Towards an Economy of Complexity: Derrida,Morin and Bataille

Abstract

In this article we explore the possibility of viewing complex systems, as well as the models we create of such systems, as operating within a particular type of economy. The type of economy we aim to establish here is inspired by Jacques Derrida’s reading of George Bataille’s notion of a general economy. We restrict our discussion to the philosophical use of the word ‘economy’. This reading tries to overcome the idea of an economy as restricted to a single logos or master narrative. At the same time, however, Derrida illustrates that we always operate from a restricted framework and as such something will always escape and interrupt our understanding of the world. In this paper we will propose that one could use Derrida’s reading of Bataille, along with notions such as différance, in order to move towards an understanding of complex systems as existing within certain sets of possibilities and constraints. We argue that this view of an economy agrees with the work of Edgar Morin on complexity and his conceptualization of general complexity.

Keywords

Bataille complexity Derrida difference general economy heterogeneous Morin

Introduction

There has been a sustained engagement with complexity and complex systems at least since the second half of the 1980s. In the last decade or so, this engagement has shifted from more traditional and reductionist approaches to approaches which emphasize the contingent nature of complex systems. It is argued that the characteristics of such systems are context dependent and irreducible to their constituent parts. Byrne (2005), Cilliers (1998), Smith and Jenks (2006) and Urry (2005) provide some overview of these developments.

In summary, the following general description of complexity is normally given: A complex system is defined by a network of rich interactions which change over time. It is not the number of parts interacting which define complexity but rather the nature of their interactions: these interactions are non-linear. The fact of non-linearity has at least two implications. In the first place, since the law of superposition does not hold, a complex set of non-linear relationships cannot be reduced to a simpler set which is equivalent. This is referred to as the ‘incompressibility’ of complexity (Cilliers, 1998: 9–10). Secondly, there is not a linear relationship between cause and effect. Small causes can have large effects and vice versa (for a discussion on nonlinearity see Borgo and Goguen, 2005; Knyazeva, 2004).

Furthermore, complex systems are usually open systems, i.e. they interact with their environment. Instead of simply being a characteristic of the system itself, the extent of the system is also determined by the purpose of the description of the system, and is thus influenced by the position of the observer (Cilliers, 1998: 4). This is an important aspect of complex systems. The boundaries which we draw between the system and its environment are often a product of the description we use of such systems. What we exclude from analysis has just as strong an impact on our understanding of the system as that which is included (for a discussion of the radical openness of complex systems see below and also Chu et al., 2003; for a discussion of issues involved in observing complex systems see Rasch, 1991).

An important consequence of these characteristics is that our knowledge of complex systems is always context dependent, determined by the models we construct of such systems (see Byrne, 2005). Strong reductionism, where the aim is to reduce the complexity faced to a neat, comprehensive model or algorithm, becomes impossible. We cannot know complex systems completely (Cilliers, 2002, 2005b). This implies that the possibilities which a model holds will always be the product of the frames we apply because we cannot comprehensively determine the limits of the system and hence accurately define the field of possibilities. The use of words such as ‘models’, ‘exclusion’, and ‘partial description’ by no means implies that we can contrast this with the ‘complete’ or ‘comprehensive’ view of the ‘system itself’ which we may have access to outside of the problems of modelling.¹ Modelling is not only a limitation of epistemology; it is also an ontological problem. A ‘pure’ description or ‘full’ presence will always elude us, mainly due to the ontological characteristics of complex systems described above. Indeed, the problems of complexity arise precisely because of the inevitable contingency of our existence.

In this paper we are trying to develop a means through which we can explain the simultaneously constrained and excessive nature of complex systems. We try to develop the notion of economy as a means to understand Morin’s (2007: 11) contention that a system is both more and less than the sum of its parts. In doing this we aim to explore and forge some links between recent work in complexity theory as exemplified by Edgar Morin (1992, 2007), and the work of Jacques Derrida (1977, 1978, 1982, 1992, 2004 [1972]) and Georges Bataille (1989, 1991, 1993). It will be shown that the complex thought of Edgar Morin shows striking similarities to elements of deconstruction, and that insights from Derrida can be used to augment our understanding of complexity.² The key notion which will be examined is that of an ‘economy’. It is important to note here that when we use the term ‘economy’ we are not referring to the discipline of ‘economics’ or ‘economic systems’ per se. Instead we use the term as it is used by Bataille (adopted from Hegel) and Derrida, in its philosophical sense, as developed by this tradition of critical thinkers (see below). We will attempt to answer the following questions: Why is the notion necessary when we talk of systems? How does one understand the difference between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ systems and between ‘general’ and ‘restricted’ economies? Are these notions related and what do they imply for the way in which we engage with complex phenomena?

