The United States and Alternative Energies since 1980: Technological Fix or Regime Change?

Abstract

Awareness of global warming has been widespread for two decades, yet the American political system has been slow to respond. This essay examines, first, political explanations for policy failure, focusing at the federal level and outlining both short-term partisan and structural explanations for the stalemate. The second section surveys previous energy regimes and the transitions between them, and policy failure is explained by the logic of Thomas Hughes’s ‘technological momentum’. The third section moves to an international perspective, using the Kaya Identity and its distinction between energy intensity and carbon intensity to understand in policy terms ‘technological fixes’ vs. low-carbon alternatives. The final section reframes US energy policy failure and asks: (1) Why, between 1980 and 1999, was America’s actual performance in slowing CO₂ emissions better than its politics would seem capable of delivering? (2) How and why has the United States since c. 2007 managed to reduce per capita CO₂ emissions?

Keywords

alternative energy energy policy energy transition Kaya Identity technological fix technological momentum United States

On Earth Day 1993, President Clinton declared, ‘unless we act now, we face a future in which the sun may scorch us, not warm us; where the change of season may take on a dreadful new meaning’ (Kolbert, 2006: 154). Awareness of the problem has been widespread for two decades, yet the American political system has been slow to respond (Calvin, 2008: 3–86). Why? This essay will examine this problem and the lack of response in three different ways. First, it will look briefly at political explanations for policy failure, focusing at the federal level and outlining both short-term partisan reasons for the lack of US leadership in dealing with global warming and structural explanations for the stalemate in Washington that are attributable to the design and philosophy of the American constitutional system. The second section presents the sequence of previous energy regimes and the transitions between them, in order to further explain why the US has found it difficult to make the transition away from fossil fuels to wind, solar, thermal, biomass, and other forms of alternative energy. In this perspective, the policy failure is subsumed in the logic of what Thomas Hughes has called ‘technological momentum’ (Hughes, 1983: 140–1). The third section then places the US response to global warming in international perspective, using the Kaya Identity as an analytical tool. It focuses not on politics or history but on the cumulative effect of four factors in determining a nation’s CO₂ emissions: population growth, GDP, changes in energy intensity (for example by adopting more fuel efficient cars), and changes in carbon intensity (for example by adopting wind energy). The difference between energy intensity and carbon intensity is expressed in policy terms as the difference between funding ‘technological fixes’ developed to improve the efficiency of the fossil fuel energy regime or funding low-carbon alternatives. To some extent, all nations have sponsored research into both technological fixes and alternative energies, but the implementation of the former has been central to US efforts at CO₂ reduction.

With this analysis in mind, the final section returns to the political question of US policy failure, reframed as two focused questions: (1) Why, between 1980 and 1999, was America’s actual performance in slowing CO₂ emissions better than its politics would seem capable of delivering? (2) How and why has the United States since c. 2007 managed to achieve negative growth in its per capita CO₂ emissions?

Energy and Politics

Many commentators have noted the lack of a coherent energy policy in the United States (e.g. Deutch, 2011; Lutzenhiser, 2001; Sovacool, 2008). In The Prince, Machiavelli notes that ‘there is nothing more difficult and dangerous, or more doubtful of success, than an attempt to introduce a new order of things in any state’.¹ Machiavelli would have seen that continued reliance on fossil fuels is based to a considerable degree on advantages that accrue to mining and utility interests. The ‘innovator has for enemies all those who derived advantages from the old order of things, whilst those who expect to be benefitted by the new institutions will be but lukewarm defenders’. In the United States, a powerful coal lobby has substantial support in the 26 states where coal mining takes place, as well as from utilities, which produce more than half of all US electricity using coal. Those elected usually defend economic mainstays in their constituencies (Fisher, 2006: 10–22). Likewise, elected representatives from petroleum-producing states tend to oppose alternative energies, whose supporters are in a relatively weak economic position and cannot lobby with the same intensity. Their weak defence of innovation, as Machiavelli knew, ‘arises in part from their fear of their adversaries who were favored by the existing laws’ and in part ‘from the incredulity of men who have no faith in anything new that is not the result of well-established experience’.

To take a specific example, in the 1980 presidential election, oil, gas, and coal companies resolutely opposed the ‘new order’ of alternative energies that Jimmy Carter supported, while the defenders of alternative energies were less united and invested less time and money in their efforts. Carter attempted to convince Americans that curbing demand was as essential as increasing energy supply, but voters preferred Ronald Reagan’s contention that there was no real energy shortage. Carter had declared in 1977: ‘The energy crisis has not yet overwhelmed us, but it will if we do not act quickly. It is a problem we will not be able to solve in the next few years, and it is likely to get progressively worse through the rest of this century.’² Voters in most states disliked the idea of a long-term problem that required sacrifices. At the 1980 Republican National Convention, Reagan accused Carter of over-zealous regulation that strangled the free market:³

Those who preside over the worst energy shortage in our history tell us to use less, so that we will run out of oil, gasoline, and natural gas a little more slowly … But conservation is not the sole answer to our energy needs. America must get to work producing more energy … Large amounts of oil, coal, and natural gas lie beneath our land and off our shores, untouched because the present Administration seems to believe the American people would rather see more regulation, more taxes, and more controls, than more energy.

