Abstract
Over the last decades, the use of explicit derogatory language (e.g., hate speech, slurs, micro-insults) has risen in many countries. We provide an overview on blatant language discrimination, including its psychological antecedents and consequences. After presenting a working definition of derogatory language and describing its prevalence, we discuss the social functions it serves and the role it plays in identity protection, in legitimizing group hierarchies, and in establishing and enforcing group norms. Drawing from both the socio-cognitive and discursive traditions in social psychology, it is argued that the language people are exposed to and the language they employ, shape the way they think and construct reality. We also consider two ways in which targeted groups may respond to derogatory language, specifically confrontation and reappropriation. Finally, we address challenges for future research, in particular the need for more cross disciplinary research to ebb the growing proliferation of hate speech on digital media which has become a global international concern.
For the last 50 years, research in social psychology and language has focused mainly on subtle forms of language discrimination (Augoustinos & Every, 2007; Maass et al., 2014). In fact, until recently, derogatory language such as “grabbing women by the pussy” or referring to Black citizens as “piccaninnies with watermelon smiles” or as “animals [. . .] that should go back to the zoo,” would have been unimaginable in public discourse. Yet, these statements were made recently by political leaders, namely Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, and Jair Bolsonaro, respectively. Given the changing sociopolitical landscape and global concerns about the increasing proliferation of hate speech via social media, it is now time to focus on blatant and hostile forms of language discrimination and consider the potential negative consequences it has on both the marginalized groups at the receiving end of such language and the society at large.
This article is a preliminary attempt to bring together research from different traditions in social psychology, specifically socio-cognitive and discursive psychology to provide an overview on blatant language discrimination, including its psychological antecedents and consequences. After providing a working definition of derogatory language and describing its prevalence, we discuss hate speech as a particular expansive and fast-spreading form of language discrimination, often directed not only at social categories and their members, but at entire belief systems. We then ask how derogatory speech acts are motivated and what psychological and social functions they may serve. In the following section we focus on the effects of derogatory language and hate speech on targets and bystanders and then consider the relatively recent literature on how targeted groups may respond to such language by confrontation and by reappropriation, transforming negative slurs into a language of resistance. Finally, we identify future challenges for social psychologists in this field, namely the need for more integrative cross-disciplinary research to stem the increasing proliferation of hate speech in online communication.
The Language of Discrimination: Definition, Contexts, and Targets
For the purposes of this review, we define derogatory language as any disparaging statement referring to a social category as a whole or to its members. Such language may consist of entire sentences or specific labels, often referring to physical traits (“nigger,” “darkie,” “cunt”), to cultural habits (“holy roller,” “kraut”), or to the animal world (“cockroach,” “bitch”). Defined broadly, derogatory language includes any type of insinuation and allegation about members of a given social category that explicitly ridicules or insults them. As defined here, derogatory language embraces numerous phenomena that have been studied under more specific labels (e.g., ethnophaulisms, ethnic or racial slurs, sexist language, homophobic epithets, verbal bullying, etc.). It also includes hate speech, an extreme form of derogatory language, which constitutes a line of research on its own and which involves the expression of hate and/or the encouragement of violence against others based on their real or assumed membership in a given category. Given the increasing prevalence of hate speech, its specific collocation in online communication, and the legal problems it poses, we will discuss this type of language discrimination in a separate section.
Which social identities may be targeted by explicit derogatory language? Theoretically any social category is at risk, including those in power (e.g., the “elite,” the “establishment”), but the risk seems inversely related to a group’s social status and size. Starting from Mullen’s (Mullen & Smyth, 2004; Mullen et al., 2001) groundbreaking work on immigrant groups, it has been shown that, everything else being equal, derogatory labels are more numerous, more frequently used and more offensive, the smaller and the less familiar the social group is, and/or the lower its status in society. For instance, in Western countries, derogatory language is more likely to be used against religious minorities (e.g., Jews and Muslims) than against religious majority groups (e.g., Christians; for an overview see Nadim & Fladmoe, 2016). Moreover, recent studies suggest that those at the intersection of two or more minority categories, such as Muslim women or Black gay men, over-proportionally attract offensive or hateful comments (e.g., Morales et al., 2019).
Although these minorities may not pose concrete threats over limited resources such as jobs, they may be seen as posing symbolic threats to cultural norms and values (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).