In thinking about complex phenomena, the notion of a ‘frame’ has often been used as a tool to describe how we exclude certain phenomena from our view in order for us to develop a model of the phenomenon we are exploring. However, as will become clear below, we consider the notion of a frame too limiting as it fails to take into consideration the various sets of relationships which are established in the process of modelling. These relationships include both the sets of relationships inside the model as well as the sets of relationships established with that which is excluded from the model. The metaphor of a general economy, as read by Derrida, helps us out of this conceptual blind spot.

The argument in this paper moves through five stages. First, we give a general introduction to the notion of an economy. We try to give a brief outline of how we use the term and which aspects of the term pertain to modelling complex systems. Following this we provide an overview as to the difficulties of modelling complex systems. We try to describe the sets of relationships which are established in the process of modelling, both those which occur inside the model and those established with that which is excluded from the model. Thirdly, we look at the distinction Edgar Morin establishes between ‘restricted’ and ‘general’ complexity. In this discussion we illustrate how it is impossible to reduce complex phenomena to simply the sum of their parts but rather argue for the fact that complex systems are always excessive and thereby incomplete. Finally, we illustrate how the view of complexity we have established here has affinities with the notion of a general economy as described by Bataille and Derrida. In this regard we propose that the notion of a ‘general economy’ as understood by Derrida is a useful aid to assist us in thinking about complex systems. In the conclusion, we aim to illustrate some of the benefits of adopting the term economy in relation to thinking about complexity.

What Is an Economy?

The notion of ‘economy’ evokes a certain set of meanings. Primarily these include usages of the term in relation to the study of economics. The dictionary definition of an ‘economy’ is twofold. In the first place, it refers to a concern with the production and consumption of resources, but it also indicates the orderly interplay between the parts of a system (Collins English Dictionary, 2006). In effect, an economy is the concern with the production and consumption of resources made possible by the orderly interplay of the parts of a system. Furthermore, the notion of economy implies limited or scarce resources which constrain not only the amount of things produced within a system but also what is produced by that system (things which are not fixed and which can change over time). A consequence of these constraints is that processes have to be developed within a system which prioritize what should be produced and in what amounts (Flemming, 1969). However, these processes, shaped by the orderly interplay between parts, not only determine what should be produced but also what can be produced. An economy then operates on the principle of a relationship of feedback (see below) between the use of limited resources (production and consumption) and what the system is able to do with these resources. This system of production, and the limited resources it exploits, produces a contingent set of priorities which favours some aspects but has to suppress or exclude others.

There is a further meaning of the word ‘economy’ which does not necessarily reflect the concern for production and consumption. In this use of the word, as the second part of the dictionary definition illustrates, an economy is more concerned with the limited sets of relationships between parts or the play between parts of a system. An economy in this regard is something internal to a system, not as concerned with the production or consumption of resources as with the constraints placed on the ability of parts to act in certain ways. This sense of the term economy affects our understanding of the general notion. An economy is dependent upon limits or constraints determined by the relationships between the components in the system. It is this, more philosophical, definition of the notion of an economy which we will be using in this paper.

The limits of an economy imply that in order for a system to produce something, it must receive in return. Indeed, it would be difficult to conceive of an economy, as an economy, that only distributes or disseminates without return. There must be constraints on how much a system can do. In a certain sense, then, an economy can be conceived of as being conservative. It aims to preserve its structure through the priorities it establishes. The means by which an economy establishes its priorities, and hence preserves its foundations, can be described as the reason of the economy (see below). These limits are not to be understood only in a negative sense. Not only are they enabling (see Cilliers, 2001: 139; Juarrero, 1999: 132–3), they are necessary for the existence of the system in the first place. Something which has no boundaries, which purports to encompass everything, is indeed nothing.

If one looks at different strategies or systems of thinking as economies, this point becomes clearer. A paradigm of thought requires that the theories or propositions which constitute it retain a certain coherence, a certain allegiance to limits which allows some components but excludes others. As a matter of fact, paradigm shifts are often initiated by the upsetting or disruption of such limits. These economies of thinking exclude that which does not suit the reason guiding the model and hence resist that which may disrupt the foundations and priorities established. For example, the shift which occurred from modernism to post-modernism was a result of the disruption of the taken-for-granted foundation of modernity, namely that of an accurately reducible world, by an economy of analysis which argued for an excess to such a foundation.

