Solutions,exclusion and influence: Exploring power relations in the adoption of social protection policies in Kenya

Abstract

Power, and how it is exercised within social relations is pivotal in explaining policy change. However, its analysis as an explanatory variable in understanding social protection policy uptake processes in developing countries remains unexplored. Using two cases of cash transfer programmes in Kenya, we examine the dynamics of power relations in the uptake of social protection policies. This article contributes to recent scholarship examining the adoption process in African countries but in departure demonstrates that asymmetrical power relations between actors are/have been central to the uptake of the programmes. The study found that within social relations in the policy space, agents exercised power in three ways. First, by controlling the policy agenda by insertion of experts; second, by excluding other actors through a process of depoliticisation; and third, by influencing the preference of domestic actors through social learning.

Keywords

actors cash transfer policy-making policy transfer social policy

Introduction

Kenya was one of the early adopters of cash transfers in the current wave of social protection uptake on the African continent. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) with the Government of Kenya (GOK) started the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Children (CT-OVC) in 2004 as a response to the adverse effects of HIV and AIDS on households with children. In the past 10 years, the GOK in partnership with international organisations has initiated three other cash transfer programmes, viz. the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP), the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT) and the Persons with Severe Disability (PWSD) in 2007, 2008 and 2010 respectively. These four programmes constitute the National Safety Net Programme (NSNP), a common framework which “aims to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of safety support to poor and vulnerable populations in Kenya” (Government of Kenya, 2016: iii). Both CT-OVC and HSNP were initiated through donor financing from UNICEF and the UK Department for International Development (DFID), respectively. PWSD and OPCT are funded primarily by the GOK. Since 2004, CT-OVC has expanded nationwide from targeting 500 household in four districts to 350,000 households nationwide by the end of 2017, currently primarily financed by the GOK (World Bank, 2018). Through CT-OVC, the government makes cash payments to poor households caring for orphans and vulnerable children. Meanwhile HSNP aims to reduce poverty in drought-prone arid and semi-arid regions of Northern Kenya by delivering regular cash transfers to extremely poor households in four counties – Mandera, Wajir, Turkana and Marsabit. The programme currently covers approximately 100,000 households (Government of Kenya, 2016).

Social protection is a microcosm of social policy which includes among other state provisions housing, education, income, health and personal services. Cash transfer programmes, as public social assistance, constitute forms of social protection policies in which the state and/or other agencies make direct, regular and predictable payments to households or individuals to address short- and long-term vulnerabilities to cushion households from shocks, and prevent further deprivation and poverty. Forty African countries currently have ongoing cash transfer programmes of some sort, up from 21 in 2010 (World Bank, 2015). In the context of high foreign financial investment, the mercurial rise of cash transfers as a policy option has changed the social policy landscape in developing countries (de Haan, 2011). The strong positive narrative surrounding cash transfers and their supposed impacts on human development indicators have also driven their rise, with others describing the rapid spread of the schemes as a ‘quiet revolution’ (Barrientos and Hulme, 2009).

This article explores the extent to which asymmetrical power relations shaped the transfer and subsequent adoption of CT-OVC and HSNP in Kenya. Recent studies on the adoption of cash transfer programmes use the political settlement approach to explore the role of domestic politics (Pruce and Hickey, 2017; Wanyama and McCord, 2017). Other perspectives consider the role of transnational actors drawing from ideational approaches as explanatory variables (Foli, 2016). However, even when domestic politics, ideational, institutional and material strategies are studied as explanatory variables, the underlying power relations among the different actors are rarely explored. To fill this gap, we draw from the nexus of policy transfer and a Foucauldian perspective on power to investigate the uptake of social protection programmes in Kenya, using the cases of CT-OVC and HSNP.

The first section discusses the contested literature on cash transfer and social policy in African countries, focusing in particular on the current promotion of social protection. Thereafter, we set out the theoretical framework of the study – policy transfer and power relations, arguing that in asymmetrical relations of policy transfer, power relations are central in the uptake of social protection policies in Kenya. We then provide a brief overview of the research methodology before presenting the results, theoretical discussions and conclusions.