Hate Speech: Taking Language Discrimination to the Extreme
Among the different forms of language discrimination, hate speech has a special status due to the following reasons: (a) it can incite, promote or justify hatred and violence to larger audiences, (b) it is mainly propagated through social media, (c) it often has a broader scope than derogatory language used in interpersonal discourse (for instance, targeting not only social groups and their members but also entire belief systems), and (d) it relies on a wider range of rhetorical tools and arguments (for instance, by evoking conspiracy theories).
The accessibility and anonymity that digital media enable has made spreading hate an epidemic that is rapidly changing social norms about the open and public expression of blatant and hostile prejudice (Bilewicz & Soral, 2020). Compared to off-line communication (e.g., face-to-face interactions, leaflets, political speeches), social-media content can be produced instantaneously, can reach large numbers of people (see reposting or retweeting), and leaves traces over time. All of this makes it a particularly powerful tool for hate speech (for a discussion see Brown, 2018). These characteristics can be exploited strategically, for instance through the use of trolls, 1 to spread hate messages. It is therefore not surprising that the widespread proliferation of hate speech via digital media especially by far-right groups has attracted increasing public concern and multidisciplinary research. Like derogatory speech, hate speech targets minority groups based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and religion. While derogatory labels, slurs, and offensive metaphors are central features of hate speech, it is typically more expansive containing arguments, conspiratorial narratives and beliefs that justify collective hate. This makes hate speech conducive to qualitative discursive approaches that analyze the rhetorical and ideological patterns that legitimize the expression of hate. In this section, we examine research informed by these approaches to detail the linguistic properties of such language.
The 21st century has witnessed a rise of populist radical right, anti-immigration, and nationalist parties around the world some of which have attracted significant electoral support. Recently, far-right groups have extended their hostile rhetoric to Muslim minorities in their respective countries and to Islam as a religion or belief system (Pettersson, 2019; Sakki & Pettersson, 2016; Verkuyten, 2013; Wood & Finlay, 2008). Muslim immigrants and refugees are depicted as holding authoritarian and misogynist values that threaten Western, liberal democratic values (Sakki & Pettersson, 2016; Verkuyten, 2013). Muslim immigrants are also represented in such discourse as undermining the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of Western liberal nation states (Mudde, 2007). In such discourse, the term “Islamization” is often used pejoratively to denote the perceived cultural and ethnic threats posed by the presence of Muslim people in the West.
In line with this idea, discursive research has identified how hate speech in far-right political discourse is shifting away from demonizing people as a category to demonizing belief systems. For example, Verkuyten’s (2013) analysis of Geert Wilders’ (leader of the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands) anti Muslim rhetoric demonstrates how he consistently rejected accusations of hate by emphasizing that he is not against Muslim people per se but Islam as an ideology. For example: I make a distinction between the ideology, the religion Islam, and the people. I have nothing against Muslims. I have nothing against people. I have a problem with the Islamic ideology (cited in Verkuyten, 2013, p. 351).
Burke (2018) identified similar discursive strategies in the discourse of far-right party Britain First, following terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, restricting their Islamophobic discourse to “Islamic extremism.” This rhetorical device—rejecting Islam as an ideology rather than Muslims as a people—allows far right groups to project an identity as reasonable and rational, and their hostility morally justifiable.
Hate speech is also characterized by conspiratorial narratives that justify outgroup hate and in extreme cases, violence (Wood & Finlay, 2008). For example, the email message below, was sent to associates of Anders Breivik just before he killed 76 people in Norway in 2011.
We, the patriotic Europeans, will continue to effectively revolt against the “Nazis of our time”; the cultural Marxist/multiculturalist elites, who are leading us to the cultural slaughterhouse by selling us into Muslim slavery.
Conspiratorial theories that the political left, multiculturalism, and the elites are working together to threaten the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of the nation are common tropes in contemporary hate speech. In this email we see most of the social functions central to derogatory language: specifically, prejudice perpetuation, dehumanization (“Muslim slavery”), and ingroup cohesion (“we, patriotic Europeans”), as we discuss below.