The ‘Open’ Boundaries of an Economy

For certain theorists, complex systems are conceptualized as being open to their environments, but at the same time they are operationally closed (see, for instance, Chu et al., 2003: 28; Cilliers, 2005a: 608; Morin, 2007: 10; Luhmann, 1989). We thus need to explore the idea of limits, that which makes an economy possible, in more detail. Due to the fact that we are always partial and situated observers of the phenomenon we are studying, we inevitably exclude certain aspects which may have a bearing on our analysis from that analysis. What is excluded, as mentioned above, is a result of the process of prioritization granted to certain facets of the phenomenon we are exploring. Early attempts to deal with complex problems took for granted the fact that this prioritization was natural and sufficient to explain the phenomenon under consideration. These approaches assumed that what was irrelevant to analysis did not have an essential bearing on the functioning of the system as a whole. This approach can loosely be described as ‘modernist’. They considered their models of complex systems to be comprehensive since they were based on the essential, underlying properties or structure of such systems usually, but not solely, described in mathematics. This approach could be justified by the atomistic and rationalistic tendency inherent within Western metaphysics (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Dreyfus, 1999).

The reductionist rationality assumes that some kind of coherence, some kind of ‘reason’, is necessary in order for the model to be sensible at all.³ Therefore, that which is excessive, that which is excluded, stands outside the particular logic or reason of that epistemology. In order to ensure the rational representation of what is investigated, that which is excluded is often depicted as being ‘noise’ or ‘inconsequential’, or even to be rotten or defiled in some way. The ‘other’ in this instance is marginalized in order to provide a sense of coherence and order to the model (for a discussion of this strategy in social systems see Laclau, 2005: 139–44). Thinking in this instance demands that we exclude the heterogeneous, that we exclude that which challenges the taxonomy of our thought. Rationality will structure and determine the process of exclusion.

However, that which is found outside the strict borders of our models can never be seen as a blank space or simply as noise. The process whereby a model is developed does not occur within a neutral, context-free environment. In order to function as models, our models can never contain everything of relevance. There is no a priori way of determining what is relevant and what is not (see Cilliers, 2005b: 259). What occurs inside our models cannot be easily separated from what is excluded because what we exclude from our models constitutes them as much as that which is included. Nevertheless, this should not be seen as a weak, postmodern cry for heterogeneity, as a plea for the inclusion of everybody and their best friend into the economy. Such a position is as futile as the complete exclusion of everything heterogeneous. It is by exclusion, the setting of limits, that the economies become useful to us. These limits are productive not only because they are constitutive, but also because they allow the very antagonisms within the models to function. That which is excluded makes possible the debates or differences found inside the system.

In science, for example, for a discipline such as botany to exist, for there to be debates within the discipline about the subject matter of that discipline, botanists need to behave and engage in a manner which by necessity excludes other fields from their discussion. In order to be botanists, they have to differentiate themselves from physicists, chemists and social anthropologists. This differentiation nevertheless remains problematic since it is constantly challenged. The nature of the boundary, of what is considered internal or external, is perpetually transformed by the threat of ‘the outside’ since the ‘threat’ simultaneously structures the ‘inside’.⁴ In order to give more content to this ‘double movement’, a distinction can be made between heterogeneity and difference.⁵

We will label heterogeneous that which is perceived as noise from the perspective of the system or the model itself. In other words, heterogeneity is that which, again from the perspective of the model, makes no sense or appears to bear no influence on the outcomes we aim to achieve, despite the fact that it has an influence nonetheless. Heterogeneity can be shown to carry weight within the model through a process of analysis which makes use of other frames of analysis. Heterogeneity is thus not noise or a mystical force but simply that which does not make sense from the limited perspective of this model. Following Ernesto Laclau (2005: 141), one can use the example of chess players to describe heterogeneity and difference. Difference makes the game of chess possible, the fact that two players compete with different pieces which have different capabilities in terms of how they move around the board. Difference is both the set of capabilities of the chess pieces as well as the two competing players. Heterogeneity intervenes when another person knocks over the chess board, for instance, or some event disturbs the game. The field on which the competing players were playing is now destroyed or changed.

Difference refers to the discriminations which can be made from the perspective of the model under consideration. Differences can be recognized only in terms of a common frame. For example, the difference between a dictionary and a novel occurs within the framework of what we understand as books. The difference between a dictionary and a tree requires that one shift frames of reference considerably in order to make these differences understandable (see Cilliers, 2010). To recognize heterogeneous objects one has to establish a chain of different frameworks, on different scales, which will eventually allow some comparison to emerge. Consider the following very simplified example. The notion of tree is heterogeneous to the frame ‘books’, but the frame ‘paper’ allows us to see the importance of the notion to the frame by which this heterogeneity is defined. Yet, as Bataille (1989: 98) pointed out, the inclusion of the heterogeneous as a difference within an economy necessarily destroys its radical status. As we include the heterogeneous into our models we necessarily homogenize these possibilities within current frameworks at the same time as producing other forms of heterogeneity outside the newly accepted range of differences.