After oil prices declined in the 1980s, only a minority of American voters remained interested in alternative energies or in the emerging issue of global warming that Al Gore later presented as ‘an inconvenient truth’. Few Republicans or Democrats made climate change a central campaign issue. Indeed, in the 1990s many Republicans accepted the idea that global warming was occurring. However, after c.2000 they increasingly denied the reality of global warming (Lochhead, 2013; Pielke, 2010: 37–8).

In 2012, environmentalists were only lukewarm in support of President Obama because he was ‘not green enough’. Had he done more to satisfy them, however, he would have lost some moderate support. Loren Lutzenhiser has discussed how private interests, lobbyists, and party politics have overpowered legislation favouring alternative energies and concluded that US climate policy is a ‘non-policy’ (Lutzenhiser, 2001: 522). The economic power of the fossil fuel energy regime is enormous compared to the Lilliputian alternative energy industry. Indeed, two American solar energy companies that looked promising in 2008, Solyndra and Abound, went bankrupt despite large federal subsidies.⁴ Energy was not a high-profile issue in the 2012 campaign, but energy use divided the so-called ‘Red States’ from the ‘Blue States’. Romney won Texas, Alaska, Wyoming, Alabama, and West Virginia. All have high per capita energy consumption. Obama won states with low per capita energy consumption such as California, New York, Massachusetts, and Oregon. Most of the swing states have roughly average energy consumption, notably Ohio (ranked 22), Wisconsin (25), Michigan (31), and Virginia (33).⁵ Even presidential candidates who support alternative energy are best served by speaking moderately on energy issues, in order to hold these swing states.

Indeed, moderation is built into the structure of American government, as defined by the Constitution, with its bi-cameral legislature, division of powers, and other checks and balances. The American constitutional system encourages piecemeal solutions and compromises, leading to ‘incremental decision making that blinds policy makers to the connections between air, water, land, wildlife, human health, and long-term prosperity’ (Orr, 2009: 15). Moreover, congressional meddling often harms energy projects. Several studies of federal R&D funding reached the same conclusions regarding congressional interference. Those modest in size (less than $50 million) are usually run with little meddling from politicians. But with larger projects, pork barrel legislation becomes common. When a project appears to have commercial applications, ‘the political system goes into overdrive and tends to interfere and to preempt sound technical choices’. In several cases ‘projects that needed a sustained level of support were instead subjected to boom-and-bust financing as the political saliency of their objective waxed and waned’. In addition, ‘Support for politically charged fields like nuclear and solar energy has depended more on shifting political winds than on their technical or commercial prospects’. Deadlines and goals were often unrealistic. Worst of all, Congress continues to fund programmes after their justification has disappeared (Weiss and Bonvillian, 2009: 208–9). More generally, Congress tends to treat each potential innovation separately, rather than taking a systems approach and creating a coherent overall policy. Not only do lobbying groups interfere, but also the fundamental organization and structure of the American federal system works against comprehensive programmes to address climate change. The Constitution is an 18th-century document drafted in a pre-industrial era. It protects the property rights of citizens but is silent on the rights of other species or the need to protect the natural world (Berry, 2006: 108–9).

If special interests blocked or distorted decisive action in Washington, however, the dispersed powers of the federal system do make possible dramatic improvements at the state and local level. Notably, California made a decisive change in its energy policy during the 1970s, and as a result its per capita electricity use levelled off for the next four decades, while it doubled for the United States as a whole (Calvin, 2008: 207). This result was achieved through state programmes focused on improved building design, improving energy intensity, and elimination of wasteful practices. California also was an early leader in developing alternative energies, particularly windmills, solar power, and burning biomass. By 2010 Californians were saving $1000 per family every year on their energy bills (Calvin, 2008: 207). In Texas and Ohio the average person used twice as much electricity as the average Californian. Had the nation as a whole changed course in the 1970s, as did California, US energy use in 2010 would have been close to the European average. Instead, for 40 years there has been no energy policy, and during that time Congress has become polarized. As Theda Skocpol concluded, ‘If it were money [from lobbyists] only, it would be so much easier to deal with’. But special interests are not the entire story. ‘Everybody on the left thinks it’s only money and it’s only Exxon. If it were, you could strike a bargain. It’s definitely ideology, along with the usual kind of industrial lobbying against any regulations or taxes that affect their sector’ (Skocpol in Lochhead, 2013).

American Energy Regimes

This political perspective on the legislative and structural difficulties that obstruct a change in the US energy regime can be further enhanced by an historical overview of energy transitions (Nye, 1998). From the 18th century to the present, a succession of different energy systems has emerged: muscle power, waterpower, steam power, electrification, oil and natural gas, and to a more limited extent atomic energy. Each regime change has required 40 years or more. These were not merely substitutions of one energy source for another but reorganizations of society, including transportation systems, population distribution, and the organization of work. All were accompanied by rapid economic growth. Furthermore, consumers had strong economic incentives to shift from canals to railroads, from water wheels to steam engines, or from coal to oil and natural gas. Nevertheless, each transition required roughly 40 years. In contrast, a regime change to alternative energies will also require reductions in energy use. The incentives for producers and consumers are not always so obvious as they were in changing from a slow-moving canal boat to a railroad or from a horse and buggy to an automobile. The transition to alternative energies is desirable because of long-term dangers from climate change and resource depletion, but in the short term fossil fuel producers profit from rising world demand, and without economic incentives relatively few consumers buy hybrid cars or solar panels. In 2011 General Motors rolled out a new electric car, the Volt, but by the end of 2012 it was unable to sell 3000 a month, far fewer than its conventional gasoline vehicles.⁶ One-third of all Volts are purchased in New York and California. This illustrates the larger point that the technologies exist already to reduce US per capita energy consumption by 50 per cent to reach European levels. But large-scale technological changes typically have occurred slowly. Since the late Middle Ages, incremental change has been the norm, whether adopting the waterwheel, the windmill, or the steam engine (Friedel, 2007)