Cash transfers and social policy

In most African countries, poverty and inequality persist (Atieno and Shem, 2007). In contrast, Latin America and Asia have achieved remarkable progress in poverty reduction resulting from a decline in levels of unemployment, labour reform measures such as increases in minimum wage, expansion in access to education, and the adoption of redistributive policies (Higgins, 2012). In Brazil part of the contribution towards poverty reduction is attributed to social protection programmes, in particular Bolsa Familia (Barrientos et al., 2013; Higgins, 2012). The perceived success and positive human development achievements of the Bolsa Familia programme have resulted in the transfer of similar schemes to other developing countries by international organisations such as the World Bank, UNICEF and DFID. Positioning itself as a global curator of knowledge (Mkandawire, 2010), the World Bank has played a significant role in shaping social protection policies. Following mounting evidence of the adverse effects of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank sought to incorporate safety net programmes (as part of its Social Dimensions of Adjustment Programme) into its lending policies, and later social risk management, in addressing poverty (Hutchful, 1994; Jayarajah et al., 1996; Taube, 1993). The Millennium Development Goals, whose first target was poverty reduction, gave a boost to the Bank’s safety net approach. The Bank encouraged countries to set up targeted safety net programmes specifically for the ‘deserving poor’ comprising children, older persons and those unable to work. Out of the Bank’s social risk management framework arose the idea of emulating Latin American cash transfer schemes as poverty reduction instruments in other developing countries.

Aspects of the cash transfer narrative, however, are open to critique. First, some discourse presents cash transfers as the main or even only antidote to poverty and vulnerability. Yet in Brazil for example, Bolsa Familia’s contribution is marginal in comparison to the impact of labour income from increased employment (Higgins, 2012). Even when practitioners acknowledge that cash transfers might be one of many social policy instruments, cash transfer schemes still dominate the social protection agenda. There are also unanswered questions about how transfers should be targeted, and whether social protection for one category of vulnerable people might come at the expense of other groups. Another concern arises from the fact that many cash transfer programmes in African countries are largely funded and implemented by international (donor) organisations, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), bilateral organisations and international financial institutions, often with little attention to local political and economic contexts.

Critics of the policy view it as a return to neo-liberal approaches of addressing market failures (Adésínà, 2014). Similarly, they view the emphasis on cash as a means of getting the poor to markets thereby reinforcing residual tendencies of social provision. Furthermore, cash transfers offer simpler alternatives than the seemingly more complicated avenues of addressing endemic poverty as undertaken by emerging economies like Brazil and China. Unfortunately, the ‘vigorous merchandising’ by international actors and the fixation on cash provisioning to the poor has narrowed social policy to social protection and further to cash transfers (Adésínà, 2011; Mkandawire, 2010). One may argue that the implementation of cash transfers in developing countries is similar to the English Poor Law. The Poor Law system administered by parishes provided relief on the basis of need with a distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor (Alcock et al., 2000). The system was designed to encourage work and discourage dependence. Pursuant to that, it employed stringent targeting criteria. Similarly, cash transfer programming in Kenya employs heavy targeting to identify beneficiaries to the programmes.

Drawing attention to the under-theorisation of broader social policy in African countries, Mkandawire (2011) notes that the purposes of social policy seem to diverge in developed and developing countries. This is despite the convergence on social concerns, economic welfare, equity and social justice. Whereas in the former there are much broader universalistic welfare regimes, developing countries and African countries in particular remain a laboratory of social protection instruments like cash transfers that do not fully bring about lasting gains. Growing evidence from emerging democracies demonstrates that investment in broad social policy regimes indeed enhances citizens’ productive capacity (Tillin and Duckett, 2017). To attain a decent level of well-being and welfare, a shift beyond the cash transfer narrative needs to occur. Anchored on norms of solidarity and reciprocity with multiple objectives of production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and nation-building (Adésínà, 2011), transformative social policy draws attention to a broader view of social policy.

Policy transfer and power

Increasingly transnational action plays an influential role in policy-making in diverse parts of the world. Recent reforms in social policy indicate the role of transnational actors in shaping the trajectories of such reforms through various mechanisms. In studies of pension reforms in African countries for instance, scholars highlight the ideological competition between the International Labour Organization and the World Bank in the reform process (Kpessa, 2010; Kpessa and Béland, 2012). Other studies on social policy reform, cognisant of the role of international actors, highlight domestic political settlements, national democratic deliberations and the desire to conform to prevailing global trends as variables in policy change (Kpessa, 2013; Lavers and Hickey, 2016). Critical scholars emphasise coercion, similar to the imposition of SAPs, as a mechanism used by transnational actors to bring about social policy reforms (Adejumobi, 2004; Adésínà, 2011; Tambulasi, 2013). However, Foli (2016) argues that coercion is not the sole mechanism of policy change and highlights ideational approaches in her study of social policy change in Ghana.