The Social Functions of Derogatory Language
Why do people use derogatory language and hateful speech and what psychological and social functions does it serve? Researchers have identified the psychological antecedents of disparaging language and hate speech (for an overview of relevant psychological theories see Walters et al., 2016). These include (a) personality variables such as right-wing authoritarian personality, social dominance orientation, and the motivation to express prejudice (Forscher, 2015), (b) affective or emotional states specifically directed at the target such as hate, contempt, disgust, and feelings of intergroup threat (Gerstenfeld, 2002), and (c) more general (target-unspecific) motivations, such as thrill seeking (McDevitt et al., 2002) and self-esteem maintenance (Golec de Zavala et al., 2020). Moreover, psychological research has identified likely social functions served by derogatory language that can be grouped into five main categories: prejudice perpetuation; maintenance of status hierarchies; legitimization of violence against outgroups; norm and role compliance; and ingroup cohesion. We are not claiming that people engage in language-based discrimination with these aims in mind but, rather, that these are the primary social functions and consequences of disparaging language, which may well operate outside of people’s awareness and intention (see Burford-Rice & Augoustinos, 2017). To illustrate these functions, we will briefly and selectively review the relevant literature.
First, discriminatory language is one way to activate and perpetuate prejudice against minority groups. This mechanism is illustrated by a set of studies in which people were exposed to, or subliminally primed with, homophobic labels, without being personally the target of the slur (e.g., Bianchi et al., 2019; Fasoli, Maass et al., 2015). These and related studies compared homophobic labels (e.g., “fag”) with neutral category labels describing the same category (e.g., “gay”). This line of research coherently shows that both derogatory (e.g., “fag”) and neutral category labels (e.g., “gay”) activate stereotypes and they do so to approximately equal degrees. However, derogatory labels are much more likely than neutral category labels to trigger a strongly negative affective and evaluative reaction. Similarly, Bilewicz and Soral (2020) found that digital media users (i.e., the media users more exposed to hate speech) reported higher levels of Islamophobia, a relationship explained by greater acceptance of hate speech. Thus, derogatory labels seem to specifically affect prejudice, producing a more negative explicit and implicit evaluation of the group, but they do not activate stereotypes any more than neutral category labels.
The second function concerns the maintenance of existing group hierarchies. Derogatory language is intrinsically linked to social hierarchies, both in its use and its effect. Compared to members of socially subordinate groups, those of dominant groups are more likely to use racial slurs, are less likely to be at the receiving end of such language discrimination and, importantly, are less likely to speak up when overhearing others use racial slurs (Rosette et al., 2013; for exceptions see later section on confronting). At the same time, slurs are considered more offensive when directed against low status groups because people anticipate a stronger emotional reaction in this case (Henry et al., 2014). Thus, the asymmetrical use of disparaging language not only reflects the existing social stratification, but it also contributes to maintaining the power differential between dominant and subordinate groups. This is evident in the case of heterosexual participants showing more outgroup discrimination in resource allocation after exposure to homophobic labels (Fasoli, Maass et al., 2015). This may also explain why people of dominant groups (e.g., White people), especially when high in social dominance orientation, react negatively against slur reappropriation by the target group (e.g., Black people: O’Dea, 2019).
The fact that slurs are mainly used against members of low status groups, therefore, reinforces existing hierarchies. To quote Simpson (2013, p. 7), “the best way to make sense of the claim that hate speech in general inflicts harm on people, is to think of hate speech as something that contributes to (identity-based) social hierarchies.” Slurs not only keep social minorities in their subordinate position, but also assure the privileged position of the dominant group.
Third, derogatory language and hate speech are tools to legitimize violence and social exclusion, either by dehumanizing outgroups or by portraying them as a threat to the ingroup. Dehumanization generally involves the most extreme language forms, such as hate speech, the use of animal or object metaphors (Haslam, 2006) and, more generally, slurs of low complexity (Leader et al., 2009; Simon & Greenberg, 1996). These language forms signal that the target person is excluded from humankind or that those belonging to the same category cannot be considered full members of the human species, as they lack some of its essential features (e.g., intelligence, verbal abilities, specifically human emotions). Dehumanizing verbal attacks generally address people “for who they are, not for what they have done” (Fischer et al., 2018, p. 315). That is, they refer to “essential” internal qualities (e.g., ape-ness) rather than to specific actions, which makes defense very difficult. Verbal attacks of this sort are often accompanied by equally dehumanizing images as in the case of animal metaphors (see Haslam et al., 2011).