The slow pace of change is due to more than a Machiavellian struggle between vested interests and innovators. New technological systems are usually difficult to understand, to build and to transfer (Hughes, 1983: 77–8). This is true for individual inventions, and it is even more the case for an energy system deeply woven into society. The population has habitual ways of heating, cooking, insulating, travelling, and working. Their way of life is inseparable from an energy system that has achieved what Thomas Hughes called ‘technological momentum’, a useful concept for understanding large-scale systems, such as those based on the railroad, the electric grid, or the automobile. In Networks of Power, Hughes examines five stages of system development for the electrical grid, and these stages apply to other inventions as well. In the case of electrification the sequence began in the 1870s with invention and early development in a few locations (1875–82), followed by technology transfer to other regions (1882–90). With successful transfer came growth (1890–), and the development of subsidiary infrastructures of production, education, and consumption, leading to technological momentum as electricity became a standard source of light, heat and power. In the final, mature stage (after c.1910) the problems faced by management required financiers and consulting engineers as problem solvers (Hughes, 1983: 14–17).

Even in 1910, when Hughes judged that the American electrical system had achieved momentum, it supplied less than 20 per cent of factory power and lighted less than 20 per cent of the houses in the United States. Only in the 1920s did it become the norm for manufacturing and urban living (Nye, 1990: 259–77). Similarly, the automobile existed as a few prototypes in 1890, but it only became the dominant form of US transportation at the end of the 1920s. Both technologies acquired enormous momentum between 1930 and the energy crises of the 1970s, and for anyone born after c.1940 they had become fully naturalized. These two technologies exemplify what Robert Fri has called ‘the far-reaching societal transition that must accompany transformation of the physical energy system’. This larger transformation must occur because: ‘The energy system is not simply a collection of autonomous pieces of plug-and-play technology. Rather, it is an integral part of our individual lives, influencing where we live and shop, shaping how we establish social networks, and molding countless everyday habits’ (Fri, 2013: 6). Because an energy system is so deeply embedded in society, change is difficult. The fuel scarcity of the 1970s provoked a temporary interest in alternative energies, but in much of the US this faded when oil shortages disappeared, and American society returned to its high-energy way of life. If Jimmy Carter put solar panels on the White House, Ronald Reagan removed them (Parr, 2009: 68–72). As those solar panels suggest, ‘technological momentum’ is not inherent in any system when first deployed.

The American reluctance to give up fossil fuels can also be understood as an example of the economic theory of path dependence, in which a corporation (or a nation) clings to a technological system even though it is becoming uncompetitive. For example, in the 1970s none of the major typewriter manufacturers successfully made the transition to producing personal computers. Like many fundamental innovations this one came from outside the established market leaders, who suffered from ‘path dependency’ (Utterback, 1994: 158–65). Established firms (and successful nations) are often too committed to a particular manufacturing (or economic) system that has become paradigmatic in the thinking of its managers (or politicians). When a major innovation appears, a leading firm usually studies the technology but remains committed to its product and production system. Indeed, established industries typically redouble their commitment to the system that has made them the market leader. They make incremental improvements in manufacturing and in this way postpone adopting the new system, but at the price of allowing competitors to dominate the new technology. This pattern even occurs in fast-changing electronic industries, where innovations come so frequently that one might think there is little time for routines and habits to blind participants to the advantages of the next change (Utterback, 1994: 195). A political system based on a division of powers and reinforced by checks and balances has a high level of stability, but arguably it also has a high degree of path dependence. A successful energy regime gains such a powerful hold that society seldom moves swiftly to adopt an alternative. As Machiavelli well knew, leaders are often more partisan than practical and cling to past arrangements.

The Kaya Identity

US energy choices can also be comprehended against the backdrop of rising world energy demand and carbon dioxide emissions after 1980, during the years when the existence of global warming first became widely understood. Habits of energy use proved difficult to change, however. Reducing CO₂ emissions requires more than buying energy efficient light bulbs, washing machines, and refrigerators, even if these are steps in the right direction. In 1992 a majority of the world’s nations agreed in Rio de Janeiro that rising CO₂ emissions were a threat to global sustainability. Five years later, a majority of the world’s nations negotiated and signed the Kyoto Protocol. The United States did not sign these agreements, but almost none of the nations that did so managed to reduce their carbon dioxide to 1990 levels. Canada signed, for example, yet its promised reductions never occurred. Rather, its record closely resembled that of the US (Harrison, 2007). In 2013 global warming continues, global energy use is still rising, and the hoped-for shift to alternative energies has only begun. A piecemeal approach to legislation tends to emerge from the US constitutional system. The division of powers, coupled with the technological momentum of the older energy regime, would seem to present intractable obstacles to change. Yet despite these difficulties, the United States made some progress toward reduced carbon emissions. To see how this was possible, another analytic framework is useful.