Policy transfer is defined as a “process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 344). Policy transfer encompasses other similar processes of policy diffusion, policy learning and policy emulation with forms of transfer ranging from voluntary to direct coercion (Evans, 2009). An analysis of policy transfer processes requires an understanding of how actors affect the policy process, and how agents relate to one another in order to further their interests. Actors within policy transfer processes include elected officials, civil servants, institutions, consultants, think tanks and supranational institutions, among others (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).

Policy learning constitutes one way in which policy change occurs that is essentially shaped by ideas and interests. Learning, and the knowledge and information involved, are often biased by the ideological orientation and policy goals of the policy promoters (Weyland, 2007). Learning, socialisation, norm diffusion and knowledge in addition reflect the distribution of power (Fischer, 2003) as they provide legitimacy to what can be discussed and how it is discussed. Learning therefore involves the control of the process to suit particular agendas. For instance, policy promoters sometimes keep away information that would undermine their narrative and constructed data (Li, 2007). Promoters of cash transfers have valorised the role of cash transfers in poverty reduction in Brazil over the bigger role played by labour reforms. What is sometimes considered as learning may be a form of coercion. The speedy and one-size-fits-all manner in which cash transfer programmes have been adopted across African countries seems to point to vertical imposition rather than social learning as the main mechanism of adoption. The way in which ideas and issues – in this case poverty and vulnerability – are constructed within learning processes valorises certain narratives and discredits others while eliminating counter-narratives.

Different scholars conceptualise power differently. On one end of the spectrum, power is conceived as ‘domination over’; a situation in which power is exercised through structures of authority arising out of economic strength and control (Dahl, 1957; Weber, 1986). Power is conceived as an imposition through which one’s actions cause the action of another. Policy processes, however, even when involving powerful players are often devoid of such direct control. Yet domination still exists in policy transfer mechanisms. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s, governments in developing countries were compelled by the World Bank and the IMF to adopt SAPs to secure grants and loans (see Mkandawire and Soludo, 2002). Equally, the recent financial bailout of Greece points to such high-handedness by international organisations in policy-making processes. In the context of Kenya’s uptake of social protection programmes, social relations between international and national actors were non-egalitarian and asymmetrical. International agents were able to strategically exercise control and dominance over the transfer process through the knowledge and resources they brought to the policy arena.

Rather than see power as an imposition, one can also view it as relational. Lukes, conceptualises power in three dimensions. First there is overt power, the clear visible exercise of ‘power over’. The second is the dimension of ‘non-decisions’ (Lukes, 2005). In policy transfer processes, this dimension relates to the ability to control the agenda and determine what is discussed. Third is the view of power as ideational, the ability of actors to shape perceptions, preferences and choices in ways that influence other actors’ understandings thereby bringing change. Lukes states thus,

A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? (Lukes, 2005: 27)

Lukes’ analysis brings to the fore interests and legitimacy. Policy-making is a constellation of interests that actors use to legitimise their views and forms of legitimacy that in turn enable them to further their interests.

To Foucault, power is not singular, rather it operates in multiple forms. Moreover, it is ubiquitous; present everywhere and operating in all kinds of social relations. Social relations are the medium through which power is exercised. His notion of power as collective action is useful in analysing policy adoption processes where power is exercised through shaping others’ perceptions, preferences and determining their wants – a form of manipulated consent. Power relations are therefore not strictly coercive but rather are dynamic, and reciprocal with actors using strategies and tactics to impose their will on others. Power operates upon a complex web of relations and is more about “management of possibilities” and ability to “structure the possible action of others” rather than through violence or direct coercion (McKee, 2009: 471). Power is multiple, it overlaps and at times contradicts (Foucault, 2002). An analysis of power within policy-making processes therefore necessitates an analysis of strategies that actors employ within and through their social relations rather than one that emphasises top-down singular modes of coercion. Foucault’s conception of power offers a superior framework through which to study power relations in policy transfer as it widens space for complex interactions among social agents. In addition, he proposes an understanding of power by linking it to knowledge (Foucault, 1980). This connection, power and knowledge, helps to draw attention to Lukes’ third dimension in relation to how expert knowledge and ideology shape preferences. Moreover, it provides room to examine different strategies through which policy transfer happens: from coercion to learning while taking into consideration both formal and informal institutions.