The dehumanizing narratives and images have been documented, among others, for homophobia (Fasoli et al., 2016), anti-Semitism (Volpato et al., 2010) and racism (Goff et al., 2008). For instance, exposing participants to homophobic labels (e.g., “faggot”), rather than to neutral category labels (e.g., “gay”) or generic insults (e.g., “asshole”), increased their implicit dehumanization of gay men as a social category. Fasoli et al. (2016) conclude that “homophobic epithets foster dehumanization in ways that other insults or labels do not” (p. 237). Different authors have argued that language- and image-based denial of humanity ultimately serves to free people from moral restraints and to legitimize violence (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012). History is replete with examples of how hateful discourse generates a fertile breeding ground for intergroup violence and at the most serious end, genocide. Hostile and persistent anti-Semitic propaganda by the Nazi regime exploited longstanding folklore narratives that depicted Jews as “vermin” and less than human, comparing them to “parasites” or “rats” (Volpato, 2017). Likewise, Indigenous peoples in the Americas, Africa, and Australia were subject to massacres and inhumane government policies, all of which were predicated on the colonizers’ beliefs of their racial superiority (see Volpato, 2017, for a historical overview). Such examples are not limited to the distant past: as described by Donohue (2018), the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was precipitated and fueled by media calls to exterminate the Tutsi (labeled Invenzi, cockroaches) and as recently as 2017, the Rohingya minority in Myanmar has been persecuted by state sanctioned violence fueled by Facebook posts depicting them as dogs and pigs (Dussich, 2018).
A different language strategy to justify hostile acts against outgroups is to portray them as a threat, against which the ingroup can legitimately defend itself. How hate can be morally justified on the basis of threat, is at the heart of Reicher et al.’s (2008) social identity model of collective hate. The model identifies five steps through which speakers justify and legitimate group hate: (a) defining a cohesive ingroup with clear definitional boundaries (who are we and who is included?); (b) exclusion (who does not belong?); (c) constructing the outgroup as a threat to the ingroup (how do they threaten us, our way of life?); (d) representing the ingroup as virtuous (we are better, superior to them); and (e) celebrating the ingroup’s right to defend itself from the outgroup (we have the right to protect and defend who we are).
Reicher et al. (2008, p. 1327) argue that social psychology has focused almost exclusively on how outgroups are perceived and treated yet how “we define the ingroup is as crucial, if not more crucial . . . in generating hatred.” Hate speech flourishes in communicative environments where the audience identifies strongly with the common ingroup identity provided by the speaker, perceives this shared ingroup identity to be under threat—threatening our values, culture and “way of life”—and thus feels justified to not only reject the outgroup, but to actively protect and defend the ingroup from these perceived threats. In extreme cases such as genocide, eliminating the outgroup is seen as virtuous, indeed, a moral duty, to preserve and maintain the ingroup’s existence. In this way, atrocious acts become celebrated as the right thing to do. Indeed, when far-right leaders have been prosecuted for hate speech, they have projected themselves as martyrs who have stood up for freedom of speech and the rights of “ordinary people” against dangerous “others” (Pettersson, 2019). Paradoxically, Jacobs and van Spanje (2020) have found that prosecuting anti-immigration European leaders for hate speech can increase their electoral support. Together, portraying outgroups as either subhuman, and hence as being outside of the sphere of human morality, or as threating constitute two opposite, but complementary strategies to justify hostile actions, including atrocities, against outgroups.
The above social functions of derogatory language (perpetuation of prejudice, maintenance of social hierarchies, and legitimization of hostile actions) all involve the outgroup as the primary target. However, derogatory language—frequently used in intragroup discourse—may also serve ingroup goals, quite independently of the effect it has on outgroups. Two social functions figure prominently among these, namely the establishment and maintenance of ingroup norms and the increase in ingroup cohesion.
In intragroup communication, derogatory language serves to establish and maintain norms and regulate role behaviors that are considered socially appropriate. A prominent example are homophobic epithets such as “fag” or “poofter,” that are regularly used to insult gender non-conforming men and that children, in many cultures, use as a generic insult long before they have any notion of sexual orientation. According to Plummer (2001), these epithets are initially used with very broad meanings (being feminine, weak, soft, acting like a girl, being studious and artistic, being a loser, not confirming to peer expectations, showing low peer group loyalty) that define male gender norms and that vividly discourage deviation from these norms. Given that they are experienced as particularly offensive, such homophobic epithets (different from neutral category labels) set the stage for subsequent compliance to masculinity norms (Carnaghi et al., 2011).