In 1971, Paul Ehrlich and John Holden proposed the IPAT model to account for environmental impact (Ehrlich and Holden, 1971: 1212). It relied on the equation

I = PxAxT

where I is environmental impact, P is population size, A is affluence, and T is ‘technology’. For I to be reduced, either population or affluence need to be reduced or technologies must be improved. As Eugene Rosa and Thomas Dietz concluded in their 1998 summary and critique of this model: ‘By definition, T accounts for all factors, other than population and affluence, that affect the environment. In a sense, all of sociology is captured by T. It is the factor that translates the myriad of human actions over and above population and economics into environmental impacts.’ While this simple model proved influential, it had the considerable drawback that T was too capacious and poorly defined. Hidden within this factor were technologies that both reduced and increased I. There were other problems with IPAT, most obviously that it asserted rather than demonstrated the causal relations between its terms. These and other problems Dietz and Rosa addressed in their STIRPAT model, which stands for ‘STochastic Impacts by Regression on Population, Affluence and Technology’ (Rosa and Dietz, 1998: 433–4).

This revised model looks at environmental impact as a whole, but another model is more useful to address the issue of carbon dioxide emissions. In the 1990s, the Japanese environmentalist Yoichi Kaya developed this analytic tool, commonly called the Kaya Identity (Deutch, 2011: 33–7), that is calculated as follows (Tester et al., 2005).⁷

Growth of CO₂ =

% population growth

+ % GDP growth per capita

+ % change in energy intensity

+ % change in carbon intensity

For the purposes of this essay, the Kaya Identity has two clear advantages over STIRPAT. First, it does not seek to calculate the total environmental impact but focuses narrowly on CO₂ emissions. Second, it disaggregates T into two separate factors: change in energy intensity and change in carbon intensity. The Kaya Identity could be improved. It still presents population growth and GDP in the same manner as IPAT, but these two factors are not the focus of the analysis here. Roger Pielke found the Kaya Identity useful as a way to disaggregate the factors involved in CO₂ emissions. As a climate scientist, he focused particularly on rising future demands for energy and the difficulties of decarbonizing the world’s energy production (Pielke, 2010: 117–24). This essay will trace the history of energy use between 1980 and 2013, to show that new forms of energy generation with lower carbon intensity have been considerably less important than technological fixes that increase energy intensity. Put another way, decarbonized energy production has been a small factor in reducing CO₂ emissions, most of which has come about through large improvements in consumption. Before developing that argument, however, one needs an overview.

Consider first what the Kaya Identity shows about the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000 (see Table 1). Its population grew at a rate of 1.6 per cent per year, or a compounded rate over 20 years of 37.5 per cent. GDP per capita grew at an annual average of 1.28 per cent. In China and India, for example, many bought refrigerators, water heaters, air conditioners, and other appliances for the first time. In all parts of the world people put more cars on the road. In Germany, manufacturing cars ‘generated about 29 tons of waste for every ton of car. Making a car emitted as much air pollution as did driving a car for 10 years’ (McNeill, 2000: 311). In short, growth in both population and GDP per capita increased CO₂ emissions by 2.88 per cent every year.

Table 1.

Kaya Identity for 1980–1999 (Tester et al., 2005: 268).

	Population	GDP	Energy Intensity	Carbon Intensity	Carbon Emissions
World	1.60	1.28	−1.12	−0.45	1.30

The third and fourth factors mitigated these increases. The third, energy intensity, improved at an annual rate of 1.12 per cent, which is a savings of 25 per cent when compounded over 20 years. Better energy intensity was achieved by improving fuel economy, shifting from cars to cycling or mass transit, building more efficient buildings and appliances, improving power plant efficiency, and the like (Socolow et al., 2004). In 2008 the American economy used only half as much energy to produce one dollar of GDP as it had in 1970 (Sovacool, 2008: 80–1). One study covering 1949 to 2006 concluded that every kilowatt of electricity used in communication devices saved between 6 and 14 kwh elsewhere in the economy, for example by sending emails and attachments rather than letters and packages. The delivery of physical mail has also been optimized using computer programs. UPS reorganized its delivery routes and annually saved 3 million gallons of gasoline. (Laitner and Ehrhardt-Martinez, 2008: 21, 26).

The world further improved 0.45 per cent per year when considering the fourth Kaya factor: carbon intensity, or how much CO₂ was released per BTU. Over 20 years this overall reduction of 9.4 per cent was due not only to windmills, solar panels, and biofuels, but also to new hydroelectric dams, burning natural gas instead of coal, and new nuclear power stations. The latter produce radioactive waste but they do reduce CO₂, and by 1998 there were 437 nuclear power plants distributed among 29 countries.⁸ All of these technologies together, including nuclear and hydroelectric power, accounted for 29 per cent of the world’s CO₂ reductions. More efficient refrigerators or improved housing insulation systems may not receive many headlines, but between 1980 and 2000 such technologies were at least three times more important in reducing CO₂ emissions than windmills and solar panels.

Taking these four factors together, the world as a whole increased its carbon emissions at a rate of 1.3 per cent annually between 1980 and 1999. Energy intensity and carbon intensity compensated considerably for rising population and GDP per capita. Without them, world carbon emissions would have increased by 2.88 per cent annually, or 75 per cent between 1980 and 2000.