Though power enables, it also constrains the action of others (Foucault, 1982). One way in which the agency of others is limited in policy processes is through the depoliticisation of the policy space, described as an ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson, 1994). Depoliticising the policy space depoliticises the policy problem rendering the process technical rather than political, thereby obscuring power relations, conflicts and choices (Laruffa, 2018). International organisations invoke neopatrimonialism, described as “the abuse of state resources and power” to depoliticise policy processes thereby legitimising their participation in what they consider a technical process (Mkandawire, 2015: 564). Through depoliticising the policy space donors keep away potential dissenters. Yet depoliticisation weakens democratic processes, compromises ownership and limits popular discussions on policies (Murunga, 2013). Further, it limits the role of citizens in holding governments to account and contradicts donor rhetoric of participation, thereby entrenching top-down processes that lack transparency.

Studies that focus on the role of power in policy transfer in developing countries are scant yet emerging in recent years. Tambulasi’s (2013) study of the transfer of New Public Management in Malawi suggests coercion and ‘power over’ mechanisms and explores how pressure affected subsequent implementation of the policies. Other recent studies on policy-making processes explore the exercise of power among national actors. For example, Chopra (2011) draws from Foucault’s notions of multi-sited and relational forms of power in examining the formulation of a social policy instrument, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA) in India. In a study of South-to-South policy learning processes, Montero (2017) shows the interrelation between learning, knowledge and power relations to explain how a sustainable transportation system was transferred from Columbia to Mexico. These two mentioned cases focus on domestic social relations. However, in the case of cash transfers in a number of African countries, transnational actors played a significant role, which needs to be explored within the context of their social relations with national actors.

To fill this gap, the following section considers the role of soft power in the adoption of CT-OVC and HSNP in Kenya. We use the case of Kenya to examine broader policy-making processes in developing countries, which involve both South-to-South processes and mediative Northern organisations and actors. We deploy a concept of power as multi-sited, multi-actor and multi-level (Peck, 2011) and situate power within the relationships between different social agents in their day-to-day interactions. This study draws from Foucault’s theorisation of power to analyse the policy transfer process leading to the adoption of CT-OVC and HSNP. We identify three mechanisms: the power to shape the agenda, the power to constrain actions of other actors, and the power to influence the preference of others.

Method

The article is based on a qualitative case study of the policy making and adoption process of two cash transfer schemes, Cash Transfer for Orphans and Children (CT-OVC) and the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in Kenya. Semi-structured interviews comprise the primary source of data. Participants included government officials, members of parliament, social protection advisors of bilateral and multi-lateral organisations, representatives of international and national NGOs, independent consultants and representatives from national and independent think tanks. We carried out twenty-nine interviews lasting 1–3 hours each during fieldwork in Kenya between January 2016 and September 2016 and three additional telephonic interviews with respondents who could not be reached during the fieldwork period. Bearing in mind the nature of the study, participants were selected based on their involvement in the policy-making process including both past and present members of the various organisations. The study, however, did not include beneficiaries of cash transfers as the focus of the study was on the policy processes in which recipients of cash benefits were not involved.

To triangulate data collected from key informant interviews, we analysed documents, mainly official government documents, international aid documents and agreements, and reports. In addition, the lead author attended four in-country forums as a participant where we observed various aspects and relationships in ongoing discussion of social protection in the country. The experience of the lead author as a participant in the social protection sector was valuable. Between 2007 and 2015, the lead author was a member of the National Social Protection Committee, the core team in the development of the Kenya National Social Protection Policy (2012) and the National Social Protection Sector Review (2011). At the same time, the author was involved in the initial design of the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT), implementation of programmes, training civil society organisations and working with regional economic communities in the promotion and development of social protection policies. We draw upon this wider in-depth experience in the study to bring out unique aspects of the policy-making process that may be obscure to outsiders, widening the study of social protection policy uptake.

