Abstract
Ian Gough’s book Heat, Greed and Human Need seeks to identify how social policy can adequately respond to the challenge of climate change. Gough aims “to [place] the social dimension of wellbeing firmly in the centre of discussions about climate change – and vice versa” (p. 21). His book centres questions of inequality both within and between nations. He argues that it is essential to incorporate both types of inequality (here inequality within nations is understood as primarily class inequality), especially given the high and growing levels of inequality in middle-income countries. The author discusses how high levels of inequality feed wasteful consumption, as consumption becomes competitive and positional while simultaneously making us unhappier.
Gough holds to an ‘objective’ account of human need, seeing this as essential to counter a neoliberal, consumerist vision of society, whereby all desires are subjective and incomparable. I found this the least convincing part of the book, as I remain unconvinced that an ‘objective’ theory of need is necessary to counter consumerism. In practice, Gough describes how one might use deliberative approaches to define needs, bringing citizens and experts together. For me, the description of this collective process highlighted an alternative to individually-defined subjective needs – collectively-defined subjective needs. Existing social structures form part of this ‘subjective’ reality; hence needs must include collective changes that can in turn redefine individual needs. For instance, if individual car ownership is needed to get to work, the sustainable solution is not to ensure everyone owns a car, but to change the social conditions such that car ownership is no longer a necessity. As Gough points out, “attention must be paid to ‘lock-in’ as well as ‘luxury’” (p. 159). Dealing with lock-in can both help address inequalities and, through dealing with perceived unfairness, help increase public acceptability of otherwise unpopular measures.
Given Gough’s stress on the need for discussions about climate change mitigation to incorporate a global equity dimension, I was slightly disappointed at the lack of consideration of how deliberative discussion of needs might happen across national borders. Perhaps internationalising a process already happening within several European countries might also be a means of building equity with those outside the traditional boundaries of the nation-state and developing practical forms of solidarity along the lines implied by contraction and convergence (where almost all nations must reduce CO2 emissions, but high emitters must reduce most until countries converge).
I appreciated Gough’s focus on consumption emissions, rather than production emissions, in capturing the true contribution made by rich countries to climate change. Many countries – Britain is a leader here – have outsourced dirty industries, meaning that if we look only at where emissions are produced, we whitewash the contribution of rich countries where the goods are consumed. It is no good Britain’s closing polluting production industries, if those industries merely shift to countries with lower environmental standards, while the nation’s consumption remains unchanged.
The book discusses some interesting tensions between environmental and social sustainability. The rich generate much more carbon per head than do the poor. However, because the rich are limited in how much they can physically consume, an extra pound in their pocket will result in fewer carbon emissions than an extra pound in the pocket of a poor person. Such tensions are exacerbated by a failure to tackle upstream determinants of emissions, such as energy inefficient housing. In Britain, VAT on home energy consumption is only 5%, but increasing this would hit some low-income households very hard, particularly those living in private rented housing.
Gough takes on the tension between green growth and de-growth. While he talks little about transport (my area of expertise), the area illustrates nicely the problem with growth. Traditional measures of growth value car use highly, precisely because it consumes many (non-renewable) resources. Walking and cycling by contrast apparently contribute far less, because they do not require the purchase of petrol, nor the creation of hugely wasteful and expensive infrastructure. The economic assessment of transport is constantly tweaked to attempt to better incorporate sustainable transport: but what if the basic paradigm is wrong?
The vision that Gough sets out is radical, with ‘post-growth’ implying challenges to capitalism, from reducing inequalities to specific policy implications such as reducing working hours. What are the chances of its success? He points out that capitalism may be “slumping towards a steady-state economy” of its own accord (p. 192). However, this does not mean that it is moving towards the kind of equitable and sustainable post-growth society he envisages. Gough argues for a three-stage strategy, beginning with increased efficiency and leading on to the recomposition and eventually reduction of consumption. While aware of more pessimistic perspectives, he holds on to ‘an assumption of optimism and human progress’ and ends with the hope that humanity can respond to the climate crisis by creating a more equitable, happier society based around needs rather than consumption.