These world averages obscure radically different results for different regions, in a pattern that corresponds with other research that has shown how, after the oil crises of the 1970s, ‘affluent nations in the core have become more carbon efficient’ while ‘the carbon efficiency of middle-income nations has gone down slightly’, and growing substantially worse in the least affluent societies (Rosa and Dietz, 1998: 437). With these generalizations in mind, it is not surprising that only OECD Europe achieved sustainable development. Its population and GDP per capita rose at annualized rates of 1.74 per cent and 0.68 per cent, respectively, increases almost entirely offset by improved energy intensity and reduced carbon intensity. Western Europe’s carbon emissions grew by only 0.18 per cent a year, or less than 4 per cent over the entire 20 years. It was the only region to come close to achieving sustainable development, however.

In contrast, Eastern Europe radically cut carbon emissions by 2.21 per cent per year, primarily because of a falling standard of living. In addition, with the collapse of the Soviet system many inefficient factories closed down, and western energy-intensive technologies were easily available for the first time. Eastern Europe’s negative GDP constituted an unsustainable decline that did not continue after 2000.

John M. Deutch has observed: ‘The Kaya relation helpfully identifies the restricted range of choices that a country faces in achieving carbon reduction targets and the significant differences in choices likely to be made in different countries’ (2011: 37). Such differences are perhaps most striking when examining the Asian economies. Compare India and China. India’s carbon emissions increased at an annual rate just under 6 per cent vs. China’s 4 per cent. India’s population grew more than 2 per cent a year, its standard of living per capita rose 3.54 per cent and its energy intensity and carbon intensity both worsened. China’s population grew more slowly (1.37%), while its energy intensity improved more rapidly than anywhere else, at 5.22 per cent per year, considerably offsetting the 8.54 per cent increase in its standard of living. Overall, China’s CO₂ emissions doubled, while India’s tripled, between 1980 and 2000 (see Table 2). The least sustainable growth occurred in East Asia, where CO₂ emissions quadrupled over two decades, throwing into question whether it is possible, in practice, to decouple environmental damage and rapid economic development (OECD, 2002; European Commission, 2005). Ecological modernization theory ‘posits that even though economic development harms the environment, the magnitude of the harmful link decreases over the course of development’ (Jorgenson and Clark, 2012: 1). European CO₂ emissions seem to support this generalization. However, the transfer of production from Western Europe to cheaper labour markets in the East also moves large CO₂ emissions offshore. About one-third of China’s carbon dioxide emissions were due to production of exports. Western Europe’s decoupling of growth from increases in CO₂ therefore may be in part illusory.

Table 2.

Kaya Equation for selected regions and large nations, annual percent change, 1980–1999 (Tester et al., 2005: 268).

Region/nation	Population	GDP %	Energy Intensity	Carbon Intensity	CO₂ Emissions	20 year growth in CO₂ emissions 1980 = 100
Eastern Europe	0.44%	−1.91	−0.14%	−0.61%	−2.21%	−45
OECD Europe	0.53	1.73	−1.00	−1.06	0.18	103.7
United States	0.96	2.15	−1.64	−0.21	1.23	127.7
World	1.60	1.28	−1.12	−0.45	1.30	129.5
Japan	0.41	2.62	−0.57	−0.96	1.47	133.9
Africa	2.54	−0.58	0.82	−0.01	2.77	172.7
Australia	1.36	1.98	−0.37	0.00	2.98	179.9
Brazil	1.61	0.76	1.83	−0.80	3.43	196.3
China	1.37	8.54	−5.22	−0.26	4.00	219.1
Middle East	2.98	0.04	2.45	−1.14	4.34	233
India	2.04	3.54	0.27	0.03	5.97	318.9
East Asia	1.78	5.00	0.92	−0.70	7.10	394.3

Economies that are scarcely growing can contribute greatly to global warming. The nations of the Middle East, which may be regarded as ‘middle income’ compared to Europe, did poorly between 1980 and 2000. Their GDP per capita rose only slightly, but population rose almost 3 per cent per year and energy intensity grew more than anywhere else in the world. Although the Middle East improved its carbon intensity, overall it emitted 4.34 per cent more CO₂ every year, a worse performance than China.

The Kaya Identity highlights that between 1980 and 2000 the world was not moving in a common direction. If Western Europe achieved sustainable growth, Eastern Europe was enduring ‘unsustainable decline’, the Middle East suffered unsustainable stasis, while the Asian economies had unsustainable growth. By comparison, the United States bettered the world average in overall CO₂ growth, largely due to improvements in energy intensity. The US could have done better and matched OECD Europe had it continued improving gasoline mileage rather than adopting SUVs. The US also had the problem that its population grew almost twice as fast as OECD Europe. Overall, world CO₂ emissions rose at an alarming rate of almost 30 per cent between 1980 and 2000.

After 2000 regional differences increased, following trajectories that could be roughly extrapolated from 1980. In the first decade of the new millennium China’s CO₂ emissions rose 170.6 per cent, including a 13.3 per cent jump in 2009. The Middle East produced 56.7 per cent more, India 59.7 per cent more, and the smaller Asian economies also increased by comparable amounts.⁹ In contrast, Western Europe’s CO₂ emissions fell by 6.9 per cent. They subsidized solar and wind energy, and they improved energy intensity through better gas mileage, better home insulation, more efficient light bulbs, and other incremental improvements. There was internal variation. The French had long produced most of their electricity using nuclear plants, and they only reduced CO₂ by 1.2 per cent. The Germans, who were becoming a world leader in solar power and in energy-efficient machines, reduced CO₂ by 10.4 per cent. UK emissions fell 7.2 per cent. The Danes drove more cars but used wind to produce a fifth of their electricity and were down 9.1 per cent. Each nation pursued a different mix of policies. Overall, Europeans continued to be the world’s leaders in achieving sustainable growth.