There is a contextual dimension to difference and heterogeneity. Due to the adaptability of the system we cannot categorically state that something will remain heterogeneous to a system because, in a different context, it may make sense to that economy. For example, if we were building a lightweight car out of composite materials, the differences within our economies would be concerned with the different pliabilities and strengths of the materials. The colour of these materials would be heterogeneous to our discussion. However, if we were told we were now building this car in a country with a warm climate, the relative colours of the composites, such as black carbon, would begin to function as differences within our economy due to concerns with heat. What was heterogeneous to this economy now becomes a difference within that economy as it fits within the logic of the economy.⁶

An important consequence of these dynamics is that it is difficult to illustrate the incoherence and excess of any economy clearly since the language we use within models relies only on difference. In other words, the language we use within models recognizes difference, not heterogeneity, as a result of the fact that they are built around a concern for coherence. This is the reason why critiques from outside a ‘system’ are often not considered valid critiques at all by proponents working within the system. An excellent example of this is the difficulty encountered in finding a meaningful interaction between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy.

From Restricted to General Complexity

As argued above, classical science attempted to reduce the problems of complexity to a level at which the unique problems faced in complex systems are not visible. Edgar Morin (1992, 2007) argues that this restriction of the problem of complexity was achieved by relying on three explanatory principles. The first of these principles is that of epistemological determinism, which implies that all future and past events must be known within the present state of a system. The principle of determinism argues that a complex system rests on a neat historical trajectory and, based upon its current state as well as the next state description, we can trace, as well as predict, the shape of the system as it has been and will be (see also Dekker, 2010). The second explanatory principle adopted is that of reduction. Reduction is the assumption that ‘consists in knowing any composite from only the knowledge of its basic constituting elements’ (Morin, 2007: 5). The reductionist argument states that a system consists simply of a sum of its parts, that the higher or emergent properties of a system can be reduced to the characteristics of the parts which determine them. Finally, classical science argues for the explanatory principle of disjunction, which ‘consists in isolating and separating cognitive difficulties from one another, leading to the separation between disciplines, which have become hermetic from each other’ (Morin, 2007: 5). One can see that all the explanatory principles of classical science are predicated upon a very similar principle, that a scientist can objectively and comprehensively know what is essential to the functioning and survival of a system. Classical science, therefore, works on the principle of simplification. The complexity of a system is simplified to sets of laws and universal truths which operate as the foundation of science. Morin refers to this strategy as ‘restricted complexity’.

Against the approach of ‘restricted complexity’, Morin (2007) proposes the concept of ‘general complexity’. In the paradigm of general complexity the assumptions made by classical science are not taken for granted as simple truths. Although such assumptions are necessary for the process of science, it should be kept in mind that they are assumptions made in order to reduce complexity to a point where practical research becomes possible. The strategy of general complexity is to recognize this dilemma.

In opposition to reduction, complexity requires that one tries to comprehend the relations between the whole and the parts. The principle of disjunction, of separation (between objects, between disciplines, between notions, between subject and object of knowledge) should be substituted by a principle that maintains the distinction, but that tries to establish the relation. (Morin, 2007: 10–11).

General complexity points towards an epistemology of complex systems which examines the relationships between the parts as well as the parts themselves. A strong reductionism thus ceases to be possible as the focus of analysis shifts away from the parts to a consideration of the contingent sets of relationships between the parts. It is this contingency which denies simple and universal models. The best we have are models which are partial and provisional.

The simplified models of a modernist science, we argue, only recognize difference, not heterogeneity. A ‘general’ approach to complexity is one which recognizes that we have to reduce and constrain, but that the heterogeneous will remain a force which disrupts our provisional reductions. Thus, consciously or not, we make exclusions when we build models, but these exclusions always have an impact on both the system and the model. Some of these exclusions hold the potential to destroy the systematic representation of what we are modelling, but the notion of general complexity is precisely to make us aware of this. The strict disjunctions, separations and exclusions are imposed by us in order to make these systems intelligible to us.

In what follows we will propose that the economies of complex systems, along with the models we create of them, should be conceived of as ‘general’ economies. We will argue that, despite the necessity of restricted models, when we are faced with a complex system we are forced to concede that our models are context dependent and therefore always open to chance and error as well as certain types of paradox, even to what may be seen as ‘irrational’. A restricted economy of analysis, as we will show, is one which does not take heterogeneity into consideration. In contrast, like Morin’s general complexity, the notion of a general economy aims to keep heterogeneity in mind whilst granting us the use value of a restricted economy.