Data collected from the interviews and notes from observations were transcribed before entering into Atlas.ti for thematic analyses and results (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The research received full ethical approval from our university’s ethics committee.

Discussion on findings

Our findings indicate that power operated in three ways in the transfer and adoption process. First, power shaped the agenda through the definition of the problem and solution. Second, power constrained the agency of other actors and excluded them from time to time, and lastly power through learning influenced the preferences and desires of other actors towards the idea of cash transfers.

Power in defining the problem and its solution

Problem definition is key in policy change. Rational actor models conceive of policy change as a logical process whereby problems are assessed, solutions proposed and choices made followed by implementation of the solution (John, 2012). UNICEF presented the reality of child vulnerability and poverty arising out of the HIV and AIDS pandemic. ‘Adjustment with a Human Face’, a report by UNICEF suggested that SAPs had negatively affected children. Another study by UNAIDS indicated that the number of orphans in Kenya was approaching 1.6 million with about 892,000 resulting from HIV and AIDS (Bosworth et al., 2016). Both reports were important in framing the problem and solution. To address the problem of homelessness among orphaned children, NGOs and individuals had set up orphanages. The idea of cash transfers offered an alternative response to institutionalisation of children. In an internal meeting of UNICEF country advisors held in 2002, the idea of providing cash to orphaned children was floated amongst other solutions. As explained in the interview, “The idea of cash provision was settled upon as it was an innovation that had not been tried as a response to the epidemic anywhere in Africa” (IOS-03, 13 March 2016).

Government officials did not resist the idea. First, the reality of suffering children and households was visible. UNAIDS and UNICEF as global authorities presented credible assessments of the situation with figures to support their argument for the need of a cash transfer programme. Second, UNICEF through funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) committed to financing the pre-pilot phase (2004–2006) with no financial obligations from government. UNICEF thus defined the problem – orphanhood, vulnerability and child poverty – backed by credible data and presented the solution to the problem as cash transfers. To make this conceptual leap effectively, promoters of cash transfers discredited orphanages as solutions to the problem and instead advocated the retention of orphans within their households and communities.

To keep the idea on the government agenda and to avoid failure of the pre-pilot, UNICEF seconded three personnel as technical advisors to the government. First was a communication specialist seconded to the Social Protection Secretariat with the role of packaging information on social protection in general. The second officer was attached to the Department of Children with the responsibilities of day-to-day administration of the programme. A participant in the study considered the officer’s tasks mundane and remarked,

The duties of the officer sent to the Department of Children included taking care of all details related to the programme as required – whether programmatic or administrative, ranging from taking down minutes to document filing and data entry. (IOS-06, 28 September 2016)

The role of the third officer, a public finance expert attached to the Ministry of Finance was “keeping CT-OVC on the Ministry’s agenda through advocacy for increased funding to the programme” (IOS-05, 20 July 2016). As a previous Ministry employee, the third officer was familiar with budgeting processes and was therefore able to bring an added advantage to the transfer process by debunking notions of unaffordability. The secondment of staff to run day-to-day duties resonates with the idea of power, not necessarily as force, but as working through practice in everyday mundane and routine tasks (Foucault, 1980). UNICEF justified the secondment of technical assistance as a response to capacity gaps within government. Yet in reality, the secondment was less about absent expertise but more of insertion of agents of advocacy within daily interactions and policy discussions. The duties of these technical assistance advisors often conflicted with, and at times subsumed those of government officers, leading to disagreements (TTC-04, 13 April 2016). Insertion of technical advisors can undermine the capacity of government bureaucrats to deliver programmes as it curtails the development of accountable structures within government (Adésínà, 2011; Mkandawire, 2015).