The United States might have followed a similar development had other states behaved like California. Instead, they clung firmly to the older fossil fuel energy regime and let other nations take the lead. This was particularly clear between 2001 and 2009, when the president and vice-president were both former oil corporation executives (Palast, 2001). They resisted mandatory higher gas mileage for American automobiles. They denied the existence of global warming and tried to modify research results in US government reports that showed the contrary, including those of leading government scientists, notably James Hansen (Donaghy et al., 2007: 2–4, 11–14). They approved new, environmentally controversial drilling techniques for oil and natural gas. They continued large public subsidies for the oil industry and at the same time minimized incentives for change to alternative energies.

Nevertheless, some major corporations and city governments began to embrace a change in energy regime. In 2004, General Motors, Dupont, Xerox, and many other corporations joined more than 500 city and local governments in choosing voluntarily to abide by the Kyoto Protocol on reducing CO₂ (Newton-Small and Salant, 2013). At the same time, many consumer products became more energy efficient. Overall, from 2000 until the economy stalled in 2007, CO₂ emissions averaged an 0.8 per cent annual increase.

The Kaya Identity demonstrates that from 1980 to 2010 American improvements in CO₂ largely rested on higher energy intensity (c. 85%) and to a much lesser extent on reduced carbon intensity (c. 15%), little of which was due to alternative energies. The focus on finding ‘technological fixes’ that improved energy intensity was a direct consequence of the legislative gridlock. Investment in new devices became a proxy for a broad policy, and the United States became a leader in improved energy intensity, even as it lagged behind on carbon intensity.

American advocates of technological fixes long have argued that ‘motivating or forcing people to behave more rationally’ is a ‘frustrating business’. It is easier to develop a ‘technological fix’ that accepts ‘man’s intrinsic shortcomings and circumvents them … One does not wait around trying to change people’s minds: if people want more water, one gets them more water rather than requiring them to reduce their use of water’ (Weinberg, cited in Nye, 2006: 142). If people want to live in suburbs, the solution is not to convince them to switch to mass transit and urban living but rather to improve automotive efficiency. If people want larger houses with more windows, then develop better wall insulation and thermal windows. A majority of Americans assume that there is a technological solution for every technological problem. Atomic power stations were a favourite technological fix in the 1950s that were expected to produce electricity ‘too cheap to meter’ (Winkler, 1999: 136–140).

The popularity of the technological fix was established by the 1920s. Roland Marchand, in his classic work on American advertising, described one of the most common sales pitches as ‘the parable of civilization redeemed’ (Marchand, 1985: 223). The parable presented and solved problems created by modern society, such as the lack of vitamins in processed foods and the illnesses and debilities that resulted. This little narrative invariably presented a new product that could cure the deficiency, in this case vitamin pills. ‘The parable of Civilization Redeemed taught that the advance of civilization, temporary afflictions notwithstanding, need never exact any real losses’ (p. 223). Every technological problem had a technological solution, and ‘No brakes need be applied to the wheels of progress’ (p. 226). The ‘content of every medium of American popular culture of the era [1920s and 1930s] affirmed that man was constantly outwitting nature through technological advances and never “losing” as a consequence’ (p. 227). Well before the energy crisis of the 1970s, Americans had absorbed this parable through its repetition in countless advertisements and political speeches.

Americans were predisposed to accept technological fixes to their energy system, whether presented as hydroelectric dams in the 1930s, atomic energy in the 1950s, fuel cells in the 1960s and after, or countless small innovations that improved performance of everyday technologies. If they were slow to adopt alternative energies between 1980 and 2000, they quietly improved energy intensity. For the world as a whole, 72 per cent of the improvement in CO₂ emissions came through more energy intensity, often embodied in more efficient appliances or cars. In the US, between 1980 and 2008 efficiency for home freezers rose 59 per cent, for clothes washers 72 per cent, and for dishwashers 91 per cent. Refrigerators grew larger but their energy use fell by two-thirds. A study by Oak Ridge National Laboratory concluded that a well-insulated yet cost-competitive ‘zero energy’ home that could meet its own energy needs was possible by 2020 (Brown et al., 2005).

However, little of the modest decline in US carbon intensity can be directly attributed to alternative energies such as wind and solar power or to energy efficient houses. After hydroelectric dams nearly tripled their electricity production between 1940 and 1975, few dams were built and growth ceased. Solar, wind, and biomass power were growing, reaching just 7 per cent of total energy projection (US Census Bureau, 2012: Table 925). However, the largest of these was biomass, which produces carbon dioxide. Windmills and solar cells were more successful in European countries where energy prices for oil and gas were generally higher and where alternative energies often enjoyed state subsidies. More important in reducing CO₂ were the utilities that switched from coal to natural gas, which halved their carbon intensity. Forty-seven American nuclear plants came on line after the Three Mile Island accident and, by 1990, 100 commercial reactors produced one-fifth of US electricity. Overall, between 1980 and 2001 US nuclear power production increased by 422 per cent, but then levelled off. In short, by 2001, nuclear, hydro, and alternative energies taken together were marginal compared to fossil fuels, which still accounted for about 85 per cent of total energy use.¹⁰

The United States after 2008

Based on the three preceding sections it is possible to answer two focused questions about the US response to global warming. (1) Why, between 1980 and 1999, was America’s actual performance in slowing CO₂ emissions better than its politics would seem capable of delivering? (2) How has the United States since 2008 managed to achieve negative growth in its per capita CO₂ emissions?