Towards an Economy of General Complexity

Thus far we have presented the notion of an economy and then illustrated how complex systems can be conceived of as operating within a particular economy. Since we can never have a complete view of a complex system, we are forced to acknowledge that the economy we postulate of a complex system is always the product of the particular viewpoint we adopt. Following Morin, we argued that classical science adopted a restricted view of complexity. However, despite our critique of the reductionism of classical science, we argued that, to a certain extent, this reductionism is necessary in order for us to be able to say anything about complex systems in the first place. The question before us now is the following: How then does this ‘new’ approach to complexity differ from that of classical science? In other words, if we criticize the economy of thought established by classical science yet, at the same time, argue for the necessity of that which we are criticizing, what is different about this economy? How can we speak of an economy, as an economy, if we are forced to speak of it as open and closed at the same time? These questions can be tackled by first investigating another perspective on the notion of an economy, one offered by the philosopher George Bataille (1989, 1991, 1993).

Bataille’s general economy

Bataille (1989) argues that traditional political economy restricts its analysis of a system to the production and consumption of resources, limited to the immediate ends they serve. According to restricted economics, ‘on the whole, any general judgement of social activity implies the principle that all individual effort, in order to be valid, must be reducible to the fundamental necessities of production and conservation’ (1989: 117). Restricted economics is therefore utilitarian, only interested in the use value any object or activity may have. The problem with this model, for Bataille, is that it does not take into consideration the ‘excesses’ and so-called ‘waste’ produced by a system. In contrast to the notion of restricted economy, Bataille argued for the notion of ‘general economy’ which aimed to include within its analysis the excesses and waste not considered by a restricted worldview.

The ‘law of general economy’ states:

On the whole a society always produces more than is necessary for its survival; it has a surplus at its disposal. It is precisely the use it makes of this surplus that determines it: the surplus is the cause of the agitation, of the structural changes and of the entire history of society. But the surplus has more than one outlet, the most common of which is growth. (Bataille, 1991: 106)

For Bataille, the impact which a surplus has on the nature of a system is not reflected upon by restricted economies of analysis which limit their analysis to notions such as utility and thereby exclude, and are unable to explain, other forces which act upon the system. It is for this reason that Bataille (1989) argues that restricted economic worldviews struggle to explain the occurrence of such phenomena as war, sacrifice or eroticism. These aspects of human life and history remain sidelined and are seen as marginal to the ‘more important’ aspects of survival. Yet it is precisely these marginalized forms which give shape to the societies we live in (Bataille, 1991). General economics tries to incorporate these aspects of life which are considered pure expenditure, or ‘excess’, into its frame of analysis. However, as we have already argued, we always operate from a limited, context dependent position. Bataille in this sense tries to ‘re-economize’ our thinking by attempting to take into consideration the excess of the frames we use when describing economies purely in utilitarian terms. In other words, Bataille tries to include all social activity in his analysis; he aims to overcome the limits of the economies we create due to our situated perspectives. However, as Bennington (1995) illustrates, by focusing on the waste or excess produced by a system, Bataille is structuring his analysis around a single concept (that of excess) in the same vein as the restricted economies he is critiquing:

In its most abstract form, this suggestion would say that ‘general economy’ is not the other of ‘restricted economy,’ but is no other than restricted economy; that there is no general economy except as the economy of restricted economy; that general economy is the economy of its own restriction. (Bataille, 1991: 47–8, emphasis in original)

The argument here is simple enough: in order to be an economy, it must by definition operate as if it is restricted; an economy cannot contain everything.

We argued above that when we model a complex system our analysis will always be restricted, due not only to our limited perspectives but also due to the fact that our models need to deal with the inevitable uncertainty of our existence and still be coherent and logical. We deal with this uncertainty through the use of reason, which Derrida (2005: 151) defined as a wager between the calculable and the incalculable. As such there will always be an excess. Excess, by definition, exceeds reason (Derrida, 1978: 255, quoting Bataille). This excess we have labelled heterogeneity.⁷ What the notion of general economy does is to establish a relationship to this excess (Derrida, 1978: 270). In Derrida’s exploration of Bataille we can note the double handed movement of the deconstructive process which aims to maintain the radical nature of Bataille’s critique whilst at the same time illustrating the impossibility of a ‘pure excess’ without an economy to which it corresponds (or ‘sovereignty’ as Bataille labels it). Derrida argues that we need to remember that we can only speak of one economy (of one discourse); it is senseless in this regard to postulate two different kinds of economy, one restricted and the other excessive or general. That is, we cannot postulate an economy of excess which runs parallel to the restricted economy or a general economy in which there is only excess. When we speak of a general economy it is not an economy separate from a restricted economy; rather, it is a single economy which is not closed but is both open to random chance events as well as predictability, open to the possibility of destruction and yet robust, whether it comes from the play of forces inside the system or from its relationship to its environment (Derrida, 1978: 272). The models we construct of such systems must keep in mind that a system does not run on an entirely rational, utilitarian basis, but is open to the possibility of paradox and inconsistency yet still displays enough stability in order to be comprehended.