Finally, disparaging language is part of a collective narrative that fosters ingroup cohesion and that is used as a sign of comradeship and shared group membership. It connects like-minded people in defense of a common identity and in the pursuit of a common cause (Douglas, 2007). Together, the literature suggests that derogatory and hateful language serves multiple purposes and fulfill distinct social functions in the construction and maintenance of intergroup relations.
The Consequences of Derogatory Language and Hate Speech
The effects of derogatory language and hate speech are often disregarded as “only words.” Although spreading hate does not always lead to violence, Allport (1954/1979, p. 57) emphasized how violence is always preceded by verbal hostility. Allport argues this eloquently in the quote below: Although most barking (antilocution) does not lead to biting, yet there is never a bite without previous barking. Fully seventy years of political anti-Semitism of the verbal order preceded the discriminatory Nuremberg Laws passed by the Hitler regime. Soon after these laws were passed the violent program of extermination began. Here we see the not infrequent progression: antilocution > discrimination >. . .violence.
There is much to be concerned, therefore, about the increasing proliferation of uncivil language and, in particular, of hate speech on digital/social media. Narratives of conspiracy and hate can spread easily and quickly to all levels of society, including everyday discussions in online forums (e.g., Nortio et al., 2020). The increasing use of social media platforms has coincided with increases in the reported incidence of hate crimes throughout the world. For example, in 2018/19 there were over 103,379 hate crimes recorded by the police in England and Wales, an increase of 10% on the previous year (British Home Office, 2019). Extremist websites have also proliferated: the first to be launched was stormfront.org in 1995 by White nationalist and former Ku Klux Klan member Donald Blac; by 2010, there was an estimated 8,000 hate sites. Such sites enable the recruitment of members, facilitate the spread of hate and the building of extremist subcultures through private message boards, listservs, and email (Banks, 2010). Hate sites also target other minorities, such as women and LGBTQIA+ people, and have become vehicles through which misogynist and heterosexist discourse are disseminated. It therefore becomes essential to analyze the effects of derogatory language and hate speech both on targets as the direct victims and on bystanders. 2
Effects on Targets
Even though targets of hate speech recount feelings of pain and the knowledge of the potential long-term consequences of these episodes, in their accounts a feeling of resignation is also present, as if the attacks were inevitable; so much so that victims may trivialize the event and not acknowledge it as discrimination (Browne et al., 2011; Greenland et al., 2018). Nonetheless, the toll of verbal derogation is still present on the mental and physical health of victims. Diary studies by Swim and colleagues, for example, evidenced negative affects (fear, anxiety, and/or lower self-esteem) in victims of sexist, racist and heterosexist language and prejudice (e.g., Swim et al., 2009). Research focusing on the experiences of LGBTQIA+ students shows that being a target of heterosexist language and microaggressions is linked to problems within the academic setting as well as physical and mental health issues (see Table 1 for examples).
Effects of Heterosexist Language and Microaggressions on LGBTQIA+ Students: Examples of Correlational Studies.
Interestingly, it appears that both heterosexual and non-heterosexual victims respond similarly to being subject to homophobic language (Silverschanz et al., 2008) and that, among peers, these responses are linked to the target’s awareness of the harmful, rather than harmless, intentions of the speaker (Slåtten et al., 2015). Derogatory language is also associated with risk behaviors, such as smoking (Ylioja et al., 2018), substance abuse (Silverschanz et al., 2008), and even attempted suicide (Woodford et al., 2018). “Hate speech kills,” write Mullen and Smyth (2004, p. 346), who show that the probability of suicide is greater among immigrant groups targeted by ethnopaulisms.
With regards to other-related emotions, anger is common in targets (e.g., Browne et al., 2011; Swim et al., 2009). Anger toward sexist language and comments, for example, predicts intentions to protest (Paladino et al., 2014), but only when sexist comments are recognized as such. Subtler forms of sexism, such as modern and benevolent sexism, elicit less anger and subsequently less inclination to engage in collective action (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009). Interestingly, in one study, when women were asked to recall episodes of sexist comments, there was no difference between hostile and benevolent sexism in terms of affective reactions and time taken to recover from the event (Bosson et al., 2010). This suggests that blatant hostility only makes a difference when the target is not the direct victim of the discriminatory event.