To the first question, one can respond that the same federal system that impeded a systematic federal response to the warming crisis also permitted considerable experimentation at the state and local level. Electricity use was held down to 50 per cent of the national average in New York and California, in contrast to Texas, Ohio, and other conservative US states (Gallagher, 2013: 61). California demonstrated that reductions in CO₂ use also led to lower energy costs for consumers, while sustaining a growing and innovative economy. In the nation as a whole, in the absence of a federal energy policy, technological fixes improved energy intensity and the nation became more efficient on a piecemeal basis. New York, California, and other progressive states reduced the technological momentum of the fossil fuel energy regime. They fostered needed innovations and prepared the ground for a shift to a new energy system. Just as importantly, they showed other states that greener energy is not just possible but profitable.

However, the Kaya Identity also reminds us that global warming in part results from population growth. The Census Bureau projects a 100 million increase in the US population, to 419 million in 2050, at a rate of annual increase of 0.8 per cent.¹¹ Rising population is not at present a widely discussed issue in US politics. If the nation does grow 0.8 per cent annually, by 2050 this factor alone will increase CO₂ emissions by 35 per cent. What about per capita GDP? Assuming all other factors are unchanged, an annual growth rate from 2013 until 2050 of 1 per cent will result in a 44.5 per cent increase in CO_2. By 2050 these two factors together could drive up US emissions by 90 per cent. Yet total CO₂ emissions must fall in order to restore balance to the atmosphere. To cut the 2013 level of emissions in half by 2050 will require an annual reduction of 1.85 per cent. To do this and at the same time offset growth in population and GDP demands a 3.65 per cent annual decline in CO₂ over 37 years.

So large a reduction might seem an impossible goal, but it is not. In 2008, when the economy stalled, American CO₂ emissions fell 2.6 per cent. In 2009 total CO₂ dropped 7 per cent, and in subsequent years Obama administration policies have sustained this downward trend. It has subsidized development of solar and wind power. More solar electric capacity was installed in 2011 (1887 MW) than in all previous years combined, and it was far surpassed in 2012, when newly installed capacity was 3133 MW. Moreover, solar panel prices fell in these two years by more than half.¹² Solar power in 2012 represented less than 0.5 per cent of total US electricity generation, even if in theory it could supply 20 per cent or more of US energy in 2050. Wind power now provides more than 3 per cent, and it seems possible it could supply 25 per cent by 2050.¹³ In terms of the Hughes model of technological momentum, these technologies are entering stage three, when rapid expansion may take place. No doubt concerned by such projections, one fossil fuel lobby group complained: ‘The Obama Administration is fast tracking renewable energy development on federal lands, while delaying oil and natural gas resource development on federal lands’.¹⁴

Yet in terms of CO₂ reduction between 2008 and 2013, alternative energy remained a sideshow. Indeed, President Obama’s second secretary of energy, Ernest Moniz, has been a champion of nuclear power. He argued in Foreign Affairs:

It would be a mistake, however, to let [the disaster in] Fukushima cause governments to abandon nuclear power and its benefits. Electricity generation emits more carbon dioxide in the United States than does transportation or industry, and nuclear power is the largest source of carbon-free electricity in the country. Nuclear power generation is also relatively cheap. (Moniz, 2011)

Obama’s first Energy Secretary, Steven Chu, made improvements in energy intensity that were far more substantial than reductions in carbon intensity from adopting alternative energy. Chu helped convince Congress to pass new gas mileage standards. By 2016 new American cars will average 35 mpg, almost 50 per cent more than in 2008. In 2025, most cars that do not meet these standards will be off the roads, saving 2.2 million barrels of oil every day. Chu also invested in research and development, notably in electric cars and new forms of ethanol that produce fuel from agricultural waste and wood rather than from corn. But much of what Chu accomplished lay in the important if unglamorous area of raising standards for everyday technologies. Energy efficiency for refrigerators and clothes washers will improve by 25 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. Florescent lights, heat pumps, and hot water heaters also will use less electricity. The first Obama administration has saved energy by retrofitting buildings, by giving rebates for purchase of efficient appliances, and through subsidies for homeowners who installed insulation (White House, 2011: 22, 25–6). The larger goal Obama announced in his re-election campaign is ‘that 80% of electricity will come from clean energy sources by 2035’ (White House, 2011: 6), This is not, however, an official energy policy backed by a majority in Congress. In contrast, Germany’s official goal for 2050 is 80 per cent of all electricity production from alternative sources, despite closing its nuclear plants. Denmark’s 2050 goal is 100 per cent renewable electricity production (Gallagher, 2013: 61). In contrast to Europe’s focus on reducing carbon intensity, the US still primarily pursues incremental improvements in energy intensity, based on technological fixes.