The notion of general economy describes an economy with open boundaries and also a play of forces inside the system. Such an economy is neither the strictly restricted economy of traditional political economy or of classical science which denies the partiality of any perspective, nor is it an economy of excess (whatever that may look like). The double handed logic of Derrida allows us to conceive of this economy as being limited, constrained and restricted and, at the same time, as being open and excessive. What makes this possible? The notion of ‘play’ is crucial to this understanding.

The play of the general economy

Under a restricted economy, a single term or centre, a single logic or reason, defines and limits the structure of a system. As Derrida (1978: 278) argues, ‘the function of this centre was not only to orient, balance and organize the structure – one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganized structure – but above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure’. However, in a complex system, a sort of totalization by means of proposing a centre is not possible. Due to the impossibility of reducing the system to some essential truth, or algorithm, in the style of restricted complexity, complex systems are ‘centreless’.

Totalization, therefore, is sometimes defined as useless, and sometimes as impossible. This is no doubt due to the fact that there are two ways of conceiving the limit of totalization. … Totalization can be judged impossible in the classical style: one then refers to the empirical endeavour of either a subject or a finite richness which it can never master. There is too much, more than one can say. But nontotalization can also be determined in another way: no longer from the standpoint of a concept of finitude as relegation to the empirical, but from the standpoint of the concept of play. If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field … excludes totalization. This field is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a centre which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions. (Derrida as quoted by Johnson, 1993: 51, emphasis in original)

Play thus constitutes another, different form of excess. This is no longer the excess ‘outside’ the system but rather a certain indeterminacy ‘inside’ the system. In the language of complexity, this is due to the nature of the multiple non-linear interactions and feedback paths within complex systems, as well as to the fact that the boundaries of complex systems are always open. This makes them non-totalizable. Play is a product of the relationships which a system establishes internally as well as with its environment. The notion of excess is not external to a system. Not only is the outside folded into the inside, the internal processes themselves break open gaps as the result of the process of différance (see below). As a result, we cannot reduce this system to a set of preconceived terms or truths, nor imagine that everything which happens within the system is reincorporated for utility within the system (Hegelian Aufhebung). Rather, we must grant, in the same logic as that of Derrida’s notion of iterability, that systems, even though they are robust, exist at a point which is open to change and even destruction, open to chance and a play of forces which we can never comprehensively predict or calculate. It is for this reason that the notion of general economy, even though it is read or understood in restricted economic terms, places our understanding of a system in a space in which we are forced to grant the vulnerability of both the system and our understanding of it. There are forces at play which we can never completely predict or control (Derrida, 1978: 270).

The excess which escapes our models of systems must pass through two straits. Firstly, we cannot exclude the excesses of the system as if they exist in some mysterious, unknowable form, ‘outside’ of our understanding of anything, as if they exist in their own context, as if we could simply write off that which we cannot model whilst claiming that they have an influence on the system we are studying, even if only as inconsequential ‘noise’ or ‘chaos’. This is what is implied by the use of the term ‘heterogeneity’. Heterogeneity can also be found within the play of the system and is not something simply external to the system. We must remember that these forces are defined by and thus exist in a relationship with the model we have constructed. The inaccessible, the unknowable in this regard, is not some mystical force outside of restricted economies which guides their interactions. The unnameable or unknowable is an inevitable product of the limits to our model. Secondly, we cannot assume at the same time that we have mastered these forces, that we can comprehensively model a system and the play of its processes, reduce its contingent existence to a single framework. The notion of a general economy reminds us that our understanding of complex systems in the world must walk this narrow edge.

Keeping this in mind, the notion of différance (Derrida, 1982) becomes central to our understanding of complex systems and the economies under which these systems operate. Différance in fact establishes the relationship between a restricted and a general economy. Difference, heterogeneity and noise collapse into the notion of différance. Thus we can never comprehensively define a clear distinction between the general and the restricted. The temporal nature of différance (to defer) implies that what is noise today may be central to our understanding of the system tomorrow, as we gain new means of interpretation or new understandings of the system. In this light, there can only be provisional discriminators between noise and structure. However, as the inside and the outside of the system are a product of the boundaries we draw rather than something natural or essential to the system itself (Allen, 2000: 80; Cilliers, 2001: 141; see also Derrida’s chapter ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ in Derrida, 2004 [1972]), the notions of difference and heterogeneity cannot be neatly distinguished, as it is often the heterogeneity of the context which defines which differences will be important, or seen as differences, inside the model. It is also différance which represents the precarity of the system, the fact that any system is always open to (self-)destruction as it makes place for heterogeneous forces which may challenge the coherency of the system.