Effects on Bystanders
Unlike targets, bystanders who are more exposed to hate speech become desensitized to it and consequently perceive it as less offensive and more acceptable (Soral et al., 2018; Winiewski et al., 2017). This may lead them to not recognize how the derogatory language they are exposed to affects their own attitudes and behaviors, such as nonverbal cues (Goodman et al., 2008), charity giving (Ford et al., 2008) and radical political attitudes and behaviors (Soral et al., 2018; Winiewski et al., 2017). Exposure to derogatory language against a specific minority group also leads to greater distancing, both physical and social, from its members. In one study, after being subliminally exposed to homophobic epithets, heterosexual individuals tended to sit further away from a gay man they expected to meet (Fasoli et al., 2016). Furthermore, people more frequently exposed to hate speech toward a certain community are also less willing to have social contact with its members (Winiewski et al., 2017; see also Soral et al., 2018). Mullen and Rice (2003) note that during a 150-year period, lower complexity of ethnopaulisms used in the USA toward immigrant groups predicted lower rates of intermarriage, fraternal associations and immigration quotas of the groups themselves. In other words, the fewer semantic categories were employed to attack the ethnic group through slurs (and consequently, the simpler were cognitive representations of that group), the more these groups were excluded from society by the majority (see also Leader et al., 2009 for experimental evidence).
As for perceptions of the speaker, recognizing language as sexist decreases their likeability (Biernat & Eidelman, 2007) and can increase willingness to protest (Paladino et al., 2014). Nevertheless, using offensive language may also be advantageous: when talking about social categories disliked by the listeners, politically incorrect speakers are perceived as more authentic (Rosenblum et al., 2019).
Finally, derogatory language may affect societies beyond discrimination: people (especially youth) more exposed to hate speech deem other non-normative behaviors as more socially and morally acceptable, as well as worth imitating (Winiewski et al., 2017). Thus, according to Winiewski et al. (2017), derogatory language may elicit an effect similar to that described by the broken windows theory, that is, that small indicators of disorder encourage anti-social behaviors and crime by signaling that those behaviors are the norm (see Welsh et al., 2015).
Reacting to Language Discrimination: Confrontation and Reappropriation
How can targeted minorities cope with verbal insults and hateful comments and react to them? As of today, recent literature has identified two potential strategies of facing verbal discrimination, namely confrontation and reappropriation.
Confrontation
One way to react to derogatory language and hate speech is to confront the offender. However, the small but growing experimental literature on confrontation suggests that confronting the person who is using derogatory (e.g., racist, sexist) and/or hateful language is not easy and even non-targeted bystanders often fail to do so (e.g., Dickter & Newton, 2013). Whether or not bystanders confront the person making the remark, either online or offline, depends on the complex interplay between situational (status of offender, ambiguity of remark, risk) and individual difference variables (such as attitudes toward the targeted group, optimism, self-esteem, certainty of own social identity and the like; e.g., Dessel et al., 2017; Weber & Dickter, 2015). Obstacles are even greater for targets trying to confront the person using derogatory and/or hateful language. Confronting the person is likely to be associated with social costs, including to be seen as a trouble-maker and to be disliked (e.g., Shelton & Stewart, 2004). Although targets may believe that they are able to face these risks and confront the perpetrator anyway, in reality they are often reluctant to do so especially in situations where important outcomes such as getting a job or making a good impression are at stake (Shelton & Stewart, 2004). What makes the situation even more complex is that non-confrontation also comes with certain (mainly intra-personal) costs. As argued by Shelton et al. (2006), targets of prejudice who decide not to confront the perpetrator may regret their decision and may feel guilty and disappointed with themselves as a consequence. Thus, the dilemma of confronting or not confronting the offender is challenging and, even if targets of slurs or hate speech opt for confrontation, they still need to choose between blatant (speaking up) and more subtle, nonverbal expressions of disapproval such as head shakes, facial expressions or brief interruptions of the conversational flow (e.g., Koudenburg et al., 2013).
Reappropriation
Another way in which targeted minorities may cope with verbal derogation is the reappropriation or reclaiming of derogatory group labels (e.g., Wang et al., 2017). Galinsky et al. (2003) define reappropriation as an act of social creativity, that involves the revaluation of a negative label through the voluntary, non-derogatory attribution of that label to the ingroup as a symbol of pride, transforming its meaning “from demeaning to empowering” (Wang et al., 2017, p. 78; see also Cepollaro & Zeman, 2020). The word “queer,” for instance, once used as a slur toward homosexual people, is now an umbrella term for the non-heterosexual, non-cisgender community (also known as “queer community”). “Slut” and “dyke,” on the other hand, while still maintaining their derogatory function, have been reclaimed by women and queer women in parades and protests (e.g., “SlutWalk”; Currans, 2017). Although the literature usually considers reappropriated slurs as a single category, Jeshion (2020) identifies two kinds, “pride reclamation” and “insular reclamation.” The former describes reappropriated slurs that express pride and eventually become group descriptors to be used by the outgroup as well (e.g., “queer,” “black”). The latter instead includes reappropriated slurs that elicit camaraderie and solidarity within the ingroup in spite of the shared oppression, and thus cannot be employed by the outgroup (e.g., “nigga,” “bitch”).