President Obama’s policy has remained incoherent. It pursues both a new energy regime and permits new drilling techniques that have revived old oil fields and opened up new ones for shale oil and gas. His administration almost seems to be adopting the Romney energy plan, ‘Believe in America’, which called for developing US oil and gas production in order to achieve energy independence.¹⁵ While such independence proved a chimera for Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush, the US has become increasingly self-sufficient during the Obama years. Texas, Appalachia, Pennsylvania and North Dakota have enjoyed an economic boom based on hydraulic fracking, a controversial technique that pumps water and chemicals into rock formations. It drives out oil and gas, but risks ground water pollution. This technique increased domestic production and cut natural gas prices in half between 2008 and 2012, making alternative energies less competitive and prolonging the economic viability of fossil fuels. Due to fracking, oil imports have declined sharply from roughly 60 per cent of total consumption at their peak in 2007. By 2020 the US may become a net exporter of oil and natural gas (Plumer, 2012). Given this renewed possibility of abundant domestic oil and gas, it is not just the Republican Party that remains locked in path-dependent patterns of the fossil fuel regime. A majority of American voters retain the habits of a high-energy culture that sustains the technological momentum of coal, oil and gas producers.

Yet because of falling natural gas prices, the persistence of the fossil fuel energy regime has accelerated the decline in US CO₂ emissions, largely because of a shift away from coal in electricity generation. Between 2005 and 2012, US emissions fell 12 per cent overall, when all factors were taken into account (Gold, 2013). This figure is close to the annual reduction of 1.85 per cent that is required to cut total US CO₂ emissions in half by 2050. In contrast, European nations signed the Kyoto Accords and defined policies to fight global warming, but in 2013 their coal imports were rising, much of it from the US. The American shift to natural gas has driven down domestic demand for coal, but in 2012 European coal imports from the US rose by more than 20 per cent. Meanwhile, European CO₂ emissions are falling at little more than half the US rate (Phillips, 2013).

The answer to the second question, as to how the US has managed to reduce CO₂ emissions since 2007, thus has three parts. The least important of these is the expansion of solar and wind power. Far more important since c.1980 have been incremental improvements in energy intensity, which accelerated under Secretary Chu. But the most important factor is the sudden availability of inexpensive natural gas, with rapidly expanding US sales. More than 20 per cent of all US electricity production has converted from coal to gas, which produces only half the CO₂ emissions. One might say that the US has no policy but the right result, even if for the wrong reason.

The US has not done nearly as well as the available technologies permitted, but it has done rather better than one might have expected. With no energy policy between 1980 and 2000, its energy intensity improved at an annual rate of 1.64 per cent. With little encouragement during the Bush presidency, per capita carbon emissions levelled off and then began to fall. They now have begun to plunge faster than in Europe. State and local leaders made these changes, primarily through technological fixes, some of which are just beginning to take full effect. Two of the three largest states, New York and California, have stopped growth in energy use, demonstrating what is possible for the country as a whole. However, the success of fracking gives new life to the fossil fuel energy regime and also makes some applications of alternative energy uneconomical.

The problem in 2014 is not technological. The means to reduce US carbon emissions by at least one half already exist (Socolow et al., 2004). Other nations are moving rapidly toward ambitious low-carbon energy systems, notably Norway, Denmark, and Germany. The problem is cultural and political. Moral arguments have at times had an important place in energy policy, for example in the successful opposition to nuclear power plants (Weart, 2012: 181–209). However, moral arguments have so far failed to move the American majority on climate change. In 2013 only a minority of voters were persuaded that an energy regime change is a moral duty to future generations, or that it was the only responsible course in order to guarantee the survival of other species. In contrast, arguments and financial arrangements that appeal to economic self-interest have a widespread, non-ideological appeal, when properly structured and implemented (Dietz et al., 2013: 80). American experience in previous energy regime changes has been that economic factors were centrally important, for example in the shift from water to steam power or from coal to oil. American leaders might reframe the argument for CO₂ reduction in terms of opportunities for households to save money, while implementing programmes that make it easier to qualify for better insulation, to get old inefficient automobiles and appliances replaced, or to install solar panels, heat pumps, and the like. States could also revise tax codes to de-incentivize having more than two children, for example, thereby slowing population growth, one of the drivers of global warming.

Can the US overcome the technological momentum of the fossil fuel energy regime? In his 2013 state of the union address, President Obama declared:

I urge this Congress to pursue a bipartisan, market-based solution to climate change, like the one John McCain and Joe Lieberman worked on together a few years ago. But if Congress won’t act soon to protect future generations, I will. I will direct my Cabinet to come up with executive actions we can take, now and in the future, to reduce pollution, prepare our communities for the consequences of climate change, and speed the transition to more sustainable sources of energy.¹⁶

This apparently bold statement is a confession that Congress remains too divided on climate change to formulate even a conservative ‘market-based’ policy. The technological momentum of the old energy regime has paralysed the legislative branch. The only alternative is executive action to increase the efficiency of (and decrease the pollution from) fossil fuels. Once again, technological fixes have become a proxy for a federal energy policy, and initiatives for a regime change are largely left to state and local authorities.

Footnotes

Notes

David E Nye is Professor of History at the University of Southern Denmark. He is the author of 12 books dealing with technology and American culture, including three focused on energy issues: Electrifying America (MIT, 1990), Consuming Power (MIT, 1998), and When the Lights Went Out (MIT, 2010). His awards include the Leonardo da Vinci Medal and a knighthood conferred by the Danish queen. His most recent book is America’s Assembly Line (MIT, 2013).

This article is part of the Special Issue on Energy & Society, edited by David Tyfield and John Urry.

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