By drawing boundaries, we create the ‘space’ which allows us to say something about the system. This space is not static but a site of action (Cilliers, 1998: 45). It is in this space that we create differences, including the difference between inside and outside, which allows us to create models and indeed to act in the world. Therefore, in the relationship which the general economy establishes between the restricted economy and its excess, one can find the play of différance. What makes it possible to model systems is the fact that différance remains undecided between activity and passivity (Cilliers, 1998: 45; Derrida, 1982: 8–9). ‘Pockets of stability’ make it possible to contingently model a system, as long as we remember this contingency and the conditions under which it was established (Cilliers, 1998: 43). Models have to be reinterpreted constantly and critically re-evaluated when used in different contexts. The process of différance thus creates the possibility for the deployment of a restricted economy in our creation of models whilst at the same time precluding the finality of such a restriction.

Conclusion

In this paper we have argued that complex systems, and the models we make of them, operate under a particular economy. We have illustrated that classical science operates under a restricted economy of analysis which does not acknowledge a model’s relationship to that which it needs to exclude in order to function. In contrast, we argued for the notion of a general economy in which this excess is acknowledged. However, this does not imply that one can operate from a general economy. As Derrida illustrated of Bataille, we can only operate from a restricted economy. This does not mean that we are arguing for a positivistic reduction of a system to some central economy. The fact that we have to reduce does not imply that these reductions are comprehensive. At the same time, we are not arguing for a relativism in which anything can be constituted as the economy of the system. One cannot privilege either form of economy. We are always dealing with economies which are simultaneously restricted and general. We cannot privilege either pole of this dichotomy, nor can we find a compromise.⁸ This is not a debilitating position. The robustness of complex systems does cater for the restricted economies upon which models are built. Yet the excess of these models leaves novel possibilities open for the future.

In this regard, the term ‘general economy’ is perhaps not the best one to use. An ‘open’, ‘folded’ or ‘excessive’ economy may be terms which could be used to replace the idea of a general economy. However, these still fall prey to the inside/outside dichotomy and the assumption that a single, essential economy exists. However, the term ‘general economy’ holds significance for the critical tradition in French philosophy as it marks the point at which Bataille illustrated for us the impossibility of a closed system. We have therefore continued using this term as its history speaks to our current concerns. In this paper we have attempted to illustrate how both Derrida and Morin drew on Bataille’s development of the term, and thus the existence of excess was acknowledged by two thinkers in apparently different domains. In fact, we are led to wonder whether Morin’s (2007) adoption of the terms ‘general’ and ‘restricted’ was not a product of reading Bataille. What the above argument has aimed to illustrate is that, despite the different domains in which Derrida and Morin worked, their work shares many common critiques of rationalist and reductive approaches to a complex world. In this article we have illustrated the connection between Morin and Derrida through the work of George Bataille, and the notion of an economy. This link, to the best of our knowledge, has not been made before.

The idea of an economy moves away from the limits of speaking about our knowledge in terms of frames, which rely upon a metaphorical distinction between an inside and outside. ‘Economy’ allows us to speak about the boundaries of a system without conceiving of these boundaries as being the limits to the system, as being the borders of influence to the system. To be an economy means to be open. An economy can be seen as an interface between resources and the use of those resources. In other words, an economy is constituted by sets of relationships rather than individuated components. The structure of the economy is therefore a relational one, yet it maintains enough form in order to be spoken of as ‘a system’. The term therefore overcomes the conceptual constraints of speaking about systems as both being, and being constituted by, isolated entities. Furthermore, the notion of frame limits what we can say about the play inside a complex system. The frame is only concerned with what we can say about the system and its environment. It conjures up an image of that which happens inside the system not being affected by what happens outside the system. The idea of economy allows us to begin to say something about the nature of the relationships ‘inside’ a complex system whilst acknowledging the openness of a system’s boundaries. The notion maintains that in a complex system everything is simultaneously close to the boundary and embedded (Cilliers, 2001: 142). The inside/outside distinction thereby collapses under the aegis of the general economy. In short, the term ‘economy’ is a useful placeholder to describe the ‘slippery’ nature of dealing with complexity. The term ‘economy’ holds five implications for the way we approach complex problems.