There is still a lively debate around language reappropriation, not only due to skepticism around the possibility or the utility of reclaiming slurs (e.g., Gaucher et al., 2015), but also from a theoretical perspective. In fact, philosophers of language have adopted either a polysemy view, that states that in order to be reclaimed the slur must have a stable new meaning, or an echoic view, according to which the word can maintain its meaning while being dissociated with the discrimination it evokes. Thus, according to a polysemy perspective, reclamation only takes place if several people use the new meaning, whereas according to the echoic perspective, small acts of reclamation are possible and can eventually lead to polysemy (Cepollaro & Zeman, 2020).
In their model of reappropriation, Galinsky et al. (2003) adopt an echoic perspective and argue that the appropriation process includes three steps. The first is individual self-labeling, given that the individual has the opportunity and sufficient self-esteem: self-labeling prevents others from using the label, defuses its negative implications, and maintains self-esteem. In fact, Galinsky and colleagues show that self-labeling with slurs elicits feelings and perceptions of power of both the individual and the whole group. Furthermore, in their studies, participants believed that self-labeling led the outgroup member to feel less powerful. Self-labeling also leads individuals to perceive the label as less offensive (Fasoli et al., 2019), as well as less negative, an effect mediated by perceived power (Galinsky et al., 2013), and group identification (Whitson et al., 2017). Fasoli et al. (2019), on the other hand, did not find differences between gay speakers’ perceived empowerment in the self-labeling and other-labeling conditions. This apparent contradiction may be explained by the fact that the authors used the derogatory label “fag,” presumably an example of insular reclamation, whereas previous literature used “queer,” an example of pride reclamation (see Jeshion, 2020); it may be that empowerment is only linked with perceived pride, and not with feelings of camaraderie and solidarity. Together, these studies suggest that reclaiming is a risky strategy whose success depends on the larger social context.
The second step is collective self-labeling, which is part of a positive feedback loop with group cohesion and group consciousness (Galinsky et al., 2003): in fact, group identification increases willingness to self-label, just as self-labeling increases group identification (Whitson et al., 2017). As for group consciousness, in one study women who imagined hearing the word “slut” during a feminist march (compared to a typical context) reported lower endorsement of rape myths (Gaucher et al., 2015), showing that they were more receptive of the ingroup’s issues. According to Galinsky and colleagues, a necessary condition for collective self-labeling is the impermeability of the group, so that members cannot rely on individual strategies to increase their status.
The final step in Galinsky and colleagues’ model is acknowledgement by the outgroup that the label has now positive implications. For instance, O’Dea and Saucier (2020) show that members of the outgroup (i.e., White people) perceive more positively reappropriated slurs that the ingroup (i.e., Black people) directs at the outgroup, interpreting them as signs of respect and inclusion, consistently with the echoic perspective. The ultimate consequence of this process, according to the authors, can be the “cultural reevaluation of the stigmatized group” (Galinsky et al., 2003, p. 242).
Future Directions
Most Western liberal democracies have enacted legislation against hate speech, the most notable exception being the United States where hate speech is protected under the First Amendment Right to free speech in the American Constitution. In contrast, under European Union Law, hate speech is illegal and concerted efforts have been implemented to regulate such speech across European signatories (Clark & Grech, 2017; European Commission, 2020). Nonetheless, curtailing free speech has become a contested political issue and one that generates heated public debate. Free speech advocates routinely complain that “political correctness” is constraining what people are allowed to say in public and that this constitutes unacceptable censorship (Maass et al., 2013). Competing democratic values are invoked in these debates, around the rights of minorities to be protected from fear and violence, so that they can participate freely in a democratic society, versus individual rights to freedom of expression, with far-right leaders depicting themselves as defending the rights of the majority to speak frankly about their concerns, and anxieties.