Similar control over the ‘solution’ was replicated in HSNP. Previous DFID support to Northern Kenya based on provision for food relief in response to the cyclical famine and drought in the region, provided a foundation for implementation of HSNP. With realisation of the failure of previous attempts at ensuring food security, coupled with the global food crisis, DFID shifted its strategy from provision of food aid to direct cash transfers. The HSNP began neither with a systematic scoping of a possible solution nor with the testing of effective solutions, rather transnational actors prescribed a predetermined policy solution as described by other critiques (see Peck, 2011). In confirmation, a government official stated thus,

DFID woke up and decided they want a cash transfer programme, they had the money for the programme for five years. The government was not consulted but since DFID had the money and were not asking government to fund the programme, the government agreed. (MGSCD-02, 25 April 2016)

From this statement, two observations can be inferred. First, we should note the abruptness upon which the decision was made and the lack of consultation with domestic actors by transnational actors in ‘providing new solutions to old problems’. Second, contrary to assertions that transnational actors are ‘proposal actors’ (Foli, 2016), the statement suggests that transnational actors can be ‘policy enforcers’ as they imposed the idea of cash transfers. Taking advantage of the asymmetrical relations, agents from the international organisations not only prescribed the policy solution but encompassed a more direct exercise of power through which they ensured their recommended solution was adopted. Whereas some scholars have argued that transnational actors are flexible and adaptable in their promotion of policy solutions (Béland and Orenstein, 2013), findings from our study indicate that international organisations remained rigid both in their policy solutions and paradigms and also in how they wanted the programmes implemented. Only in light of opposition from powerful veto actors like members of parliament, did they become flexible and adaptable to alternative views.

To further ensure the programme was implemented as prescribed, decision-making and the day-to-day running of the programme remained the prerogative of DFID, leading to the description of HSNP as ‘donor initiated, donor driven, donor implemented, but government branded’ (TTC-04, 13 April 2016; CSO-05, 28 September 2016). DFID recruited and managed the programme through the Programme Implementation and Learning Unit (PILU), comprising a team of consultants. Though PILU was situated within the National Drought Management Authority, a government agency, the team reported directly to DFID. In describing the decision-making process, a respondent involved in Phase 1 of the programme stated,

Decisions were [made] by DFID and in situations where the government is not putting in any money, government cannot be in control. The government was there to append its signature and was required to create a conducive environment for the programme to run. (TTC-04, 13 April 2016)

In addition to revealing the control that DFID had over the decision-making process, this quote points to the diminution of the state’s role in the policy process from that of a policy lead to that of an enabler and facilitator (Peck, 2011).

Politics of exclusion: Power in constraining options, actions and agency

One interviewee described the policy-making process as “a very closed system, an elitist sector”, thereby capturing the exclusivity of social protection policy-making. For instance, the Social Protection Committee, a network tasked with design and development of policies and programmes at national level comprised largely of government and international organisations with occasional participation of domestic civil society organisations. As noted by Shearer et al. (2016), networks can influence the balance of power by choosing to include or exclude participants. Fearing political capture, transnational actors and government bureaucrats deliberately excluded politicians from the policy process to minimise “political interference and to depoliticise the policy space” (IOS-03, 13 March 2016). According to a representative from the international organisations, the move to exclude politicians ensured little interference from politicians with interests to gain mileage and expediency out of the programmes. By defining the process as technical, donors further aimed to exclude the political class. Such an observation follows on from other studies where the depoliticisation process entails advocates framing poverty reduction as a technical problem to be tackled by experts and professions even when the problem has emerged out of political circumstances (Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2007). In reality the policy problem necessitated political action as it had been brought about by political marginalisation of Northern Kenya. By suppressing the participation and agency of politicians their input remained reactive as confirmed by a participant,

Politicians were not involved and were just reacting to what we were doing. If any of them came, it was to complain mainly on how we had conducted targeting in their constituency. (TTC-04, 13 April 2016)

By excluding politicians and depoliticising poverty and vulnerability, international actors and government bureaucrats exhibited acts of power. Ironically, the same actors who promoted the exclusion regularly decried lack of political will as the main hindrance to adoption of the programmes.

Equally, domestic civil society organisations (CSOs) like the Africa Platform for Social Protection (APSP) and the Social Protection Actors Forum (SPAF) were occasionally excluded from the policy process. Paradoxically, the same civil society organisations were established with funding from international organisations like DFID, with the specific task of generating grassroots demand for social protection instruments, specifically cash transfers. Domestic civil society members considered international organisations and staff from the Ministry of Social Development dominant members of the Social Protection Committee with influence to decide who participates in the policy process. According to participants from domestic civil society, international agencies used highly technical terms and esoteric language in committees and networks of policy-making. Civil society members perceived the esoteric language as an exclusionary strategy that constrained their meaningful participation. As highlighted during an interview with a member of civil society concerning their participation within the policy-making process,