Firstly, the concept of an economy allows us to think about the ‘economy’ of possibilities which any system, and indeed any model of a system, holds. Under a restricted view of complexity we can see that any model of a complex system will only acknowledge those possibilities which can be reduced to the model itself. The range of these possibilities is defined by the field of differences allowed inside the economy. This closed economy of possibilities gives little leeway for dealing with unforeseen and unexpected occurrences. If we assume that our models of the world capture the essence of the world, prediction should be a perfect science. However, under a general economy of complexity we are forced to grant that the unforeseeable is a necessary or constitutive aspect of modelling complexity. This implies that we are forced to develop measures which can deal with this contingency. This ‘open’ horizon of possibilities implies that the world, and our models of the world, always contain more potentialities for realizing novelties than can ever be measured at any time. This does not mean that prediction is impossible, only that prediction is a context specific endeavour. This is both a positive feature of the notion of a general economy, that there are always divergent ways of living possible, and a negative consequence, that the future is never guaranteed, the possibility of war or atrocity always remains.

Secondly, the acknowledgement that the economies through which we view the world always contain a certain set of possibilities allows us to develop a definition of conservatism. Under this definition we can begin to see how conservative positions are able to be progressive in appearance, as they maintain a faith in science and the possibilities of the future, yet remain tethered to the possibilities of the present economy. This is because we can argue that a conservative position only acknowledges and aims to forward those possibilities their economy may currently cater for or realize (see Fukuyama, 1992, for an example of this). So although these positions may be future orientated they are not necessarily progressive. In contrast then to understandings of conservatism as always being backward looking, we can begin to understand current modes of conservatism which argue for progress (see Bourdieu, 1998). The term ‘economy’ then complicates what we see as progressive or conservative positions by disallowing reductionist understandings of these terms.

Thirdly, the notions of ‘difference’ and ‘heterogeneity’, as worked out here, illustrate the difficulties we face in coming to some ‘common ground’ or Habermasian ideal speech situation when faced with other worldviews. We are always limited by the economies we deploy and the discriminations (differences) they harbour. We cannot operate under any other set of circumstances.

However, this does not mean that our worldviews are limited. The fourth consequence of the term ‘economy’ is that it allows us to realize the wealth of potentialities any model may contain. The folded or general nature of general economies of complexity forces us to grant that possibilities for novelty do not only rest outside of the economies we deploy. We needn’t wait for an event to reveal some other possibility for existence (see Badiou, 2007) nor for some interaction with a radical ‘other’. The play of general economies means that there is always a wealth of possibilities unrealized in the present, inside the very economies we deploy on a daily basis. The challenge is to begin conceptualizing ways of realizing these novelties in the present without them being consumed, or incorporated as differences, within the economies of the present.

Finally, the excess of the general economy of complexity implies a normative dimension to our engagement with the world. We can only engage with a complex system by means of a restricted economy, yet both our economy and the economy we are dealing with are always open. We cannot thereby comprehensively calculate both the effects of our actions as well as the reasons for acting in this way. The ethics of complexity rests in the tension between the different economies, between what we include in the restricted economy which constitutes our models and what we exclude. The normative dimension rests in the fact that we have to choose what we include in the economy, but there is no objective means of doing so. We cannot escape this normative dimension when dealing with complexity as we are forced to make exclusions in order to maintain the coherence of our economies. Our actions are meaningful precisely because they close down other possibilities. This position demands that we take a radically critical stance when engaging with complexity, the main component of which is self-critique (Preiser et al., 2013). Because the economies we are using to analyse the world are always open to forces we cannot account for, we are forced to reconsider our position when facing complexity. Self-critique does not imply that we undermine our stance in the world; it implies that we open this stance up to other alternatives. The idea of a general economy reminds us of both the ubiquity and the necessity of alternatives. This reminder is as much an acknowledgement of the inherent normativity of complexity as it is a demand. We have to acknowledge this excess in order to begin imagining alternative means of engaging with the problems the world faces. There is a wealth of possibilities which goes unacknowledged by restricted or utilitarian economies which we have to begin to realize in order to improve living conditions on this planet.

Footnotes

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank Rika Preiser for her invaluable insight and discussions of the various earlier drafts of this paper. We would also like to thank the reviewers of TCS for their insightful and patient comments on earlier drafts.

Notes

Oliver Human completed his PhD in Philosophy at Stellenbosch University. His dissertation was concerned with the notions of ‘economy’ and ‘novelty’ in post-structuralism and complexity. He is currently a PhD candidate in Social Anthropology at the University of Amsterdam. His current dissertation is concerned with rethinking the notion of the ‘state’ and ‘subject’ in the context of state craft in South Africa.

Paul Cilliers was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa. He taught Cultural Philosophy, Deconstruction and Philosophy of Science. He also had a degree in Electronic Engineering and worked professionally as an engineer for many years. His research focused on the philosophical and ethical implications of complexity theory and he published widely in the field. He is the author of Complexity and Postmodernism (Routledge, 1998). Sadly, shortly after submitting this paper for review, he passed away. His inspiration, humour and thoughts are sorely missed by all those who knew him.

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