To fully understand how derogatory language, and in particular hate speech, has gained traction and social acceptance a more inclusive theoretical and empirical research agenda is required in social psychology, one that combines quantitative and experimental research with qualitative discursive approaches that analyze the situated and interactional use of derogatory language in naturalistic settings. Despite the epistemological and methodological differences of these traditions, several researchers have demonstrated how they can be brought together creatively to produce a nuanced and rich understanding of how inequality and power is produced and legitimated in language (e.g., Reicher et al., 2008).
In particular, we see a number of directions in which future research could evolve. First, it may be useful to develop a multi-dimensional classification of communication settings in which language discrimination occurs. Such a system may, among others, distinguish intra-, inter- versus mixed group settings, verbal versus written language production, private versus public settings, as well as the characteristics of specific media platforms, including the degree of anonymity they provide. Drawing on prior social psychological work on de-individuation, norm compliance and accountability, this may allow more precise predictions about the likelihood of uncivil communication. Such a classification system may also help to understand the role of technology in language production. The very format of social networking services may, to some degree, determine the kind of message that is likely to be produced by its users. For instance, twitter facilitates short and direct messages that are comparably simple, impulsive and often uncivil (Ott, 2017).
Second, given that people live in (social) media bubbles that expose them very selectively to specific types of messages (e.g., via social networks or via indexing through hashtags), we believe that greater attention ought to be paid to local norms and their development and change over time. We agree with Spears et al. (2007) that offensive computer-mediated messages are more likely to reflect group norms than de-individuation processes. Such norms not only define whether derogatory and hate messages are acceptable, but also what kinds of offenses are tolerable (e.g., derogatory vs. objectifying sexist slurs, Fasoli, Carnaghi et al., 2015). Considering the lively controversy surrounding legal interventions to limit hate speech, norms may provide a basis for alternative intervention strategies to counter hate speech, possibly as part of broader media and information literacy training programs (for an overview see Gagliardone et al., 2015).
Third, it may be beneficial to broaden the scope of research on derogatory and hateful language beyond minority groups. In keeping with the definitions of hate speech offered by international organizations such as the Council of Europe or the United Nations, most psychological research has focused on language discrimination of small and/or low status minority groups (e.g., immigrants, women, LGTBQIA+, religious minorities, people with disability). However, there is now increasing evidence that hate speech may also target individuals who, for personal or professional reasons, publicly express opinions and take stances on social, political or economic issues. For instance, journalists have become a prime target of verbal insults and threats, with severe consequences for media freedom (e.g., Clark & Grech, 2017). Just like hate crime (Craig, 2002), hate speech curtails the behavior and freedom of expression of victims (and their colleagues), often leading to self-censorship that poses a threat to the basic principles of democracy (Clark & Grech, 2017). Thus, derogatory or hate speech against public figures such as politicians and journalists deserve a space in social psychological research.
Fourth, future research may draw a clearer line between offensive or hateful language produced by single individuals or by organizations. There is now evidence that a portion of hate speech is strategically produced by organizations with specific political aims in mind, including the intimidation of political opponents, the creation of religious outrage (George, 2016), or the influence of election outcomes (George, 2020). We believe that such deliberate and well-orchestrated use of hate speech for sociopolitical reasons, often spread via political trolls, is qualitatively different from the spontaneous and often impulsive hate messages produced by individuals. Organized (vs. individual) hate speech deserves attention both under a psychological and legal perspective, similar to the way organized crime is seen as distinct from individually committed crimes.
Finally, given the multifaceted phenomenon and its frequent collocation in social media, interdisciplinary research efforts are needed that involve researchers from psychology, media studies and communication, sociolinguistics and law. The advent of big data has also made it increasingly imperative for social psychologists to collaborate with experts in IT and computer science, who are developing algorithms for identifying hate speech, to understand the process through which users are selectively exposed to certain messages, and responding to regulatory requirements to restrict such communication.
Conclusion
Our review suggests that derogatory and hateful language is a widespread, increasing phenomenon that targets mainly minorities and groups with less power (as it maintains social hierarchies and ingroup-outgroup dynamics) and that affects not only victims, but also bystanders and the society at large. We hope that this article paves the way for future multi-method work on derogatory language: how it proliferates, its psychological and social consequences, how victims and bystanders cope with the phenomenon, and how groups and society at large face up to its challenge.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We thank Dagmar Stahlberg and Fabio Fasoli for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