But when the policy and the Bill were being developed, we got incorporated as they know that their legitimacy and capacity to lobby on some issues is limited. It can only reach a certain point. When ultimately the policies were adopted we got out of the loop and started watching things happen at the periphery. CSOs are invited when it is convenient. CSO participation and that of NGOs in the programmes is very limited. (CSO-01, 6 April 2016)

The exclusion of domestic civil society organisations undermined public participation, resulting in an erosion of a citizen–state contract based social provisioning. Civil society actors viewed their occasional inclusion in the Social Protection Committee as a move by international actors to legitimise the policy process. Even when included, domestic civil society organisations were assigned peripheral roles like advocacy and implementation in hard-to-reach areas. Donor agencies instead contracted international NGOs more closely linked to them like Oxfam and HelpAge International as key partners in implementation.

Ability to influence preference and desires

In addition to structural mechanisms including financing, ideational approaches constituted one of the core mechanisms through which transnational actors promoted the uptake of cash transfer policies in Kenya. Mechanisms employed in the learning process included spreading of norms, persuasions, socialisation and demonstrations (Foli, 2016; Peck, 2011). Mechanisms of learning in policy learning are deemed more acceptable than coercive mechanisms (Flyvbjerg, 1998). The origins of different ideas and learning matter for policy uptake as they can indicate different power structures and asymmetry between the learner and the idea promoter. Besides their financial resources, transnational actors possessed a hegemonic position on the ideas promoted within the Kenyan learning process. Learning and influencing processes involved diverse approaches to ensure policy adoption.

Participants identified DFID as the lead organisation in the learning process, sponsoring various courses, study tours and South-to-South partnerships. While ideational mechanisms of social protection are often presented as benign processes of knowledge transfer from one actor to another, policy learning in Kenya involved the expenditure of enormous financial resources and persuasive power. A report on DFID’s role in influencing the adoption of the programmes for example indicates that in Zambia and Uganda, the organisation set aside up to GBP 150,000 in each country for between 2 to 3 years for learning purposes, primarily for commissioning of studies and to facilitate study tours. The report further highlights that in Ethiopia, 90% of one advisor’s working time was spent influencing the adoption of the policies (Hickey et al., 2009: 5). The magnitude of resources deployed for learning set the agenda for the massive promotion of cash transfer programmes.

A large part of the learning process involved multiple training courses from early adopters, notably South Africa and Brazil where empirical evidence demonstrated the impact of cash transfer programmes. Other learning avenues included conferences, seminars and study tours mostly targeted at mid-level civil servants comprising directors and their deputies. High and medium level government officials’ participation was desirable as transnational actors considered their ability, power and proximity to influence essential for policy uptake. The most influential training course according to participants was the Designing and Implementing Social Transfer Programmes course organised by the Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI) with funding from UNICEF, DFID and other organisations like HelpAge. The conversion of hard-line ministries of finance from sceptics to champions of cash transfer programmes occurred in this training. A government official at the Treasury who attended the training confessed,

I went to the training sceptical about the idea of giving cash to the poor but left converted. I came back and, in my briefing, asked my seniors to consider increasing the budgetary allocation we were making towards cash transfers. (MFP-03, 29 July 2016)

Specific emphasis on participation in the training focused on staff at ministries of finance and planning who promoters considered hurdles to the adoption and expansion of the cash transfer programmes. Regional meetings and conferences set up as learning and sharing platforms provided avenues for exerting soft pressure and advocacy for the uptake of cash transfer schemes with the aim to inspire governments to emulate what others had achieved. The normative or symbolic appeal (Weyland, 2007) provided inspiration for the development of the Kenya National Social Protection Policy after a regional meeting organised by the African Union in 2006 under the banner Livingstone Call for Action in Zambia.

Regional meetings and conferences are also spaces in which regimes find themselves ‘assessed and respected’, thereby adopting certain prescriptions from the promoter (Lavers and Hickey, 2016; Rodgers, 2014). As one participant mentioned, the choice of Zambia to host the African Union Intergovernmental Regional Conference on Social Protection was deliberate. The government of Zambia had been reluctant to adopt the pilots started by various international organisations. Hosting the regional conference in the country therefore aimed at “embarrassing the government into adopting the 4 cash pilot programmes which were under implementation” (CSO-05, 28 September 2016).

