Abstract
The aim of this book is to outline the circumstances in which it might be permissible for governments to develop policies informed by paternalism. The book discusses these issues largely in abstract terms as it is primarily concerned with establishing the principles that might govern such policies.
The starting point of the book is John Stuart Mill’s harm principle – that power should only be exercised to prevent the actions of individuals causing harm to others and that: ‘His [sic] own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant’ (cited, p. 7). Le Grand and New conclude that Mill ‘was wrong’ and that there are ‘situations where the government should intervene to save people from the consequences of their own decisions, even if no one else is harmed by those decisions’ (p. 177). They arrive at this conclusion having considered various aspects of paternalism in the book’s substantive chapters.
Chapter 2 examines various definitions of paternalism and argues that they are problematic because one of their components is a concern with an interference with individual freedom. In contrast, Le Grand and New contend that the central component of government paternalism is that individuals cannot be trusted to make decisions to promote their own good. For Le Grand and New, government interventions are paternalistic if they address a failure of individual judgement and further the good of the individual. Chapter 3 discusses different types of paternalism, suggesting that the crucial distinction is between ends- and means-related paternalism, of which, it is argued, only the latter is acceptable.
Chapter 4 focuses upon the prevalence of paternalism in contemporary policies. It argues that conventional justifications for policies rooted in notions of market failure and/or social justice are unable to explain the nature and extent of government interventions. In Chapter 5 the book focuses upon the circumstances in which Le Grand and New argue that paternalistic policies can be justified. These relate to the mistakes (‘failures of judgment’, p. 79) individuals are held to make in attempting to reach the end of improving their well-being.
Chapter 6 considers whether paternalism harms autonomy. It suggests that autonomy cannot be viewed as an absolute right that cannot be violated. The consideration, therefore, becomes one of a trade-off between the extent to which an intervention may impact upon autonomy and to which it promotes well-being or prevents harm. Chapter 7 examines claims made about the efficacy of ‘nudge policies’ in attempting to change the context in which individuals make decisions. Le Grand and New support examples of such policies that improve well-being ‘with only minor infringements of autonomy’ (p. 5).
The more abstract arguments of the previous chapters are grounded in Chapter 8 in three examples – pensions, smoking and assisted suicide – where, in the case of the first two, paternalistic interventions are justified because of ‘reasoning failure’ (p. 147) and, in the case of the third, paternalistic interventions to protect people from suicide assistance cannot be justified because there is little evidence of judgement failure among individuals seeking such assistance. Chapter 9 explores the circumstances in which it might be acceptable for a government to develop paternalistic interventions – when it can and will make better decisions than the individual. Chapter 10 concludes the book by suggesting that rather than considering the paternalistic government as being an ‘infantilizing nanny or an irritating nag’, it should be considered as being a ‘helpful friend’, one that can help individuals ‘achieve their own ends, and thereby promote their own well-being’ (p. 182).
Government Paternalism is an accessible book. It is clearly written and takes readers logically through the book’s concerns. Readers of Critical Social Policy, however, might find the book frustrating. This is because of the way in which it locates the justification for paternalistic policies within the decision-making of individuals. This left me constantly considering the social and material basis of much of what is conceptualised as a failure of judgement or reasoning. Smoking, for example, is acknowledged as being particularly problematic in scale for income-poorer people. However, there is little indication of how it might be related to the circumstances in which the income-poor live and how attempting to change those circumstances might be a means of addressing it, rather than making it more expensive and/or difficult to do. Similarly, analysis of the material basis of (not) saving for pensions is largely absent.
In addition, readers of Critical Social Policy will question two other elements of the book – the view that individual decisions are rooted in rationalism, with little room for the emotive and the idea that governments are, or can be made, benign, acting in the interests of the public. For example, current concerns with tax credits – changes to which have in part been justified by the government on paternalistic grounds – demonstrate this is not the case and that governments are primarily involved in the reproduction of unequal social relations.