy, 2001).