Furthermore, the South-to-South cooperation mediated by DFID and the International Policy Centre was an avenue through which international organisations created learning relations between global South countries. South-to-South cooperation involved sharing of knowledge and ideas through provision of technical assistance, publications, video conferencing and study tours between Latin American and African countries. Different countries adopted different learnings from Latin American countries. In Kenya, officials indicated that the development of the single registry emanated from the South-to-South cooperation, with the programmers from Bolsa Familia providing technical support. Though acknowledging the role of learning from the process, a participant from civil society criticised the exclusion of domestic civil society organisations. Whereas one of the key aspects of the social protection experience in Brazil has been the inclusive participation of civil society organisations, the South-to-South cooperation failed to create avenues for participation of domestic civil society organisations within African countries. Domestic critics point to the South-to-South process as exclusionary with involvement of only government officials and international organisations. Elsewhere, others have argued that among the reasons South-to-South cooperation has grown is because of “efforts by traditional donors to reconstruct their legitimacy in international development and the realisations and the agreement that the transfer of knowledge and practice among southern countries is more effective in promotion of international development” (Costa Leite et al., 2013: 1).

Conclusion

By using the cases of CT-OVC and HSNP, the article argues that power, based on an enduring asymmetric relation among policy actors in Kenya’s social policy space, led to the adoption of the two programmes. Through a combination of strategic actions, international organisations, sometimes in concert with domestic actors, exercise power in regulating human action in subtle ways to bring about desired policy change. International actors’ financial, knowledge and transfer-prestige base emboldened them as ‘producers of power’ (Rodgers, 2014), enabling them to exercise control over policy-making. The article identified various tactics and strategies that actors employ as exercises of power to bring about policy change. Moving from the idea of ‘power over’ to ‘relational power’, the article demonstrates how power operates to influence the policy preferences of domestic actors. By forming alliances and collaboration with domestic actors like civil society organisations, government officials and international actors from South-to-South cooperation, policy transfer agents built stronger bases for influence. Contrary to the political settlement argument, national political processes and social contexts provide mediative factors upon which transfer agents anchor policy advocacy. The political settlements approach focuses on domestic political contestation but neglects how international actors use expertise and financial resources to depoliticise the policy arena.

The research raises important questions about policy-making processes and choices under the continued dominance of global agendas amidst pressure and incentives like financing of desired policies. As argued, the current policy-making process has led to a subversion of broader social policy. Such single and narrow instruments are inadequate in supporting welfare and well-being. Furthermore, policy-making processes, which frame developmental ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ as technical issues, continue to undermine opportunities for enhancing broader social policy rooted in democracy. In particular, prefabricated policy solutions are pushed at the expense of alternative policy options and to the exclusion of endogenous national democratic processes for policy-making. Further research on policy-making processes and policy transfer processes could consider the subversion of democratic principles under the current social protection paradigm. Learning promoted through South-to-South cooperation, while simultaneously narrowing the learning experience, provides space for legitimation and justification of international agendas on social protection.

Our argument approaches policy-making from a power perspective with international actors playing a domineering role in the policy process. As we argue, this was not solely through overt strategies, but through subtle strategies operating in everyday undertakings. An understanding of policy-making within more egalitarian and symmetrical relations could provide a new perspective on policy transfer involving international actors and domestic actors in policy-making processes.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Marion Ouma would like to acknowledge the National Research Foundation of South Africa which funds her doctoral studies. Jìmí Adéśínà would like to acknowledge the National Research Foundation of South Africa and the University of South Africa which fund the work of the South African Research Chair in Social Policy.

Funding

This publication was made possible by support from the Social Science Research Council’s Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa Fellowship, with funds provided by Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Author biographies

Marion Ouma is a doctoral candidate with the South African Research Chair in Social Policy at the Archie Mafeje Research Institute, University of South Africa. Her doctoral dissertation focuses on the dynamics of social protection policies’ transfer and uptake in Kenya. She holds a Master’s degree from the University of Nairobi. Her research interests are in social policy, social protection and policy-making in Africa.

Jimi Adésínà holds the South African Research Chair in Social Policy at the Archie Mafeje Research Institute, College of Graduate Studies, University of South Africa. He is a former president of the South African Sociological Association.

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